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ABSTRACT
TRANSFORMATION OF ISLAMIST POLITICAL THOUGHT
IN TURKEY FROM THE EMPIRE TO THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1908-1960): NECİP
FAZIL KISAKÜREK’S POLITICAL IDEAS
Burhanettin Duran
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Supervisor: Associate Professor Ümit Cizre
January 2001
This thesis aims at situating the transformation of Turkish Islamist thought from the
Ottoman empire to the early Republic as a case study within the contemporary analyses of
Islamism. Islamist thought in Turkey contains new elements, but it also has deep roots in
the tradition of Islamic political thought. As such by devotion to the traditional renewal
(tajdid), it reflects a continuing dimension of Islamic political theory. It is also important to
understand the specific intellectual settings within which Turkish Islamism has evolved.
Islamist depictions of state and democracy whether in the Empire through Islamist
identification of shura with constitutional regime or in the Republican period through
Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s totalitarian Başyücelik State, seem to be influenced by the
political ideologies of their times such as liberal constitutionalism (in the Empire), and
totalitarian aspects of communism, fascism, and Kemalism (in the Republic). Hence,
Islamists of the second constitutional period perceived Islam a “soft ideology” whereas
Islam became a kind of “hard ideology” in Kısakürek’s formulation, determining every
aspect of political, societal and individual life. These analyses are also related to another
argument that the tradition of Islamic political thought is open to different Islamist
readings, both as authoritarian/totalitarian formulations and as democratic openings.
This study also argues that Islamist intellectuals have a tendency of mixing modern notions
such as progress and ideology with traditional material/grammar to face the challenge of
western modernity. In order to reach an Islamic modernity, the concept of Islamic
civilization constitutes a platform for the transformation and interaction of the elements of
continuity (traditional grammar) and change (progress and ideology). This dissertation also
suggests that Islamists are basically keen to see democracy as the limitation of an
arbitrary/despotic rule and as the establishment of the rule of law, implying a rather
Schumpeterian conceptualization of democracy: a type of government and procedure in
electing those who rule people. The question of whether Islam is compatible with
democratic values should be reworded in the way that whether Islamist
interpretations/reconstructions of Islamic tradition were/are compatible with democratic
values or not. This thesis also tries to give an insight about the Islamist stance towards
Kemalist ideology and the impact of Kemalism on Islamism.
Keywords: Islamism, Civilization, State, Democracy, Kemalism.
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ÖZET
TÜRKİYE’DE İSLAMCI SİYASAL DÜŞÜNCENİN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ
İMPARATORLUKTAN ERKEN CUMHURİYETE (1908-1960): NECİP FAZIL
KISAKÜREK’İN SİYASAL DÜŞÜNCELERİ
Burhanettin Duran
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç.Dr. Ümit Cizre
Ocak 2001
Bu tez, Türkiye’deki İslamcı düşüncenin Osmanlı imparatorluğundan Erken Cumhuriyete
geçirdiği dönüşümü, bir örnek olarak ele alıp, çağdaş İslamcılık analiz çerçevesine
oturtmayı hedeflemektedir. Türkiye’deki İslamcı düşünce yeni unsurlar taşımakla beraber
İslami siyasi düşünce geleneğinde derin köklere sahiptir. Bu itibarla, geleneksel yenilenme
(tecdid) nosyonuna olan bağlılık, İslami siyasal teorinin süreklilik unsurunu yansıtır. Türk
İslamcılığının evrildiği spesifik entelektüel ortamları anlamak ta önemlidir. Gerek
imparatorluk döneminde, şurayı meşrutiyetle aynileştirirken, gerekse Cumhuriyet
döneminde Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’in totaliter Başyücelik Devleti’ni sunarken, İslamcı
devlet  ve demokrasi kavramlaştırmaları kendi zamanlarının liberal anayasacalık, ve
komünizm, faşizm gibi ideolojilerin totaliter yanlarından ve Kemalizmden
etkilenmektedirler. Böylece, İslam, ikinci meşrutiyet dönemindeki “yumuşak ideoloji”
konumundan Kısakürek’in formülasyonunda siyasal, toplumsal ve bireysel hayatından
herbir yönünü belirleyen “sert ideoloji” olmaya dönüşmektedir. Bu analizler diğer bir
argümana da ilintilendirilmiştir: İslami siyasi düşünce geleneği hem otoriter/totaliter hem
de demokratik açılımlı farklı İslamcı okumalara açıktır.
Bu çalışma, İslamcı aydınların Batı nodernliği ile yüzleşmek için, terakki ve ideoloji gibi
modern nosyonları geleneksel materyal/gramer ile birleştirme eğiliminde olduklarını iddia
etmektedir. İslami bir modernliğe ulaşabilme hedefinde, İslam medeniyeti kavramı,
süreklilik (geleneksel gramer) ve değişim unsurlarının (terakki ve ideoloji) dönüşüm ve
etkileşim platformu olma özelliğini taşımaktadır. Bu tez İslamcıların temel olarak
demokrasiyi despot iktidarın sınırlandırılması, ve hukuk devletinin kurulması olarak
görmeye yatkın olduklarını tartışmaktadır ki bu Schumpeteryan bir demokrais anlayışına
karşılık gelir: halkı yönetecek olanları seçmede bir hükümet tarzı ve prosedür olarak
demokrasi. İslamın demokratik değerlerle uyumlu olup olmadığı sorusu İslamcıların
geleneği yorumlarının/kurgulamalarının demokratik değerlerle uyumlu olup olmadığı
şeklinde yeniden formüle edilmelidir. Bu tez, İslamcı duruşun Kemalist ideolojiye bakışını
ve Kemalist ideolojinin onun üzerindeki etkilerini aydınlatmaya çalışmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: İslamcılık, Medeniyet, Devlet, Demokrasi, Kemalizm.
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1INTRODUCTION
I passed through the lands of the infidels, I saw cities and mansions;
I wandered in the realm of Islam, I saw nothing but ruins.
Ziya Paşa
Since the nineteenth century, political thought has been the most lively area of intellectual
life in the Islamic world.1 The development of Islamic intellectual activity can be
accounted for firstly by the encounter of the Muslim community with the superiority of
Western civilization in every aspect of life and by the consequent position taken against it.
The dominance of the West, whether perceived as Christian or as secular, has served to
revive the Muslim interest in Qur’an and Hadith, the Islamic fundamentals, in order to
work out the relevance of Islam for Muslims in the modern age. Secondly, this intellectual
vivacity is also related to the political nature of the religion of Islam. Since there is an
interdependence between religion and politics in Islam, any proposed political reform or
any political movement have felt the urgent need of situating themselves in relation to the
intellectual-political heritage of Islam. But it is significant that this vivacity in Islamic
political thought, in one way, signified the deeply rooted crisis in Islamic intellectual mind.
The causes of this crisis or decline have been perceived not only as being external but also
as internal to the extent that attempts of reconstruction or rediscovery often have led to a
critique the reform proposals. Expectedly, Islamist discourses have maintained an
                                                
1 Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought: The Response of Shii and Sunni
Muslims to the Twentieth Century (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press,
1982),1.
2important place in Western imperialist discourses on the decline of the Islamic civilization.
But this has not prevented Islamist intellectuals’ desire to learn from the West in various
areas ranging from politics to military. Perhaps, another paradoxical conclusion about the
West has been the discovery of a “West” which is different from the secular modern
conceptions. Islamist reconstruction of the West, in contrast to a secularist one, has
underlined a moral decadence of the West while adopting the good aspects of the western
civilization. The perception of a spiritual crisis within the western civilization has
produced an Islamist expectation of an inevitable end for the West.
Muslim thinkers, with the aim to keep their civilization from total destruction, have
underlined the concepts of tajdid (renewal) and ıslah (reform) to “reconstruct”2 political,
social and even religious life of the Muslim community. This attempt at reconstruction, as
the main intellectual issue of the modern Islamic political thought, has raised the following
questions: how can modernity be reconciled with Islamic civilization? How can the same
process of reconciliation work between the Western institutions of science and technology
and the Islamic values? How could (western) democratic ideas and institutions such as the
parliament and constitution be made compatible with Islamic political principles and
institutions such as caliphate and shura.
The Islamist intellectuals of the second constitutional period, on the whole, came to the
conclusion that the idea of the sovereignty of the people, and the resulting institutions, i.e.
parliament and constitution, which formed the real sources of the West’s superiority did
not conflict with those values. Prompted by the desire to find Islamic equivalents of
                                                
2 Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (New Delhi: Kitab
Bhavan, 1974).
3Western democratic institutions and values in the traditional Islamic political “theory,”3
Young Ottomans, Islamist intellectuals of the 1860s, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani,
Mohammad Abduh, Rashid Rida conducted a “twofold campaign to bring out all the
progressive tenets of Islam to prove that it is in essence a religion of freedom, justice and
prosperity for mankind”4; while on the other hand, reevaluating Muslims’ historical
performance in this respect. The transformation of modern Islamic thought is shaped by a
combination of the two major processes: the need of reviving an Islamic principle of
renewal (tajdid) to get a true Islamic life and the urgency of facing the challenge of the
western supremacy.
Despite such a long history of theoretical attempts of reconciling Islamic values with
Western democratic institutions, only a handful of Muslim countries have succeeded in
making substantial moves in establishing democratic systems like Turkey. But still even
the Turkish experience has not been easy and bright in incorporating Islamist movements
into her political system at the very beginning of the twenty first century.5 The
governments of Muslim countries, including Turkey’s, have come to see revivalist Islamic
movements as simply paying lip service to democratic ideals. For sure, the very fact that
“attempts at Westernization are undertaken and effectively realized through authoritarian
regimes”6 has contributed to the weakening of a yet-to-develop tradition of Islamist
                                                
3 It is hard to speak of an Islamic political theory, similar to that of modern political
thought Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London: Verso, 1993), 89 and
Enayat, Modern. 2. But still here we will try to delineate some basic lines of the
classical political thinking in order to present a framework which situate Islamism in
relation to the classical corpus.
4 Enayat, Modern. 15.
5 For an optimistic view on the interactive relationship between Islam and democracy in
Turkey see Metin Heper, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a
Reconciliation?” Middle East Journal. 51:1 (Winter 1997): 32-45.
6 Nilüfer Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey,” in
Civil Society in the Middle East ed. A. Richard Norton (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 19.
4political thought. At the same time, the attempts of Westernization have influenced the
Islamist theorizing of politics to a certain extent. The reemergence of Islamism as a parallel
development to the transition to democracy in Turkey necessitates an analysis of not only
the authoritarian nature of the Kemalist regime but also the authoritarian/totalitarian
tendencies within Islamism. An examination of Islamist political thought regarding state
and society in the Second Constitutional Period and Early Republican times, which is the
main objective of this study, would, among others, also contribute to the understanding of
the difficulties in consolidating a democratic regime in Turkey. The exposition of an
interactive relationship between two sets of certainties or totalities as Kemalism and
Islamism would also illuminate the nature of the current conflicts between Islamists and
secularists.
The development and emergence of Islamist ideas in the Ottoman intellectual life can be
traced to the Young Ottomans.7 By the period of Second Constitutional Monarchy (1908-
18), Islamism had established itself as “the strongest of the three schools of thought.”8 Yet
the Westernization project interrupted its natural evolution. The present dissertation is
aimed to study Islamism before and after the Kemalist project, in an attempt to assess the
impacts of that project on the transformation of Islamic political thought.
Ottoman intellectuals during the Second Constitutional Period directed their energies to the
question of “how to save the state.” This elicited three major answers or competing reform
proposals: Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism.9 An important contribution to the
                                                
7 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, İslamcılık Cereyanı [Current of Islamism] (İstanbul: Baha
Matbaası, 1962); İsmail Kara, İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri [Political Ideas of
Islamists] (İstanbul: İz, 1994); Mümtaz’er Türköne, Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın
Doğuşu [The Birth of Islamism as A Political Ideology] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1994).
8 Tunaya, İslamcılık. 31.
9 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill
University Press, 1964), 338; Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London :
5development of democracy in Turkey was made by the ideological debates, in the
relatively liberal atmosphere of the post-Hamidian times, on saving the state, for it to assert
itself against the West. The Young Turk revolution represented the triumph of the
supporters of such notions as freedom, constitution and parliament which were considered
as the only solutions to the problems of the Ottoman polity, including the preservation of
the unity of the empire (to put an end to the separatist nationalism of minority groups)
through the establishment of the Second Constitutional Monarchy. Since then, the
ideological discussions on the nature and future of the political system in Turkey continued
under the impact of these currents of thought.10
After an interval between 1923 and 1946, such discussions on the nature of the Turkish
political system have revived. The transition to multiparty politics has created a democratic
space for the questioning by Islamists of political modernization in Turkey. Therefore,
Islamists began to raise their voice in order to problematize Turkish modernization and
democracy, but this time in a secular republican polity. At this point, the primary question
to be asked is “what has changed in their outlook, in their conceptualization of state and
democracy."
A closer examination of the political thoughts of Islamists in these two periods (1908-1918
and 1946-1960) on the above mentioned issues, will make a contribution to the existing
body of knowledge on the comparative analysis of the two periods in question and will
enable us to better see the prospects of democratic consolidation in Turkey. A critical
comparison of Islamists of the two periods will also serve to determine the impact of the
Republican regime on the evolution of Islamist political thought in Turkey. In this respect,
                                                                                                                                         
I.B. Tauris and Co., 1993), 132; Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic: A
case study in National Development (Cambridge and Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1963), 16.
10 Berkes, The Development. 337.
6this study is an attempt to evaluate the achievements and failures of the experience of
Turkish political modernization in the eyes of those who oppose it. Under these
considerations, in this dissertation, I will try to examine and compare the political thoughts
of the established Islamists of the two periods, with a view to assessing the transformation
of Islamist political thought in Turkey.
The present study will attempt to provide answers for the following questions: Are
political authority and government essential categories of Islamic political thought? What
are the Islamist conceptualizations of state and democracy in the periods of 1908-1918 and
1946-1960? What are the continuities and changes in Islamist political thought of the
Republican period? What is the impact of Turkish democratic experience and Kemalism
on those conceptualizations?
Before starting to delineate the scope of this study on the political ideas of Islamist
intellectuals, we should address the question as to why intellectuals have been the focus of
this study. Islamist movement in Turkey has some social, political, economic, cultural and
religious dimensions, manifesting itself in various organizations, like religious
communities and orders, journals and other political organizations. Reflecting the
proliferation of the movement, Islamist movement in Turkey might be classified into four
groups: a) political organization(s), like the defunct Welfare Party11 b) religious orders
(tarikat) and communities like several branches of Nakshibendi order and of Nurcu
                                                
11 For the Welfare Party see Ruşen Çakır, Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi: Refah Partisini
Anlamak [Neither Sharia nor Democracy: Understanding the Welfare Party] (İstanbul:
Metis, 1994); M. Hakan Yavuz, ”Political Islam and The Welfare (Refah) Party in
Turkey.” Comparative Politics. (October 1997): 63-82; Haldun Gülalp, “Political
Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah Party.” The Muslim World.
LXXXIX:1 (January 1999): 22-41; Yalçın Akdoğan, Siyasal İslam: Refah Partisi’nin
Anatomisi [Political Islam: Anatomy of the Welfare Party] (İstanbul: Şehir, 2000), and
for its stance on the Kurdish Question see, Burhanettin Duran, “Approaching the
Kurdish Question via Adil Düzen: An Islamist Formula of the Welfare Party for Ethnic
Coexistence.” Journal Of Muslim Minority Affairs. 18:1 (April 1998): 111-128.
7movement12 c) intellectuals like Sezai Karakoç, İsmet Özel, Ali Bulaç and Rasim
Özdenören d) independent small organizations around some journals and associations.
Regarding the political dimension, all these categories, more or less have been involved in
Islamist politics.
For present purposes, it does not seem proper to classify Islamism as political Islam
(party), social Islam (religious order and communities) and cultural Islam (intellectuals)
though it is certain that the first category is directly related to the political dimension of
Islamism. Religious orders and communities and intellectuals should be treated under the
label of Islamism since they all, in the ultimate sense, have, more or less, an aspiration to
shape state, society and individual along the lines of Islamic principles. The will to
transform the public sphere in accordance with the moral values of Islam may take mainly
social and cultural forms on the part of religious orders and communities and intellectuals
but certainly this does not mean a total refrain from political aspirations.
As to the significance of intellectuals within the Islamist movement, it might be firstly
noted that the challenge of modernity to the Ottoman-Turkish polity and the response to
this challenge were accompanied by the fall of the ulema and the emergence of a new
class: intellectuals. The transfer of the function of thinking and theorizing on Islam from
ulema to an Islamist intellectual has been an important part of the formation of Islamism in
Turkey though it is not a completed process yet. Moreover, one might also observe a
tendency of a fusion between intellectual and alim (plural ulema) traditions. There is,
however, no established class of ulema who could lead the religious and intellectual
                                                
12 See Ruşen Çakır, Ayet ve Slogan [Verse and Slogan] (İstanbul: Metis, 1994) and Şerif
Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman
Said Nursi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).
8agenda of Islamist movement in Turkey. Hayrettin Karaman13 and Yaşar Nuri Öztürk14
should be regarded as exceptions in this setting. It was the intellectuals who publicized
Islamist discourses regarding the nature and future of the political community and who
criticized the Kemalist regime by references to Islamic political values. However, this does
not mean that the leaders of religious orders and communities have a minor place in the
formation of Islamist movement in Turkey. Despite their influence on the formation of
religious understandings for devout people, shaikhs and hocaefendis have not been able to
take a place in the republican public arena.
Furthermore, in contrast to the leading role of shaikhs and ulema in traditional society,
intellectuals have been the new comers and modern representatives who take their places
in the intellectual leadership for the Islamic world and Turkey. Although it is not possible
to argue that intellectuals have achieved in substituting the role of shaihks and ulema that
served in the classical epoch, they have had a critical place in the formation of Islamist
ideologies/discourses and in their introduction to the republican public sphere. Like
Islamism, an Islamist intellectual, in this thesis, is defined by a rather loose criterion simply
for the reason that the borders of Islamism is not just confined to a movement which has a
political project/ideology for capturing political power. Rather, conscious epistemological,
ontological reference to “Islam” for shaping/directing state, society and individual directly
or indirectly is regarded as the essential feature of our conceptualization of Islamism.
Certainly, this conceptualization is broader than what Olivier Roy termed political Islam
                                                
13 For his ideas see Hayrettin Karaman, Laik Düzende Dini Yaşamak I-II [To Live
Religiously in a Laic Order] (İstanbul: İz, 1997 and 1998).
14 See A. Esra Özcan, “Yaşar Nuri Öztürk ve Yeniden Öğrenilen İslam,”[Yaşar Nuri
Öztürk and Relearning Islam] in İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri [New Public Faces of
Islam] ed. Nilüfer Göle (İstanbul: Metis, 2000).
9(and its failure), as a totalistic solution/ideology to any political regime in Muslim lands15
though it includes this particular conceptualization as well. One reason for this broad
conceptualization of Islam is the recognition that Islamism in the Ottoman-Turkish context
has been different from the Islamism that gained much currency in the literature of
Islamism or fundamentalism by reference to the examples in Iran, Egypt and Pakistan. It
has never been possible to urge for an Islamic state or sharia based politics in the
republican Turkey due to the legal prohibitions.
Seen in this light, it should be noted that the Welfare party as a political representative of
Islamism could not develop any Islamist claim/project for capturing the power in order to
establish a sharia based state. Any observation for the hidden Islamist intentions of an
Islamic state (takiye) on the part of this party should also pay attention to the fact that
Islamism in Turkey has a very poor Islamist political language and vocabulary to articulate
its discourses regarding the problems of the Turkish polity. Moreover, it is not obvious
what Islamists meant by sharia in the Turkish context. Our definition of Islamism would
enable us to study different manifestations of Islamism in Turkey from the Ottoman ages
to the republican times.
It must be noted that this thesis has a tendency of dividing the Islamist intellectual heritage
in Turkey into three parts: 1) Islamists in the second constitutional period, to name a few,
                                                
15 Olivier Roy, Siyasal İslamın İflası trans. Cüneyt Akalın (İstanbul: Metis, 1994). This
thesis has also a tendency the present positions of Islamism which Olivier Roy termed
“post-Islamism,” as a continuation, though it is a new stage, in the history of Islamism.
Highly politicized and ideologized stages of Islamist movement should be regarded as
different manifestations of Islamism and it is possible that a pendulum might swing
back in the future. For the discussions on post-Islamism see Olivier Roy, “Le Post-
islamisme.” Revue Des Mondes Musulmans et de le Mediterranee. 85-86 (2000?): 11-
30 and Farhad Khosrokhavar and Olivier Roy, İran: Bir Devrimin Tükenişi trans.
İsmail Yerguz (İstanbul: Metis, 2000). Furthermore, it should be also expressed that
the political conditions that produced the “failure” of Islamism in Turkey (the case of
welfare party) was totally different from the failure of the Iranian revolution.
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Said Halim Pasha, Mehmet Akif Ersoy, Babanzade Ahmet Naim, Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi
and Eşref Edip 2) Islamist intellectuals of the republic till to the 1980s, like Necip Fazıl
Kısakürek and Sezai Karakoç, 3) Islamist intellectuals of the 1980s and 1990s like İsmet
Özel, Ali Bulaç and Rasim Özdenören. Here, the objective of this thesis is not to dwell on
all the Islamists of these three periods, but to expose the early reemergence of Islamism in
the republican period with references to medieval heritage as they are necessary and to the
Ottoman background and to see the transformation of Islamism from empire (Second
Constitutional Period) to republic with a special reference to Kemalism.
The Islamists of the 1908-1918 period have been studied by some students of Turkish
politics like Tarık Zafer Tunaya (1962) and İsmail Kara (1994). However, Islamist
political thought in republican Turkey still remains to be studied from a comparative
perspective with regard to the earlier period. Binnaz Toprak16 and Michael E. Meeker’s17
pioneering works are confined to the Islamist intellectuals of 1980s and 1990s. In fact, the
new Islamist/Muslim intellectuals of the 1980s and 1990s are different from Islamists of
the Second Constitutional period in one basic way in that the latter tried to reconcile the
“good” aspects of the western modernity with Islam through an unnamed effort of creating
an Islamic modernity while the first group have rejected the grand narratives of the
nineteenth century such as progress, science, reason and civilization and have essentialized
modernity by positioning it in contradistinction to Islam.
                                                
16 Binnaz Toprak, “Islamic Intellectuals of the 1980s in Turkey” Current Turkish
Thought. 62 (İstanbul: Redhouse Yayınevi, 1987) and “Islamist Intellectuals: Revolt
Against Industry and Technology,” in Turkey and the West: Changing Political and
Cultural Identities ed. Metin Heper, Ayse Öncü and Heinz Kramer (London: I.B.
Tauris, 1993), 237-257.
17 Michael E. Meeker, “The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey,” in
Islam in Modern Turkey, ed. Richard Tapper (London and New York: I.B. Tauris and
Co. Ltd., 1991), 189-219 and “The Muslim Intellectual and His Audience: A New
Configuration of Writer and Reader Among Believers in the Republic of Turkey,” in
Cultural Transitions in the Middle East ed. Şerif Mardin (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1994), 153-
188.
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In fact, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904-1983) was an important transitional figure between
these two periods. Moreover, despite the common ground of spiritualism and nationalism
between Kısakürek and conservative intellectuals like İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu and
Peyami Safa, Kısakürek was different from a conservative school of thought in presenting
Islam as a way of life and an ideology of salvation. Connecting the beliefs (cosmology) to
the social and political affairs, he manifested an Islamist deviation from “the Durkheimian
approach” towards Islam dominant among the republican intellectuals.18 Unlike a
conservative mind, Islamism in general and Kısakürek in particular do not have the goal of
reforming Islam (even strongly oppose) through a modern intervention while the Turkish
conservative intellectuals supported a religious reform in Islam. It should be noted that
though Kısakürek shared some basic notions (state, nation, community and authority) of
the Turkish organic understanding of state and society which is also apparent in Kemalism
and Turkish conservatism, it is still hard to classify his call for an Islamic state and
revolution and his ideologization of Sunni Islam, as conservative. Kısakürek does not
employ religion for the sake of legitimating a political-social authority but rather seeks for
a (re)establishment of a political authority in order to realize Islamic ideals.
His merge of nationalism with Islamism is also different from the one that a conservative-
nationalist line comes to get a blend of nationalism with Islam in the 1970s and 1980s. In
his Islamism, nationalism seems to be in the service of Islam and much colored by Islamic
tenets and not vice versa. Put it differently, if the major aim of the modern Turkish
conservatism was to soften the radical reforms of the Turkish revolution19 or to provide “a
                                                
18 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “The Re-emergence of Islamic Thought in Turkey-Intellectual
Transformation.” a paper presented at the International Conference on Middle Eastern
Studies, at the University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 6-9 July,
Brimes Proceedings (1986): 235.
19 Tanıl Bora, Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlık, İslamcılık [Three
Forms of Turkish Right: Nationalism, Conservatism, Islamism] (İstanbul: İletisim,
1998), 76.
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competing vision of Kemalism”20 Kısakürek goes beyond, in spite of the common themes
he shares with conservatism in criticizing Kemalist modernization project: extremity in
language reform, failure of the revolution in creating a social ethics and spiritual crisis. For
Kısakürek, these observations are the starting points to be employed in the construction of
a counter ideology to Kemalism: Islamism. His attribution of failure to Kemalism in
providing an ideology to Turks was succeeded by a proposal of a new identity and
ideology of salvation. Thus, Islamism in Kısakürek’s formulation is not a posture/attitude
but rather a search for a coherent, systematic and totalistic ideology.21
                                                
20 Celal Nazım Irem, “Kemalist Modernism and the Genesis of Turkish Traditionalist
Conservatism.” Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1996),
344. As Irem aptly points out, traditionalist conservatives like İsmail Hakkı
Baltacıoğlu, Peyami Safa, Ahmet Agaoğlu, Hilmi Ziya Ülken and Mustafa Şekip Tunç
advanced their conservative ideas in order to provide “new means of maintaining
stability, order and continuity of the Kemalist status quo” though they were “on the
edge of the Kemalist power structure.” They expressed also their opposition to Islamist
intentions on the revival of Islamic community by reducing Islam to an element of the
Turkish society, pp. 345, 352. For more on traditional conservatism see also Irem,
“Kemalist Modernizm ve Gelenekçi-Muhafazakarlığın Kökenleri.”[Kemalist
Modernism and Origins of the Traditionalist Conservatism] Toplum ve Bilim.74 (Fall
1997): 52-101 and “Muhafazakar Modernlik, ‘Diğer Batı’ ve Türkiye’de
Bergsonculuk.”[Conservative Modernity, Other West and Bergsonism in Turkey]
Toplum ve Bilim. 82 (Fall 1999):141-179.
21 It is true to say that Turkish Islamism have always contained a strong tendency of
religiously based conservatism especially regarding organic theories of state and
society but this kind of conservatism is obviously very different from a kind of
conservatism that İrem and Bora are talking about. This nationalist and conservative
trend within Islamism has been legitimized with a reference to the Ottoman past, not to
Kemalism which actually produced an unprecedented rupture in the Islamic heritage.
Seen from this perspective, one might argue that the Kemalist reforms have had a
decisive/retraditionalizing impact on the transformation of Islamism in the republican
period. A rupture in the Islamist heritage by Kemalism inhibited, as shown in the
chapters related to Kısakürek’s political ideas, a continuation of Islamist arguments of
the second constitutional period. Thus, Islamism of the republican period manifested a
rather traditionalist inclination in interpreting Islam such as the refusal of ijtihad by
Kısakürek. But it is also correct that Islamism easily embraced a conservative language
in the authoritarian days of the early republic, see Nuray Mert, “Cumhuriyet’in İlk
Döneminde Yurtdışında İki Muhalefet yayını: Yarın ve Müsavat.” [Two Publications
of Outside Opposition in the Early Republic: Yarın and Müsavat] Toplum ve Bilim. 69
(Spring 1996): 138-139.
13
Necip Fazıl Kısakürek as an Islamist intellectual not only responded to the Republican
“constructedness of social relations and personal identity”22 he but also sought for another
alternative constructedness, i.e. an Islamic state and society. Kısakürek lived in a more or
less Islamic society of Islamists in the second constitutional period in his youth but he also
experienced the very formation of a new society, state and individual by Kemalism. Unlike
Islamist intellectuals of 1980s and 1990s, he rather intimately observed the making and
application of Kemalist secular reforms, healing the Turkish republican ethos to a
significant extent. But he also inherited some Ottoman Islamist influences which led him
to a more nostalgic evaluation of the Ottoman past than Islamists of the 1980s and 1990s
who do not see the Ottoman example as good enough to be taken as the example.
Kısakürek had a sense of a culture of empire, if we notice that he was nineteen years old
when the republic was declared. His intellectual mind also, together with Kemalist
intelligentsia, shared the basic characteristics of the late nineteenth century bureaucrats:
elitism, authoritarianism and social engineering. Nevertheless, his political ideas were
shaped by the intellectual and ideological atmosphere of the republic even when he
presented a counter historical writing on Turkish history as opposed to the Kemalist one.
The “new Muslim intellectuals” of the 1980s and 1990s are “very much the product of the
post-1950 secular Turkish Republic.”23
Certainly, the study of the reemergence of Islamism on an intellectual level can not be
confined only to the examination of Kısakürek’s ideas. There have been some other
influential intellectuals within this intellectual revival such as Eşref Edip (1882-1971),
Nurettin Topçu (1909-1975), Cemil Meriç (1916-1987) and Sezai Karakoç (1933- ) who
have contributed much to the shaping of Islamist thought in modern Turkey. Nevertheless,
this dissertation will focus on the political ideas of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek because it aims
                                                
22 Meeker, “The New,” 194.
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at examining both the political ideas of the Islamists of Second Constitutional Period and
the reemergence of Islamist political ideas in the republic. Delineating the Islamist line in
the republican period through an analysis of some distinguished Islamist intellectuals is out
of the scope of the present thesis and could be the subject of another study. Secondly,
among the above mentioned intellectuals, it was Kısakürek who firstly tried to transform
Islam into an ideology by presenting a systematic and coherent writing in this respect,
whereas Eşref Edip,24 for instance, who survived from the second constitutional period
limited his diverse writings specifically to the critique of Kemalist conceptualization of
secularism and democracy. He was far from offering an Islamist ideological discourse
regarding Islamic state and revolution.
Nurettin Topçu, writing in the same period with Kısakürek, is not included to the scope of
this thesis mainly due to the reason that he could be called as both nationalist/conservative
and Islamist. In this way, S. Seyfi Öğün attributed Topçu to a “communitarian nationalist”
trend while İsmail Kara regarded him within the Islamist current. Still for the present
purposes, Kısakürek will be considered as a more appropriate representative of the Islamist
current in the republican period.
Islamist intellectuals have remained within the tradition of Islamic political thought even
though they have been deeply interested in Western constitutionalism and in the socialist
thought that developed in the nineteenth and in twentieth centuries respectively.25 For that
reason, this dissertation will look at the basic political concepts of that tradition in terms of
                                                                                                                                         
23 Ibid., 189.
24 For more on his political ideas see İsmail Kara, Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi:
Metinler/Kişiler vol. III [Islamist Thought in Turkey: Texts/Personalities] (İstanbul:
Pınar, 1994), 11-111.
25 Charles E. Butterworth, “Philosophy, Stories and the Study of Elites,” in Elites in the
Middle East ed. I. William Zartman (New York: Praeger Pub., 1980), 11; Montgomery
W. Watt, Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity (London: Routledge, 1988),1.
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the Islamist literature on state and democracy (in the third chapter) to show how they were
transformed on the intellectual level in a way to reapropriate those concepts through a
reconstructive attempt to accommodate Western institutions such as parliament and
constitution, from the Ottoman empire (in the fourth and fifth chapters) to the Turkish
republic (in the seventh and eight chapters). In this thesis, for the republican period, I have
studied the political ideas of an Islamist intellectual, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, who
established his political thinking before what were translated from Arabic in the 1950s, 60s
and 70s, in the last three chapters.
In general, Islamism should be thought of as some sociological, cultural and political
responses to the contemporary world, but not as “the mere reflection of the essence of
Islam.”26 Its ideological and cultural elements and vocabulary, way of thinking, ideas and
values all are a mixture of some adopted modern ideas and of some forms of reinvented
Islamic heritage (tradition). Two trends go hand by hand within Islamism: ihyacılık, a
return to the true form of early Islam by clearing up the defects and superstitions which
come from pre-Islamic and western influences and, secondly modernism, an adaptation of
Islamic values and principles to the modern necessities.27 One might further argue that all
formulations of Islamism has constituted versions of the mixture of these two trends.
Kısakürek, in this sense, represents a transitional figure between the nineteenth century
Islamists who reconciles Islam with modernity, and Islamist intellectuals of the 1980s and
1990s who have dropped this effort of reconciliation. Through his claim that all good
things (ideology, true freedom, true order and so on) exists in Islam, Kısakürek continues
the effort of reconciling Islam with the good aspects of the West. On the other hand, his
attacks against positivism, rationality and imitative modernization might remind one the
                                                
26 Bobby Sayyid, “Sign O’Times: Kaffirs and Infidels Fighting the Ninth Crusade,” in
the Making of Political Identities ed. Ernesto Laclau (London: Verso, 1991), 273.
27 Türköne, Siyasi. 275.
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first glimmerings of an Islamist effort to deconstruct the grand narratives of the west such
as positivism, reason and progress. But in the final evaluation, Kısakürek resembles more
the Islamists of the second constitutional period than Islamist intellectuals of the 1980s and
1990s.
State-Centered Nature of Islamism and A Search for an Islamic Modernity Another
contribution this dissertation is expected to make is to the literature on Turkish politics on
democracy in that a detailed study of Islamist intellectuals on the issues of state and
democracy delineates the development of the idea of democracy and its implications in
different sectors of Turkish intellectual life, and in return it has much to offer to a new
understanding of the transformation of Islamist political thought in the republican period.
The thesis is expected to show how the political ideas of Islamism correspond to the state-
centered thought of Turkish intellectuals in general and transforms the main lines of
medieval Islamic political thought in modern times with the need of ideology.
Islamism directed its energy to the task of building a sound and stable base for the
restoration of the unity of the Islamic community and eventually for rebuilding the Islamic
civilization. That meant a search for Islamic modernity vis-a-vis the challenge of the
western civilization in the second constitutional period and a search for a new/authentic
ideology in the republican period. Comparing the ideas and attitudes of leading Islamist
intellectuals towards democracy and state in the second constitutional period and the
republican period will give us an insight about the transformation of Islamist political
thought in Turkey. This comparison also will provide us with the Islamist intellectual
quality on the interplay between religion and modernity and provide at least a partial
understanding of what was the Islamist stance towards Kemalist ideology and the impact
of Kemalism on Islamism. Throughout the whole thesis, I maintain that the evolution of
Islamist political thought in Turkey and its approach to state and democracy is closely
17
bound up with the “state-dominant nature”28 of Turkish political tradition. This is also
related to the fact that Islam is a civilization but in Turkey it is culturally specific.
Contextualizing Turkish Islamist Thought A further scientific merit of this study is its
findings on Islamist positioning regarding state and democracy. This should not be
conceived without paying attention to the political and intellectual settings of their times.
Islamist depictions of state and democracy whether in the Ottoman Empire through
Islamist identification of shura with constitutional regime or in the Republican period
through Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s totalitarian Başyücelik State, seem to be influenced by
the political ideologies of their times such as liberalism, communism, fascism, and
Kemalism. This contention is also related to another argument that the tradition of Islamic
political thought is open to different Islamist readings, both as authoritarian/totalitarian
formulations and as democratic openings.
The purpose of this thesis is to try to place Turkish Islamist thought in its historical and
intellectual context. Since the nineteenth century Islamic thinkers have had to confront
new ideas and institutions such as modernity, nationalism and democracy (constitution and
parliament) whose origins lie in the West, while at the same time their political mind has
been deeply rooted in the Islamic political tradition and medieval theorization on
government. Both sets of intellectual sources need to be considered, for it is their
interaction which has shaped the Islamist conceptualizations of state and democracy.
Islamism did not emerge in an ideological and intellectual vacuum. It is therefore
important to see what other ideologies have influenced the formation of Islamist
intellectual/ideological mind.
                                                
28 Ilkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, “Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey.” Government
and Opposition. 18:4 (Autumn 1983): 421.
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In this way, I present, here, the basic argument that Turkish Islamism constitutes a mixture
of four interrelated sources of influence: a) medieval heritage of Islamic political thought
b) the idea of strong and transcendental state by the example of the Ottoman state c) the
recognition and adaptation of dominant ideologies of the time, this being the idea of
progress and civilization in the second constitutional period; Kemalist nationalism in the
republican period; the critique of positivism and modernity and the employment of some
post-colonial, communitarian and post-modern arguments in the 1980s and 1990s.
The pervasive influence of nationalism as a fourth source of influence, can certainly be
attributed to the fact that from the 1940s to even nowadays, nationalism represented a
shield and vehicle for the expression of Islamist demands in the secular republican period.
An Islamist usage of nationalism also transformed the meaning of the Turkish nation from
a non-religious terrain into a religiously legitimated and colored area. An imagination of an
Islamic Ottoman past through the Islamic figures the Ottoman sultans like Fatih and Yavuz
has been a central element to this religiously based nationalism. This kind of nationalism is
obviously different from the Kemalist (secular) nationalism which excluded religion from
the definition of nation and the nationalist trend which was established by a reference to a
pre-Islamic Turkish Shaman heritage by Nihal Atsız and some others.
In this thesis, qualitative research methods will be employed. For the second chapter which
will focus on state and democracy in Islamic/Islamist political thought reliance will be on
literature review. For the following chapters which will contain the examination of Islamist
thinkers, a discourse analysis will be conducted, especially by looking at the primary
sources through a close reading of them. Islamists continued the Young Ottoman tradition
of awakening political consciousness through publishing journals both in the second
constitutional period and in the republican period. In this way, the study of Islamist
intellectuals also will focus mainly on the examination of Islamist journals like
Sebilürreşad, Beyanü’l Hak in the first period and Ağaç and Büyük Doğu in the latter
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period. It should also be stated that the Islamist ideas of the Second Constitutional period
will be studied thematically around the concepts of Meşrutiyet, Hilafet, Kanun-i Esasi,
istibdat, hürriyet in the third and fourth chapters. For the Republican period, the books and
articles published in Ağaç and Büyük Doğu of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek will be analyzed in
the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters.
The outline of the chapters in this thesis is as follows:
The purpose of the second chapter is to examine the Islamist blending traditional material
with modern notions such as progress, civilization and ideology. This attempt can be
generally read as a quest for an Islamic modernity by Islamist intellectuals. In this regard,
the transformation of the idea of state from the medieval formulations into a nation-state
will be studied as well. The analyses of the debates on the (in)compatibility between Islam
and democracy will be followed by an effort of contextualizing the Islamist
conceptualizations of state and democracy.
The objectives of the third and fourth chapters are to indicate various aspects of the
Islamist political thought in the second constitutional period on the issues that are closely
connected to the concepts of state and democracy, including civilization, the West, true
Islam, meşrutiyet, caliphate, shura and nationalism. No attempt will be made, however, to
describe all political thoughts of the Islamists in detail. What will be attempted is to discuss
the transformation of basic political concepts in the hands of Islamist intellectuals.
The fifth chapter tries to illuminate the nature of the Kemalist ideology as an
intellectual/ideological setting in which Islamism reemerged. The main characteristics of
Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, an Islamist intellectual of the period, will be portrayed in the same
chapter. A biography of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and an explanation of his views on Turkish
intellectuals are studied in this chapter as well.
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The sixth and seventh chapters were directed to delineate the importance of Kısakürek in
contrast to the Islamist hope that the adoption of constitutions and the creation of elected
assemblies in the Ottoman empire would revive the Islamic civilization. Islamist
intellectuals (Kısakürek) in the republic replaced the idea of the “constitution” with the
urgent need of a new “ideology” in order to establish Great East or Great Turkey. The
analysis of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s political thoughts on state and democracy will be
complemented by an exposition of his ideologization of Islam as an alternative to the
communist and capitalist ideologies. The analysis of his conceptualizations of politics and
state were connected with the critical evaluation of his ideal Islamic state: Başyücelik
devleti and its institutions. Furthermore, in this chapter, an examination of Kısakürek’s
critique of Kemalism will provide a perspective in order to re-understand Kemalism within
the ideological and political framework of those who opposed it. That is to say, this would
constitute an effort of reading the dark side of the republican modernization.
In the concluding chapter, a synopsis of the thesis will be given in relation to a critical
comparison of Islamists of the two periods. The possible influence of Kemalism on
Kısakürek’s political ideas and the main similarities between these two set of minds will be
presented as well.
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CHAPTER I
ISLAMIST CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND STATE
Islamism, as a political ideology is two-centuries old. In general, since its emergence
within the ideas of the Young Ottomans in Turkey, Islamism has been the product of the
interaction between the elements of a continuity and the forces of a change. In other words,
Islamist political thought in Turkey has a long history and it manifests itself in different
formulations in different political/intellectual settings.
As a popular movement in all the Islamic countries, however, Islamism is of relatively
recent origin. Its current wave has reached its peak level with the Islamic revolution of Iran
in 1979. Nevertheless, it is still true to say that this recent heightening of Islamism is a
continuation, though a new phase, of Islamism that emerged in the political ideas of the
nineteenth-century Islamist intellectuals. This observation, as I will do in this chapter,
compels us to examine the literature on both Islamic reformism of the nineteenth-century
and contemporary Islamism. The continuity of the same problems and the same literature
also obliges us to combine the Islamist discourses on democracy and state in the past and
the present. Moreover, this chapter has the aim of situating the transformation of Turkish
Islamist thought from the Ottoman empire to the Turkish Republic as a case study within
the contemporary analyses of Islamism. It is believed that this attempt will contribute both
to the understanding and anaysis of Turkish Islamism under the light of the contemporary
literature on Islamism and to the understanding and analysis of Islamism in the world in
general.
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This chapter will analyze Islamism under three sections. The first section will hypothesize
that Islamist intellectuals have had a tendency of mixing modern notions such as progress
and ideology with traditional material/grammar to face the challenge of western
modernity. In order to reach an Islamic modernity, the concept of Islamic civilization
constituted a platform for the transformation and interaction of the elements of continuity
(traditional grammar) and change (progress and ideology).
Since the Islamist meeting with modernity has been achieved mostly on the issues of
political modernization, the second section will analyze the idea of state in Islamic political
thought and its transformation into a nation-state in the modern age. The third section will
explore the debate on the (in)compatibility between Islam and democracy with reference
to the Islamist conceptualization of democracy. A further analysis of what some well-
known students of Islam discussed on the issue will be done by contextualizing the
Islamist conceptualizations of state and democracy.
1.1 A Note on Islamism(s): Ideology and Intellectual
Islamic resurgence has taken political, social and cultural forms in its moralizing pursuit of
an Islamic life for individual and society in this world. The heightening of Islamic
consciousness has been variously called as revivalism, rebirth, fundamentalism,
reassertion, awakening, reformism, renaissance, resurgence, radicalism, milleniarism,
return to Islam and march of Islam. Actually, these names could be employed to point out
different aspects of the Islamic resurgence. But for the political nature and aims of the
movements that are within a broader framework of resurgence, students of Islam and
Middle East politics have used mainly three terms: fundamentalism,1 political Islam2 and
                                                
1 W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity (London and New
York: Routledge, 1988); Ernest Gellner,”Marxism and Islam: Failure and Success,” in
Power-Sharing Islam? ed. Azzam Temimi (London: Liberty for Muslim World,
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Islamism. Firstly it is worth noting that the first term is not employed in this study for the
reason that the term of fundamentalism is pejorative in the sense that it refers to a violent
and narrowly dogmatic literalism. This term was coined to describe a Protestant Christian
movement in the United States, implying “a passive adherence to a literal reading of the
sacred scripture.” 3 But today, many Islamist movements have a strong tendency of
adapting the Islamic tenets to the needs of the time. Furthermore, this term is defected with
the problem of generating and representing the other by a hegemonic discourse about
Islam.4
The term political Islam does not seem appropriate due to the fact that politicization of
Islam is one though the most striking, aspect of Islamic resurgence. It may not be able to
reflect the different social, cultural and political dimensions of Islamic resurgence. The
second part of the term “Islam” does not indicate originally any ideologization but the
addition of “ism” might be a more correct wording to describe the given political emphasis
                                                                                                                                         
1993), 33-42 and A. K.S. Lambton, “The Clash of Civilizations: Authority, Legitimacy
and Perfectibility,” in Islamic Fundamentalism ed. R.M. Burrell (London: Royal
Asiatic Society, 1989), 33-47; see for a redefined version of this term, Youssef M.
Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990); and “The
Political Discourse of Contemporary Islamist Movements,” in Islamic
Fundamentalism ed. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1996).
2 Ayubi defines political Islam as a doctrine or movement which “contends that Islam
possesses a theory of politics and the state” see Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam:
Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London and NY: Routledge, 1991), ix. For
our purposes, the term Islamism which indicates an ideological or moral involvement
in politics does not necessarily imply a theory of politics and state. It is concerned with
Islamic principles as the basic values of any polity.
3 Robin Wright, “Two Visions for Reformation.” Journal of Democracy. 2: 7 (1996):
65-66. For the critics of this terms see Oliver Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 1986), 6-7; Gilles Kepel, The Revenge of
God (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994), 3; William E. Shephard, “Islam and Ideology
Towards a Typology.” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 19 (1987):
307-336; Mark Jurgensmeyer, The New Cold War (London: University of California
Press, 1993), 6.
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by the Islamic movements. Although the word of “Islam” is open to an interpretation
which stressed different understandings of religion as “Islams,” still this second form does
not directly imply any ideologization. In this study, the term Islamism in place of
fundamentalism and political Islam is preferred simply because of the reason that
compared to the first two, it seems to contain less ambivalence in describing the
phenomenon in respect to Muslims’ acceptance and the conceptual clarification.5 Here,
we, by the term Islamism, refer to Islamic systems of thought and movements which have
a political aim whether as the creation of an Islamic state whose basic feature is the
application of Islamic law or as the reshaping of the political systems of their related
countries in a religiously framework. The latter form does not necessarily call for an
establishment of an Islamic state. But any form of Islamism, whether as a “political Islam”
or a “cultural Islam”6 advocates a reshaping of society along Islamic principles. Actually,
our usage of Islamism includes both the Islamic reformism of the late nineteenth century
(and its counterpart in the Ottoman-Turkish context) and the emergence of Islamic
movements against the imperialism of the West in the 1940s and 1950s and their
heightening in the 1970s, leading to the Iranian revolution. Certainly, Islamism is not a
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Civilization and Veiling] (İstanbul: Metis, 1991), 105-107.
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monolith but a spectrum that covers different opinions from radical to moderate
tendencies, from modernist to traditionalist interpretations.
Different theories have been introduced in an attempt to explain the reasons for the
emergence of Islamism and its contemporary heightening. To give some illustrative
examples, Gellner explains political vigor of Islam in terms of a reaction to
underdevelopment which endures political humiliation as a result of a technological and,
hence economic and military inferiority.7 Nikkie Keddie interpreted Islamism as a reaction
to the rapid political and economic modernization and to a heavy western and secular
control on the Islamic world that meant a failure of secular nationalism.8 According to M.
Ira Lapidus, Islamism is a response to the major problem of adopting an Islamic tradition
(culture and values) to modernity and its implications, i.e. a construction of a modern state
and economy.9 Olivier Roy regarded Islamism as not against the modernization of Muslim
societies but rather as a product of it.10 The main commonality of these explanations given
for the emergence and rise of the Islamist phenomenon is the interplay between Islamism
and modernity/modernization. The question of the urgent need to face the western
challenge has been also tied closely to another stimuli which is the effort of finding reasons
for the decline of Islam and rediscovering the way of a true Islamic life.
The present study also has an inclination to discuss the issue around the advent of
modernity and Islamist responses to both modernity and modernization movements in the
Islamic world. Young Ottomans and their followers can be considered as the
representatives of Islamism of the second half of the nineteenth century. Their driving
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force was to cope with modernity which emerged in the West through Renaissance and
reformation movements, in terms of an Islamic values and idioms. Seen in this light,
Islamism with its different positioning has always felt the need of a true Islamic life as
connected with the necessity of a meaningful response to the western supremacy
(modernity).
In this thesis, my discussion on the issue of Islamism11 and its relation to democracy and
state shares Aziz al Azmah’s contention that “there are as many Islams as there are
situations that sustain it”12 and comes to conclude that there are as many Islamisms, given
their specific historical, local, political, socio-economic realities. Islamism as an ideology
or a political discourse is derived from a particular understanding of Islam. The process of
reading the Islamic text and tradition has been a constant but changing one, especially in
the face of the needs of the time. Like the medieval Islamic understanding, a modern
conception of Islam and further Islamisms are some specific readings and translations of
the text into contemporary notions. Consequently, like the medieval theorization on state
and government through the three basic lines, as delineated in the second chapter, in the
twentieth century, Islamist movements and intellectuals have provided us with some
specific theorization on democracy and state. These political formulations are by nature, a
deliberate combinations from the medieval theorization and the early Islamic practice.
                                                                                                                                         
10 Roy, Siyasal.
11 In this thesis, for the practical purpose of situating the Islamist reemergence in the
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part of the Islamic world though the Iranian revolution contributed much to the
Islamisms in the Sunni world. For Islamist formulations of politics and state in modern
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Thus, here at the beginning of the discussion, we pay a critical/deconstructive attention to
the Islamist discourse(s) on authentic Islamic identity and civilization and their attribution
of themselves as the only true representation to these identity and civilization. Islam is not
a concept that should be taken as a monolith, but like other religions, it has varied with
political, economic and social variables such as time, place, national culture, social class,
ethnicity, and gender.13
Islamists of both the nineteenth-century and of the present, through a construction of “an
utopia” from the Islamic golden age, do not aim to return back to the past. But rather they
express their intention to join the adventure of modernity by advancing a specific version
of modernity, Islamic modernity. The political implication of this utopia is to establish “a
City” which is regulated by “morality” and virtue and is a place of Islamic life i.e.
solidarity, equality and justice, certainly with respect for “the word of God.”14 Islamism
calls for “the retrieval and restoration of the original qualities that made for strength and
historical relevance. No progress without the retrieval of pristine beginnings and the
cleansing of the essence from the adulterations of history”15 in the hands of esotericist
sects or Persians or Turks or westernized elite. The golden age of Islamism constitutes a
source of aspiration in envisioning a worldview which comprised social, cultural,
economic and political aspects, by a reference to the past which is not necessarily proven
by the historical realities.
Since the end of the nineteenth century, the major problematic of the Islamist intellectuals
has been how Muslims could be authentic and modern at the same time. In a psychological
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mood of responding to the challenge of the West, they urged for the revitalization of
Islamic civilization. Because of their concern for the West, Abu-Rabi calls the present
Islamic resurgence as “a neo traditional Islamism,” which by this aspect differed from
other traditionalist and conservative tendencies in the Islamic world.16 Certainly this does
not mean that Islamist movements emerged just as a reaction to the Western impact. On
the contrary, as Talal Asad correctly observes, Islamic resurgence predated the impact of
western modernity by some attempts of renewal in the eighteenth century on the part of
Muslim thinkers such as Shah Waliyullah of Delhi, who discussed the authority of the
traditional interpretations of the text.17
Given the above mentioned reservation, it is still true that identity based quest of Islamists
directed itself to the creation of “a major alternative form of modernity” for humanity,
including “a feeling of solidarity, a rediscovery of values, an examination of self and the
world.”18 This quest have also taken place in a framework in which the return to Islam
have been seen as the only substitute for the failure of the imported ideas from the West
such as nationalism and secularism.19
Haldun Gülalp argues that Islamism is opposed to a specific form of modernization or to
the ideology of modernism as Westernization but not to modernity/modernization. Given
the contradictions, crises and failures of nationalist/developmentalist modernization
movements in the Islamic world, the quest for an authentic Islamic identity has taken the
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form of “a politics of identity.”20 Still here it is possible to argue that the failure or success
of modernization movements would inevitably bring the issue of identity (and civilization)
to the forefront. Islamisms are open to different positioning in regard to modernity whether
being against its very bases or using its tools to create another form. But what is significant
for our purposes is that Islamism(s) could not escape from the challenge of modernity and
modernization movements. The success or failure of the modernization movements might
contribute to the direction and contents of Islamism but they could not prevent the urgency
of the modernity’s challenge to Islamism. For instance, one implication of this argument
may be observed in Islamist attitudes towards the modern state and ideology. Islamisms
believed in the possibility and even the necessity of “the translatability of traditional
texts”21 in their search for a modern state or ideology: thus for some Islamists shura
becomes parliamentary democracy and separation of powers while for some others it
becomes a counterpart of a modern political ideology.
It is early to declare the end of Islamism by glancing at the diminishing power of political
Islam. As H. Sohail Hashmi perceptively observes, the weakening of Islamism as a
political force, aiming to capture power, may in fact trigger “more active and broad-based
religious politics”22 in the Muslim world. Nevertheless, one may expect this active
religious activism more in social and cultural dimensions rather than directly and radically
in political dimension. This does not mean that Islamism will lose its political nature
though it is hard to foretell the future formation of Islamism. But if Islamism continues to
exist in tomorrow’s world, it has to deal with a political dimension in order to influence if
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not to shape, politics and public sphere through its ideal of sharia whether as some state
regulations or underlying values of the polity.
Islamism as an indigenous ideology and reaction to the alienating influences of the west
represents a “counter-quest for authenticity”23 or “counter-acculturation,”24 implying the
spiritual and moral superiority of Islam over the west. In this respect, Islamism involves a
dramatic re-evaluation of the West. Having reminded the fact that Islamists have always
criticized the values of the west in terms of moral decadence and idolatry since the
nineteenth century, the idea of the failure of the West in spiritual terms has gained much
currency in the twentieth century, further leading to a self-assertion of Muslims to a
civilization, namely Islamic civilization.
1.1.1 A Quest for An Islamic Modernity: Islamist Intellectual and “Civilization”
Just as the political writing on the decline of the Ottoman state and the adoption of western
institutions constituted the touchstone of Ottoman-Turkish political modernization,
Islamists also started to develop their political ideas within the confines of this debate.
Although the ulema positively contributed to the debate on the decline of the Ottoman
empire and Islamic civilization and supported the early Westernization measures, they lost
their position to a new class, intellectuals, throughout the reform movement. Consequently,
transformation of Islam into a modern ideology and its formulation as an ideology of
salvation/revival for the country was realized not by the ulema but mainly by the
intellectuals. It was certain that the advent of modernity in the West and its profound
effects on the Ottoman elite urged this new class to reimagine Islamic political values in
the light of modern democratic institutions and values. All schools of thought in the second
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constitutional period, namely Ottomanism, Turkism, Islamism and Westernism were
progress oriented and reform minded, but they differed on the values by which the
civilization and identity of the Ottomans would be established. Westernist school had the
inclination of becoming Western (modern) through a civilizational conversion, while
Islamists searched for the revitalization of Islamic civilization, or for advancing an Islamic
modernity.
Islamists intellectually embraced the concept of civilization not only to criticize the
modernization movements in the Islamic world and to underline the moral decadence of
the West but also to express their quest for a new paradigm. The Islamist discourse on
civilization starts with the “problematization of a universalistic construction of western
civilization”25 and comes to manifest its goal of an Islamic civilizational vivacity: “[t]he
revival of Islamic identity is another form of civilizational transformation which provides a
comprehensive civilizational alternative and challenge to western civilization rather than
posing a political threat.”26 Indeed, this tendency to problematize the issues that belong to
the Islamic world and to Turkey has constituted an Islamist intellectual tradition in the
Republican period, namely Büyük Doğu (Great Orient) of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Umran
(Civilization) of Cemil Meriç and Diriliş (Resurrection) of Sezai Karakoç.
When Islamist intellectuals speak of Islamic civilization and tradition, they do not refer to
“the traditional beliefs and practices of the Turkish Gemeinschaft”27; rather, they envision
an Islam that includes not only the precepts of Qur’an, Sunnah and the practices of the four
caliphs, but also the intellectual heritage and historical expreriences of Muslims all over
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the world. Nevertheless, the quest of “authenticity” brings a selective approach in the
revival or invention of Islamic civilization and tradition.
Islamist discourse postulates a civilizational essence which unifies the experiences of
different local cultures and geographies, for both Islam and the West (Occidentalism). To
place the western enterprise, modernity as just another civilization is “the provincialization
of Europe.“28 Like orientalism, Islamist discourse rests upon the basic conviction that
Islamic civilization is ontologically and epistemologically different from the West. The
relationship between the civilization of Islam and that of the West is generally presented in
terms of difference and often in terms of polarization. Although the word Islam refers
primarily to a religion, Islamist intellectuals generally use it to refer not only to the faith
and its followers, but also to the civilization of muslims. Islam can provide an answer to
the perplexing problems of the day, be they political, economic, social, cultural or
religious. Islamic way of life brings with specific values and mechanisms for the
revitalization of Muslim human being, society and politics. The view of the West and its
“occidentalization” is crucial not only for rejecting western product of modernity but also
for redefining Islamic way of life. Islamist writers’ essentializing attitude towards the
concepts of the West and Islam constitutes an “ideological posture” which tries to
demolish the superiority of western modernity and positivism. They have employed
internal critics of the West to deconstruct the hegemony of the West with its project of
modernity. One may argue that Islamist writers, in their understanding of the West, have
been caught by the same essentialist logic present in the Orientalist tradition.
Civilization as the dominant idea of the ninteenth century is a controversial concept and as
Elias argues, it also “expresses the self-consciousness of the West. One could even say: the
national consciousness. It sums up everthing in which Western society of the last two or
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three centuries believes itself superior to earlier societies or ‘more primitive’ contemporary
ones. By this term, Western society seeks to describe what constitutes its special character
and what it is proud of: the level of its technology, the nature of its manners, the
development of its scientific knowledge or view of the world, and much more.”29
The Islamist emphasis on civilization can be read as an effort to create a native modernity
for self-definition. But it is certain that this effort would reject to be called as a new form of
modernity whether it is not named as the non-Western modernity or Islamic modernity
simply because the employment of the civilization concept aims to go beyond western
modernity and to find an alternative to it. Indeed, the concept of civilization provides an
avenue for Islamists to express an Islamic authentic identity without ideologization of
Islam. Thus, Islam means a civilization which developed throughout history in the Islamic
world, not an ideology. However, looking from a civilizational point gains its discourse
from a belief that the western civilization have been experiencing an acute civilizational
crisis. That is another version of the narrative on the “ends”: the end of west(ern
supremacy), mainly related to the discussions on the end of modernity or modernism.
Inevitably, the discussion of modernity in relation to Islamist intellectuals and movements
bring us to the point of debating “whether ‘modernity’ is a single tradition, a singular
structure, or an integrated set of practical knowledges...whether there are varieties of
modernity.”30 The present study has an inclination to make a distinction between western
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form/experience of modernity and modernity in general without forgetting the fact that
modernity emerged within western societies. But this recognition does not have to led to
the conclusion that there is only one kind of modernity which is western one. If modernity
is a symphony of humanity, it is plural and not restricted to western experience; then every
part of humanity as cultures or civilizations or something else might participate in this
experience without losing their some native pecularities.31 Hence, the idea of modernity is
open to different conceptualizations in the forms of “alternative modernity,” “native
modernity,” “pluralist modernity” or in Nilüfer Göle’s conceptualization as “non-western
modernity.”32
One may argue that the contemporary Islamist discourses around the concept of Islamic
civilization have been attempts of recreating/reinventing an Islamic tradition/traditions.
Although it is correct to say that the Islamist return to the golden age have produced a
rupture or de-traditionalizing effect33 on Islamic heritage, still, Islamist intellectual
discourses around the notion of Islamic civilization directed themselves to the
reconstruction of tradition. Hence, despite of its essentializing attitude as Islam and the
West, the concept of civilization might provide a ground for both learning from the west
and still keeping the claims to authenticity and identity. The idea of civilization which was
invented in the nineteenth century Europe, according to Talal Asad, is not helpful for
thinking constructively about the present cultural and political problems, including the
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crisis in the Islamic tradition. The notion of tradition which is falsely opposed to modernity
is a more appropriate term to be argued through and reconstructed.34 Still, one has to be
added to Asad’s above statement that Islamist intellectuals have a tendency to understand
the concept of civilization in the way that Asad envisoned for the concept of tradition.
Moreover, it can be argued that the battle between Islamists and the secular regimes could
be seen as a conflict about which type of modernity, western modernity or a “native one”
(Islamic modernity) should be adopted.
The issues of political modernization suh as an establishment of a modern nation-state and
democracy are central to the agenda of the Islamist search for modernity for two reasons:
the first is to save the Ottoman state from its decline and dissolution in the Second
Constitutional Period and the second is to create a new society and an individual in the
republican period. An examination of the idea of state in Islamic political thought and its
transformation into a nation-state are the topics of the following sections.
1.2 The Idea of State in Islamic(ist) Political Thought
The concept of the state, in its modern connotations, did not form a part of the Islamic
political thought35 in the classical period and it is sure that modern conceptualization of the
                                                
34 Asad, “Europe,” 7.
35 For the present purposes, the focus of the study will be limited basically to the
elaboration of Sunni political theory. To examine Shi’i and Khariji theories of political
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state is a Western one which evolved in relation to the phenomena of the Renaissance and
capitalism. Here when I say state, I am referring to the body-politic (types of statesmanship
or government) which is the closest thing to the concept of the state in traditional Islamic
political thought.36 Put it differently, I shall be using in this chapter the concept of state, not
in its modern connotation but rather in a general way that considers ‘state’ as an
organization of political power or authority.
Pertaining to the type of government, traditional Islamic political thought seems to put an
emphasis on the concept of political leadership, the caliph. The theory of caliphate, or
imamate, lacks an abstraction of state in the modern sense: it rather conceptualizes
government and state which is entrusted with governing in accordance with the provisions
of the shari'a.37 This lack of abstraction has led some students of Islam and of political
scientists to the conclusion that Islamic polities produced weak states38, which are personal
and dynastic and which are not “impersonal source of public law.”39 This is because of a
distrust of Islam for the government (exercise of political power)40 or of the fact that, as
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G.E.Von Grunebaum41 argues, Islamic law started from a definition of political leadership,
and not from a definition of state, and came to the latter as late as Ibn Khaldun (d.1037). In
other words, it is argued that in traditional Islamic political thought, political authority is
not clearly separated from the persons who embody it.
The origins of this essentialist approach to Islam regarding the emergence of state can be
found in the writings of Max Weber. He notes that “the state itself, in the sense of a
political association with a rational, written constitution, rationally ordained law, and an
administration bound to rational rules or laws administered by trained officials, is known,
in this combination of characteristics, only in the Occident, despite all other approaches to
it.”42 However, neither the Medieval Europe nor the Medieval Islam had a state in the
modern connotation of a sovereign structure that was above and beyond both the ruler and
the ruled.43 It is also striking to see that on the issues of state and democracy, the
comparisons of Islamic institutions are made with the European political institutions after
the sixteenth and even the eighteenth centuries.44 The approach of determining a set of
“absences in Islam”45, seen in Weber’s analysis of patrimonialism and Karl Marx’s Asiatic
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mode of production46 as the most distinguished expressions, is called as Orientalism, a
very rich field of study in representing Islam for the Western audience. Orientalist
discourse asserted the claim that due to despotism (or patrimonial rule) and other religious
features of Islam such as otherwordliness, rational bureaucracy and democratic institutions
(civil societal elements, parliament, constitution and the idea of opposition as a
constructive political force) did not develop or take root in Muslim lands. As Yahya
Sadowski rightly put it, the label of “strong state, weak society” for the Middle Eastern
societies is transformed into a new one, “strong society, weak state” by the neo-Orientalists
especially after the Iranian revolution in 1979. He writes,
“[w]hen the consensus of social scientists held that democracy and
development depended upon the actions of strong, assertive social groups,
Orientalists held that such associations were absent in Islam. When the
consensus evolved and social scientists thought a quiescent, undemanding
society was essential to progress, the neo-Orientalists portrayed Islam as
beaming with pushy, anarchic solidarities.”47
However, as I have tried to show in the following chapter, Islamic political thought
provides enough material for both authoritarian closures and democratic openings,
depending on the nature of the specific political culture and attitudes of political elite.
Particular historical developments (economic basis, class structure and so on) of the
Muslim lands and the international network of capitalist relations should also be employed
in the analysis of Islamic political ideas48. In this line of thinking, one may say that
personalization of government and state in the person of the caliph did not constitute an
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obstacle to the emergence, in Islamic political theory, of an idea of a state with a
transcendental reference, namely; the shari'a49 (divine law). The unity of community and
its identification in principle with the office of the caliphate is very intimately linked to the
principle that the fundamental loyalty of Muslims is given not to the caliph but to the
shari’a.50 The institution of caliphate is regarded not as being unchangeable, but as an
ideal that symbolizes the nature of Islamic political system.
One aim of the dissertation is to observe the changes and continuities in the Islamist
conceptualization of democracy and state by comparing the medieval theorization and the
modern period. This necessitates a glance at the theoretical perspectives on democracy and
state in Islamic political theory. Islamists had provided us with some specific theorizations
on state and democracy with references to the Islamic tradition/civilization. These political
formulations were some selective combinations from the medieval theorization on state
and government and the early Islamic practice. In their attempt to reconstruct Islamic
community and polity, Islamists, both in the Second Constitutional Period and in the
Republican period, were influenced by all the three main theories of classical Islamic
political thought: the theory of the jurists, the theory of Islamic philosophers and the
literary theory, but with a greater emphasis on the first. According to all these theories, the
main constituting elements of an Islamic polity might be specified as follows: the ideal (or
idealized) political authority i.e. the caliph, philosopher king or the pious and the just king;
                                                
49 The shari’a’s intention is wider in scope and purpose than a simple legal system in the
modern sense of the term law. Shari’a is also is more extensive in scope and meaning
than the concept of Islamic law (fiqh), though both terms are sometimes used
interchangeably. Fıqh as a composite science of law and morality regulates both the
faith, and political and legal matters; Coulson, A History. 83. Brinkley Messick defines
shari’a as a “central societal discourse” or as a type of “total discourse”, wherein all
kinds of institutions find simultaneous expression: religious, legal, moral, political and
economic, The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim
Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 3, 262.
50 H.A.R. Gibb, “Constitutional Organization,” in Law in the Middle East ed. Majid
Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1955), 14.
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the supremacy of the shari’a; and the unity of the Islamic community. In this respect, the
central question of Islamic political thought was to realize the happiness of the community
in this world and in the hereafter through the application of shari’a. In other words, in
Islamic legitimization of political authority, the most significant matter was whether or not
some types of institutionalization of political authority such as caliphate or sultanate (or
republic) fit the Islamic political values such as shura and justice as prescribed by the
shari’a.
On this background of medieval theorization on government, Islamists transformed the
medieval conceptions of caliphate and shura (meşveret) into modern nation-state and
constitutional regime when they faced the advent of modernity and its political institutions.
In order to delineate and situate the emergence of the idea of Islamic state through an
interaction with the idea of nationalism in the second constitutional period and in the
republic, it would be beneficial to have a look at the literature on contemporary Islamist
attitudes towards the nation-state.
1.2.1 Islamist Adaptation to the Modern Nation-State: An Islamic State
The abolition of the caliphate, complemented by the western colonialism of the early
twentieth century constituted a cause for the higly politicized agendas of the Islamist
movements in this century. Actually, the abolition of caliphate did not mean the end of the
jurisdic theorization on state and government but rather, various Islamist movements and
intellectuals tried to revitalize the theory of caliphate either by adaptation to the
requirements of the nation-state in the form of a call for an Islamic state or by insisting on
the possibility of a caliph over all Muslims without much regarding the divisions of
Muslims into nation-states. The first reaction became the dominant trend in the minds of
Islamists but at the same time they attributed personal aspects of a caliph to a modern
construction, namely nation-state. Although the direct or indirect emphasis has represented
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a historical and “epistemic continuity”51 with the Islamic tradition and its self-image, as
Talal Asad argued, this Islamist demand for a modernizing Islamic state has been indeed a
reproduction of a western model: “most Islamic movements are concerned to capture the
center that the modern state represents, instead of trying to cut across or dissolve it...,
adding only that it be controlled by a virtous body of Muslims.”52
The idea of an Islamic state revealed its early glimmerings in the early twentieth century in
the writings of the Islamists of the second constitutional period alongside the diminished
significance of the caliphate, as our elaborations on the issue show in the third and four
chapters. But certainly a theorization of an Islamic state as a reaction to the abolition of the
caliphate and along the lines of a modern nation-state was provided by M. Rashid Rida
(1865-1935), who influenced the Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt, spreading an important
impact all over the Sunni world.53
From the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to the foundation of a new secular republic from
its ruins, the historical experience of the Turkish state came to represent the different stages
of the disintegration of the traditional Islamic political order totally, though the Ottoman
caliphate had been a blend of the caliphate and sultanate with a suspicious reference to the
transfer of the caliphate from Abbasid to the Ottomans. The expansion of the western
colonialism over the Muslim lands furthered the crisis of Islam which had showed itself in
                                                
51 Abu-Rabi, Intellectual. 9 and Watt, Islamic. 1. For Watt, this continuity in Muslim
mind is an unchangingness about muslim perception of human nature. This
unchangingness of human nature justifies Islamists’s insistence on the finality of Islam
as a religion and the supremacy of sharia and therefore there is no need for a
fundamental revision of sharia see pp. 3-6.
52 Asad, “Modern,” 14, 8.
53 For his political ideas see Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal
Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of california Press, 1966) and Yusuf H.R. Seferta, “The Concept of
Religious Authority According to Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Ridha.” Islamic
Quarterly. XXX:3 (1986): 162
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the process of learning from the West in the nineteenth century, in Islamic intellectual life.
Thus, Islamic resurgence appeared in the political life of Islamic lands which had been
under the western colonial rule, as a vehicle for anti-colonial independence movements.54
The ground for revitalizing Islam as a political element firstly to war aginst western
colonialism and later to oppose the secular/modernist ideologies of the newly established
states in Islamic world had been prepared intellectually by Jamal ad- Din al-Afghani and
his disciple Muhammad Abduh for the Islamic world in general and by the Young
Ottomans and the Islamists of the second constitutional period for Turkey in particular. In
the post-colonial era, with the establishment of different nation-states in Muslim lands, the
question of the religion in relation to these new states emerged. The general trend was in
the direction of secularizing Islamic traditional polities through a strict modernization
process. In some cases like Turkey and Tunisia, modernizing elites adopted a radical
understanding of secularism to the extent that Islam was far away from providing even “a
function of civil religion” for the new polity.55 To establish a new political community,
nation-state and national identity, an ideology of nationalism had been introduced by the
modernizing elites. Thus, Islam as a set of legitimating values for politics and state had
been abondoned in the course of modernizing/developmental models of the Islamic
countries though it had always been employed in the service of different nationalisms as
well. At this point, a complex relationship between Islam(ism) and nationalism enters into
the picture. To portray an Islamist stance in the face of nationalism would contribute to the
understanding of Islamisms in relation to state and democracy on the whole. A first glance
at the issue may reach some easy conclusions that Islamists are unanimous in their
                                                
54 In Turkey, too, both Islamist goals of freeing the sultan-caliphate and Islamists played
important roles in politicizing the masses and mobilizing them for the National
Struggle see Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey (Leiden:
E.J.Brill, 1981), 66.
55 Metin Heper, “Islam and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective.” The
Middle East Journal. 35: 2, (1981): 350.
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opposition to nationalism which they consider as unIslamic or western; that Islam has a
universal aspect, going beyond the ethnic and local differences; or Islam and nationalism
are competing ideological sources of identity and community.
In fact, the discussion on the interplay between Islam and nationalism (and nation-state)
can best be summarised in two views. The first view that underlines the emergence of
nation-state in the west as a result of the process of secularization (limiting religion to
one’s private life) is best represented by P.J. Vatikiotis. Reminding the broad framework of
sharia which encompasses both the public and private aspects of human life and the non-
territorial/universal aspect of the Islamic community, he comes to claim that state in Islam
is defined in a religious and ideological way; thus Islam is not compatible with nationalism
which is a constructive loyalty to a territorially defined national group. This approach also
emphasizes that the concept of the nation-state has no equivalents in the classical Islamic
writings. On the contrary, the classical Islam stresses a division of world into two hostile
realms: dar al-Islam (the realm of Islam or peace) and dar-al harb (the realm of war).
Given the insistence on the holw war, Islam has the aim of conquering the non-Islamic
world at the expense of other beliefs.56
The second view which stresses a compatibility between Islam and nation-state is best
articulated by James P. Piscatori who finds some indications of “territorial pluralism” in
the Islamic classical theory.57 A significant indication of the acceptence of territorial
pluralism is found in the verse of the Qur’an that God divided mankind into nations and
tribes for the purpose of better knowing one other. After mentioning the Islamic historical
experience as the record of pragmatic adaptation to diversity under different states and
                                                
56 Vatikiotis, Islam. 36.
57 James P. Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), 144.
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empires such as Ottoman, Persian and so forth, Piscatori underlined the important effect of
the Islamist/pan-Islamic sentiments in the establishment of the credentials of particularized
nationalisms and in validating the idea of a territorial separation between us and them.58
Speaking in similar terms, Nazih N. Ayubi argues that the Islamist quest for an authenticity
provides a form of “cultural nationalism,” thus, being able to take the support of the
secular nationalist people in the Iranian revolution or the admiration and respect of secular
nationalist movements in the Arab world.59 Hence in a paradoxical way, despite their
ideological rejection of nationalism and nation-state as a harmful importation from the
west, Islamists accept the nation-state as their operational framework and many of them
are strongly attached to the notions of territory, nationhood and nationalism. Although
Islamist movements theoretically have situated themselves against the (secular)
nationalisms of their relevant countries, they have been influenced by the tradition and
practice of these secular nationalisms. This is due to their contention that a modernizing
national state and its way of conduct (reform from above) is necessary to bring about the
creation of a new Islamic society and individual.
The nationalist aspect of Islamisms led Mark Jurgensmeyer to name Islamist movements
as “religious nationalism” in contradistinction to a secular nationalism. According to him,
an “almost Hegelian dialectic” between the two competing frameworks of social order
(religion and secular nationalism) have given a birth to a synthesis (Islamism or religious
                                                
58 Ibid., 77.
59 Ayubi, Political. 217. In fact, in the case of the Iranian revolution, a new national entity
came into being that was different from both the polity under the old Muslim rulers
and from the Shah’s failured attempt of a new secular nation-state: a religiously-based
nation-state. This is similar to the practice of socialist ideology in the USSR (Socialism
in one country). Shi’ism and its politicization in the hands of Khomeini contributed to
the Iranian self-assertion and pride in nation and culture see Mary Elaina Hegland,
“Islamic Revival or Political and Cultural Revolution?” in Religious Resurgence ed.
Richard T. Antoun and Mary Elaine Hegland (New York: Syracuse University Press,
1987), 214.
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nationalism) in which religion has become a new “ally of the nation-state.”60 In this
respect, a synthesis of mutual accomodation has appeared. On the one hand, pan-Islamic
aspirations of Islamism has been cut off, and on the other hand, religion has turned out to
be a base for the legitimacy of the nation-state. Islamism can serve the function of restoring
the legitimacy of the nation-state’s connections with individual.61 This may soften the
alienating effects and crisis of the modernizing state in the Islamic world. Futhermore,
Islamists have been obliged to consider the necessities and interests of a nation-state when
they came to power. The realities of politics is not only confined to the recognition and
pursuit of national interest but also, internal politics shapes the Islamists in an
accomodationist way in that “it is the state or the political power, which defines the place
of Islam in an Islamist polity, and not the reverse. Islam is no more than a way to
legitimize their power and exclude their opponents.”62 In sum, the interplay between
nationalism and Islam(ism)seems to open to different combinations in practice, despite the
so called theoretical difficulties. This fact, in the case of Turkey, has been connected
evidently to an observation that Turkish nationalism has always contained a religious aura
and Islamists have been sympathetic to Turkish nationalism, as will be explained
throughout this study, as well.63
                                                
60 Jurgensmeyer, The New. 30. A supporting evidence comes from the experience in
Turkey during the period between 1980 and 1997. Changing attitude of Turkish state’s
conception of secularism and its representation in the ideas of presidents Kenan Evren
and Turgut Özal in this period see Burhanettin Duran, “Kenan Evren’s and Turgut
Özal’s Conceptualizations of Secularism: A Comparative Perspective.” Unpublished
Master Thesis (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1994).
61 François Burgat, “Ballot Boxes, Militaries and Islamic Movements,” in Islamism
Debate ed. Martin Kramer (Syracuse and Tel Aviv: The Dayan Center Papers, 1997),
43.
62 Olivier Roy, “Islamists in Power” in Islamism Debate ed. Martin Kramer (Syracuse
and Tel Aviv: The Dayan Center Papers, 1997), 69.
63 The developments after the military intervention in Turkish politics by means of the
National Security Council in February 28, 1997, and the dawnfall of a coalition
government, led by a pro-Islamist Welfare Party do not contradict the fact that
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Perhaps, the most significant issue which has confronted the Islamist intellectuals since the
nineteenth century has been the (in)compatibility between Islam and democracy. As will
be discussed in the next two chapters, Islamists of the empire tried to reconcile liberal
constitutional democracy with Islamic political institutions and values. Hence, an
elaboration of the interplay between Islam and democracy in the eyes of Islamists,
including the contemporary debates, will shed a light on the transformation of Islamism in
Turkey.
1.3 Islam and Democracy: Islamizing Democracy or Democratizing Islamism
Stemming from the fact that the original Islamic sources, Qur’an and Hadith, do not
prescribe a specific type of government, Islamic political thought in the last two centuries
has come to witness some differing opinions on the issue of the (in)compatibility of Islam
and democracy. As Nuray Mert correctly argues, the discussion of (in)compatibility of
Islam and democracy in the Turkish context is related to “a historical habit” of seeing
Islam as an obstacle to progress at the core of social problems.64 The arguments which
underlined the progressive aspects of Islam by supporting the compatibility or which
stressed the incompatibility by claiming the uniqueness of Islamic civilization seem to
share and reproduce the similar intellectual defects. Any attempt to speak about the
(in)compatibility of Islam and democracy is stuck with the fragile position of taking both
Islam and democracy as ideal types. Here we start from a point of recognizing that there
exist many Islams and Islamisms. Thus, it should be noted that any discussion/argument of
                                                                                                                                         
Islamists of Turkey have had a strong inclination to accept the nation-state as their
operational framework. Rather the conflict between Islamists and secularists should be
taken as an implication that Kemalist establishment does not allow any more
Islamization of the Turkish nation-state.
64 Nuray Mert, Islam ve Demokrasi: Bir Kurt Masalı [Islam and Democracy: A Tale of
Wolf] (İstanbul: İz, 1998), 33. Mert advanced the idea that there is no direct
relationship between Islam and democracy and consequently no tension between the
two, ibid.
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compatibility or incompatibility is very closely connected to a kind of conceptualization
from which Islam is viewed. What is more is that the issue is also tied to the different
Islamist positionings regarding democracy. In his way, here we study Islamist intellectuals
and their conceptualizations of democracy and state under specific historical conjuncture.
As shown in the following chapters, democracy is not new to Islamism, at least it has been
a subject of discussion since the Young Ottomans though democracy is new to Islam and
Islamism if compared with the Christian experience with democracy.
In order to understand the very nature of the transformation of Turkish Islamism from the
empire to the republic, regarding the conceptualizations of state and democracy, there is a
need to study the incompatibility between Islam and democracy in detail.
1.3.1 An Analysis of the Islamist Discussion on the (in)compatibility between Islam and
Democracy
Three approaches can be distinguished with regard to the debates on the relationship
between Islam and democracy. Firstly, having reinterpreted such notions as “equality of
men before God irrespective of differences”, ‘freedom of belief and thought for Muslims
and nonmuslims” and “shura, ijma and bay’a”, it was argued that Islam and democracy
were inherently compatible, even mutually reinforcing.65 Mohammed Iqbal, illustrative of
this approach, suggested that due to the centrality of brotherhood and equality in Islam,
democracy was the most important ideal in it. Arguing that Islam was inherently
democratic not only because of the principle of shura, but also because of the principles of
ijma and ijtihad, he regarded the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey as a sound ijtihad
exercised by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (support for the republican form of
                                                
65 M. Favzi Najjar, “Democracy in Islamic Political Philosophy” 11th Annual Meeting of
the Middle East Studies Association, New York November 9-12, 1977, 107.
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government). But he also expressed his discomfort with the lack of ethical and spiritual in
western democratic systems.66
Similarly, contemporary Iranian Islamic thinker, Abdul Karim Soroush argues that “there
is no contradiction between Islam and the freedoms inherent in democracy. Islam and
democracy are not only compatible, their associations is inevitable. In a Muslim society,
one without the other is not perfect.”67 Calling for a democratic religious government
which does not deform religion and which does not prevent people’s participation in the
process of government in the Iranian context, Soroush argues that democracy both as a
value system and a method of governance is compatible with Islam. But still, Soroush’s
conceptualization of democracy as a value system indicates respecting human rights,
justice and public’s right to elect their leaders. At this point it should be reminded that
although this enumeration meets a minimum of the required values of modern liberal
democracy, Soroush here seems to put the emphasis on the institutions and rationalizing
function of democracy such as separation of powers, free elections, free press and political
parties and the question of relativity of human values as an essential of political pluralism
remains untouched.?68 In another place, he argues that any Islamic and democratic
                                                
66 Iqbal, Reconstruction. 157; Iqbal criticized modern western democracy which was a
democracy of undeveloped individuals:” ‘Democracy is a system where people are
counted but not weighed’. The existence of a society whose members are undeveloped
individuals necessitated for Iqbal the guidance of great leaders (supermen): the ethical
training of humanity is really the work of great personalities, who appear, from time to
time, during the course of human history’” John L. Esposito, “Muhammad Iqbal and
the Islamic State,” in Voices of Resurgent Islam ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983), 180.
67 Quoted in Wright, “Two Visions,” 68. Abdul Karim Soroush is an Iranian Shi’ite
Muslim intellectual, teaching philosophy in Tehran University, who have been under a
close scrutiny of the Iranian Islamist regime.
68 George Joffé, “Democracy, Islam and the Culture of Modernism.” Democratization.
4:3 (Autumn 1997): 151. For more on political ideas of Soroush see Valla Vakili,
Debating Religion and Politics in Iran: The Political Thought of Abdulkarim Soroush
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996).
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government has to synthesize the duty based language of Islam with a right based content
of democracy through ijtihad.69 Nevertheless, Soroush, by his acceptance of an organic
relation between politics and state, assigns duty on a religious state in preparing the
atmosphere of freedom to believe and to call others to belief. This religious state openly
has some unlaic elements and the moral purpose of regulating human life to meet the
religious demands of the society. In other words, state is open to being made religious by
the society though it could not make society more religious.70 Given the supremacy of
religious community in colouring the state, Soroush’s compatibility argument could not
escape from being communitarian in the face of more liberal and individual demands of
dissidence from the “right” way of the community.
Contrary to the compatibility argument, the second approach denies the idea that Islam and
democracy are compatible.71 It is argued that the absolute equality of all citizens was
impossible due to the inequality between believers and unbelievers in Islamic law and that
sovereignty belonged to God not to the people. More sophisticated arguments about the
incompatibility of democracy and Islam have been supplied by Sayyid Qutb an Egyptian
Islamist thinker who strongly objected to any notion of popular sovereignty. Qutb argued,
democracy was a modern form of jahiliyya (ignorance) and of usurpation of God’s
sovereignty; It was also a form of tyranny, for it subsumed the individual to the wishes and
                                                
69 See his speech in a panel on “Democratic Experience in Islamic countries,” in 21.
Yüzyila Girerken Islami Oluşumlar [Islamic Formations while Entering 21st Century]
ed. Yalçın Akdoğan (Istanbul: Pendik Belediyesi Yayınları, 1996), 71-74, 101-104 and
see the interviews made with him in his visit to Turkey in 1995, Abdulkerim Süruş,
Modern Durum ve Dini Bilginin Evrimi [Modern Condition and Evolution of the
Religious Knowledge] ed. Yalçın Akdoğan and Kenan Çamurcu (Istanbul: Pendik
Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 1995), 20-21
70 Süruş, Modern. 22-24. He is dedicated to the flexible employment of sharia as a basis
for modern legislation.
71 Esposito and Piscatori argues that this view emerged during the Constitutional
Movement of 1905-1911 in Iran, see John L.Esposito and James P. Piscatori,
“Democratization and Islam.” Middle East Journal. 45:3 (Summer 1991): 435.
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whims of other individuals.72 Despite the concept of majority rule and people’s
sovereignty, to Qutb, a small minority controls sources of power and wealth through
indoctrination and brainwashing in a democratic regime.73
This second approach can be also found in the political ideas of two well-known
contemporary Turkish Islamist intellectuals, Rasim Özdenören and İsmet Özel who deny
the reconciliation of democracy with Islamic values by drawing attention to the unique
historical, socio-economic conditions of the West in which democracy was grown up. The
first and the great difficulty which Rasim Özdenören found in the attempt to reconcile
Islam and democracy is that in Islam it is not acceptable to establish the principle of
popular sovereignty in the western sense, which contradicts the supremacy of divine law in
Islam. Özdenören, paying attention to the conceptualizations of democracy as a way of
thinking not just as a type of government, speaks of the total difference between Islamic
way of life and democracy; that is not to say that Islam envisions a despotic regime.74
According to İsmet Özel, the formal similarities found between democracy and nebevi
(Islamic) model stem from the emphasis given to the community in both of them. But
while “in democracy, the community is effective in making decisions without determining
the direction, in prophetic model it is effective not in making decisions but in determining
the compatibility of the decisions made with the right path.”75
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(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 177.
73 Youssef Choueiri, “The Political Discourse of Contemporary Islamist Movements,” in
Islamic Fundamentalism ed. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 24.
74 See Rasim Özdenören, Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Sefaleti [Poverty of New World Order]
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The third approach looks to democracy as a mechanism through which the shariah can be
applied.76 According to this approach advanced by Abu’l A’la Mawdudi, if democracy is
understood as the sovereignty of the people, Islam has no trace of “Western democracy”
which contradicts the very first principle of Islamic political theory: the belief in the Unity
and Sovereignty of God. 77 More significantly, Islam repudiates the sovereignty of the
people and forms its polity on the basis of the sovereignty of God and the vicegerency
(caliphate) of man. According to Mawdudi, if democracy is perceived as a “limited form
of popular sovereignty", supervised by the shari’ah, then Islam and democracy are
compatible. The term that Mawdudi uses to define the “Islamic democracy” is theo-
democracy.78 Thus, the Islamic state is both democratic and theocratic state run by popular
viceregency. While Mawdudi’s understanding of popular sovereignty is limited regarding
the relationship between God and man, it is not a limited one between community and
caliph. In fact, the power to rule over the world is given in the Qur’an to the whole
community of believers, no one can be raised to that position (every believer is a caliph of
God).79
                                                
76 Esposito and Piscatori, “Democratization,” 437; Hassan Al-Alkim, “Islam and
Democracy: Mutually Reinforcing or Incompatible,” in Power-sharing Islam? ed.
Azzam Tamimi (London: Liberty for Muslim World Publications, 1993), 77-89. After
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77 Abu’l A’la Mawdudi, “Political Theory of Islam,” in Islam: Its Meaning and Message
ed. Khurshid Ahmad (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1975), 160.
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Khurshid Ahmad presents a contemporary conceptualization of Islamic democracy which
deals with the issues of sharia’s supremacy and the relativistic philosophy behind modern
liberal democracy. Speaking about the “multifaced” reality of democracy, he argues that a
particular western model of democracy must not be seen as an ideal form of democracy for
all the world, including Islamic world who had its own identity and civilization.80 Ahmad
underlines the claim that the term people’s sovereignty as a philosophical root of
democracy indicates also a rejection of the relevance of absolute religious and moral
values over politics by seeing popular will as the source of values, principles and ideals.
And he continues in this way as follows: “As absolute values have no place in this system,
the standards of right and wrong were subjected to the whims of the people, who began to
change their ethical values as they changed their clothes and fashions.”81 Morally defined
individual and society of Islam, to Ahmad, could only realize the spiritual and material
perfection in an “ideological, educational and consultative (Islamic) state” which enables
them to serve the “higher moral ideals of life,” i.e. God’s pleasure and eternal bliss.
Despite this moral limitation, Ahmad does not accept to drop his Islamist claim to
democracy and comes to conclude that “If democracy means rights of a people to self-
determination and self-fulfillment, that is what Islam and the Muslim people are striving
for, nothing more and nothing short of that.”82 Regarding the stance of “Islamic
democracy”, it might be said that this approach constituted a version of a selective Islamist
attitude towards the western achievements in its call for taking the good aspects of
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“western” democracy. Given the naivity in the insistence of developing a kind of specific
democracy, this approach is also replete with the neglect of the relations between
mechanism and values.83
An interesting example of the search for an Islamic democracy in Turkish Islamism is
provided by a leading contemporary Turkish Islamist intellectual, Ali Bulaç. He, in his
proposal of Medina Document as a form of living together, tries to advance a kind of
Islamic democracy which accepts pluralism, different ways of lives and multiple law of
communities in participatory bases. Given his consideration of keeping the supremacy of
sharia for the devoted Muslims, he comes to propose a new contract among the
communities consisting of people with similar ways of life: “In the new Medina Contract,
public sphere will include the common goods and common bads as agreed by the social
blocs.... Legislation is left within the realm of social blocs. Therefore, each social bloc is
given an opportunity to lead its way of life.”84
After an elaboration of Islamist notions of democracy, it would be appropriate to examine
the issue of Islam(ism) and democracy with a reference to the theoretical writings by some
students of Islam and the Middle East.
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1.3.2 Views of Observers: The Continuation of the Same Discussion on (In)compatibility
Among the students of Islam, the relationship between Islam and democracy is generally
discussed along the dominant line that finds compatibility or incompatibility betwen these
two. Some scholars such as Elie Kedourie, Majid Khadduri and Bernard Lewis seem to
take sides with the incompatibility argument. According to Kedourie, there is nothing in
the Islamic political tradition which might be connected to “the organizing ideas of
constitutional and representative government” in the West. In this way, he argues that the
notions of popular sovereignty, representation, elections, legislation by a parliament, an
independent judiciary, secularity of the state and lastly civil society are alien to the Islamic
political tradition.85
Khadduri also asserts that Islamic theory of the state, placing ultimate responsibility in
God’s representatives, is certainly not inherently democratic in principle; on the contrary,
the people whose basic duties are to obey God’s law and his representatives, is a passive
element in principle. In an Islamic political system, political parties are not recognized as a
legitimate political opposition to the power but conceived as an act of unbelieving of
heterodox religious-political groups. 86 Having rejected the Islamist argument that Islam is
the only authentic democracy, Bernard Lewis also put a stress on the absence in Islamic
political tradition of the notion of citizenship as participation and secularism. 87 The public
aspect of Islam as a religion and “Islamicist utopia” is seen as as an obstacle to both
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democracy and political modernity by Addi Lahouari who maintained that “democratic
ideology” can be compatible with Islam only if the latter is reduced to a private concern.88
Apart from the difficulties for the adoption of democracy into the Islamic political thought,
the nonexistence of democracy in the Islamic countries could also explained by the lack of
socio-economic transformation. According to Charles Issawi who does not find the socio-
economic level of development in the middle east enough to have “a political democracy”,
for the establishment of “a genuine democracy” in the region, there is a need of “a great
social and economic transformation” which will prepare the society for bearing the
burdens of the modern state.89
Ahmet Arslan expresses an idea on the possibility of reconciling democracy with Islam by
the statement that “Islam during its history, has appropriated many of the things thought to
be non-Islamic at the beginning” though it is not meaningful to derive democracy from
Islam.90 Any discussion of Islam and democray had to face the challenge that neither Islam
nor democracy as a political concept have all encompassing definitions. This situation is
connected to the fact that Islam has rich and different traditions within itself and its
spiritual meaning, i.e. a comprehension of world, universe and the afterlife, rather than its
political meaning, has a greater say in its conceptualization as a religion. Islam’s
addressing to the totality of life and human relations is another factor that makes the
picture more complex.91
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According to John L. Esposito, an incompatibility approach has to remind the fact that the
said imcompatibility have been found between Christianity and Judaism by some secular
and religious writers since the traditions, values and beliefs of these religions had been
formed before the development of the modern democracy. Moreover, these religions had
also been employed in the legitimation of undemocratic states and empires, ranging from
divine kingdom to dictatorship.92 William Zartman furthers the same point by presenting
the argument that there is no inherent compatibility between democracy and Islam. Like all
scripture, the Qur’an can be interpreted to support many different types of political
behaviour and systems of government.93 Under the light of these observations, therefore, it
seems true to look at not to Islam as a religion but to the Islamist depictions of state and
Islamist legitimation of any political authority to situate the relationship between Islam and
liberal democracy.
John L. Esposito and John O. Voll seem to regard Islamism and its call for Islamic
democracy as compatible with democracy if Islamic principles are not interpreted in a
strict way and if a a specific western experience is not imposed on the Islamic world.94
Bassam Tibi, who places his thoughts in the philosophical tradition of classical Islamic
rationalism, disagrees with Esposito’s and Voll’s contention that Islamism is a variety of
democracy. Since establishing democracy on religious grounds is not possible, Tibi
defended the idea that Islamism or an Islamic democracy could not be democratic in a real
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sense though Islam and democracy are compatible in the sense that if Islam is understood
as a religion and divine ethics.95 To interpret Islamic ethics in a democratic manner is to
participate in the common core of ethical values of humanity, i.e human rights and
democracy, which might be shared by people of different civilizations. Given classical
Islam’s experience with Greek philosophy, Tibi points to Islam’s openness to learning
from the other civilizations and finds many ethical affinities between Islam and
democracy.96 By using Popperian word, Tibi envisages “Open Islam” which is liberal and
open to embracing cultural modernity, democracy and civil society, and its enemies,
political Islam. Bearing in mind the fact that Islamic rationalism was one of the factors in
the emergence of European Renaissance and cultural modernity, he speaks about the
possibility of a syhthesis of Islam and democracy through Islamic rationalism, not through
any Islamism.97 Thus, Tibi’s compatibility argument is directly related to his
conceptualization of Islam as a religion and ethics which reduces sharia principles from
legal rules to mere ethical values.
George Joffe tied the Islamist emphasis on morality (which seems to be a major point of
conflict with democracy) to the Islamic inability to face the challenge of modernism and
the ensuing failure in embracing secularism in public sphere, as took place before the
nineteenth-century in Europe. The cause for this failure lies in the overemphasis on jurisdic
tradition while marginalizing the rationalist philosophic tradition in Islam. The Islamist
failure in adopting democratic values and an escape into the moral and normative world of
                                                
95 Bassam Tibi, “Islam, Democracy and the Vision of An Islamic State” in World, Islam
and Democracy ed. Yahya Sezai Tezel and Wulf Schönbohm (Ankara: Konrad
Adenauer Foundation, 1999), 53-54.
96 Tibi, “Islam,” 58-60, 64.
97 Tibi, “The Cultural Underpinning of Civil Society in Islamic Civilization: Islam and
Democracy- Bridges Between the Civilizations,” in Civil Society, Democracy and the
Muslim World ed. Elisabeth Özdalga and Sune Persson (Istanbul: Swedish Research
Institute, 1997), 29-30.
58
Islam, to Joffe, mainly are stemming from “an inability to cope with the socio-political
atomism implicit within the democratic project.” That was tantamount to the denial of the
ideological implications of modernism which produced an incomplete transition from
organic to a mechanical society in Durkheimian sense.98
The worldly and relativistic roots of democracy’s philosophy which contradicts any
religious claim to a monopoly over the absolute truth seems to students of Islam as the
most problematic issue in the pursuit of a synthesis between Islam and democracy.99 Saad
Eddin Ibrahim points to the significant place of “sacred” and “absolute” in religion and
thus to the difficulties in tolerating and recognizing the other in such exclusive belief
systems. On the other hand, each definition of democracy embraces ”the inclusion of all
human beings of the community” regardless of their differences in religion, race or
ethnicity and “the peaceful management of differences” as legal and political equals.100
Now, it is the time to situate the Islamist conceptualizations of democracy within the
confines of the literature on democratic theory. This attempt should also be made with a
special reference to the supremacy of the sharia in Islamic political thought.
1.3.3 Elitist Democracy: A Schumpeterian or An Islamist Conceptualization?
The above analyses of the Islamist conceptualization of democracy make it clear that
Islamists generally has an inclination of understanding democracy in elitist and procedural
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terms, like Joseph Schumpeter. Perhaps, a critical comparison of Schumpeterian
democracy and Islamist conceptualizations of democracy will contribute much to the
ongoing debate.
Schumpeter conceives democracy as a political method, that is, an “institutional
arrangement for reaching political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”101 Democracy has
nothing to do with ideals. It is not and end itself, irrespective of what decisions it will
produce under given historical conditions. On the contrary, it could serve a variety of
ideals because there are no ultimate values and interests to which all parts of society might
be related and because there exists a statist division between the rulers and the ruled. Thus,
there is nothing about democracy which necessarily makes it desirable. Schumpeter also
claims that democratic method as an instrument can only have “instrumental value,” it is
“incapable of being an end itself.” Democracy could be justified by showing that, as a
method for arriving at political decisions, it is superior to any possible alternative.
Certainly, this expectation of high performance amounts, in Islamist mind, to
demonstrating that the decisions arrived at in a democratic regime will be better (more
Islamic) than those produced by other political regimes. Schumpeterian account of the
“democratic method” assigns a small role to the citizenry of a democratic society: “the role
of the people is to produce a government or else an intermediate body which in turn will
produce a national executive or government.”102 Similarly in the determinations of the
ultimate values, Islamist discourses tend to assign a small role to the people and a rather
large role to the experts (ulema).
                                                
101 Joseph A.Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy London:Unwin
University Books, 1974, 13th edition), 269 and 242.
102 Ibid, 269.
60
Schumpeter advances the view that people do not actually rule in democracy; they just
elect those who would rule. Democracy is a system of the elected and the competing elites;
thus it is the rule of the politician: “democracy does not mean and cannot mean that the
people actually rule in any obvious sense of the terms ‘people’ and ‘rule.’ Democracy
means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are
to rule them.”103
In Islamist conceptualizations, democracy is defined in terms of procedural principles and
justified on the basis of its service to the supremacy of sharia and to the common interests
of the Muslim people. In other words, Islamist conceptualization of democracy construes
the interests of the people narrowly within the framework of the sharia values. Democratic
elitism would not have so much difficulty in accepting this limited notion of the people
though the supremacy of sharia is still a point of tension. Moreover, any Islamist
inclination towards elitism and a limited sovereignty to people could be well based on
Schumpeter’s claim that no matter how intelligent and competent ordinary people were in
their private life, when it came to politics such people would lack any real competence. As
Schumpeter states: “Thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental
performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which
he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes
a primitive again. His thinking becomes associative and affective.”104 A search for a “real
interest” of the people again seems to have some paralellism to the Islamist mind which
defines the interest of the people in relation to the Islamic principles.
Schumpeter’s attack to the nature of the idea of a popular will in the theory of the classical
democracy may well serve any Islamist purpose on the limitation of the popular
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sovereignty by the sharia. According to Schumpeter, the popular will on any issue is
manufactured exactly anologous to the commercial advertising.105 The so called will of the
people, in reality, is the will of the majority and is replete with the assumption that there is
a uniquely determined common good discernible to all. In fact, there is no such thing. This
is due to the fact that to different individuals and groups, “the common good is bound to
mean different things and due to the fact that “ultimate values-our conception of what life
and what society should be- are beyond the range of mere logic. They may be bridged by
compromise in some cases but not in others.”106
In Islamist discussions on democracy, the source of the common good and of the ultimate
values is certainly the sharia. In Islamist usage, when it is referred to the supremacy of
sharia in an Islamic society, it is not necessarily meant that this society is constituted and
regulated some strict laws which emanates from sharia. But it is pointed to the moralizing
impact of the notion of sharia in an Islamist framework. The question of sovereignty
(hakimiyah) in Islamic political thought is intimately linked to the conceptualization of
state and to the idea of law (legislation). In actuality, sovereignty constitutes a framework
within which political authority in Islamic political theory is legitimized.107
The conceptualization of God in Islam entails that the supreme sovereignty of the earth
and the universe belongs to God (malik ul mulk; Lord of the earth) who alone has the
prerogative to determine the moral, legal and religious values of the Islamic community.
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Human being is the vicegerent of God on the earth. Therefore, it is correct to argue that
sovereignty in its ultimate sense belongs to God (divine law) and its immediate sense it
belongs to the community108 or the individual, who is the integral part of the divine trust of
vicegerency. The sovereignty of God should be understood in legal terms rather than in
political terms.109 This sovereignty is expressed through the moral obligation of the
believers on the observance of His law: shari’a.110 Yet from this understanding of
sovereignty it is possible “to deduce many different political systems, both monarchical
and republican, and a wide variety of mechanisms of government, provided only that the
supreme law of the state, the sharia, is respected.”111
Thus, it is inevitable that any Islamist conceptualization of democracy would have a kind
of common good determined by sharia values whether this conceptualization is based on
the popular will of the people or it is based on elitism, especially regarding the
promulgation of a constitution and laws by experts (ulema). For the ultimate values of any
Islamic society-the conception of what life and what society should be- are to be settled in
the moral world of Islam. Thus, a Schumpeterian conceptualization of democracy as a
political method (but not as an end) could be regarded as appropriate to the Islamist
                                                
108 Ahmad Hasan, The Doctrine of Ijma in Islam. (Islamabad: Islamic Research
Institute,1991), 21-22.
109 While rejecting the idea that God is politically sovereign, Fazlur Rahman contends that
the statements in the Qur’an on God as being the supreme judge and all-powerful do
not even refer to legal sovereignty. He claims that “God neither acts as political
sovereign nor as a law-maker. The Muslim people themselves are the sovereign and
the law-maker” “Implementation of the Islamic Concept of State in the Pakistani
Milieu” Islamic Studies September VI:3 (1967), 209.
110 Certainly, it is the people who make laws by deriving their legal norms from the
revelation (the ulama) and who enforce (the caliph) it. Islamic law, though divine in its
origin, is human in its matters, its promulgation, its implementation and its end: the
welfare of man (maslaha) see David de Santillana, “Law and Society” in The Legacy
of Islam Sir Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume (eds.) (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1931), 290
111 H.A.R. Gibb, “Constitutional Organization,” in Law in the Middle East, ed. Majid
Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1955), 6.
63
conception of democracy which embodies Islamic moral values to which a Muslim
community (and their sense of common good) is supposed to be devoted.
The conception of shari’a, defined as comprising both “the acts of the heart as well as
overt acts,” contains a moral character to the extent that the ideal of shari’a is coterminous
with the “good” and “just.”112 The comprehensive nature of Islamic law is perhaps the
main source for the Islamist identification of Islamic life with state’s conformity with the
shari’a. The moral character of the state and its responsibility for enforcing the stipulations
of shari'a have led some students of Islam to conclude that state in Islam is ideologically
based, and the main purpose of government is to safeguard the faith, not the state.113 In the
same vein, Majid Khadduri points out that "[the] Law ... precedes the state: it provides the
basis of the state. It is therefore not God, but God's law which really governs, and, as such,
the state should be called nomocracy, not theocracy."114 Nomocracy (Gr. nomos, law and
kratein, to rule) is a system of government based on a legal code, the rule of law in a
community.115 A number of scholars116 agree that Islam espouses nomocracy whereas
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some insist that it is a kind of theocracy.117 Nomocracy does not name a governmental
system, parallel to monarchy or democracy, but designates a certain kind of placement of
the ultimate source of state authority, regardless of the form of government. What concerns
us here is the relationship between sovereignty and the law not the forms of government.
In Islamic political thought, it is a well-established fact that the shari’a is the ultimate
sovereign over the life of the community and the individual. Thus, the shari'a in this
account, is taken as prior to the community and the state.
1.3.4 What is Beyond: Contextualizing the Islamist Argumentation on Democracy
The discussion until now makes it clear that if by democracy is meant a form of
government which is the opposite of any kind of despotic/arbitrary rule, there is a
consensus on its compatibility with Islam. Islamists have a tendency to see the issue of
government as a matter of technique if the adoption of any technique, including
democratic government, does not violate the Islamic values and the supremacy of sharia in
an Islamic polity. However, it is clear that democracy is not just procedure (as a means) in
which people choose their rulers at regular intervals from among the politicians. Whether it
is seen as “an ideology”118 or “a condition of freedom from ideology (a moralising and
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power hungry way of life claiming to be universal)”119, democracy is also ‘a way of life’
(as an end) which contradicts with the ideological nature of the Islamic state. John Keane
lays a stress on the profound tension between ideologically defined Islam and democracy
and continues:
democracy rejoices in hotchpotch, melange and controversy, for that is how
novelty enters the world. Democracy loves indeterminacy and change by
conflict-and-compromise. It fears and resists the absolutism of the pure, the
Grand ideology... Religion by definition has a dogmatic core and it is
therefore on tense terms with democracy, which encourages ceaseless debate
and self-questioning and, thus public spaces for citizens to challenge and to
reject many a sacred axiom.120
Expectedly, Islam, as a system of belief based upon at least minimum unquestionable
ideals, would clash with this kind of conceptualization of democracy. The classical
tradition and its Islamist interpretations do not accept the relativity of truth, a basic
principle of pluralism. As I have tried to describe to this point, on the one hand, Islamist
thinkers seem to be open and willing to reinterpret the classical theories of the state in
order to adopt a democratic form of government but on the other, as Fatıma Mernissi’s
work121 illustrates, the attempt to grasp the ongoing interplay between Islam and
democracy necessitates venturing into the values, ideals and ‘fears’ of Muslims. Although
Islam teaches the principles of freedom, human dignity, equality, pluralism, popular
vicegerency and the rule of law, there are deeply rooted differences between democratic
values and Islamic tradition. To give an example, Western notion of freedom is not what in
Islamic political culture is called justice (adl) and there is no word for citizenship in
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Islamic lexicon.122 To adopt the principle that all, including Muslims and non-Muslims,
must be equal before the law would be acceptable more easily than the principle that all
should be be equal in framing the law. In both the classical jurisdic theory and in the
present Islamisms, framing of a law has been regarded as the concern, the right and the
duty of men of knowledge, i.e. the ulema.
In fact, the question of whether Islam is compatible with democratic values should be
reworded in the way that whether Islamist interpretations/reconstructions of Islamic
tradition were/are compatible with democratic values or not. The absence of democracy in
Islamic countries has little to do with Islamic principles and much to do with their Islamist
interpretations. The answer to this question also must be looked for in the Islamist
literature which read the modern issues in the light of the classical Islamic political values
and concepts. This statement should not be taken in the sense that we consider the history
of political thought as the only element in the establishment of a democratic political
culture in Islamic countries. It is certain that the experience with democracy and elite’s
attitudes in this respect were also significant for the establishment and consolidation of
democracy in the Islamic world. But here, this study will confine itself to the analysis of
Islamist political thought on state and democracy with a special reference to the Islamist
intellectuals.
It is obvious that Islamist ideology in general is not compatible with the idea of
democracy. And when they appreciate the significance of democracy, Islamists are
basically concerned with the limitation of an arbitrary/despotic rule and the establishment
of the rule of law. But certainly this is not the end of the story. The totalitarian nature of
Islamist ideology/ideologies have had a close tie to the dominant ideological atmosphere in
the West.
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Islamist depictions of state, as will be shown in this study for Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s
totalitarian Başyücelik State, seem to be influenced by the political ideologies of their
times such as the totalitarian aspects of communism and of fascism. In Kısakürek’s Great
East, Islam as an ideology of salvation was presented with, if we express in Sayyid’s
words, “all the certainity of a meta-narrative.”123 Progress, a meta-narrative of the Islamists
in the second constitutional period had been replaced by another meta-narrative, ideology
in Kısakürek’s political thinking. The content of his ideologization of Islam was coloured
by grand claims; Great East as the ideology of humanity and essentialist distinctions and
classifications; East, West and Islam. The Young Ottomans ideologized Islam to direct the
political mind and to mobilize masses in the path of progress and constitutionalism
whereas Kısakürek derived an ideology from Islam to provide the Muslims with “a map of
action” to understand and to explain the modern world. The role of religion as a “soft
ideology” became a kind of “hard ideology” in Kısakürek’s formulation, determining
every aspect of political, societal and individual life.
But nevertheless, reminding the Islamist attempts to read Islam from a democratic angle in
the second constitutional period in the Ottoman empire, this observation may lead to the
conclusion that Islamist intellectuals and movements could/may adopt the democratic
values and institutions from the West, whether in the forms of an Islamic democracy or in
the form of dropping their demand of an Islamic state. Islamist adoption of democracy
might be possible only if any democratic wave on the part of both political elite and
intellectuals establishes itself as a strong political tradition in Islamic countries.
Nevertheless, the guidance of sharia for a Muslim individual and society would continue to
constitute a source of Islamist demands and furher Islamist revitalization of the idea of an
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Islamic state. The process of transforming sharia principles as universal ethical values is
not easy though it seems possible in the future.
Islamist emphasis on the supremacy of sharia employes sometimes a democratic discourse
in appearance, as worded by Gudrun Kramer as follows: “given that all people are created
equal and that consequently no one has the right to impose his or her will on others, and
given that people are too weak to control their passions and desires (hawa), a higher
authority is needed to keep them in check. This higher authority is divine law, binding on
all-high and low, rich and poor. The submission to God’s sovereignty as demonstrated in
the strict and exclusive application of the sharia, therefore signifies not just the (only
genuine) rule of law, but also the (only genuine) liberation of man from servitude to man
(‘ubudiyyat al-insan).”124
Any Islamist claim to democracy has to answer the following questions: are all laws and
government policies humanly decided in accordance with the changing opinions of people
in an Islamic state? What is sharia? Let alone the problem of defining sharia, is sharia
incumbent over those who do not share Islamic belief and if not, how could a unity of law
be kept in a given state? If sharia’s principles are transformed into general public ethics of
an Islamic community, what is the stance of the state regarding these ethical principles?
And is the reduction of sharia from legal rules to ethical values something appropriate for
the realization of Islamic/Islamist ideals.
An illustrative example that deals with the above mentioned questions is supplied by
Fazlur Rahman who put a great emphasis on the community as the final authority in
understanding Islam. As to the Islamic community’s right to interpret the text of the
Qur’an and to understand the sharia principles, Fazlur Rahman expressed a positive view
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on the community’s performance in this respect. By arguing that the Islamic community is
charged by the Qur’an with a certain moral mission, he proposed a solution to the problem
of the lack of values in democratic regimes as follows: “if the Muslim ummah is just like
other societies, including western ones, then we must admit that the Muslim ummah does
not exist.” Put it differently, Rahman comes to say that if there exists a Muslim ummah,
then, its democratic regime will not experience the ethical and spiritual crisis of the
western democracies.125 Seen in this formulation as well, there is a long way to walk on
the issue of Islam and democracy.
All said, it would be correct to say that the attempts of reconciling Islamic political
tradition with the Western notions of state and democracy, will continue to dominate the
intellectual agenda of Muslims. The process of reinterpreting Islamic political tradition in
terms of Western political achievements through the principle of ijtihad is still going on.
The limits for the operation of ijtihad in the minds of Islamists also constitute the other side
of the pendalum between authoritarian/totalitarian126 and democratic inclinations in the
future reformation of Islamic political thought.
After such theoretical perspectives on state and democracy in Islam in general, now it is
the time to observe the reflections of the discussion on the Islamist political thought in the
Second Constitutional Period in the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER II
ISLAMISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1908-1918) I: A QUEST FOR
ISLAMIC MODERNİTY
Islam, they say, is a stumbling-block to the progress of the state
This story was not known before, and now it is the fashion.
Forgetting our religious loyalty in all our affairs
Following Frankish ideas is now the fashion.
Ziya Paşa.
2.1 Organizing Ideas of Ottoman-Turkish Political Modernization on the “Decline”
The debate on the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the call for reform among the
Ottoman political elite started in the middle of the sixteenth century when the Empire was
at the peak of its power. A grand vezir of the Sultan Suleyman the Magnificient, Lutfi
Pasha drew attention to the signs of weakness and decline in the Ottoman state and society.
His book Asafname was not only an example of Islamic advice literature to rulers but also
it was the first example of Ottoman political writing in which “the urgent and hopeful
demand for reform gives way to a profoundly pessimistic longing for a lost Golden Age
[the idealized era of the Ottoman Empire exemplified by the reign of Sultan Suleiman], as
the faith of the Turks in their ability to restore the greatness of the past faded.”1 The several
books of this tradition, including Mustafa Ali’s Nushat üs-Selatin (Counsel for Sultans, in
1581), Koçi Bey’s Risale (presented to Sultan Murad IV in 1630), Katib Çelebi’s Düstur
ül-Amel fi-Islah ül-Halel (Regulations for Reforming Defects, presented to Sultan
Mehmed IV in 1653) and Sarı Mehmed Pasha’s Nasaih ül-Vüzera ve-ül-Ümera (Counsel
                                                
1 Bernard Lewis, “Ottoman Observers of Ottoman Decline.” Islamic Studies. I, (March
1962): 74.
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for Viziers and Commanders, written in 1703)2, laid a great stress on the restoration of the
political order (maintaining the status quo as elaborated in “the circle of justice”), the
elimination of corruption, and the respect for shariah and qanun, which was the strength of
the religion and state (din-ü-devlet)3. With the aim to restore the Ottoman greatness, this
literature underlined, in their conceptualization of the decline of the Empire, the concepts
of justice, shariah and qanun which were the other names of the rule of law in the Ottoman
political system.
Starting with Ibrahim Müteferrika’s Usul ül-Hikem fi Nizam ül-Ümem (Philosophical
Principles for the Polities of Nations, presented to Sultan Mahmud I in 1731), the Ottoman
statesmen recognized the fact that they should learn from the military strategies of the
European enemies while at the same time adhering to shariah.4 The reason for the failure
of the Ottomans in the field of military and economics was not because of the insufficiency
of the qanun and shariah but because of the reluctance in adopting the new methods of the
                                                
2 Zuhuri Danışman, trans., Koçi Bey Risalesi [Report of Koçi bey] (İstanbul: Milli
Eğitim Bakanlığı yay., 1997); Katip Çelebi, Bozuklukların Düzeltilmesinde Tutulacak
Yollar [Regulations for Reforming Defects] ed. Ali Can (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm
Bakanlığı yay., 1982); Defterdar Sarı Mehmet Paşa, Devlet Adamlarına Öğütler
[Counsel for Viziers and Commanders] ed. Hüseyin Ragıp Uğural (Ankara: Kültür
Bakanlığı yay., 1992).
3 Lewis, “Ottoman,” 83. On the advice (decline) literature, see also Cornell Fleischer,
“Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and ‘Ibn Khaldunism’ in the Sixteenth Century
Ottoman Letters,” in Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Ideology, ed. Bruce B. Lawrence
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984), 46-68; Douglas A. Howard, “Ottoman Historiography and
the Literature of ‘Decline’ of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.” Journal of
Asian History. 22 (1988): 54; Agah Sırrı Levend “Siyaset-nameler.” [A Mirror for
Princes] Türk Dili Araştırmaları Yıllığı Belleten. I (1962): 71-87; Ahmet Uğur,
Osmanlı Siyaset-nameleri [Ottoman Mirrors for Princes] (Kayseri: Erciyes
Üniversitesi Yay, 1992) and Mehmet Öz, Osmanlı’da “Çözülme” ve Gelenekçi
Yorumcuları [Decline and Its Traditionalist Interpreters in the Ottoman Empire]
(İstanbul:Dergah, 1997).
4 İbrahim Müteferrika, Milletlerin Düzeninde İlmi Usüller [Philosophical Principles for
the Polities of Nations] (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı yay., 1990) and Virginia H.
Aksan, “Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808.” International Journal of Middle East
Studies. 25 (1993): 53-69.
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Europeans in these fields5. The awareness of the need to reform the Ottoman state
structure by borrowing from the West, certainly firstly in the military field6, became
manifest when Sultan Selim III convened a council to discuss the problems of the Empire.
One of the participants, Ebubekir Ratib Efendi (an ambassador to Vienna, 1791-92) in his
report, expressed the idea that” the introduction of the new order (nizam-ı cedid) of Europe
would be needed for the Ottoman Empire to regain its former position of power”7
Following this line of thinking, the reform movements of the nineteenth century, namely
Tanzimat and Islahat differed from the earlier ideas of reform in one major understanding:
“modern European society was superior in many ways to that of the Ottomans; that instead
of seeking to regain the past, new institutions and new methods should be imported from
the West.”8
Apart from the recognition of the necessity for the adoption of new institutions from
Europe, still at the beginning of the nineteenth century, in an official Ottoman note sent in
August 1821 to the Russian ambassador, the Ottoman state was described as “the
Muhammedan state and Ahmedi (Muslim) nation [which]... was born 1200 years ago,”
                                                
5 Berkes, The Development. 45.
6 This awareness can be linked to the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 after the defeat
of the Ottomans by Russia, an event that urged the Ottoman political elite toward
westernization Roderic H. Davison, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-
1923: The Impact of the West (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), xi.
7 Aksan, “Ottoman,” 63. Aksan notes that the classical Ottoman model of social and
political harmony embodied in the circle of justice lost its force as a literary convention
in the Ottoman political writing of 1768-1808 period, p. 64.
8 Standford J. Shaw, “Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth-
Century Ottoman Reformers,” in Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: the
Nineteenth Century ed. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 32.
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being the heirs of the city state established in Medina in 622.9 True to this commitment, the
reforms of Selim III, Mahmud II, Tanzimat and Islahat were made ‘for the sake of religion
and state’ and presented as being compatible with Islam and as being necessary in order to
keep its ideals. Put it differently, the traditional philosophy of the Ottoman state, din ü
devlet was present in all these reforms.10 Ottoman statesmen’s concern on keeping the
shariah was so important that the attempts of reform were legitimated with the claim that
they were trying to regenerate religion and state.
But what was significant in Tanzimat and in the following reforms was that they gave the
“expression of the need to get into step with a rapidly changing world, the world created
through the still rumbling French Revolution and the nascent Industrial Revolution. The
Tanzimat was not an imitation of Europe: it was Ottoman participation in an Age of
Reform when Europe itself lacked stability.”11 With the proclamation of the Tanzimat, the
notion that reform was merely the import of military weapons and technics was abandoned
and replaced by the understanding that keeping the unity of the Empire was possible only
by restructuring state and society on the basis of modern political institutions such as a
parliament, a constitution etc.12 Tanzimat aimed to transform procedures (usüller) into
                                                
9 Uriel Heyd, “The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and
Mahmud II,” in the Modern Middle East ed. Albert Hourani, Philips S. Khoury and
Mary C. Wilson (London and New York: I.B.Touris and Co ltd, 1993), 50.
10 Ibid., 53; see also İnalcık, From Empire. 136. In the Hatti Sherif of Gülhane of 1839
which was issued with “the sole benevolent intention of strenghtening the religion and
the State, and with the sincere desire of giving renewed vigour to the Law,” the
traditonal philosophy was clearly stated; see Salahi R. Sonyel, “Tanzimat and Its
Effects on the Non-Muslim Subjects of the Ottoman Empire,” in Tanzimat’ın 150.
Yıldönümü Uluslar arası Sempozyumu (Ankara:Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), 363.
11 Ezel Kural Shaw, “Tanzimat in the Ottoman Empire Age of Reform in Europe,” in
Tanzimat’ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu (Bildiriler) (Ankara: Milli
Kütüphane, 1991), 208.
12 By arguing that the Tanzimat period is a “seed-time” in which ideas and institutions of
political modernization which later became ripe in the Republic first took root,
74
institutions, for example usul-ü meşveret (shura) was linked to an institution, namely
parliament.13 Modernization was seen as an adaptation to the age or as meeting the needs
of the age (icab-ı asra intibak yada ihtiyacatı asrı karşılamak) and in this vein, Tanzimat
presented itself as the establishment of the rule of law and restructuring the
administration.14
The Gülhane Rescript of 1839 (Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber; Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerifi)
advocated the idea of Ottoman nation (composed of different religious groups; millets) as
an imperial, solidaristic ideology, in order to preserve the unity of the state and to eliminate
the increasing separatist demands of the Christian subjects of the Empire. By recognizing
the urgent need to reform the Ottoman state and society, the Tanzimat Statesmen preferred
an autocratic and centralizing way of modernization by thinking that they alone had the
necessary knowledge to reform the Empire.15 The elitism of the Tanzimat statesmen might
be connected to the fact that the first direct Western intellectual effect on Ottoman ideas
was through the tradition of enlightened despotism of the Western states and Cameralism.
                                                                                                                                         
Davison enumaretes twelve points in this respect: 1) the concept of the state as the
fatherland of its people, 2) the concept that sovereignty should be complete and
uninfringed, 3) the concept of the state as an indivisible territorial unit, 4)The concept
of people as individual citizens of a state, not as members of a religious community
from which they derive their civil status, 5) the concept of the equality of all citizens
before the law, 6) the concept of the guaranteed individual rights and civil liberties, 7)
the concept of the right of the people to a representative voice in government, 8) the
concept of a written constitution on the western model, 9)the concept of the right of the
people to control the government, 10) the concept of responsible government, 11)the
concept of the separation of powers, 12) the concept of an expanded sphere of
governmental activity and responsibility, Davison, Essays. 243-264.
13 Şerif Mardin, Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset (İstanbul: İletişim, 1990), 255. The great
desire for institutionalization and less emphasis on good ruler (a traditional Ottoman
argument) were apparent in the ideas of Ottoman reformist statesmen like Mustafa
Reşit Paşa. This was also the very core of the modern constitutionalist movement, ibid,
pp. 252, 254.
14 İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı [The Longest Century of (İstanbul: Hil
yay., 1995, 3rd ed.), 205.
15 Shaw, “Some,” 37.
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Cameralism, a theory underpinning enlightened despotism, seemed appropriate to
Ottoman statesmen in order to create a national unity from a very dispersed country under
the umbrella of Ottoman citizenship as a melting pot.16 Consequently, the Tanzimat
reformers “did not see the role of the state as that of nightwatchman, as liberal theory
required; the state had to be interventionist -the state as social engineer- so as to transform
society.”17 The elitism of the Tanzimat statesmen produced the intellectual opposition of
the Young Ottomans in the 1860s. For purposes of this discussion, the most significant
development of the Tanzimat period was the emergence of the intellectuals alongside the
ulema who were losing their power and influence with the impact of modernization.
Before discussing the rise of the intellectual, it is important to observe the ulema’s position
towards westernization movement and its decline.
2.2 The Decline of the Ulema and the Emergence of Intellectuals: Early Islamist
Ideas in the Ottoman Empire
The power of the Ulema during the earlier phases of Ottoman modernization increased
considerably and they secured their representation during all the age of reform (1839-
1918) in many of the committees which were established to determine specific issues of
reform. Sultan Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II who gave a permanent place to
şeyhülislam in the cabinet, were supported by the ulema in their adoption of European
military science and the employment of foreign instructors and experts.18 The support of
ulema to the reforms also showed itself in political aspects of modernization by their active
                                                
16 Şerif Mardin, Türk Modernleşmesi, [Turkish Modernization] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1991),
12-13, 83.
17 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London and New York: Routledge,
1993), 27.
18 Heyd, “The Ottoman,” 30-31. Veli-zade Mehmed Emin, Tatarcık Abdullah, Mehmet
Tahir, Mehmed Es’ad and some others were among the ulema who expressed their
approval of the reforms.
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role in the promulgation of 1876 Constitution and in the convention of the first Ottoman
parliament. This support was mainly because of their awareness that reform was the only
way to save the Empire and the glory of Islam against their European enemies. They
supported the reforms due to the deeply rooted conviction that ”the basic character of the
Ottoman Empire as an Islamic state was being preserved and that their own position within
the system was not being seriously threatened.”19 But side by side with support, the
opposition of the lower ulema to the reforms was also evident especially when the reforms
were regarded as contrary to the principles of the sharia.20 Nevertheless, the ulema’s
position in the reform movement gradually weakened as a result of the secularising nature
of further reforms and as a result of the ulema’s inability to devise a working formula as to
how European institutions and ideas could be adopted into Ottoman society. Moreover as
Şükrü Hanioğlu states, the ulema “due to their close adherence to the establishment,
seemed unable to produce ideologies that challenged the westernization movement,
leaving fervent popular feeling against westernization with no strong guiding ideology.”21
True to these observations, Islamist current of thought in the Ottoman Empire was
developed not by the ulema but mainly by intellectuals who were familiar with western
philosophy and science even though some of them were of ulema origin.
The advent of modernity in the West and its profound repercussions on the Ottomans
initiated a new intellectual reformulation beyond the traditional formulations. For the
Ottoman intellectual, Western political philosophy supplied political and philosophical
concepts of far-reaching significance in order to adopt the modern political institutions and
at the same time in order to reimagine Islamic political values. In this perspective, Young
                                                
19 David Kushner, “The Place of the Ulema in the Ottoman Empire During the Age of
Reform (1839-1918).” Turcica. 19 (1987): 72.
20 Kushner, “the Place,” 71.
21 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Oppositon (Oxford: Oxford University
Press,1995),10.
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Ottomans’ opposition to the reform policies of Tanzimat and at the same time their
appropriation of modern ideas into Islamic forms can be seen as the attempt of “the first
modern ideological movement”22 and can also be seen as the emergence of a group of
intellectuals from the ruling strata of the Ottoman empire. Transformation of Islam into a
modern ideology and its formulation as a universal political and social theory in the hands
of the Young Ottomans23 were the products of this new group of intellectuals who were
very different from the alim (plural, ulema) of the Ottoman polity. Alim was a scholar,
representing Islamic learning and morality, and a part of the Ottoman ruling class who did
not have enough autonomy from state to criticize political goals of the state ideology. The
European impact on the Ottoman intellectuals, the Young Ottomans was manifested itself
in the areas of ideologies such as romanticism, and liberal constitutionalism and later this
impact extended itself to the ideologies of positivism and nationalism. In this respect,
political ideas of European philosophers, Montesquieu and Rousseau provided Young
Ottomans’ theoretical foundations to translate islamic jurisdic notions into western
political institutions and ideas. Although the Renaissance and the Reformation did not
found any considerable response among the Ottoman elite, the French Revolution made a
significant impact on the Ottomans. Nevertheless, the abolition of monarchy and
establishment of republic in France did not affect the Ottoman elite because “[t]he
Ottomans had been familiar for centuries with republican institutions in Venice and
Ragusa and there was nothing in the mere establishment of a republic to alarm them. What
was by now disturbing ruling circles in Istanbul was the secularism of the Revolution-the
seperation of State and Church, the abandonment of all religious doctrines, the cult of
                                                
22 Zürcher, Turkey. 74.
23 Türköne, İslamcılığın. 279, 30-31.
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reason”24 Young Ottomans’ selective approach to Western heritage in order to appropriate
good aspects of modern civilization became manifest in their reference to the eighteenth
century romanticism and to the concept of “natural law”, but not to the nineteenth century
positivism.25
Young Ottomans’ popularization of western political ideas in the Ottoman intellectual life
made its impact over all the quests for the progress of the Ottomans, including the three
schools of thought in the second constitutional period; Islamism, Turkism and Westernism.
In fact, each of these three schools, in their vision of reform for the empire, believed that a
degree of westernization was necessary both to strengthen the state and face the European
challenge. They differed as to what extent Westernization needed or acceptable. Three
schools of thought were primarily concerned with denying that Eastern (or Islamic) culture
was inferior to that of the West. Thus, since then, the distinction between “culture” and
“civilization” which was made by Young Ottomans and later developed Ziya Gökalp, has
constituted a framework for the Ottoman-Turkish intellectual life to discuss the scope,
limits and goals of Westernization (modernization) and its reflections in the Ottoman-
Turkish society.26 Through this distinction, Islamism, as an “ideology of salvation and
                                                
24 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey ( London: Oxford University press,
1968, 2nd edition), 40, 68; On this subject see also Şerif Mardin, “The Influence of the
French Revolution on the Ottoman Empire.” ISSJ, 119 (1989): 17.
25 Türköne, İslamcılığın. 272.
26 Gökalp considered all feelings, values and judgments as part of culture which was
national, while science and technology were regarded as belonging to civilization that
was international, see The Principles of Turkism trans. Robert Devereux
(Leiden:E.J.Brill, 1968), 22-23 and Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism:
The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp (London:Luzac Company and the Harvill
Press, 1950), 63. In Gökalp’s view, the distinction between culture and civilization was
so clear that there was no problem in accepting civilization, like religion in its entirety.
In Gökalp’s words, “when a nation reaches the higher stages of its development, it is
obliged to change its civilization” see Principles. 39-40.
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progress”27, tried to achieve a synthesis: to take technology of the West (civilization
aspect), but to reject their moral values (culture aspect). But unlike Gökalp, Islamists
advocated the idea of “islamic civilization” which regenerates itself in the modern world.
In other words, for Islamists, the most vital question to answer was “how to bring about a
synthesis of these European elements with Muslim Ottoman civilization; in other words
how to become modern while remaining oneself.”28 Although all the three schools were
progress oriented and reform minded, they differed on the values by which civilization and
identity of Ottomans would be established.29 Westernists had the inclination of becoming
Western (modern) by accepting civilizational conversion, while Islamists favored the
search for the revitalization of Islamic civilization, in today’s terminology native
modernity or a kind of non-western modernity or Islamic modernity.
2.3 Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period
It was during the “turbulent decade” of 1908-1918 that Islamism had established itself as
the strongest school of thought. Accepting the selective Westernization, indeed, the
Islamists of the Young Turk Period, Mehmed Akif (Ersoy),Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı, Said
Halim Paşa, Musa Kazim, Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, Elmalılı M. Hamdi, M.
Şemsettin (Günaltay), Eşref Edip (Fergan), Mustafa Sabri Efendi and Said-i Nursi to name
a few, continued the particular ambition of identifying certain traditional concepts of
Islamic thought with the dominant ideas of the West. The proclamation of the constitution
triggered a public debate on political and societal issues ranging from parliament to
womes’s place in society through the journals which all tried to create public opinion by
discussions among themselves as well. Like the members of other schools of thought,
                                                
27 Kara, Türkiye’de. vol.1, xxvıı.
28 Zürcher, Turkey. 132.
29 Göle, Modern. 25.
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Islamists gathered around journals to propagate their ideas about how the Ottoman
political and social life should be restructured. Sırat-ı Mustakim (later Sebil-ür Reşat)
Circle, the most important of all Islamist journals, represented a kind of Islamic
modernism or “an intellectual Islam” which focused on the idea that the gates of free
interpretation ((içtihad) and research had to be reopened for Islamic scholarship. A group
of the ulema, including Mustafa Sabri, Elmalılı Hamdi, İskilipli Atıf and Ermenekli M.
Safvet became organized in a circle of Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i İslamiye (Islamic Society of
Men of Learning) and published a monthly journal called Beyanu’l Hak (Presentation of
the Truth) to denounce the claim that Islam was an obstacle to progress. Another Islamist
circle, İttihad-ı Muhammedi which was a group of provincial, lower ulema, constituted a
kind of populist Islamism or people’s Islam (halk İslamlığı) in the second constitutional
period through Volkan journal.30
Following the political ideas of the Young Ottomans, shura and meşveret turned into the
principle of national sovereignty or parliament (hakimiyet-i milliye ve meclis-i Mebusan),
the shari’ah into the constitution (Kanun-i Esasi) by Islamists of the second constitutional
period; Islam itself became identical with civilization. Furthermore, in the emphasis placed
upon the return to the Qur’an and the Sunnah with the belief that true Islam might be
derived from the original sources and in the attempt to reconcile the Islamic principles of
shura and ijma with the Western institutions of constitution and parliament, it may be said
that Islamists of the second constitutional period were strongly influenced by the ideas of
the Young Ottomans, Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi. The endeavor of enlarging if not
distorting, the meanings of these concepts through the opening of the gate of ijtihad was
aimed at finding answers to the some vital questions as follows: “ what are the causes of
Muslim and Ottoman decline? What should be done to unify all Muslims? Is Islam
                                                
30 Şerif Mardin, “İslamcılık.” [Islamism] TCTA vol. 5, 1402-3.
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reconcilable with the Western values such as freedom, equality, science, freedom of
thought which are the sources of Western superiority? What is the scope for the adoption
of Western institutions? How can specifically the institutions of state, religion, education,
economy be reformed? Do the political principles of Islam prescribe a specific form of
government? Is the constitutional regime in accordance with these principles?”31 In fact,
the questions asked by the Islamists reflected the consideration of rethinking Islam in
relation to the concepts of Western civilization, which might be called as “cultural
borrowing”32 or “acculturation.”33 The acculturation meant, in the context of Turkish
political modernization, “the beginning and unfolding of an exogenously induced cultural
and political change,”34 producing adaptation of the Western institutions such as
constitution and parliament into the Ottoman politics.
Just as the political writing on the decline of the Ottoman state and the adoption of western
institutions constituted the touchstone of Ottoman-Turkish political modernization,
Islamists also started to develop their political ideas within the confines of this discussion.
Here, we will study firstly, Islamist discourses on the reasons for the decline of the
Ottomans and the Islamic world; and secondly the Islamist conceptualizations of the
Western civilization in respect to what should be taken from Europe and how to be
adopted into the Ottoman political and social life. Islamist effort to reconstruct religious
understandings on the basis of the significance given to the idea of progress and
civilization will be explored as well.
                                                
31 Tunaya, İslamcılık. 34; Berkes, the Development. 347; Kara, İslamcıların. xxı-xxıı.
32 G.E. Von Grunebaum, Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), 237.
33 Bassam Tibi, “Islam and Modern European Ideologies.” International Journal of
Middle East Studies. 18 (1986): 15-29 and The Crisis of Modern Islam, (Salt lake
City:University of Utah Press, 1988).
34 Tibi, Islam. 20.
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2.4 Symptoms: The Reasons for the Decline and Tanzimat
Generally, the Islamist interest in the discussion of the decline seemed to be grounded on
the rejection of the Orientalist assumption that Islam was an obstacle to progress and
civilization. In Islamist opinion, of course, it was not possible to think of Islam as the cause
of decline; rather Muslims owed their days of greatness and earlier great civilization to
their religion and their present state of decline to their turning away from it. Said Halim
Paşa made it clear that : “No religion has ever been an obstacle to progress. Christianity
did not prevent the Europeans from achieving progress; neither was Buddhism an obstacle
to the Japanese. This is even more true of Islam. Because Islam is a rational religion. The
best proof is the heights reached by the Islamic civilization in the past.”35 Against the
Orientalist claim about Islam’s role in the decline of Muslims, Islamists also advanced an
Occidentalist argument regarding Christianity’s negative role in achieving progress.
Christianity had been an obstacle to the progress in the West because of the inherent
contradiction between its fundamentals and modern science. Christians reached their level
of civilization by departing from their religion. The situation was completely different in
Islam; Muslims could get civilization and progress by their adherence to their religion.36
                                                
35 Said Halim Paşa, Buhranlarımız ve Son Eserleri, [Our Crises] ed. M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ
(İstanbul: İz, 1993),153; Berkes’s translation, The Development. 349; see also
Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı, “Mezaya-yı İnsaniye; Hasaili Fazıla.” [Human Qualities,
Virtous Results] SM. II/ 38, (14 Mayıs 1325/7 Cemaziyelevvel 1327/1909): 177;
Elmalılı M. Hamdi Yazır, “Müslümanlık Mani-i Terakki Değil, Zamin-i Terakkidir.”
[Islam is not an Obstacle to Progress but a Guarantee of Progress] SR. XXI-XXII/544-
545, 546, 547-548, 549-550, 551-552, 553-554 (Zilkade/Zilhicce/Muharrem,
1339/1341-1342/ 1922-1923), 187-189, 203-205, 3-7, 21-22, 36-38, 52-53; M. Akif
Ersoy, “Süleymaniye Kürsüsünde,” [On Süleymaniye Mosque] in Safahat, ed M.
Ertuğrul Düzdağ (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Vakfı, 1987), 170-171; Halil
Halid, Hilal ve Haç Çekişmesi, [Conflict between the Crescent and the Cross] ed.
Mehmet Şeker and A. Bülent Baloğlu (Ankara: TDV, 1997), 222.
36 Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, “İslamiyetle Medeniyet-i Cedide Birleşebilir mi?” [Can Islam
be Unified with Modern Civilization] BH. I/21 (9 Şubat 1324/30 Muharrem 1327/
1909): 466-468; Şeyh Mihridin Arusi (a pseudonym of Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmet
Hilmi), “Avrupa Medeniyeti Nereden Geldi, Bu Medeniyetin Doğru İsmi Nedir?”
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Islamist picture of the Muslim’s decline contained not only their material backwardness in
industry and science but also their moral values and religious understandings.37 What
disturbed the Islamists about the present conditions of Muslims was the disconnection
between their degenerated daily lives and their Islamic values. Bringing a viable relation
between the two was possible by means of teaching the real Islam. Indeed, this was the
major way for the beginning of Islamic revival (intibah-i İslam). In this way, Islamists
seemed to unite in determining the main reason for the backwardness of Muslim world:
Muslims have lost the true nature of their religion, and this had been furthered by the
decline of religious institutions such as medreses and tekkes and by ignorance and
passivity of the ulema who were also expected to be in a leading position in the revival of
Muslims, even in the holy war against the enemies.38 But unfortunately what appeared to
be as the duty of the ulema in the modern age to address the problems of Islamic
                                                                                                                                         
[Where has European Civilization emerged, What is the True Name of this
Civilization?] Hikmet. 3 (22 Nisan 1326/25 Rebiülahir 1328/1910): 4.
37 See Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı, “Mevaiz.” [Sermons] SM. I/4 (4 Eylül 1324/21 Şaban
1326/ 1908): 63; M. Akif Ersoy, “Nasrullah Kürsüsünde.” [In Nasrullah Mosque] SR.
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1336/ 1916): 199; Halil Fahreddin, “Bizde Ahlak.” [Our Morality] SR. IX-II/210-28
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[Speech of Damascus] in Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, [Copmlete Works of Said Nursi] vol 2
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the Reform of Religious Schools, to those who Confess and Witness] SR. X/238 (21
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Light] (İstanbul: Furkan, 1996),101, 107; Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, “Saadet-i hakikiyye.”
[Real Happiness] BH. I/15 (29 Kanunuevvel 1329/18 Zilhicce 1326/ 1908): 328-333;
Sebilürreşat, “Ahkamı Kuraniyenin İfası İçin Ulema Davetname-i Resmi Bekliyor.”
[The Uelam are Waiting an Official Call to Execute the Laws of Qur’an] SR. IX-II/
219-37 (1 Teşrinisani 1328/5 Zilhicce 1330/1912): 200-201; Abdürreşid İbrahim,
“Müslümanları İntibaha davet Hakkında.” [On the Invitation of Muslims to
Awakening] SM. IV/89 (6 Mayıs 1326/10 Cemaziyelevvel 1328/1910): 191; “Cihad
Meydanları Ulema-yı Azamı bekliyor.” [Battlefields are Waiting the Ulema] SR.
XIII/328 (12 Şubat 1330/10 Rebiülahir 1333/1915): 121; Şehbenderzade Filibeli
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community was not translated into action. The ulema was caught in the throes of passivity
and decline and was caught in the selfish struggles.39 Needless to say, the ulema had been
the foremost responsible agent for the decline of Muslims “because they do not perform
their duty of guiding and enlightening people (avam), because they do not teach people the
fact that religion’s existence is dependent on this world and the fact that those Muslims
who are not striving for this world will be under the domination of other nations.”40 In line
with their effort to enlighten people, the ulema had to study the spirit of contemporary
civilization and had to prepare the public for the adoption of its good aspects which were,
in nature, not contrary to Islam.41 For this purpose, medreses which contributed much to
the decline of Muslims and the Ottomans, had to be reformed to introduce modern
sciences into their curricula.42 Islamists of the Second Constitutional period voiced the
argument that the revival (intibah) of the nation (Osmanli milleti) or Islamic ummah had to
come from the ranks of the ulama and also this ulama had to come to grips with the
modern sciences and with the spirit of the time, progress (terakki). Islamists of second
constitutional period urged the ulema to take a superior position again in devising formulas
for the solution of the Ottoman state’s problems and also in enlightening and guiding the
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41 Sırat-ı Mustakim, SM. V/117 (18 Teşrinisani 1326/29 Zilkade 1328/1910): 219.
42 M. Şemseddin, “Medreselerin,” 64-66.
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public. The responsibility of calling the ulema to perform their duty was on the shoulders
of Islamic community as well.43
According to the Islamists, the ignorance and backwardness of Muslims were the fault of
the Muslims themselves rather than of Islam as such.44 If despotism was the cause of
political and economic decline of Muslims, superstition (hurafe) was the major factor
responsible for the intellectual and religious stagnation in Islamic world. Thus, the most
recurring theme of Islamism was perhaps the explanation that Muslims were bacward and
weak due to their departure from the true Islamic principles (sharia) and from the practice
of the prophet and first four caliphs.45 Seen in this light, the political, economic and
cultural decline of the Muslims in general, and of the Ottoman Empire in particular were
due to the influence of pre-Islamic traditions.46 Moreover, one of the causes which had led
to the decadence of Muslims and Islamic civilization, according to Islamists, was the
abandonment of ijtihad. Abandonment of ijtihad had made some Muslims imitate the
Europeans (taklit) in every fields of life (political, social, and cultural) while it had caused
others to reject any reform attempt on the basis that it was contrary to the precepts of Islam
(taassub).47
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Among Islamists, it was so common to argue that in the present time the only way of
ending the decline of the Ottoman state was the adoption of European institutions (the
causes of the European progress), while remaining faithful to the spirit of the sharia. Put it
differently, the gulf between the West and the Muslim world could only be bridged by
accepting the necessity of change and by linking that change to the ideals of Islam. In their
explanation for the rise and decline of nations, they often repeated the verse: “Lo! Allah
changeth not the condition of a folk until they (first) change that which is in their hearts.”48
Muslims, for long centuries, have remained in a state of ignorance (cehalet) and stagnation
(atalet) due to the unjust (despotic) rule of the political leaders, from the times of
Umayyads. Ahmet Hilmi’s statements were representative of the dominant trend among
Islamists:
I will tell you the reason why we are despicable, wretched, poor, enslaved. It
is because we have not harkened to nor understood the commands of our God
and of our Prophet; because we have been shameless and ignorant; because
we have tyrannised over ourselves, over our brothers, over all servants of
God...Many of us have strayed into evil ideas not based upon Islam. Science
and knowledge have passed to other nations, but we have remained
ignorant...We do not work; we act as though ignorance and poverty were
necessary conditions of Islam.49
Islamists also paid attention to the external factors of the decline in the Islamic world: it
had fallen into poverty and slavery because of the struggle between Islam and the West,
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and because of the imperialism of Christendom.50 An interesting argument about the role
of the West in the decline of the Islamic world was advanced by Milaslı İsmail Hakkı. He
rejected the naive claim that Muslims were backward because of their departure from
religion and continued: “if we say that Muslims are backward because they left their
religion then, due to the fact that all Muslims are in the same position, the question that
comes to the mind is whether Islam has the capability of application?”51 By proposing a
different explanation for the decline of Muslims, he went on to argue that “we should not
ask why muslims are undeveloped but rather we should ask why muslims are
underdeveloped. Because Islamic world is underdeveloped... Because Muslims’ present
situation emanated mainly and firstly from the development of Europeans, not from the
backwardness of Muslims. Therefore, we should look better to how Europeans
developed.”52 Thus, Western challenge as the external factor and the superstitions and
taqlid as the internal factors, in their eyes, were undermining the authority and prestige of
Islam to the point of threatining its identity and existence.
Turning to the second facet of the discussion on the decline; how to overcome the decline,
Islamists provided a harsh critique of the beginnings of the Ottoman-Turkish
modernization, namely Tanzimat and Islahat movements. At this point it may be useful to
start the analysis by mentioning briefly the criticisms made by the Young Ottomans and to
continue with the ideas of the Islamists of the Second Constitutional period against the
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edicts of the Tanzimat and Islahat. Although Young Ottomans supported the declaration of
Gülhane Hattı by calling it as source of happiness (mebde-i saadet) in terms of its will to
reform the empire, the first and foremost charge which they brought against the Tanzimat
was that of its departure from sharia.53 Namık Kemal argued that the Divan-ı Hümayun
(the Ottoman assembly of high officials), the ulema and Jenissaries (a kind of armed
popular assembly) provided checks and balances against absolutism and thus, the sultans
were in a fashion elected by these civil and military elite.54 The arbitrary and absolutist
policies of Ali and Fuad Pashas which would lead to the destruction of the Ottoman state,
destroyed these democratic bases and left the political power free from any check at all.
Islamist intellectuals of Second Constitutional period also criticized Tanzimat and Islahat
movements of blind imitation of Europe without taking into account the Ottoman nation’s
own hars (culture).55 Islamists usually addressed negatively westernist policies of
Tanzimat especially when they discuss on what should be taken from the West. The
imitative nature of Ottoman modernization movement was presented as an illness which
would had resulted in further decline, as Babanzade Ahmet Naim argued:
“ we have been imitating Europe for a century. We imitated their courts, their
modes of walking, speaking, eating, and every kind of their madness. We
imitated their popular nationalist conflicts. We have put their issues of
socialism and democracy on our agenda as the matters of our country without
questioning their possibility of application...But have we become European?
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Has our material power increased? Have our industry and trade developed?
Has our morality been perfected?.. With our imitation, have we stopped
Europeans’ enimity towards us? [No] Our science has not increased but
decreased. Our trade and industry has been dominated by the alien hands. Our
national wealth has decreased. Our strength has exhausted. And our morality
has fallen down."56
Eşref Edip attributed the failure of Tanzimat to two interrelated factors: first, to its
adoption of French institutions such as courts and schools which were entirely irrelevant to
our social setting; second to its reluctance in reforming the Ottoman institutions which
assured the greatness of Turkey.57 The failure of Tanzimat in reforming the Ottoman state
also led to despotism which was contrary to the nature of the state. What was to be done
was the regeneration of the existing institutions in a new form while keeping their spirit
and values.58 Therefore, at the core of Islamist formula for the regeneration of the Ottoman
state and society, there was bringing the values of sharia back into the society and political
system to prevent further cultural deterioriation which started with the impact of the
Tanzimat reforms.59
2.5 An Islamist Quest for Modernity: Positioning the West and Reinventing Islamic
Civilization
Islamists believed that Muslims could face the challenge of the Western imperialism by
reappropriating reason, science and technology and also by the advocation of
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constitutionalism and parliamentary government. It is not true to say that Islamists initially
regarded the change to the use of Western technology as a change of minor importance
only, which would not affect the central values of the Ottoman culture. In fact they were
aware that the admittance of Western technology and institutions would inevitably bring
more and more new elements with more and more changes, resulting in serious
disturbances in the Ottoman traditional Islamic culture. But the necessity of adopting some
good aspects of the West (industry, science and technology) was so striking that Islamists
saw no other way around. The word icabat-ı medeniyet (the necessities of civilization) was
among the mostly used concepts in Islamist journals like Sebilürreşad and Beyanül Hak.
An important feature of modernity, the rapidity of change or the necessity of progress had
a far-reaching impact on the Ottoman-Islamist mind to the extent that humanity was
moving in the way of progress and perfection like a clamorous flood (seyl-i huruşan) and it
was necessary to participate into its move; otherwise, decline was inevitable.60 Time was
the time of progress; the laws of progress which were the will of God could not be resisted
like that of natural laws.61 Islamists, in their search for adopting the positive elements of
the Western civilization, especially for the adoption of science, advocated an
understanding of natural law which recognized “the parallel competence of both reason
and revelation within the same sphere, denying that there is either a separation or a conflict
between them... Reason and revelation are different paths to truth and fulfill differing
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functions, but can not contradict each other..If there appears to be a contradiction one or
the other has been incorrectly understood.”62
Apart from being the first Ottoman intellectual who put the emphasis on progress (terakki),
Namık Kemal was also the thinker who presented the concept of civilization (medeniyet)
as “an ideal to be achieved” by the Ottoman society63 and who made a distinction between
civilization and culture. Here culture simply refers to morality, religion, tradition and
customs of the Ottomans: “The Muslims did not need to borrow the moral (manevi)
civilization of the West. The standards of our own morality are amply sufficient to meet all
the requirements of modern civilization.”64 In other words, in Young Ottoman language, to
differentiate good and bad aspect of Western civilization meant the rejection of the blind
imitation of Europeans in every field of social life. According to Namık Kemal,
civilization, in its essence, did not necessarily contain bad things (fuhşiyat) such as
immoral family relations and dance in itself, rather they emanated from the shortcomings
of the application (nekais-i icraat): “Civilization, as defined by our old philosophers, if it is
taken in the sense that human being lives as a social group, is the natural need for human
life.” This understanding of civilization naturally produces the argument that a new
civilization which is composed of just good aspects i.e. science, books, progress and
technology, can be established in the Ottoman Empire.65
Being used in the sense of modernity in the nineteenth century, the dominating concepts of
civilization and progress were absorbed by Islamists in order to adopt the positive sides of
the West as well as to reimagine Islamic civilization. They accepted and assimilated
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modernity and some of its attributes that were regarded reconcilable with the Islamic
principles. They laid an equal emphasis on the return to early Islam as well as assimilation
of the spirit of the modern age. To the Ottoman people, Islamists’ message was that to be
“modern, progressive and democratic”, you don’t have to borrow anything, since you
already have it in your own Islamic past and what was to be done was to return to this
pristine Islam.66 In other words, for a Muslim, a better understanding of the “good” values
(proper qualities) of modernity can best be derived from the study of shariah and Islamic
civilization.
The concept of civilization was defined by Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period as
a totality of the “good aspects” of human experience such as progress and science. In this
sense, civilization was a product of political, social and economic gatherings by the people
in every stage of the human history. Human achievements (progress and science) should
be directed to the realization of happiness in this world and in the other world. Here,
civilization, to an Islamist mind, came to represent a state of being which fulfilled the
ideals of religion, namely Islam.
Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi’s argument is illustrative of the Islamist selective approach in the
adoption of modern civilization: “Let us accept European civilisation, i.e., science and
industry, and even carry them still further. But let us not abandon the blessed customs of
our religion and our nation, i.e., let us not adopt the material civilisation of the
Europeans.”67 They were, in one sense, admirers of the Western material progress but they
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were also against the mere taqlid (imitation) of European laws and institutions which had
no relevance to the Islamic principles. Appropriation of some philosophical schools such
as materialism and positivism was conceived as a dangerous terrain that could undermine
the very basis of the Islamic faith. Nevertheless, Islamists approved sending students to
European countries to study science certainly on the single condition that they should not
lose their religious and national characteristics. For example, Mehmet Akif encouraged
Asım, a representative of his idealized young generation, to go to Germany in order to
bring civilization (progress; science and technology) into Turkey.68
According to Islamists, modern western civilization, particularly in the sphere of science,
was the inheritor of Islamic civilization. The era of Enlightenment in Europe was initiated
with Europeans’ borrowing of sciences from Islamic civilization and their further progress
was based on them.69 Therefore, the acquisition of science and technology from the West
was to take back what was lost (hikmetin yitik mal) by the Muslims and was not contrary
to the precepts of Islam. To obtain scientific and industrial progress of the West became
necessary in order to advance and revive the Islamic civilization and its institutions. But
this did not mean the imitation of Western civilization and did not mean destroying Islam
which was the source of Muslims’ progress: “Because civilization can not be imitated.
Civilization is not a product of material elements. Civilization emanates from origins and
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views (telakki). Our origins are different than theirs. We can just take what is needed for
the perfection and elevation of our civilization and what is compatible with it; just as the
Islamic civilization adapted from the old civilizations in the past.”70
Islamic civilization was presented as a “real”(hakiki medeniyet) and “virtuous” civilization
(medeniyet-i fazıla) which was immune from the shortcomings of western civilization.
Islamic civilization was, prescribed by sharia, based on cooperation, right, justice and
virtue whereas western one was established on might and interest.71 Islam had the goal of
reaching a level of civilization which was superior to the contemporary progress of
humanity. The idea of Islamic civilization was supported by the conviction that civilization
and religion were indeed the same thing.72
Islamist understanding of Western civilization was twofold. Islamists came to regard the
Western civilization sometimes as a universal civilization transcending national and
religious affiliations but sometimes as an opposite and enemy of Islamic civilization. What
captured the Islamists’ imagination about Western life (civilization) was, on the positive
                                                
70 Ömer Rıza (Doğrul), “İslam Mefkuresine Doğru.” [Towards Islamic Ideal] SR.
XVI/400-401 (27 Mart 1335/24 Cemaziyelahir 1337/1919): 107-108; see also Said
Halim, Buhranlarımız.18.
71 Sırat-ı Mustakim, SM. V/117 (18 Teşrinisani 1326/29 Zilkade 1328/1910): 219;
Sebilürreşad, “Avni Hakla Sebilürreşad Yirmibirinci Cilde Başlıyor.” [With God’s
Help, Sebilür Reşad starts to publish its twenty first volume] SR. XXI/521 (11
Teşrinisani 1338/ 2 Rebiülevvel 1341/1922): 2; M. Akif Ersoy, “Nasrullah
Kürsüsünde.” [In Nasrullah Mosque] SR XVIII/464 (25 Teşrinisani 1336/15
Rebiülevvel 1339/1920): 257; Volkan, “Volkan” [Volcane] 8 (5 Kanunuevvel 1324/18
Aralık 1908): 38; Said Nursi, “Sünuhat,” [Manifestations] in Risale-i Nur Külliyatı.
vol. 2, 2049.
72 Milaslı İsmail Hakkı, “Müslümanlar,” 57; Ahmed Hamdi, “Şems-i Münir-i Medeniyet
Şarktan mı Tulu Etti Yoksa Garbtan mı?” [Has Civilization Emerged from the West or
from the East] SR. VIII-I/187-5 (22 Mart 1328/16 Rebiülahir 1330/1912): 82; “Din-i
İslam Medeniyet-i Hakikinin Ruhudur.” [Islam is the Spirit of the Genuine
Civilization] SR. VIII-I/192-10 (26 Nisan 1328/22 Cemaziyelevvel 1330/1912): 182;
Ömer Rıza, “Avrupa Dine Rücu Ediyor.” [Europe is Returning to Religion] SR.
XIV/344 (25 Haziran 1331/25 Şaban 1333/1915): 48.
95
side, the dynamism ( progress, science and so on) and vitality of this life and, on the
negative side, the imperialist dimension of the Western civilization. On the one side,
Islamists perceived the West as people of the Cross (Ehli Salib), or false civilization
(yalancı medeniyet), or the monster with one tooth (tek dişi kalmış canavar) by drawing
public attention to the imperialist and religiously fanatical aspect of Western civilization.73
Islamists often felt themselves under the duty of explaining the true Islam and its perfect
culture to the fanatic, hypocritical, egocentric and materialistic western audience.
Moreover, they enjoyed accusing the West of “an inability to live up to their own
proclaimed religious, political and social values.”74 Western civilization was portrayed as
being fond of power and even worshiping the manifestations of power, especially in the
aftermath of the Balkan and Tripoli wars.75 West’s desire for power and its neglect of
humanist values were partly connected to its colonialist ambitions and partly to the
foundations of its Christian fanaticism. Western civilization had been experiencing a crisis
which would lead the world into decline and non-existence. Seen from this perspective, the
Western civilization had been destined to decline in Ibn Khaldunian sense. Moreover, the
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West was responsible for the prevention of the East’s and Islamic world’s progress as
well.76
But on the other side, they often made references to Islam’s contribution to this civilization
and its universal character as the common experience of all human beings. Islamists’
negative assessments of the concept of civilization was also partly related to the
established equivalence between civilization and the West since the times of the Young
Ottoman intellectuals. This sometimes led to using positively charged terms for
civilization; for instance, Mehmet Akif preferred çemenzar-ı terakki (garden of progress)
and seyr-i tekamül (course of evolution) to connote a meaning of civilization.77
Actually, Islamists did not neglect to examine the spirit responsible for the development of
West’s impressive material accomplishment when they became focused on the good
aspects of this civilization. Having found the sources of the “spirit of civilization” in Islam,
they favored the revitalization of Islamic spirit in order to reach the civilizational level of
the West without losing the centrality of Islamic values for Muslim individual and
society.78 In Islamist perspective, religion, humanity and civilization were seen as
interdependent to each other.
Islamists always rejected the idea that Muslims could only progress by following the way
of the West. Europe triggered the discussion on whether Islam was inimical to progress or
not simply in order to impose their own way of progress on Muslims.79 Progress of
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Muslims could be realized by creating their way of progress which was strongly related to
their own roots (moral values, customs and environment). Progress came to denote not
neglecting the values of the past (tradition) but perfecting and reforming them by some
changes and inventions.80 One might say that the contemporary terms of this debate go
back to the Second Constitutional period.
In this vein, Musa Kazım argued that
“Imitating a country’s sciences and industry does not necessitate imitating its
morality, customs and way of life, because there is no any relationship
between the two. Because every country and every nation has its own way of
life, means of subsistence and accepted custom. But no country and no nation
has its own peculiar industry, techniques and sciences. These are common to
all people and all nations.... Applying a nation’s peculiar morality, customs
and way of life to another country means trying to change the law of nature.”81
What was to be done was not a conversion to western civilization but “nationalization of
European civilization” (Avrupa medeniyetini millileştirmek).82 Interestingly enough, The
Orientalist picture of East as the lands of passivity and degeneration as compared to active
and progressive West seemed to be shared by Islamists.83
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In the optimistic era of Young Turks, the model of Japan as a modernized non-western
country which had defeated a European power (Russia) was depicted as the desirable way
to modernize the Ottoman polity and to adopt science and technology from the west while
remaining Ottoman, namely, Muslim. For Islamists, the Japanese became modern without
abandoning their religion and nationality and, as a result, had caught up with the
Europeans in every respect.84 Here, it would be tempting to argue that Islamists saw the
Japanese way of modernization as a kind of “modernization from within” or “native
modernity” which attained somehow the synthesis of East and West or the revitalization of
Eastern-Islamic civilization against the Western one.
The spirit of the time when Islamists tried to face the challenge of the West was the spirit
of progress and civilization. In fact, the Western belief in progress was so influential on the
rest of the world that it transcended cultural and national boundaries. Certainly, one
obvious example for the influence of French revolution on the Ottoman intellectuals was
their emphasis on the concept of progress.85 Namık Kemal, by rejecting Ibn-i Haldunian
argument of decline, argues that the “sick man” (hasta adam), namely the Ottoman empire,
could secure its vitality and prevent its decline if it acted in accordance with the needs of
the nature (mukteza-yı tabiat).86 The optimistic view of Kemal for the progress of the
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Ottomans was accompanied by his advocation of the liberal premise of development and
his rejection of the notion of underdevelopment: “Europe will not impede the progress of
the Ottoman state because progress of each nation will serve other nations’ progress as
well.”87
The Islamists of the nineteenth century focused on the concepts such as mastery of nature
to control and shape physical conditions of life, public morality and progress. Being
prepared to recognize Europe’s superiority in its power, Islamist discourse on progress
appropriated a principle of Darwinism, the survival of the fittest, as applied to nations and
civilizations: “the strong survives and the weak becomes extinct; this is the law of nature,
nobody can change it.”88 The duty of the preparation of force (i’dad-i kuvvet) which was
sanctioned by some verses (Qur’an, VIII:60) such as, ‘prepare against them (the enemies)
what force ye are able’ was enlarged to become the obligation to acquire good aspects of
modern civilization (mehasin-i medeniyet), including science, technology, industry and
trade.89 Since the early attempts of reform in the time of Sultan Selim III, learning from the
West had been justified on the grounds that the sharia permitted Muslims to use the
enemy’s methods. Indeed, the statement of the Prophet to the effect that science should be
sought wherever it existed to be employed to legitimate learning from the West.
                                                
87 Kemal, in Özön, Namık. 257. Kemal attributes the superiority of the West and the
flood of progress (terakki tufanı) to its struggle for the achievement of law, Hilmi Ziya
Ülken, Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi [History of Contemporary Thought in
Turkey] (İstanbul: Ülken, 1994), 103..
88 Ahmed Hamdi, “Müslümanların Uğradıkları Felaketler Kendi Nefislerindendir.”
[Muslims, themselves are Responsible from the Disasters they face] SR. XI/282 (3
Kanunusani 1329/9 Rebiülevvel 1332/1913): 339; “Tefsir-i Şerif,” [Sacred
Interpretation] IX-II/228-46 (10 Kanunusani 1328/15 Safer 1331/1913): 342; M.
Şemseddin continued to argue that “those organisms that are not able to adaptate to the
needs of environment atrophies. A society which does not adaptate its action to the
needs of the age is like that”, Zulmetten. 53.
89 See Musa Kazım, “Kuvvet hazırlamak-1.” [Preparing Force-1] SM. III/56, (17 Eylül
1325/15 Ramazan 1327/1909): 52-53; “Kuvvet hazırlamak-2.” [Preparing Force-2]
SM. III/59 (8 Teşrinievvel 1325/6 Şevval 1327/ 1909): 99-102.
100
In the nineteenth century, science as the most significant basis of western civilization was
elevated to the status of religion in the minds of Ottoman intellectuals; thus “science
became endowed with a transcendent meaning.”90 Islamist intellectuals were disturbed by
this superior status of science in relation to religion and often underlined the compatibility
between Islam and science in their articles in order to weaken the perception of science as
the only criterium to shape every aspect of life.
To sum up, Islamist intellectuals continued to voice the classical discourse that the decline
of the Ottoman state was due to the deviations from the Islamic ideal society and insisted
that the restoration of this ideal society was the solution to the backwardness of Muslims.
But at the same time, they increasingly modified the picture of the ideal society by their
strong emphasis on progress and by their attempt to equate the modern civilization with
this ideal.
Reading from today’s perspective, it can be said that Islamist intellectuals shared the basic
conviction that Islam and modernity are compatible, once both are properly understood.
Islamists’ emphasis on the compatibility of religion and science (or reason) and their
underlining of the concept of ijtihad to pave way for the adoption of new ideas and
institutions was a sign of the tendency to combine modernity and Islam. And consequently
they tended to see learning from the West as a way of creating Islamic modernity which
was nevertheless distinct from Westernization. Although this idea of compatibility seems
to be similar to the approach of Islamic philosophers towards the Greek philosophy in the
medieval age, this time, the task of harmonizing Islamic tradition with Western modernity
was more difficult due to the global and unpredecented features of modernity and Europe’s
superiority. It was easier said than done that what had been done in the past could be
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achieved again in the present age. Moreover, learning from the West was presented as just
taking back what originally Europe borrowed from Islamic civilization.
2.6 Reconstructing the Understanding of True Islam
When Islamists criticized the imitation of Europe, they did not mean a simple rejection of
Europe-inspired reforms and a return to the pre-Tanzimat era but a return to the “true”
Islam which they recognized as the representative government (biah and meşveret) and the
sovereignty of peope (umma). The true Islam of the Islamists contained: a) the idea that
when the Qur’an and Sunnah contradicted reason or science, they should be reinterpreted
b) An opening of the gate of interpretation (ijtihad), accompanied by the return to the
original sources of Islam and to the times of prophet and the first four caliphs c) the
unification of schools of law d) reconstructing all the religious schools and institutions of
Islam, including theology, tradition of prophet, fıqh (law) and sufism.
Islamists urged Muslim masses to take their destiny into their own hands by forcing their
rulers to accept democratic institutions. By reminding the grandeur of the early days of
Islam, they aimed at inspiring the masses to act for creating the kind of political system
that ought to be. This retrospective look to (glorification of the past) the greatness of the
past aimed at calling Muslims for “action” but not turning the time back. They denied the
passivity (atalet), tevekkül of popular Sufism91 as well as the secularist restriction of
religion to private life. They tried to awaken Muslims to the fact that Islam was a religion,
and a dynamic, progressive force to answer to the needs of the modern age or modernity.
The Islamists recognized the dangers in the traditional dichotomy of different systems of
value (understanding of religion) for the few (havass) and the many (avam) and tried to
bridge the gap through their articles in their journals which were very successful in
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popularizing intellectual discussions on complex religious issues. True Islam, they argued,
was compatible with advanced civilization like that of Europe. Islam had been corrupted
by superstitions and as a result, Muslims lost their spirit of progress which was derived
from true Islam of Prophet and his companions. In order to recover the great days of Islam,
the remedy was simply to restore Islam to its true form in accordance with Qur’an and
Sunnah.92 The titles of two books written by M. Ş. Günaltay in the period are helpful in
understanding how Islamist intellectuals evaluated the conditions of Muslims of their time:
From Darkness to Light (Zulmetten Nura) and From Superstitions to Truth (Hurafattan
Hakikata). According to İsmail Kara, the notion of superstition was used not to attain a true
understanding of religion but to get rid of some beliefs and convictions which were
considered as obstacles to modernisation.93 Islamist reconceptualization of religion (from a
traditional to a dynamic conception of Islam) advocated the main conviction that Islam has
within itself the faculty and the spiritual force for a far-reaching adaptation to meet the
needs of the modern times.94 Seen from this perspective, Islamism has been partially a
modernizing ideology with its emphasis on progress, civilization and democracy.
With the acceptance of natural law theory, the dependent position of reason to the
revelation in the classical theological schools was transformed into a new one in which the
revelation was considered secondary to the reason, at least equal, in identifying right and
wrong. In this context, Islam was presented as a “natural religion” (tabii din, fıtri din)
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which did not contradict with the human nature and reason, and its principles were
compatible with the laws of progress and were applicable in every century. Islam, free of
superstitions and beliefs was the only natural religion among the existing religions.95
Sometimes the compatibility between religion and reason was understood in the way that
both religion and reason had their own separate and different realms. If religion violated
the realm of science, it would be damaged.96
Escalating the position of reason coincided with the desire of liberating Islamic faith and
reason from the chains of taqlid (imitation). In the matters of theology and law, Islamists
took a stand against uncritical acceptance (taqlid) of the religious formulations which were
made by the ulema of the medieval age. The harsh critique of medieval religious
understandings sometimes went to such an extent that, for example, Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi
accused Al-Ghazzali as one of those thinkers responsible for the intellectual decline in the
Islamic world.97
In the revitalization of religious institutions and sciences, the center of concern and the
focus of attention of the Islamists was on the shariah and its relation to modern society.
The present understandings of Muslims about their religion were thus regarded as
degenerated by the distorting impact of foreign elements and bad customs in the form of
superstitions.98 It was not Islam that was petrified, but its distorted understandings by the
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foreign elements. Far from being an obstacle to progress, Islam signified, in Islamist
understanding, the most significant factor which facilitated science, technology,
civilization and strengthened the unity of the state. Closely tied to this recognition,
Islamists underlined the necessity of reforming or reconstructing all the religious schools
and institutions of Islam, including theology, tradition of prophet, fıqh (law) and sufism. In
that way, Islamic theology (kalam), among other branches of religious sciences, were
restated by the means of modern European philosophical arguments such as Boutroux and
Bergson’s theories, to fit the need and understanding of modern man (yeni ilmi kelam).99
Through reconstructing religious thought as cleared off from the superstition (hurafe), they
contemplated the creation of a dynamic and progressive religiosity and society. But, as
Elmalılı Hamdi stated: ”renewing religion was not an alteration or distortion. Due to the
fact that the greatest principle in Islam was the unity (tawhid), other principles would be
effective for the improvement of the principle of unity. Keeping this point of view in the
generality of renewal, the identity of Islamic nation would be maintained... The duty of
renewer would not be denying the essential principles of religion, nor destroying the
identity of umma.”100 While for some Islamists like M. Şemseddin, renewing Islam by
returning to the times of prophet and four caliphs and by the clearing off superstitions from
religion came to mean a “revolution” in religion,101 for others like Mustafa Sabri this
would constitute the distortion of the basis of Islam, by copying Europe’s revolution in
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religion, namely Reformation.102 It would be beneficial to point out that those Islamists
such as M.Ali Ayni, Şemsettin Günaltay, who put more emphasis on the issue of
reforming the religious understandings of Muslims, supported the Republican attempt to
modernize and nationalize the rituels of worship in 1928, taking part in the committee of
the reformation of religion.
Islamist aim to get true Islam manifested itself in the discussions of unifying the Muslim
medhabs (schools of legal doctrine) which were seen as the way of uniting Muslims at
least culturally and religiously. Rashid Rıza’s book on the same subject was translated into
Turkish by an Islamist, Ahmed Hamdi Aksekili.103 Perhaps, Islamists of the second
constitutional period were influenced by the Islamic modernism of Cemaladdin Afghani
and Muhammed Abduh mostly on the issues of getting true Islam and, for this purpose,
returning to the early form of Islam in order to put an end to the decline of Muslims.
Mehmet Akif, Şemseddin Günaltay, Said Nursi, Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi were among
Islamists who were heavily influenced by the writings of Afghani-Abduh line. For
instance, almost every work of Muhammad Abduh and of his disciples, Rashid Rıza and
Muhammad Farid Wajdi was translated into Turkish by M. Akif and Aksekili Ahmed
Hamdi and their various views on the political and social matters of Islam were quoted in
the articles of Islamists. Their articles in Sırat-ı Mustakim-Sebiliür-Reşad were written and
translated with the special object of showing the truth about Islam on the issues ranging
from the rights of women to slavery in Islam. 104
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Generally, Islamists expressed a negative view on Sufism, because it, as they claimed,
taught passivity (atalet) and created apathy towards the worldly affairs, neglecting society
at the expense of the individual’s moral purification. Sufism, by its more emphasis on
(tevekkül) docility and contentment as opposed to vigour, courage and an active interest in
social and political affairs of true Islam, distorted the real meaning of this Islamic term.105
One the one side, Islamists, such as Ferit Kam, İsmail Fenni Ertuğrul, M. Ali Ayni and
Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahnet Hilmi accused Sufism of being the source of docility and
superstition, but on the other side, they had mystical characteristics which came from their
educational background and their social ties with people’s Islam (halk islamı)106 and their
interest in philosophical sufism such as Muhyiddin Arabi’s idea of Vahdet-i Vücut.
Islamists, in their endeavour to realize the renaissance of Islam, turned their eyes to Islam
both in the sense of religion and in the sense of civilization. In other words, Islamists
employed their selective approach not only in adopting some European ideas and
institutions but also in their evaluation of the historical heritage of Islam. If they thought
that it was suitable for the understanding of the modern times, some medieval
conceptualizations also were regarded as truly Islamic. The movement of turning back to
the original sources of Islam emanated from the belief that modernization was of inevitable
necessity. In this way, the original sources, Qur’an and Sunnah seemed flexible enough to
incorporate modern meanings and to clear up their historical interpretations which were
considered inimical to the spirit of the time, progress.107
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All in all, the arguments of Islamists contained “a constant effort of translation,”108 for
their arguments which were established by reference to the values and principles of the
texts (Qur’an and Hadith), the early Islamic practice and medieval theorization.
2.7 Political Power and Islamists
In Muslim lands, Islam as a source of political legitimization was employed by the ruling
elites to keep the existing political order but at the same time it was also used by the
oppositional movements in order to protest this political order.109 In joining the Young
Turk opposition to Abdul Hamid II, Islamists, by the employment of religious
terminology, considered the Hamidian regime as an autocratic regime which was an
obstacle not only to the preservation of Ottoman moral values- sense of solidarity and love
of motherland but also to the realization of shari’ah. It was the Young Ottomans who
started to use autocratic rule synonymously with despotism (istibdad) against the rule of
Tanzimat statesmen and Islamists of the second constitutional period continued this
tradition even by reading all the Islamic history through this word. In fact, as explained at
the end of the first chapter, absolutism was regarded as necessary for the strong and just
rule in order to distribute the welfare among subjects in the classical times of the empire.110
Stuck with the dichotomy of despotism and constitutional regime, Islamists used Islamic
concepts for both opposing the Hamidian rule and supporting the Young Turk regime. In
order to achieve clarity in the explanation of Islamist political ideas in the following
chapter, it seems necessary to discuss the Islamist attitude(s) towards political power in
practice in the rest of this chapter.
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2.7.1 Why Did The Islamists Join the Opposition Against The Hamidian Regime?
The autocratic rule of Abdul Hamid II brought about the shift of the centre of political
power from the Porte, the bureaucracy to the palace, the sultan-caliph. Mainly because of
this concentration of power in the hands of the sultan, Islamists, unlike the Young
Ottomans, directed their criticism and opposition to the personality of Abdul Hamid II,
portraying his rule as a kind of despotic and unjust “ancien regime.”111 Their negative
feelings about the personality of sultan became apparent when the Committee of Union
and Progress felt itself strong enough to enthrone the sultan in 1909 by exploiting the
incident of 31 Mart.112 Abdul Hamid’s picture as a selfish and unjust despot (müstebid)
who was seeking to fulfill his desires and interests at the expense of the nation’s
interests113 was so common among Islamists that one could not find any argument for the
support of the Sultan’s policies in Islamist journals of the time. By the portrayal of Abdul
Hamid II, against whom they participated in the Committee of Union and Progress; they
usually referred to the sultan’s absolutism simply as the foremost impediment to the
progress of Ottomans and saw nothing in it contributing to the modernization of the
Ottoman state. Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi argues that “[t]he Ottomans opened their eyes and
saw their faults; they removed from his throne their Khalif and Sultan, who acted contrary
to God’s command and the tradition of the Prophet; they did away with the accursed rule
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called despotism, and its place established the principle of consultation and constitution,
which is the command of Islam and the tradition of the Prophet.”114 The dethronement of
Abdul Hamid also indicated the end of absolutism (usul-ü mutlakiyet), which was contrary
to Islamic principles, in the Muslim world.115 In this way, by reading the Islamic history in
terms of the dichotomy of freedom (meşrutiyet)/ absolutism (istibdad), they reached the
conclusion that Muslims had lived under absolutist rules until the 1908 revolution,
certainly with the exception of the periods of the prophet and his four caliphs.
During the Hamidian times, as to the ulema, particularly lower ranks, they were allowed to
be in poverty and decline whereas the modern schools (mektebs) were supported and
spread to the provinces. Sultan Abdulhamit II attempted to undermine the financial powers
of the Ulema, not only by adding the wealth of the religious foundations to the state
treasury, but also by preventing the Ulema “from retaining power which would have
enabled them to hinder or prevent the secular reforms which followed.”116 Abdul Hamid’s
poor treatment of the ulema was attributed to his ambition to continue the despotic regime
and to prevent any opposition to his rule. Thus, medreses and their students were forced to
be in decline117; even the main religious books of Islam were burnt118 by Abdul Hamid,
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Islamists claimed. Furthermore, Islamists strongly criticized the dissolvement of the
Mecelle committee by Abdulhamid II as well. Like the civil code, other braches of law
were codified by this official committee.
Abdul hamid II tried to raise the sense of unity into the Muslim community’s
consciousness as a defensive political programme of action against the menace of the
imperialist West to the Ottoman state, the bastion of the Islamic civilization. Inside the
empire, his Islamism was mainly directed to awakening a new social and religious
motivation for the Ottoman people.119 But according to Islamists, the Sultan ideologically
and mentally was very far from developing İttihad-ı İslam as an effort to unify the
Muslims of the world under his leadership as Sultan and Caliph or cement the Muslim
elements of the Empire.120 The sultan’s good relations with the sheikhs of some tarikats in
peripherial parts of the empire and Muslim lands, including Sheikh Muhammed Zafir of
the Shazeli order, Ebul Huda as-Sayyadi and Ahmed Esad of the Rufai order were not
regarded as the policies of İttihad-ı İslam.121
Abdulhamit put the priority on the caliphate part of his titles, rather than his sultanate
because in his view, the social structure and politics of the Ottoman state was based upon
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religion and thus, in the Empire, the idea of motherland should not come first before the
love of faith and the caliph. The love of motherland should be of secondary importance. 122
The sultan tried to prevent the advance of the idea of nationalism within the empire and to
substitute Islamism in its place. Abdul hamid’s anti-nationalist policy and his discontent
with the idea of vatan was criticized by Islamists on the grounds that the love of
motherland was indeed “a part of the faith.”123 The “despotic” regime of the Sultan also
created a sense of separation and enmity between muslims and non-muslims. Even, non-
muslims subjects of the empire were in better position than muslims due to the advantages
of the millet system.124 Islamist identification of Abdulhamid II’s rule with istibdad, was
not a contested one. Ahmed Midhat, the most distinguished intellectual of the Hamidian
time, defended Hamid’s regime by making a distinction between absolutism which was
synonymous with lawlessness and autocracy, and by emphasizing the claim that the
sultan’s rule was entirely true to Islamic principles.125
2.7.2 Points of Tension Between the Young Turks and the Islamists
In their struggle against the rule of Abdulhamid, Young Turks addressed mostly to Islamist
arguments as an oppositional ideology and got the support of the ulema and of some parts
of popular Islam, namely tarikats. Among the ulema who established the science branch of
the Union and Progress in 1908 with the goal of displaying the Islamic nature of the
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constitutional regime, were Musa Kazım Efendi, Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı Efendi and
Mustafa Sabri Efendi, writing in different Islamist periodicals at the moment.126
Islamists were in full agreement in supporting the erection of constitutional government
and the June revolution against the absolutism of Abdulhamid II. According to Musa
Kazım, “The Islamic state was restored thanks to the constitution (of 1876/1909) which is
based on the Islamic principle of consultation, revealed in the Koran (Sura 42:38). The
umma (Muslim Community) is represented by the Ottoman parliament. The neglect of the
principle of consultation led to the decline of Islam.”127 Islamists presented the July
revolution to the people as the last chain of the revolutions that occured in Islamic
world.128 Even Volkan which was later involved in the event of 31st Mart, considered the
July Revolution for the Ottomans as the beginning of being the nation which was until
then composed of several ethnicities.129 The word revolution (inkilap) as something
positive was incorporated into Islamist discourse(s) by the July revolution and continued to
be used in that way in the Republican period. The revolution was achieved under the
leading role of the Union and Progress as “the guarantee of the freedom and
constitution.”130 An interesting and somehow telling evaluation of the June revolution was
provided by Mustafa Sabri Efendi who mentioned the ulema’s duty of ‘commanding the
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good and forbidding the bad’ and continued: “Although the duty of leading the force
which would forbid and remove the bad [the despotic Hamidian regime] belonged to the
ulema, we, unfortunately, could not perform this duty. But our glorious soldiers and the
Committee of Union and Progress did this legitimate duty.”131
While a group of Islamists, the Society of Muhammedan Union, under the leadership of
Derviş Vahdeti through Volkan journal, played a role in organizing the Incident of the 31st
Mart, almost all Islamists, including Sırat-ı Mustakim and Beyanül Hak, opposed to the
uprising and tried to persuade the public not to participate in the revolt. Interpreting the
usage of Şeriat by the uprising as something reactionary (irtica), Islamists claimed that the
uprising was religious in its appearence but was political and reactionary in reality. It was
organized by the despot Abdul Hamid in order to bring the despotism back and in order to
put an end to the constitutional regime.132 In their eyes, denying meşrutiyet and meşveret
which would save the Ottoman state was, indeed, tantamount to denying Islam and
humanity.133 Looked form this particular perspective, the Operation Corps (Hareket
ordusu) which supressed the rebellion of 31 Mart in 1909 was salluted by Islamists as
being “the saver of Islamic nation, caliphate and Ottomon government.”134
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Islamists hoped much from the proclamation of the second constitution (İkinci
Meşrutiyet); in fact they participated into the secret organizations of the Union and
Progress to oppose Sultan Abdulhamid and to force him for the reopening of the
parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan). During the years of opposition to the Hamidian rule and
after the June revolution, the different sectors of the Islamists of the Second Constitutional
period called the Union and Progress as “the renewers (müceddidin)” or “the good people
of the ummah (ahyar-ı ümmet)” while accusing the sultan of not applying the sharia.135
Despite of the fact that Islamists supported wholeheartedly the oppositon to the Hamidian
regime by denouncing any accusation of irreligousity for the Young Turks, as İsmail Kara
underlines, the ulema was not in a position of establishing the opposition but rather was a
passive and secondary part of the opposition so that its legitimacy was controversial from
an Islamic point of view.136
But the performance of the Union and Progress defeated their expectations, for this party
was carrying out some unIslamic (or secular) and nationalist policies. Like Young Turks,
Islamists were imbued with the ideas of the Young Ottomans on constitution and
parliament and even some Islamists mentioned Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi among their
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sources of intellectual and political inspiration. But while the Young Ottomans’ attempt to
reconcile western civilization with Islamic values found an echo in the intellectual life of
the Islamists, Young Turks considered this effort as useless, except for the purposes of
propaganda.137 Thus, it was inescapable that the Young Turks and Islamists would be in a
serious conflict on how to define ideological features of the post-Hamidian state and on
which layers of Ottoman identity, Islamic or Turkist, would be emphasised to give the
colour to the new regime. Although in their search for the support of the ulema, Young
Turks employed the jurisdic arguments of Islamic political theory and the shari’a as the
source of constitutionalism and as a leverage to oppose the despotic government (istibdad)
of the sultan Abdulhamid II, as Hanioğlu rightly points out, their ideology was “originally
‘scientific,’ materialist, social Darwinist, elitist, and vehemently antireligious; it did not
favor representative government.”138
It is not true to say that after their disillusionment with the direction of the Union and
Progress’s regime, Islamists changed their minds and became anti-democratic.139 But
rather, they criticized, especially after the Balkan wars, the Union and Progress as ruling
the country despotically similar to that of Abdulhamid’s despotism140 and as “not walking
along the way of true Islamization and not completing the political revolution by social and
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religious revolutions.”141 Furthermore, the Young Turk regime’s reluctance in
promulgating laws which were derived from the sharia and its Turanist and secular
policies gave way to the serious disturbances among Islamist circles.142 Another
significant subject of tension between Young Turks and Islamists, especially Beyanul Hak
circle was the negative image of the ulema portrayed as sarıklılar, denoting a group of
reactionary and anti-constitutionalist people, in the second constitutional period. This
negative image of the ulema was also discussed in connection with its involvement in
politics. Beyanul Hak circle, composed of the ulema who expected a more significant
place for themselves in the new regime simply because of their unique role in executing
sharia, discussed the subject in great detail between 1911 and 1912. Closely tied to their
duty of commanding the good and forbidding the evil, they regarded themselves as the
inheritor of the prophet to supervise the government policies and to enlighten the public
opinion from a position, that was above party politics. The involvement of the ulema in
politics was also defended by reference to the idea of national sovereignty which the ulema
was a part of as well. 143
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CHAPTER III
ISLAMISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1908-1918) II: POLITICAL IDEAS
A Muslim’s fatherland is the place in which the shari’a prevails
M. Said Halim Pasha, Buhranlarımız
3.1 Islamizing Democracy: Islamists and The Meşrutiyet
The notions of constitutionalism, representative government and popular sovereignty came
to constitute the heart of the modernization movement in the Empire, embracing the view
that they were compatible with the principles of Islamic government. Based on the
compatibility argument, the idea of democracy as the basis of a constitutional regime was
widely discussed in the writings of the Young Ottomans, most notably by Namık Kemal
and Ali Suavi. They advocated liberal constitutionalism because it, as they argued, could
put an end to the absolutism and restore shariah or rule of law, in a parliamentary
framework. By emphasizing certain concepts (shura, ijma and bay’a) of Islamic jurisdic
tradition and relegating others to the background, they reconstructed Islamic theorizing on
democracy and state to justify the adoption of democratic institutions.1 For example,
Namık Kemal advocated the doctrine of popular sovereignty and found its equivalence in
Islamic tradition : bay’a as a social contract between the people and the sovereign.2 In this
way, shura and meşveret grows into representation or democracy, ümmet into nation, ijma
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into social contract, içtihad into the parliamentary legislation, bay’a into the delegation of
sovereignty to the ruler by the people, justice into freedom and ilm into science.3
There are two differing opinions regarding Islam’s compatibility with democracy in
Turkish political thought. They can be traced back to the disagreement between the two
thinkers on the issue of popular sovereignty. While Namık Kemal assumed that popular
sovereignty could be reconciled with the notions of bay’a and ijma, Suavi was the first
political thinker who voiced the argument that there is no popular sovereignty in Islam
because sovereignty belongs to God, not to people.4 Through this understanding of
sovereignty, he speaks of Islamic government in nomocratic terms and comes to conclude
that “sharia is superior to caliph and sultan in the Islamic state (Devlet-i İslamiyye) and
that government is indeed conducted in the name of sharia.” The central importance of
sharia, in Suavi’s ideas was highly tied to the ulema’s supreme duty of control (murakebe)
over statesmen and the sultan.5 Young Ottomans sometimes broadened the compatibility
established between meşrutiyet and meşveret to the approval of republic as a form of
government by the argument that Islam and the Ottoman state were a sort of republic when
they first arose.6
Here we have the beginning of an interesting line of thought- an attempt to establish the
legitimacy of Western democratic values and institutions within the framework of a
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general Islamic political heritage. Their liberal interpretation of Islam, their reconciliation
of Islamic political values with the Western political institutions, their emphasis on
spreading education and the use of journalism to create public opinion prepared the
Ottoman intellectual mind for accepting modern concepts and institutions. The concepts
were old but their contents were new and to a great extent Western ones.7 The Young
Ottomans were addressing people whose foremost commitment was to religious values
and when they say that the Western political ideas and institutions such as parliament and
democracy, were to be found in Islam’s early days, they were trying to appropriate modern
ideas into Islamic forms. Interestingly enough, Islamist intellectuals’ effort to combine
western political ideas with Islamic tradition constituted the most effective channel for the
penetration of Western ideas into the Ottoman intellectual mind.8
More importantly, Islamists of the Second Constituional period like the Young Ottomans,
had the inclination of adopting (and justifying) democratic institutions and notions for the
cause of adopting good aspects (mehasin-i medeniyet) of Western “civilization,” without
sacrificing the Islamic ideals and values of the Ottoman society. Young Ottomans’ effort
to amalgamate European liberal constitutionalism and Islamic (classic ) political theory
was taken up by the Islamists of Second Constitutional period. Put it differently, the
political institutional framework coming from modernity was tried to be adopted and
legitimized by the traditional political symbols of Islam.
3.1.1 From Meşveret To Constitutional Regime: Hürriyet and Kanun-i Esasi
At the proclamation of Meşrutiyet, like the Young Turks, for Islamists freedom (hürriyet)
signified the ending of Abdülhamid II’s autocracy (istibdad) and the restoration of the
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constitutional regime (free election and parliament) and so that, ‘constitutional regime
became in perfect conformity with the Islamic government’. Against the accusation that
the constitution was a thing which was taken from Christian Europe, Ahmet Hilmi argued
that “It was by Islam that consultation was proclaimed for the first time in the world.”9 He
went on to claim that although the prophet’s form of government was a patriarchal
government, it was basically a constitutional regime that its principles were subjected to
well arranged laws and its details were subjected to meşveret.10 Common among Islamists
was the effort to find the principles of democracy in the era of the first four caliphs. The
only cure for the problems of Muslims is to return to the rules of Islam and their practice in
accordance with what it was in the days of the early caliphs.
In their articles, Islamists, in order to introduce modern-democratic ideas into their readers,
used classical jurisdic terminology and combined traditional and modern concepts with the
aim to give the legitimacy of old concepts to the new ones, as if they were synonyms. In
this way, Islamists tried to transform the Islamic legal conceptions of hürriyet, müsavat and
uhuvvet into political ideas as something similar to the democratic political concepts of
freedom, equality and fraternity.11
While adhering to the institution of Shura or meşveret, they made it clear that members of
shura or Ehl-i Hal ve’l Akd (men with power to bind and loosen) should be elected by the
people and the ruler should be bound by the decision of the majority of Shura. Shura was
what made political authority legitimate and more importantly, the continuation of
legitimacy hinged on the application of the sharia. The principle of shura or meşveret was
made into the most significant element of political thought in Islam. Its employment
                                                
9 Arusi in Landau, The Politics. 338.
10 Ahmed Hilmi, İslam Tarihi. 198-199.
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served two objectives: first, to absorb modern political institutions such as constitution and
parliament within Islam; second, to denounce the autocratic rule (istibdad) of Abdulhamid
II and later, at least by a small part of Islamists, the Committe of Union and Progress.
Islamists were against also the despotic rule under the cloak of meşrutiyet in the regime of
the Union and Progress.12
The support to constitutionalism was mainly accompanied by the rejection of despotism in
Islamist discourse. Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi’s statement is an illuminating example: “[t]he
method of government of all governments subject to the faith of Islam is that of lawful
consultation and constitution. In Islam there is not despotism, i.e., rule according to the
arbitrary wishes of one man. If any Moslem accepts any principle other than that of
consultation, he is guilty of disobedience towards the tradition of our Prophet and the
command of God, and of giving assistance to tyranny.”13
In Islamist definition, meşrutiyet denoted a contract, a social contract, between the nation
and the government on the condition that the nation had the right of controlling the
government.14 According to another definiton, meşrutiyet was composed of justice,
meşveret (shura) and limitation of power in law.15 Generally, meşrutiyet was defined in
contradistinction to despotism. Meşrutiyet meant government’s acceptence of being
limited by laws while applying its political power to carry out the affairs of the nation
                                                                                                                                         
11 Kara, Şeyhefendinin. 263. Kara thinks that this attempt was not succesfull.
12 See Mustafa Sabri Efendi, Dini Mücedditler. 108-109.
13 Arusi in Landau, The Politics. 336-7; see also Ömer Rıza (Doğrul), “Türkçülük,
Memleketçilik.” [Turkism, Patriotism] SR. XVIII/448 (13 Teşrinisani 1335/18 Safer
1338/1919): 70; Mustafa Sabri, Dini Mücedditler. 101
14 Mustafa Sabri, “Talebe-i Uluma.” [To the Students of Learning] BH. II/33 (29 Haziran
1325/23 Cemaziyelahir 1327/1909): 766.
15 Said-i Kürdi (Nursi), “Hakikat.” [The Truth] Volkan. 70 (26 Şubat 1324/18 Safer
1327/11 Mart 1909): 337.
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whereas despotism signified the noncompliance with the laws by rejecting any sense of
limitation. The Ottoman Constitution, Kanun-i Esasi was legitimated and defended by
Islamists on the ground that meşrutiyet as a form of government and a political ideal was
completely in accordance with the sharia. Within this mood, Musa Kazım, in his article,
‘Freedom and Equality’ argued that “the Constitution is nothing but the embodiment of
some parts of the fundamental provisions of the Kur’an relating to worldly affairs.”16
Similarly, Elmalılı M. Hamdi suggested that Kanun-i Esasi was a document of agreement
between the nation and the government in order to protect Islamic sharia and to execute its
laws.17
As Berkes rightly argues, “[i]t had never occurred to the Young Ottomans to claim that the
constitutional system they found in the West had been taken over from the Arabs. They
simply believed that in the past Islam, too, had had its constitutionalism”. Islamists of the
second constitutional period went further. Europeans owed both their constitutional system
and their science and technology to Islamic civilization of the medieval ages.18 Thus, for
Islamists the ideas of hürriyet (freedom) and müsavat (equality) were not new to Muslim
mind. Constitutional democracy was welcomed by them because it was believed that this
new political system of Europe was the revitalization of the early Islamic government (the
early caliphate of Islam) in the times of the first four caliphs.19 Islamic political system as
                                                
16 Musa Kazım, “Hürriyet-Müsavat.” [Freedom-Equality] SM. I/2 (21 Ağustos 1324/7
Ramazan 1326/1908): 20-22.
17 Yazır, “31 Mart,” 790.
18 Berkes, The Development. 263; see Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı, “Mev’iza.” [Sermon] SM.
I/7 (25 Eylül 1324/12 Ramazan 1326/1908): 109; Mustafa Sabri, “Muhterem
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19 Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı, “İslam ve Usul-ü Meşveret.” [Islam and Principle of
Consultation] SM. I/5 (11 Eylül 1324/28 Şaban 1326/1908): 70; “Mev’iza.” [Sermon]
SM. I/13, p. 13, 6 Teşrinisani 1324/24 Şevval 1326; İsmail Fenni Ertuğrul, Hakikat
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exemplified by the first four caliphs decayed because of the absence of meşveret
(consultation). By classifying the types of government into three; monarchy, aristocracy
and democracy, İzmirli İsmail Hakkı argued that Islamic government was a kind of
democratic government in which political head of the government was elected by the
people. As in democracy everybody was equal in front of the law, everbody in Islam has
the same rights and equal in front of the sharia. As democracy was a people’s government
in which people participated in the affairs of the state, Islamic government was a
government of the umma to whom the three powers, executive, legislative and judiciary
belonged.20
The identification of constitutional regime with the Islamic political principles; shura and
ijma was justified in such a way that ” the constitutional regime which ‘the Europeans
believe to be their own invention is nothing but the totality of the sacred Şeriat.’ ”21
Islamist discourse envisioned such a very close and organic tie between meşrutiyet and
sharia, calling it as meşrutiyet-i meşrua (shari constitutionalism) so that they generally
regarded meşrutiyet not only as a form of government which was compatible with Islam
but also as a form of government that would realize the goals of sharia such as ittihad,
progress and religiosity.22 Commenting upon constitutionalism of a government which
                                                                                                                                         
Nurları [Lights of the Truth] quoted in İsmail Kara, Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi
[Islamist Thoght in Turkey] vol.2 (İstanbul: Risale, 1989), 164-5; Elmalılı Hamdi
Yazır, “Müslümanlık Mani-i Terakki Değil, Zamin-i Terakkidir-5.” [Islam is not an
Obstacle to Progress but a Guarantee of Progress-5] SR. XXII/551-552, p. 36-38, 3
Muharrem 1342; Mahmud Es’ad, “Din-i İslam Meşrutiyeti emr eder.” [Islamic
Religion Commands Constitutional Regime] TM. I/15, pp. 238-239, 9 Eylül 1326/18
Ramazan 1328.
20 İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, Anglikan. 278-279, 282.
21 Quoted in Berkes, the Development. 369.
22 Said-i Kürdi (Nursi), “Bediüzzaman-ı,” 402-403; ”Lemean-i Hakikat ve İzale-i
Şübühat.” [Shining of Truth and Elimination of Doubts] Volkan. 101 (29 Mart 1325/20
Rebiülevvel 1327/11 Nisan 1909): 494; Elmalılı M. Hamdi, “Vaaz.” [Sermon] BH. I/2
(29 Eylül 1324/16 Ramazan 1326/1908): 7.
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applied the sharia based laws, Mustafa Sabri spoke of the adherence to sharia as the major
condition in the contract between nation and head of government.23
In fact, even when the expectations produced by the July revolution (Young Turk
revolution) faded away with the autocratic rule of the Committee of Union and Progress,
Islamists continued to identify the constitutional regime with the Islamic model. Despite
their opposition to the application of constitutionalism by the Young Turk governments
through their articles in some periodicals, Sırat-ı Mustakim (The Straight Path) (from 1912
known as Sebilürreşad, Path of Righteousness), Beyan’ül Hak, Hikmet, Volkan and the
like, Islamists did not voice any argument against the said compatibility between Islam and
the constitutionalism. Even İttihad-ı Muhammedi circle led by Derviş Vahdeti in the
periodical Volkan presented not an anti-democratic discourse but rather it advocated a
more libertarian and democratic language in their opposition to the policies of Union and
Progress. 24 Certainly this discourse was overtoned by their call for the strict adherence to
shariah in the new regime. Nobody paid attention to the apparent incompatibility between
the notion of national sovereignty and Islamic principles, on the contrary it was seen as a
form of ijma.
One exception to this trend was Said Halim Pasa, who, interestingly enough, was also the
prime minister (grand vezir) of the Young Turk government during the period of 1913-
1917.25 He presented a wide range of arguments against the adoption of constitutional
regime, including the uniqueness of Western democratic experience. Said Halim said: “
Constitutionalism is one of the results of the erroneous idea of achieving reform by making
                                                
23 Mustafa Sabri, Dini Mücedditler. 101.
24 Kara, Şeyhefendinin. 64-5.
25 Kara, İslamcıların. 121. His connections with the Arab world made him a suitable
candidate for prime ministry in the period of Union’s Islamist policies.
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laws drawn from Europe. European constitutionalism will not work here...The tyrannies of
the West were made in the name of religion and church. This is not so with us. The
internal class struggles of Western society do not exist in Islam... Democracy, which has
been found as a remedy to the inequalities inherent in Western society, therefore is entirely
irrelevant to us.” 26 Moreover, according to him, Kanun-i Esasi of 1908 was a great error
and it was not compatible with the politico-social situation of the country and with the
beliefs and customs of the people. This error mainly emanated from one major conviction
that if the foreign institutions and laws were adopted, then the Ottomans would realize
progress.27 However, Said Halim did not propose a return from the constitutional regime
to the old autocratic regime, but rather a reformation of the existing democratic regime on
the basis of the sui generis features and values of the Ottoman society.28
The acceptance of the compatibility between constitutional rule and meşveret were a part
of the deliberative intellectual attempt that tried to transform the religious understanding of
the time into a new one capable of absorbing what was good in modern science,
philosophy, politics and economics as being not the introduction of something new but a
return to the true spirit of Islam. Unfortunately, many Islamists, with the exception of Said
Halim Pasha, supposed that identifying meşveret of the early days of Islam with
constitutional rule would do away with the problems of the existing political culture as
distorted by autocratic rulers and missed the significance of socio-economic factors and
political heritage in the formation of both new institutions and their justification.
                                                
26 Said Halim, Buhranlarımız. 14-22; Berkes’s translation, The Development. 372
27 Said Halim, Buhranlarımız. 17.
28 Ibid., 23. The Islamist views of Said Halim influenced an Indian Muslim thinker,
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The idea of meşveret was not unknown to the Ottoman mind but it had never meant the
sovereignty of the people.29 In modern sense, through the theories of constitutionalism, the
sovereign was transformed from the caliph to the parliament, a representative of the
people’s sovereignty. A constitutional regime (meşrutiyet) which meant national
sovereignty (hakimiyet-i milliye), had one major essence: national interest in the form of
majority’s interest.30 National sovereignty was evaluated in positive terms because it was
believed that the Islamic nation had a right of control and sovereignty over the early
Islamic government in the times of the first four caliphs.31 Connected to the idea of
national sovereignty, it was argued that public opinion (efkar-ı umumiyye) had to become
supreme in a constitutional regime otherwise the parliament which did not follow the
public opinion were a form of absolutism.32 Some Islamists, like İzmirli İsmail Hakkı
underlined the sovereignty of the umma more than others, on the grounds that the essence
of Islamic state was not government nor its forms, but the interests of the umma (mesalih-i
ümmet). Therefore, all the three powers, executive, legislative and judiciary powers
belonged only to the umma by the existence of ijma. The Umma had a legislative power
simply because it had the duty of commanding the good and forbidding the evil, and
therefore, umma’s ijma was canonically legal. Certainly, the umma’s legislation was an act
                                                
29 Berkes, The Development. 238.
30 Ahmet Hilmi, “Mutlakiyet ile Meşrutiyette Suistimal Suretlerinin Mukayesesi.”
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of discovering the law which God, the Lawgiver prescriped.33 It is therefore obvious that
the principle of ijma should represent a very different thing to Islamists of the Second
Constitutional Period than to the ulema of the classical age. The major difference between
Islamism of the Second Constitutional Period and the Islamic medieval theorization on
politics was that the latter underlined values such as justice and the application of sharia,
whereas the former laid a great emphasis on the necessity of institutionalization such as
constitution and parliament.
Despite their identification of shura with democracy, Islamists sometimes argued that the
sharia did not prescribe any form of government; and it was not correct to say that the form
of government would determine the decline or progress of Muslims. İsmail Hakkı Milaslı
and Osman Fahri spoke of the merit of the nation (liyakat-ı millet) as the criteria in
determining the goodness of any form of government. By reading from Plato’s Republic,
Osman Fahri went on to claim that monarchy with just sultan was more beneficial than
democracy with ignorant and immoral people.34
After the proclamation of meşrutiyet, Islamists were disturbed by the “unlimited freedom”
of people in their daily life, neglecting their religious and moral duties such as women’s
inclination to uncover their heads. Freedom did not mean being without any limitation.
Absolute freedom could not be thought of anywhere in the world and even in “the
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universe.”35 Freedom had to be settled within the sphere of sharia by obeying its principles
otherwise freedom might be a form of despotism or slavery to selfishness.36 Musa Kazım
stated that “the universal need for world order and the regulation of society demand that
freedom always will be limited socially according to traditions, character and (Islamic) law
school.”37 The discussion on the limits of freedom was extended to the critique of adopting
constitutionalism in the form of parliamentarism which was the most developed form of
freedom, by Ahmet Hilmi. The Union and Progress did not recognize that the nation could
not absorb such a huge freedom just after the violent despotism. The Ottoman political
culture was not suitable for this development. What was to be done was rather to adopt
gradually the reasonable level of meşrutiyet which was proper to the existing conditions of
the Ottomans; otherwise meşrutiyet was destined to be a mere imitation or another form of
despotism in the hands of five to ten people.38
3.1.2 The Views on Parliament: Elitism and Limited Legislation
Young Ottomans used the Prophet’s saying, ‘difference of opinion within my community
is an act of divine mercy’, to legitimize the creation of an assembly which represented
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different opinions.39 For the legitimacy of the assembly, for instance, Namık Kemal used
meşveret and icma-i ümmet which would offer the suitable ground for the establishment of
a kind of western parliament in the Empire.40 Learning from one man’s autocratic rule,
Abdulhamid II’s despotism, in their own words, Islamists of the Second Constitutional
Period had the inclination to put the real power in the hands of the umma, or more
precisely the parliament (Meclisi Mebusan), rather than in the hands of the caliph, for
realizing the ideals of sharia; shura and justice.41
Shura, having been founded on democratic principles, was regarded as a great check on
the absolutism of the rulers. In the eyes of Islamists, the shura represented an indigenous
principle of representative or constitutional government in Islam or a check on the ruler’s
authority or power. The inclusion of non-Muslims into the circle of meşveret was new to
Islamic mind and was justified by the necessities of the time to keep the political unity of
the empire.42 Actually, the acceptence of Ottoman citizenship by enlarging Islamic
brotherhood to non-Muslims was the manifestation of the same kind of reasoning.
The Islamist identification of shura with the parliament sometimes confused the idea of
representation with the idea of public debate. For instance, after stating the fact that the
prophet took different opinions of the umma while making public decisions, Manastırlı
İsmail Hakkı claimed that shura in its essence was no different than parliamentary sessions
though deputies from different countries did not come together for public debate in the first
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one. But it was the “real” ulema who served as the deputy of the nation. Actually, the
representative element, the parliament was brought into existence as a necessity due to the
deterioration in morality and justice and due to the dominance of private interests over
general interest (menafi-i umumiye).43 More significantly, the members of the elected
parliament was expected to be the most wise, religious and learned men of the umma,
being charged with the duty of carrying out the affairs of the Ottoman Islamic caliphate in
accordance with the interests of state and religion.44 The qualifications to be elected as a
member of the parliament was defined by Islamists in the same way as they actually
described the characteristics of the ulema in the jurisdic theory. Nevertheless, their elitist
and virtue and knowledge based portrayal of a parliament member was meaningful if one
remembered the fact that Islamists justified the existence of a parliament with reference to
an elitist notion: ehl-i hal ve’l akd (men with power to bind and loosen) who were the
ulema in the classical period.45 Furthermore, the idealistic characterization of parliament
members and political leadership can be considered as similar both to the jurisdic
idealization and Muslim philosophers’ good city (al-madiah al-fadilah).
According to Said Halim, the parliament of Muslims would have no legislative powers
because Islamic society had unchanging ideals, prescribed by sharia while the Western
parliaments had to legislate to meet the flactuating demands ot their societies. The
parliament could only exercise supervisory function; the legislative power belonged to the
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independent delegation of the learned men, the ulema, for it was not a question of majority,
but simply one of competence like being a doctor.46 In fact, the ulema’s power of
legislation was also limited in the sense that the ulema was under the duty of ijtihad for the
discovery and understanding of the divine laws nor for the legislation of the laws, because
the power of legislation belonged only to God.47 A leading member of Beyanül Hak circle,
Mustafa Sabri, rejecting the use of kuvve-i teşriiye (power of legislation) for the
parliament, claimed that the right of legislation belonged only to God, not even to the
prophet. He added that the right word for the parliament might be kuvve-i kanuniye or
kuvve-i tanzimiyye.48 Certainly, according to those Islamists who accepted the legislative
power of the parliament, it had to make laws which were in accordance with sharia.49
Islamists often referred to the article of the 1908 Constitution stating, “the religion of the
state is Islam,” as a support to their claim that any legislation had to be in accordance with
the principles of sharia.
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3.1.3 Difficulties on the Concepts of Political Opposition and Political Party
The significance of the Islamist reaction to the event of 31st March was that Islamists,
unlike the Young Ottomans’ and Young Turks’ usage of religion as a source of opposition,
employed religious arguments to legitimate the existing political regime.50 The call for
sharia as form of opposition to the Young Turk regime in this event was rejected by
Islamists as being an anti-constitutionalist and reactionary movement (irtica). As Islamists
were discomforted with the religious nature of any opposition to the power, they
discredited the idea of opposition.51 The quest for unity and solidarity in the circles of
intellectuals and statesmen in the second constitutional period to keep the unity of Ottoman
state was certainly more effective in Islamist conceptualization of opposition. Here,
important for our purposes, Islamists, for the sake of protecting the sharia, were trying to
undermine the possibility of any political appeal to the sharia which functioned as source
of political opposition for social and religious movements at any time in the Islamic world.
As the juristic consideration of preserving order and unity and preventing civil war and
anarchy had shifted their focus of attention much to the duty of obedience but less to the
contractual side of that obedience. Similarly, Islamists concentrated much on the
obedience but less on the right of non-obedience to unjust rule. This was, a continuation, if
not a revitalization of the doctrine of passive obedience, discussed in the first chapter. At
this point, it would be insightful to reiterate Mardin’s observation on the difficulty of
constituting any opposition to the power in a legitimate way in the Empire: “There is an
element in Turkish political culture to which the notion of opposition is deeply repugnant,”
Mardin continues, “[i]f a political opposition is defined as a mechanism which has as its
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function (a) the checking of absolute power and (b) the suggesting of real policy
alternatives, then it may be stated that no such thing existed in the Ottoman Empire.” 52
In the Islamist discourse of the second constitutional period, there were two different
opinions about the existence of political parties. For those who denied the possibility of
different political parties, since the emphasis was on the urgent need of ittihad for the
Ottoman progress, political party (fırka) was apparently synonymous with dividing the
society, self-seeking, destructive competition, taassub (etc.); therefore there was no place
for it in the structure of Islamic political system. Musa Kazım was cautious especially
about the destructive effects of establishing parties on the basis of ethnic and religious
differences which would result in the breakdown of the Ottoman unity.53 A more
sophisticated example was provided by Said Halim. In his opinion, since in Islamic
society, where there were no class rivalries and where the ideals were the same for all
Muslims, national representation would take a form different than that of Western one. By
maintaining in the political sphere the solidarity which was found in the social sphere, to
him, “in the parliament of Muslims, there would be neither communists nor socialists;
neither partisans of republic, nor partisans of sultanate. All the members of this parliament
would devote their lives to the same goal: the sincere enforcement of the wise commands
of sharia. They might be differing among themselves as to the selection of the best way in
order to serve this common ideal.”54 In the same vein, Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi interpreted
the right to differ in the prophet’s saying that ‘difference of opinion within my community
is an act of divine mercy’ as a sign of division of labor among Muslims in the search of
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science and industry but not as a proof of forming different political parties.55 Needless to
say, this line of thinking presumed that the political and social conflicts that occured
among Europeans would not take place in Islamic societies; if any conflict arised, it would
be resolved by the application of sharia. Clearly, this understanding did not foresee the fact
that the adoption of West’s good aspects such as industry and science would produce
political, economic and social conflicts among different sectors of any Islamic society and
that the existence of representation and parliament would inevitably bring into factions and
parties on public issues. Interpretation of sharia and its different conceptualizations were
enough for the differing ideas and groups within Islamic parliament.
On the other side, a significant group of Islamist intellectuals came to regard the existence
of political parties as the natural and useful elements of the constitutional regime,
especially after it became clear that the Union and Progress could not meet the Islamist
demands about the future destiny of the new regime. The existence of different political
parties in the parliament would provide an opportunity for the selection of different
programs that were suitable to different views or ijtihads. To denounce any opposition as a
betrayal to the unity of nation and state was not incompatible with the idea of meşrutiyet.56
İttihad-ı Muhammedi and Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası were established or supported by some
Islamists within this framework in order to oppose the ruling party, the Union and
Progress. As a consequence, it would be true to say that although the idea of political party
and opposition was recognized as something legitimate, the reservations made about its
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harmful results such as hatred (adavet) and division (tefrika) came to mean debunking it
(muhalefetin iflası) alongside with the ruling party. The main functions of any political
party, were relegated to supervising the government and enlightening the public opinion.57
3.2 Disarming the Caliph and the Early Emergence of the Idea of Islamic State
When the issues of constitution (Kanun-i Esasi), meşrutiyet and the source of political
authority were at stake, the Islamists unanimously accepted that the representative
government was Islamic. They made reference to the caliphate and supported the
meşrutiyet regime but with the extra effort to make it sure that Kanun-i Esasi should be
compatible with the principles of Shari’ah. While the jurists of the medieval age tried both
to idealize and justify the institution of caliphate, the Islamists attempted to justify the
meşrutiyet and its institutions such as parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan) and constitution
(Kanun-i Esasi) which were established by the Union and Progress regime. Turkish
Islamists did not establish a theory of caliphate while they defended the Ottoman caliphate,
unlike Rashid Rida who thought that only if a true caliph (an idealized ruler mainly
springing from medieval theorization but with modern implications) could help a real
Islamic political system to exist. They did not give much attention at all to the jurisdic
formulations and instead applied the practice of prophet and the first four caliphs to
modern needs; therefore, the jurisdic theory of the caliphate acquired the potentiality of
becoming a positive constitutional system in the hands of Islamists, even though for the
jurists it was something else. Islamists did not defend the historical record of Umayyad and
Abbasid caliphate after the first four caliphs and in fact they severely criticized them as
distorting the democratic nature of caliphate and establishing istibdat. The principle of
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election and the consultation with the electors (shura) were perverted by the authoritarian
rules of these dynasties and were replaced by the principle of force (güç).
With the dominance of the democratic ideas in Islamist political mind, the sultan-caliph
conceptualization of the Ottoman classical times, which was discussed in the first chapter,
started to be transformed from the absolute right of the sultan to the head of executive,
under the duty of sharia’s application. Actually most Islamists came to neglect and reject
the supreme position of the sultan in Ottoman traditional sense and came to use caliph and
sultan synonymously in order to denote a political authority or a head of state.58 While the
title “caliph” for the sultan, in the classical period, was used in the sense of shadow of God
in the world, this time, the sense of successorship to the prophet became well established in
any Islamist depiction of caliphate. Actually sultan became another name for caliph, a
political authority. This was stated in very clear terms by Elmalılı Hamdi: “in the era of
meşrutiyet, it is better to use the word caliphate instead of sultanate which implied a
usurpation of power (tasallut) and domination over others (tagallüb) or despotism
(istibdad).”59 But, the unification of sultanate and caliphate on the personality of the
Ottoman caliph-sultan was restated for the unity of religious and worldly political powers
of the caliph in order to reject their separation. The necessity of having a political
authority, for Muslims, to apply the sharia also made its reference to such unity.60 The
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necessity of political authority and government for the goals of religion was expressed
very openly in İzmirli İsmail Hakkı’s words: "the religion of Islam survives with the
lasting of Islamic state and declines with its decline as well... The obligation of
commanding the good and forbidding the evil, holy war and justice can be completed by
the force and political leadership.”61
It is obvious that Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period did not wish to revive the
caliphate along the lines of jurisdic theory. By making it as the core value and institution of
Islamic political theory, Islamists gave much attention to the element of consultation
(meşveret), which was not so central to the classical writings of jurists. What was new in
Islamist enlisting of caliph’s duties was their emphasis on meşveret and and freedom
alongside the classical jurisdic duties.62 Expectedly, the first and foremost duty of caliph or
sultan was considered to be the application of sharia among his other duties. According to
Eşref Edip, “Islamic conceptualizations of sultan and government is different that of
Europe. Unlike the European experience, Islam does not accept the right of the king. In
Islam’s view, caliphs are nothing but officials charged with the application of sharia.
Caliphs of Islam are neither innocent nor eligible for the legislation of divine law. If the
caliph violates the sharia, it is an obligation on the Islamic nation to resist this acts.”63 It
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was indeed this limitation of caliph’s power by sharia that enabled the establishment of the
constitutional regime.64
But on the other hand, Islamists were following the jurisdic theory, while they were
regarding the Ottoman caliphate as the symbol of the unity of the Muslim community. In
the eyes of Islamists, the Ottoman caliphate was then the only power which could
conceivably face the challenge of European colonialism. They did not oppose Sultan
Abdulhamid’s claim to the title of caliph in particular because this claim was the natural
outcome of the Ottoman dynasty’s claim to caliphate, regarding the transfer of caliphate
from the Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil to Sultan Selim. According to Islamists, the
requirement of the Qurayshi lineage for the caliphate was no longer operative (by
reference to Ibn Khaldun’s ideas in this respect) and therefore the Ottoman claim to
caliphate as the most powerful protector of Muslims was beyond dispute.65 Unlike their
negative assessments on the performance of Abbasid and Umayyad caliphates, Islamists
spoke of the good credentials of the Ottoman caliphate, similar to the prophetic era and to
the practice of the first four caliphs: ”the Ottoman state was a law-abiding Islamic state and
Ottoman sultans were law-abiding Muslim sultans as well.”66 During the World War I,
Sebilürreşat published Ibn Taymiyya’s famous book, Siyasetüş-Şer’iyye to support
implicitly the Ottoman caliph’s fatwa of holy war, calling the Muslim cooperation against
the enemies of the Ottomans.67 All in all, although the Ottoman sultan was still regarded as
the head and leader of all Muslims and it is their duty to obey his commands if they are
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lawful and true, Islamist equivalence established between modern democratic institutions
and the classical theory of caliphate not only gave a new substance to jurisdic theory but
also weakened the authority of the caliph.
Unlike the jurisdic theory, Islamist reconceptualization of caliphate clearly attributed
sovereignty to people (constitution and parliament) and progressed in its treatment of
sovereignty beyond the religious to the positive level. The question of procedures for
legislative interpretation which was not discussed in jurisdic theory was solved in favor of
the elected representatives of people and parliament. The Shari’a was a universally
acknowledged divine law to be respected by the parliament and the constitution and
legislation of new law could not be contrary to this supreme divine law. Elmalılı Hamdi’s
statements can be taken as the example of the new democratic reading of the jurisdic
theory: “the caliph possesses the representation (vekalet) of the umma who made an oath
of allegiance to him on the one side and the regency of the Lawgiver in the execution of
sharia on the other side. The caliph can not violate the sharia by his despotic opinion... if he
does, the national sovereignty (hakimiyyet-i milliye) will execute its judgement [will
overthrow him]. Caliphate is nothing different than a presidency of executive power for
sharia.”68 Elmalılı also interpreted the bay’ah as the “contract” between the caliph and the
umma by identifying the conditions of bay’ah with the articles and content of Kanun-i
Esasi.69 In the same way, Ömer Rıza put the emphasis on the national sovereignty when he
made it clear that caliphate was not a theocracy. According to him:
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“the caliph is appointed by the nation or its deputies; sovereignty belongs to
the nation. If the national interests (mesalih-i milliye) needed, the caliph
would be overthrown...Caliphate is not a theocracy. Theocracy means
receiving sharia directly from God, having the right of legislation, possessing
the right of obedience not the right of bay’ah, over people and thus no any
opposition without being evaluated in terms of the (in)compatibility of actions
with sharia. Because his saying is religion and sharia, like the church of the
medieval age.”70
Islamists often put the emphasis on the fact that in juristic theory, the caliphate was defined
to have contractual (delegation) features. Seyyid Bey, providing an example of
reformulating jurisdic theory in the Second Constitutional Period, stated that the majority
of the jurists maintained that the caliphate could only be conferred by consent and election
because the caliphate was a contract between people and the caliph. Due to the fact that
caliphate was a sort of contract between the caliph and the Islamic nation, the caliph was
not only the successor to the prophet but also the trustee or deputy (vekil) of the nation,
therefore he could be dethroned by ending the contract by the nation.71 Public trusteeship
(velayet-i amme) given to the caliph was limited by the idea of public interest (maslahat-ı
amme).72 Thus, the obligation of obedience to the caliph was restricted by two conditions:
a) “no obedience in sin”, that is a command contrary to the shari’a was not to be obeyed b)
the caliph’s acts and commands had to contain the public interest of the nation and state.73
Nevertheless, Seyyid Bey had a rather traditionalist understanding on the issue of the right
of revolt (sultana karşı ayaklanma), saying that it was not permitted to revolt against the
sultan just because of his injustice and immorality. Otherwise it would mean dividing the
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nation and weakening the state, that were forbidden in Islam.74 The goal of establishing
caliphate and government was to elevate Islamic state and the word of God, and to attain
the happiness of Islamic nation, Seyyid Bey said.75
While justice was the only sound basis for the Ottoman state and while the ruler’s
autocratic power was the guarantee to ensure the just rule in the traditional ideological
formulation (the circle of justice), Islamists considered the limitation of ruler’s power as
the sign of justice. It would not be incorrect to say that Islamist notion of freedom was the
natural outcome of the classical Islamic idea of justice. But this time, the notion of justice
constituted the answer to the different questions: how should the people govern
themselves? And how should the ruler be limited? The notion of justice as the main
principle of Islamic state was the spirit of the supreme sharia and strongly related to the
progress of Muslims in the near future.76
Theoretically, it can be said that Islamists had two conceptualizations of state in their
minds at the same time: 1) state as a transcendental and abstract entity and 2) state as body
politics, the level of rulership. In fact, these two different conceptualizations often get
mixed with each other and make the picture more problematic. One the one hand, when
there is injustice it is regarded as coming from the bad rulers, if good government (rulers)
comes to power, there will be no problems because state, in its nature, basically good and
can not do wrong things. But on the other hand, if you disobey and oppose the wrong
commands of the rulers, you may find yourself opposing not to the bad rulers but to the
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notion of abstract (good) state in the eyes of your opponents. Any opposition to political
authority, therefore, has to justify itself thatit is not an opposition to the good/abstract state
but to more concrete manifestations, to bad rulers. Regarding the form of government, in
their opinion, the Islamic state (devlet-i İslamiye) which was founded in the early Islam
was open to the good aspects of the modern state, paying attention to its essence, not to its
form. Government in Islam was under the duty of executing the laws and of protecting the
rights (goals) of religion and civilization. Sovereignty belonged to the rule of law, namely
sharia.77 Although the idea of Islamic state was conceptualized by Rashid Ridha (1865-
1935) in response to the abolution of caliphate by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in
1924, we encounter, especially with the weakening of the institution of caliphate, the first
glimmerings of the idea of Islamic state based on sharia in the second constitutional
period.78 Still, it is true to argue that, as İsmail Kara does, the concept of “Islamic state” in
the minds of the Islamists of the Republican period was inspired much from the
translations of the writers from Eyptian Ikhwan al Muslimun and Pakistanian Cemaat al
Islami in the 1960s.79
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79 Kara, Şeyhefendinin. 177. But it is oversimplification to claim that this concept is a
formulation which does not take into account Turkey’s unique local (yerel) political
culture and experiences and which emanates from the ideas of anti-Ottoman caliphate.
The first signs of the idea of Islamic state became apparent during the time where the
Ottoman caliphate still existed. The supremacy of sharia became the anchor point in
the conceptualizations of Islamic state in the absence of the caliphate. Certainly, the
emergence of this concept coincided with the efforts of adopting the modern nation-
state.
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3.3 The Rule of Sharia Conceived as Framework of Democracy
Not unexpectedly, Islamism of the Young Ottomans, draws special attention to the place
of shariah in the establishment or appropriation of civilization and progress; this is certain
especially in Namık Kemal’s and Suavi’s writings. Being the main source of strength in
order to catch up with Europe, Shariah gains a further importance in their eyes, not known
in the classical period of the Ottoman Empire. In this way, Young Ottomans broaden the
domain of shariah to the extent that the legal prerogative of the sultans to issue kanun was
wieved as “a Mongolian accretion with no Islamic precedence” and to the extent that the
Shari’a, as conceived by Kemal, “incorporated within it key elements of the European
discourse of reform: sovereignty of the people, representation, constitutionalism,
egalitarianism, individual freedom and division and separation of powers among the
judicial, legislative and executive branches of government.”80 Young Ottomans
established an equivalence between sharia and the natural law theory of the eighteenth
century in order to defend the unchanging principles of sharia and to oppose the
importation of French codes by the Tanzimat statesmen as well.81 In the same way,
Islamists of Second Constitutional Period saw paralellism between natural law and sharia,
which were both acts of God, therefore could not contradict each other.82
Moreover, closely tied to the central importance of sharia, political sovereignty, according
to N. Kemal, “had to fulfill two conditions for legitimacy: (a) it should be based on the
consent of the people, and (b) it should act according to the law derived from the abstract
good. ‘In Islam the good and bad are determined by the Şeriat which is the expression of
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the abstract good and the ultimate criterion of the truth.’”83 Such concepts as hilafet-i
İslamiye, devlet-i islamiye or hükümet-i islamiye gained their meanings in the minds of
the Young Ottomans within this framework84: “If our state wants to survive, it has to
continue to be an islamic state and it has to follow the sharia. Sharia is the soul of our
state.”85
Certainly, according to Islamists there was no doubt that the shariah was the binding force
for the Muslims at all times. But at the same time, they were ready to reinterpret the laws
of shariah in keeping with the changes of the time. Islamists advocated the view that it was
not necessary to follow the Prophet’s opinion in worldly matters, by quoting the tradition
‘I am only a human being, when I give you a command in religious matters, you should
obey it, but when I give you a command in daily affairs, then remember that I am only a
human being.’ They did not believe that Islamic jurisprudence, in its medieval formulation,
without the opening of the gate of ijtihad, could meet the modern needs. The closing of the
gate of ijtihad was one of the principle reasons for the decline of Muslims today simple
because of the despotism of the rulers and of the backwardness of the ulema.86
Apart form the fact that they were highly critical of the mere imitation (taqlid) in the field
of law, to Islamists, the responsibility for the backwardness of Muslims belonged to their
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145
rulers and to the ulama who did not codify Islamic law. Codification, a deliberate attempt
to systematize (formulate) the fıqh as a positive law, was not considered as a sign of
secularization or something against the precepts of Islam to Islamists.87 Actually the
process of codification started with the compilation of the Mecelle under the head of
Cevdet Paşa (1822-1895) and this codification was praised by the Islamists as a very
positive thing and was expected to be continued, rather than the adoption of European
laws, by the regimes of the second constitution and the new Republic. 88 In this vein, the
failure to fully apply sharia since the times of sultan Suleyman the Magnificient caused the
decline of the Ottomans though the adherence to sharia was the source of the Ottoman
greatness. In the minds of the Islamists, constitutionalism became associated with the
reinstitutionalization of the Shari’a.
Around the discussion about sharia and örf between Islamists and Turkists, the first group
was trying to enlarge the domain of sharia in order to Islamicize the society and to rescue
from the deteriorating effects of unIslamic customs while the latter aimed to enlarge the
domain of örf in order to introduce some secular reforms by their emphasis on ijtihad.89
The predomination of örf over the nass by Turkists such as Ziya Gökalp, Halim Sabit and
Mansurizade Said was rejected by Islamists to ensure the supremacy of sharia in devising
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rules for Islamic society.90 A middle way in these discussions was provided by
Şeyhülislam Musa Kazım who “devised a theoretical formula how to introduce
modernization while maintaining Islamic tradition: örf (=adet or custom of the believers)
was to have the legal force of nass (the prescript of the Sacred Scripture) in matters not
contained in the latter. All örf or adat belongs to the rule of Islamic law (shari’a).”91
According to Islamists, sharia was the totality of principles in order to institute the just
community and is above the constitution (Kanun-i Esasi) just for this reason.92
3.4 Islamist Ideal: İttihad-ı İslam As a Social and Religious Unity
The Islamist ideology, with its twin goals i.e. to establish a cohesive political and social
order with an Islamic identity in the Ottoman polity and to reach the material and
intellectual level of modern civilization, advocated the idea of Pan-Islamism (İttihad-ı
İslam) which is regarded as “proto-nationalism.”93 With the possible influence of the pan
movements of Germans and Slavs, the idea of İttihad-ı İslam, a union of all Muslims,
appeared first in the texts written by the Young Ottomans in the late 1860s (Hürriyet of 9
November 1868).94 By underlining the concept of the sultan-caliph, panislamism aimed to
deter European powers from attacking the empire “as well as to forge a unity within the
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Ottoman Empire that might resist the inroads of further European penetration and arrest
the internal forces of disintegration.”95 For them, the Islamic union under the leadership of
the Ottoman state, being the centre of the caliphate and being near Europe, could be a
civilizing force for other parts of Islamic world as well.96 They embraced the idea of
İttihad-ı İslam to stop Western encroachments in Muslim lands, but not to end the adoption
of western institutions and ideas. Moreover they were also “firm in their belief that the
Sultan Caliph, who was entrusted to rule with justice by the Sharia, shoud remain as head
of state, as he was the centre of loyalty within the Empire and also the head of the Islamic
Ummah.”97 Here, it is significant that pan-Islamism triggered the “imagination of a
political community”98 which was different from Ottomanism that was basically centered
around the empire.
During the Second Constitutional Period, Islamist journals contained a lot of news about
Muslims and other movements of Islamic revival in various parts of the Islamic world. The
impact of journalism in this period was particularly recognized in the dissemination of
political and religious ideas. For instance, Resid Rıza’s and Egyptian press‘ reaction to the
dethroning of sultan Abdul Hamid II found enough columns in Sırat-ı Mustakim. The
Islamists were appealing to what appeared to be the most effective tool to provide
solidarity and loyalty among the Muslim elements of the Ottoman Empire and the
available defensive strategy against the great powers such as England and France. Young
Turk regime’s and Turkist intellectuals’ call for İttihad-ı İslam to defend the Ottoman state
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and to weaken the British rule in its Muslim populated colonies during the World War I,
was welcomed by Islamists as “a great revolution.”99 Tied to the idea of İttihad-ı İslam
which was the spirit of Islam, tevhid (the unity of God) was not considered just as the
cornerstone of Islamic belief but also as the symbol and source of the unity of Muslims.100
According to Islamists, the Ottoman state was the last fortress of Islam against the
expansion of Europe. Therefore, the Islamist ideal was to strenghten Turkey as the force of
Islam, which might rescue other parts of the Islamic world from European colonialism.101
Islamist emphasis on the Ottoman caliphate aimed at the defence of the empire and the
umma against the increasing encroachements of Europe at a time when most Muslim lands
were falling under European colonial rule, with the exceptions of the Ottoman empire, Iran
and Afghanistan. Under the leadership of Ottoman caliphate, Afghanistan, Iran and the
Ottoman Empire had to establish alliances and agreements among themselves against the
European colonialism.102
İttihad-ı İslam in this period were concerned much with the revival of Islamic civilization
in its religious and cultural dimensions rather than with the political unity of all Muslims
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around the world. Islamists viewed İttihad-ı İslam as a mainly cultural and religious
phenomenon which was expected to serve the awakening and progress of Muslims all
around the world by the adoption of the modern civilization.
The idea of İttihad-ı İslam had two sides: 1) the unity of Muslims living beyond the
borders of the Ottoman Empire 2) Islamism within the empire, most particularly among its
Muslim subjects, including Arab, Albanian and other nations. Islamists often rejected the
Western view of Pan-Islam as the fanatic Muslim threat to the West and saw the political
unity of all Muslims as something could not be realized.103 Rather, ittihad-ı İslam was a
sense of brotherhood born in the times of the prophet and the four caliphs. The believers
were regarded as the human body, which suffers if its one part was ill. Certainly, the Union
of Muslims was not confined to the spritual togetherness, but rather it had to be improved
by cooperation, mutual help, affection and consultation. But Muslims were very far away
from establishing an Islamic union (İttihad-ı İslam) as a threat to the West, even Muslims
were not capable of being acquainted with one another (Tearüf-i Müslimin).104 One of the
most authoritative explanations for the different levels of İttihad-ı İslam was given by
Ahmet Hilmi who talked about its three levels: 1) İttihad-ı İslam as a political unity, it was
a clear madness to think of such a unity under the rule of one government, for Muslims
were composed of different ethnicities, languages and interests; 2)İttihad-ı İslam as a
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religious unity which was already existent in Islamic world and which could be improved
by unifying medhabs and orders; 3) İttihad-ı İslam as a social unity which was the most
reasonable among the three levels. Social unity of Islam (İttihad-ı İçtimai-ı İslam) meant
brotherhood, cooperation and the agreement in the demand for progress among Muslims
by means of Islamic awakening and science.105
Islamists, who acknowledged that it was impossible to achieve the union of Muslims in the
near future, argued for a theory of Aile-i İslam (Family of Islam). According to this theory,
every ethnicity of Islam should establish their nationhood and their independent state, then
furthering a future union of all Muslim nations.106 Therefore, despite their rhetoric against
nationalism, like Afghani, at least some Islamist intellectuals of the second constitutional
period thought that the Union of Islam and nationalism could be mutually complementary.
This acceptance would lead to the approval of nation-state for different parts of Islamic
world.
The Islamists, in a way, combined nationalist and pan-Islamic ideals or arguments against
the imperialism of the West. Although they advocated the idea of the Islamic nation
(umma), they also accepted the reality of different ethnic groupings (kavimler) or
nationalities.107 But in the final sense, the idea of nationhood was based on religion and
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thus; these ethnic groupings were considered as the parts of the body of Islamic nation
(milliyet-i İslamiye).108 According to Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi, “the idea of one umma is not
contrary to the idea of nationality [and to the existence of separate governments]. Although
the Islamic umma contained hundreds of different ethnicities (akvam), it has not violated
their nationalities (milliyet). This is demonstrated by the ten century-experience.”
Moreover, the umma might correct and alleviate the disintegrating pecularities of the idea
of nationhood.109 This acceptence of ethnic groupings in the second constitutional period
later turned into an advocation of Turkish nationalism whether in the form of Said Nursi’s
positive (müspet) nationalism110 or just nationalism in the republican period.
3.5 From İttihad-ı İslam to the Acceptence of Nationalism as the Vision of Political
Community
The concepts of nation (millet), liberte (hürriyet) and patrie (vatan) in their modern
connotations were foreign to the political imagination of both the classical ruling elite who
made distinctions among their people (reaya) in terms of their religious beliefs and the
modernizing statesmen of Tanzimat. Being aware of both the “imagined” character of the
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ideas of nation and fatherland and their power in keeping political unity of states111, a
Young Ottoman intellectual, Namık Kemal created a new terminology in which the words
millet, hürriyet and vatan took their modern meanings and served as “the ideological
instrumentarium”112 for later Islamist, Westernist and nationalist intellectuals in Turkey.
Namık Kemal’s conceptualizations of Ottoman nation and fatherland was Ottomanist and
its emotional content was both religious and patriotic: “Kemal’s ideology of patriotism
was pan-Ottomanism with Islamist ‘nationalism’ at its base”, in Berkes’s words.113
After the proclamation of the constitution, three political themes which were all somehow
related to the position of non-Muslims in the Empire appeared in the articles of Islamist
journals: brotherhood (uhuvvet; fraternity), equality (müsavat), freedom (hürriyet). In fact,
just at the beginning of the new regime, all schools of thought; westernists, Turkists and
Islamists were united around the idea of Ottomanism which advocated the brotherhood
and equality of muslims and non-muslims in order to keep the unity of the Empire.
Islamists seemed to share the Young Turk regime’s Ottomanism (İttihad-ı Anasır), which
aimed to promote the desire to defend the political boundaries of the Empire and which
also sought to promote a spirit of patriotism (Osmanlılık) among the various religious
communities and ethnic groups. Ottomanism of the July revolution, the idea that all
subjects of the Empire shoud be united around the Ottoman citizenship was accepted
vigorously by Islamists (especially in the early years of the revolution) and it remained so
until all Ottomanist ideals were broken in the Balkan wars and the Albanian
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independence.114 People of the Ottoman political system had multi-layered identities;
religious, ethnic and local and one could appeal to any of them when it was needed.
According to Islamists, Uhuvvet (brotherhood), depicted as a sense of unity could be
established at the several levels, from narrower to larger: Uhuvvet-i nesebiye (ethnic
brotherhood), Uhuvvet-i diniye (religious brotherhood), Uhuvvet-i vataniye (brotherhood
of fatherland), Uhuvvet-i insaniye (brotherhood of humanity).115 In Islamist formulation,
uhuvvet-i vataniye, called also as uhuvvet-i Osmaniye (Ottoman brotherhood) was the
other name of the European idea of citizenship. Ottoman citizenship based on religious
terminology was conceptualized in a way that it recognized the equality of Muslims and
non-Muslims, simply to keep the political unity of the Empire and to discourage the
demands of separation, coming from different political imaginations. Islamists believed
that the Ottoman empire could be reformed within the framework of Islamic practices and
sharia, which they thought was progressive and elastic enough, to allow also the adaptation
of the idea of citizenship.
Though it was certain that the concept of Ottoman citizenship was a break with the
Ottoman classical millet system, in which Muslim nation was dominant (millet-i hakime)
over non-muslim nations, Islamists did not see it as unIslamic if the supremacy of sharia
was kept intact. In the classical age of the empire, the millet system, providing a cultural
and religious autonomy to different religious groupings, was a form of organisation and
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legal status in which “the religious community and religious law regulate the subjects’
lives and determine their obligations.”116 But the departure from the classical millet system
was not new since during the Tanzimat period, the classical millet system was transformed
into a kind of modern citizenship under the name of Osmanlılık (İttihad-ı Anasır) by
introducing the idea and policy of the equality of all Ottomans whatever religion they hold.
Under the pressure of the claim that the application of sharia was the obstacle to the
political unity of non-muslims and muslims, Islamists generally suggested that the shariah
could unite all religious and national groupings of the Ottoman empire in equality of
government, even though the non-muslim minorities were not believer of the faith of
Islam. Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı from Sırat-ı Mustakim journal voiced this argument in
these words: “All Ottomans are the followers of Islam. Some of them are really Muslim
and some [non-Muslims] are Muslim in law because of their allegiance to the laws of
Islam [sharia].”117
Against the charges of intolerance to Christian subjects, an Islamist thinker
Çerkesşeyhizade Halil Halid118 argues that “Is not the existence of such a large number of
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Christians in Turkey a living proof of the tolerance granted them by the ‘persecuting’
Turks? If our ancestors had exterminated them by the same methods which are now
practised by some Christian States in Mussulman countries seized by them, there would
not now remain such a large number of Christians who are becoming dangerous plague-
spots to the body politic of our country.”119
In the ultimate stage, Islamists generally identified what was Ottoman with what was
Islamic; this became evident especially after Balkan Wars. Due to this fact, Islamists
advocated a kind of Ottomanism which envisioned, at the first stage the unity of Muslim
subjects and later the unity of all the subjects in the empire.120 With the dramatic decrease
in the numbers of non-Muslims after the Balkan Wars, Islamists easily and voluntarily
transformed the idea of Ottoman nation, based on the patriotism (uhuvvet-i vataniye) and
citizenship to the idea of Ottoman nation, based on the unity of vatan and Islam. In other
words, it has to be noted that when the Islamists used the term “nation” they meant the
nation of Islam, since the cause of any nationalism, based on ethnicity (kavim) was
regarded as unIslamic. 121 In one sense, Islamists continued the classical conception of the
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Ottoman state or Islam that all Muslims form one millet which was used generally
synonymously with the term ümmet (Islamic community).
Islamist thinkers of the second constitutional period were not opposed to the idea of watan
(fatherland), patriotism, not seeing it as an obstacle to Islam, even they considered it to be
the religious duty of every Muslim to be patriotic and to strive for the sake of their
fatherland.122 In various numbers of Sebilürreşad journal, the territories of the Ottoman
empire were referred to as Türkiye alongside the terms, “memalik-i Osmaniye ve İslamiye”
and “Osmanlı toprağı,” its people as Turks but in the sense of Ottomans. Moreover, again
in this journal, in order to define other parts of humanity, the classical Islamic classification
of the world into the lands of war and lands of Islam (darülislam, darülharb)lost its
significance while the words nations (milletler/ümmetler), our nation, our fatherland
(memleketimiz, vatan) appeared very often.123
According to the Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period, the feeling of nationality
and nationalism was something acquired and invented. Islam was incompatible with
nationalism but did not repudiate the reality of ethnicity. Islam united Muslims of different
countries and obliterated all traces of race and nationality, by rejecting racism. Shariah
regulated in detail the rights and duties of both the ruler and the ruled, and removed all
racial distinctions. Muslims were in a decline and were subject to many weaknesses due to
divisions (tefrika) among them. While the need of unity (ittihad) was so acute, the idea of
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nationalism in the forms of Arab nation, Turkish nation or Kurdish nation among the
muslim subjects of the empire was detrimental, even to the survival of Muslims and
Ottomans as well. The invention of nationalism might be natural for Christians who had no
unity of religion and holy book as that of Islam, but for Muslims it was a degrading
imitation from Europe, taking no place in Islam. The nation of Islam would be broken into
pieces if its different elements (ethnicities) seeked for their own national imagination
(milliyet-i mahiyet-i muhayyilesi).124 Certainly what disturbed Islamists about nationalism
was its political nature but not its contribution to the awakening of consciousness about the
language and culture of ethnicities.125
Similar to the emergence of any idea of nationalism among Muslim subjects of the empire,
Islamists considered Turkism as dangerous to the unity of the state, to the vitality of
Islamic community (and brotherhood), and as contrary to the precepts of Islam; as
Babanzade Ahmed Naim argued that the assertion of nationalism (dava-yı kavmiyet, dava-
yı cinsiyet) was rejected by sharia; it was an assertion of pre-islamic paganism (cahiliye).
He also continued to say that: “Turkishness was nothing but an artificial invention of the
Turkists. There was no Turkish history apart from that of Islam... They have invented
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strange national days. They would almost revive the ancient shamanistic cults.”126 In their
rejection of the idea of Turkish nationalism, Islamists, like Ali Suavi, made a distinction
between East, namely Islamic world and West in this respect: “in the East, Islam not
Türklük is dominat whereas in Europe, nationalism is dominant, not religion.”127 Berkes is
right in his point that Islamists sensed from the beginning that the Turkists would achieve
what Westernists could not do: further secularization of Ottoman political and social
life.128 For instance, the Westernist inclination in the circle of Türk Yurdu journal
(Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Yusuf Akçura) and its aim of getting
the Turkish nation into the family of Western nations without making distinction between
good and bad aspects of the West was harshly criticized by Sebilürreşat.129 Interestingly,
Islamists sometimes suggested that İttihad-ı İslam which put the emphasis on the
importance of caliphate, would contribute to the ideals of pan-Turanism much more than
Pan-Turanism might do.130
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In spite of the dominant trend among Islamists against Turkism, there was also an
inclination that put the emphasis on Turkish ethnicity, as the leading element of the
Ottoman and Islamic nation. Certainly for most of the Islamists, the place of Turks among
Islamic nations was vital to the extent that the rise and fall of Islamic civilization was
considered as directly related to Turks’ strength against the enemies of Islam: “[w]hen the
Abbassid Khalifs grew weak and fell into a state in which they could not be of any service
to the Moslem faith; God had pity on this religion and on Islam, and made the Ottoman
Turks soldiers and defenders of the Faith. They took over the Prophet’s trust from the last
of the Abbassids; they carried the frontiers of Islam to the very centre of Europe.”131 Some
Islamists like Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi and M. Şemseddin spoke of the supremacy of Turks in
the empire and in the Islamic world as well. By establishing an equivalence between what
was Ottoman and what was Turkish, Turks were considered as the line of the unity and as
the basis of being Ottoman for the Ottomans.132 To save the Ottoman state and nation was
seen directly related to the fate of Turkishness as a matter of life and death. It was high
time to prefer national interests rather than persons and private interests.133 In Islamist
usage, the term Turk seemed to lose its classical derogatory sense to designate the ignorant
peasants of the Anatolian villages.
The tension between Islamists and Turkists just after the Balkan Wars increasingly lost its
significance during the World War One, because of the Islamist foreign policies of the
Young Turk Regime. During the National Struggle, the inclination that emphasized
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Turkishness among Islamists had gained upperhand. Islamists rather, seriously criticized
the Westernist ideas of Turkist intellectuals on the grounds that Westernism and
secularization would undermine the very existence of firstly the Islamic nature of Turkish
(Ottoman) state and secondly the social and cultural unity of Muslims over all the world.
Thus, when the Islamists were faced with the dramatic results of a new ideology i.e
nationalism, they, at the beginning, rejected nationalism in principle simply beacuse it
negates the ideals and teachings of Islam; but in practice, in the course of the events they
had to make some concessions in favour of the idea of nationalism, especially if they
thought that they could equate Turkishness with Islam and that nationalism could be
served for the ideals of Islam. Writing at the end of the world war I, Said Halim Pasha
acknowledged the significance of nationalism by accepting implicitly the nation-state
system: ”The most excellent form in the social organization of human groups in the world
is accepted as classifying people in terms of nations. Therefore, this form is naturally the
convenient one for revealing and realizing the Islamic truths in the most perfect way…One
day, humanity will understand the most true and beneficial type of nationalism by the
means of Islamic principles. It is a great mistake to see Islam as contrary to every kind of
nationalism.”134 This did not mean dropping the Islamist ideal of getting a kind of Islamic
unity among Muslims. The acceptence of nationality had to be situated within the confines
of an Islamic internationalism which was, to Said Halim, similar to the socialism’s
internationalism. Here what I am trying to suggest is not to claim that Islamists, at the end
of the second constitutional period, constituted the forerunners of Turk-Islam synthesis;
but rather to delineate the intellectual material which enabled Islamists to revive their
Islamic ideals from the ideological elements of Turkish nationalism such as national
identity and national culture. It would be more correct to say that Turkish Islamism has
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always contained the tendency to regard Islam and nationalism as complementary to each
other if nationalism was in the service of Islam not vice versa. In other words, with the
dissolution of the empire and the establishment of the Turkish nation-state, Islamists
searched for a strong refuge in Turkish nationalism in order to oppose the radical
secularization policies of the Kemalists.
3.6 At the Crossroads: How the Islamists Interpreted the National Struggle?
Actually, the National Struggle represented an era of the rising Islamist expectations and of
their death in relation to the nature of the new regime which was on the way of
establishment. This era also provided us with enough material for understanding the
transformation of Islamism and its reemergence in the republican period.
 Islamists considered the National Struggle in Anatolia as a movement which was
dedicated to Islamist ideals and which was striving to promote the glory of Islamic
caliphate by reviving the sense of brotherhood and unity among Muslims. The National
Struggle, as “the Islamic revolution in Anatolia” was depicted as the “key” which had
triggered the movements of independence in the other parts of Muslim world under the
European colonization since Turks were the vanguards (alemdar, pişdar) of Islam from the
times of their acceptance of Islam and since the ijma of the umma (icma-ı ümmet) was in
Anatolia.135 Expectedly, by identifying kuvayı milliye (national forces) with kuvayı
İslamiye (Islamic forces), each victory of the National struggle (İnönü wars, Lausanne
Treaty) against the invading forces of Greece was saluted by Islamists as” the great victory
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of Islam.”136 True to this Islamist expectations and commitments, Islamists urged the
Grand National Assembly to take a lead in organizing an Islamic Congress which would
discuss the social and religious problems of all Islamic nations in Ankara. This sense of
İttihad-ı İslam was brought into agenda by Sebilürreşat circle with the aim to improve the
political relations among Islamic states and nations and with the aim to base these political
relations on the political and legal principles of Islam by creating an Islamic international
law (hukuk-u beynelmilel-i İslamiye).137
The Grand National Assembly appeared to Islamists as the proper basis in order to
establish the Islamic state and in order to Islamicize not only the secularist policies of the
Young Turks but also the reforms that had been made through the process of Tanzimat-
Islahat Edicts. This was outspoken in more concrete terms by the owner of Sebilürreşat,
Eşref Edip in his criticism of Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet: “since the times of Tanzimat and
Islahat, the state has always been evolved in the direction of despotism” and “religious
institutions, including medreses have been neglected deliberately.”138 Meşrutiyet in the
form of a second movement of westernization (or second movement of Tanzimat) in the
Empire directed itself to the goal that was not completed in the period of Tanzimat:
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departure from Islam (islamdan uzaklaşmak) and secularizing the state from the effects of
religious laws as happened in the Christian world. According to Eşref Edip, if the Young
Turks had remained in power for a while, they would declare the separation of government
and religion publicly and would erase the articles stating, the religion of the state was
Islam, and the government was under the duty of enforcing the laws of sharia, from
Kanun-i Esasi.139 Islamist criticism against the reforms of Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet
concentrated mainly on the adoption of laws from Europe on the grounds that the laws and
institutions of Turkey had to be extracted from the nation’s own spirit, customs and culture
(hars) and that was the only way to protect the national identity (hüvviyet-i milliye).140
What was expected from the Grand National Assembly in Islamist circles was to reverse
this secularizing reform policies by replacing the Europe-imported institutions and laws
with the Islamic institutions and laws in their true forms. In Eşref Edip’s words, for the
Grand National Assembly, ”today there are two ways to choose; one is the way of
Tanzimat (Tanzimatçılık yolu)and the other is the way of Islam (Müslümanlık Yolu).”
What was meant by the way of Islam was the establishment of a “true Islamic state” which
would be a glorious achievement in the history of Islam as well.141 On the necessity of an
Islamic state, he made a rather interesting comment: “since there is no clericalism in Islam,
Muslims’ intermediary between God and themselves is not their hodjas (ulema) but their
governments. Muslims have always considered dying for the sake of their state and
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government as the greatest virtue and deed; because they know that their worldly and other
worldly interests can only be secured with state and government.”142
As expected by Islamists, indeed, some policies of the First National Assembly manifested
an inclination towards Islamization of the state apparatus such as the decrees for the
opening of new medreses and for the prohibition of gambling and drinking alcohol. As
Berkes noted the Islamic nature of the assembly was heightened to the extent that “all bills
of the parliament had to pass the Şeriat Committee in addition to the usual parliamentary
committees concerned.”143 Having supported these prohibitions, in Islamist eyes, the
Grand National Assembly was considered as the most Islamic assembly among the
assemblies of Turkey up to that time and was expected to codify the muamelat and ukubat
parts of fıqh in order to execute properly the laws of sharia.144 Similarly as a manifestation
of the Islamist expectation from the Assembly, Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi presented a report
to the Assembly about the reform of medrese system with the aim of constructing new,
modernized religious schools in order to educate the ulema who could extract laws from
fıqh and enlighten people in religious subjects.145 In this perspective, the “Islamic
government” (hükümet-i İslamiyye) of Grand National Assembly could not be a laic (laik-
ladini) government like the one in France and any accusation of the national government
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with laicism had to be rejected since the religion of the state was Islam, commanding the
enforcement of sharia laws.146
When Islamists sensed the new regime’s increasing tendency towards secularism, they
continued to stress the significance of enforcing the sharia laws by making a reference to
national will (milli irade) or to people’s government (halk hükümeti). They maintained that
people, in a country which was entirely composed of Muslims was demanding the
codification of laws, emanating from its spirit, emotions and culture. That was the essential
right of Turkish people.147 Unlike the Islamists of the second constitutional period,
Islamists this time did not make a distinction between sharia and the nation’s mores
(culture); rather they tried to protect the first one under the cloak of the second one. The
given emphasis to the nativity and its positive effect on the attainment of progress were
supported by the examples of English and Japanese modernizations which conserved their
culture (terbiye-i içtimai).148 Again this time, what was stressed in their arguments was not
the Islamization of the every aspect of life but rather was the conservation of Islamic
characteristic of the national culture from further secularization in the hands of Kemalists.
This “defensive” positioning showed the way for the adoption of some Europe-inspired
ideological formulations, such as conservatism and pragmatism in order to propagate the
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ideals of sharia without naming it openly. As an Islamist writer from Sebilürreşat, Hasan
Hikmet put it: “Penetration of a foreign civilization and spirit into our social life is the
greatest one of the dangers. Instead of imitating West’s science and industry, the imitation
of its social ills has resulted in the decline of morality, absence of solidarity and the
weakening of family ties.”149 To him, conservatism was neither reactionary nor fanatic but
it was dedicated to raising Turkish society to its true place and to striving for its material
advancement as well.150 Conservatism also showed the most proper and natural way for
the development by paying attention to the spirit of Islamic civilization which contained
independent social principles and by its adherence to progress and renewal as well.151
As a reaction to the westernist conceptualization of republic which denied the existence of
sharia laws in the new regime, Islamists then underlined the aspect of popular sovereignty
in their Islamicly oriented republic. According to them, republic did not mean replacing
Islamic laws with European laws in the social life of the nation; rather it indicated the total
sovereignty of the nation’s spirit, will and beliefs. Since a republic represented and
enforced the national will (irade-i milliye), those Westernists who spoke of democracy and
populism could not pass this test. Rather, they just spoke in the name of the nation for their
personal wills.152 Significantly, similar to the identification of early Islamic government
with meşrutiyet in the previous decade, Hasan Hikmet established an equivalence between
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Islamic government and the republic as a form of government by calling new Turkey as an
Islamic republic.153 Putting an emphasis on the difference between laiklik (laicite) and
asrilik (modernity), Hasan Hikmet argued that the former meant the replacement of what
was spiritual with the principle of materialism in the social life while the latter denoted the
synthesis of human progress (international) with the national principles and customs;
namely the principles of sharia. “Since Islam has assured progress and evolution by its
credentials in the past, asrilik exists within our soul”, he continued, “but laiklik is a
detrimental principle to the national structure.”154 In this line of thinking, he also denied
the connection between laiklik and democracy which had lived within the frame of Islam
for centuries with a different name: rights of people (hukuk-u ibad).155
3.6.1 How to Reconcile the Abolition of the Caliphate with Islamist Ideas
More importantly, at this period, the discussions on the nature and limits of the caliphate
represented a turning point in Islamist theorizing on state and democracy which resulted in
justifying firstly the separation of sultanate and caliphate and later the abolition of the
caliphate by the Grand National Assembly. Particularly, Islamists advanced the argument
that the caliphate, far from being divinely ordained, was a political institution designed for
the welfare of the community. This time, more than in the classical theory of the caliphate,
the caliph was seen as the trustee of the nation (or ummah) and as the representative of the
national sovereignty. Seeing the caliph only as the head of government, this line of thought
                                                
153 Hikmet, “Asr-i Kanun-2.” [Modern law-2] SR. XXIII/579 (13 Kanunuevvel 1339/5
Cemaziyelevvel 1342/1923): 104.
154 Hikmet, “Laiklik-Asrilik.” [Secularism-Modernity] SR. XXII/555-556 (30 Ağustos
1339/17 Muharrem 1342/1923): 73-74; “Asriliğin Manası.” [Meaning of Modernity]
SR. XXII/559-560 (105, 13 Eylül 1339/1 Safer 1342/1923): 103. Ömer Ferit (Kam)
also criticized of interpreting asrilik (secularism) as the total imitation of western
contemporary practices including their culture without differentiating the good and bad
aspects of asrilik, see “Hasbihal.” [Talk] SR. XXIV/612 (14 Ağustos 1340/12
Muharrem 1343/1924): 209.
155 Hikmet, “Asr-i Kanun-2,” 105.
168
transferred the representation of the national sovereignty from the caliph to the assembly
when the abolition of the caliphate was discussed in the Grand National Assembly.156
During the discussions on the abolition of caliphate, Mehmed Seyyid Bey157 made a
classification of caliphate as the true caliphate (Hilafet-i hakikiye) which lasted for thirty
years after the death of prophet and the nominal caliphate (hilafet-i suriye or hilafet-i
hükmiye) which followed the real caliphate of the four caliphs, including the Ottoman one
and which was not different from a despotic sultanate. The true caliphate was the one in
which the caliph had been chosen by the nation’s baya (election) and he had all the
conditions, given in the jurisdic theory. Moreover, due to the impossibility of realizing the
important condition that the caliph should be from the lineage of Quraysh, it was no longer
possible to have a true caliphate for the time being. The jurisdic arguments on the necessity
of a caliphate or imamate was related to the fact that the nation could not be left in chaos
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Milliye (the Caliphate and National Sovereignty),but published without any signature,
in order to justify the replacement of the sultanate by a spiritual caliphate and also gave
a long speech on 3 March 1924 (later published as Hilafetin Mahiyet-i Şeriyyesi)
during the discussions on the abolition of caliphate by rereading critically the classical
jurisdic theory. For more on his ideas about caliphate see Mohammad Sadıq, “The
Turkish Revolution and the Abolition of the Caliphate.” International Studies. 28/1
(1991): 25-40; Sami Erdem, “Cumhuriyet’e Geçiş Sürecinde Hilafet Teorisine
Alternatif Yaklaşımlar: Seyyid Bey Örneği (1922-1924).” [Alternative Perpectives on
Caliphate in the Proces of Transition to the Republic: the Case of Seyyid Bey] Divan. 2
(1996): 119-146.
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and its rights had to be protected by the application of sharia and justice.158 Therefore, by
making an equivalence between caliphate and government, he came to conclude that the
caliphate was a matter for the Muslims of selecting the proper form of government in
accordance with the exigencies of time, only on condition of being committed to the ideas
of meşveret and justice as the basis of that government.159 It can be said that Seyyid Bey
was agreed with Muhammad Abduh that government (caliphate) “is not a matter
specifically determined by Islamic doctrine but is rather to be determined from time to
time according to circumstances, by general consultation within the community.”160
Caliphate was a kind of contract between the nation and the caliph, and therefore, the
caliph’s authority was limited by the terms of contract and the will of the nation. If the
nation conferred authority to the caliph without any limitations, this would be the form of
absolute government (hükümet-i mutlaka); with some limitations, it would be meşruti
hükümet. Finally, Republic was a form government in which the nation delegated
authority to nobody. This was what happened in Turkey because the nation (or umma) had
reached a mature stage of intellectual development, and there was no need any more for
delegation of authority on the part of the people to conduct governmental affairs.
According to him, the Assembly, embodying the principle of shura was fully authorized to
make any decision ensuring the proper conduct of the nation’s affairs and that abolition of
caliphate as a great revolution in the history of Islam was one such decision.161
                                                
158 Seyyid Bey, “Hilafetin Şer’i Mahiyeti,” [Islamic Nature of Caliphate] in Türkiye’de
İslamcılık Düşüncesi [Islamist Thought in Turkey] vol. I ed. İsmail Kara (İstanbul:
Risale, 1986),188-189, 196.
159 Ibid., 201, 205.
160 Kerr, Islamic Reform. 149; Seyyid, “Hilafetin Şer’i Mahiyeti,” 181, 183.
161 Seyyid, “Hilafetin Şer’i,” 201, 204-208 ; for transferring the meanings of the sultanate
and caliphate to the assembly with the condition of enforcing sharia see also Said
Nursi, Risale-i. vol. 2, 1318.
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Certainly, the Assembly inherited the moral purpose of the caliphate which was ensuring
the application of the stipulations of the shari’ah. The hope behind Seyyid Bey’s very
justification for the abolition of the caliphate was the expectation that the parliament would
enforce the religious law or sharia, which was the caliph’s principal duty in the jurisdic
theory: “There is one point on which all jurists and legal thinkers, Eastern or Western,
agree and that is the theorem that the laws of a country should be in agreement with the
mores of the nation...Just as the West has mores and laws peculiar to itself, the East, and
within that out country, have their own.”162 There was the idea of completing the
codification of Mecelle in Seyyid Bey’s mind when he spoked of the peculiar mores of the
Turkish nation in the Assembly.
In fact, Mustafa Kemal used some Islamist arguments which were developed by Islamists,
like Seyyid Bey, saying that Islam originally depended on consultative government and on
the community’s sovereignty. He did this in order to defend absolute sovereignty of the
nation as represented at the GNA against those who advocated sovereign rights of the
Caliph in the execution and legislation of laws for the nation, during the process of
abolishing both sultanate and caliphate. What Islamists and Kemalists had in common was
precisely the principle that the caliphate was a temporal and political office.
During the discussions on the declaration of the republic as the new regime of Turkey by
amending the Constitution in this respect, Seyyid Bey, according to the Speech (Nutuk) of
Mustafa Kemal, saw nothing new in the proposition: ”Necessities and not theories dictate
laws. The times and events are stronger than everything. The law of evolution is an
unalterable law. The proposed form does not include any innovation. When we render the
already existing form clearer and more explicit, we shall surely have acted in a manner that
                                                
162 Seyyid, “Hilafetin Şer’i,” 218; Berkes’s translation, The Development of Secularism.
468.
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more nearly corresponds to the interests of the country and the nation.”163 But in general,
Islamist intellectuals of the second constitutional period preferred being silent regarding
the selection of the republic as the new form of government and Sebilürreşat, perhaps the
only enduring Islamist journal at the time, gave a very little space to the declaration of the
republic within its pages without making any comments.164
The concepts of progress, civilization (with certain emphasis on its imperialist aspect),
ittihad, law of nature (kanun-u tabiat; sünnetullah), national identity (hüvviyet-i milliye)
and the necessities of the time were still widely used during the National Struggle.
Moreover, the new issues such as socialism, communism, masons and dönmeler
(members of a Jewish community who were converted to Islam in the seventeenth
century) were critically discussed in the Islamist journal, Sebilürreşat. Ottoman lands
(Memalik-i Osmaniye) was turned into Turkish state (Türkiye devleti) and even Turkism
would not be in contradiction with the principles of Islam, if not deviating into racism. In
fact, with the formation of the new regime, the most basic difference between Islamists
and Turkists became clear around the hot issue: secularization of law. While Islamists tried
to present the codification of Islamic laws through the claim that sharia was the mores and
culture of Turkish people, Turkists were more open to the adoption of European laws and
to further westernization in every aspect of political and social life.
                                                
163 A Speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 1927, (İstanbul: Ministry of Education
Printing Plant, 1963), 670.
164 Furthermore, this journal did not voice any comment and argument for or against the
declaration of the republic until its closure by the government in 1924, with the
exception of the aforementioned article by Hasan Hikmet. For the news on the
declaration of the republic in this journal see, Sebilürreşat, “Cumhuriyetin İlanı.”
[Declaration of The Republic] SR. XXIII/573 (10 Teşrinisani 1339/21 Rebiülevvel
1342/1923), 16-17.
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CHAPTER IV
KEMALISM AND THE REEMERGENCE OF ISLAMISM IN THE REPUBLIC
(1943-1960): AN ISLAMIST INTELLECTUAL
The philosophers have tried to understand the world; our task is to change it
 Karl Marx
The purpose of the following three chapters is to examine how the ideas of state and
democracy are formulated in the discourse of an Islamist intellectual, Necip Fazıl
Kısakürek. In order to clarify these conceptualizations, generally, these chapters also seek
to investigate his main political ideas and polemics, both at theoretical and practical leves,
that underlie his articulation of Islamist ideology. In this regard, they deal with how
Kısakürek addressed the fundamental issues and stages of Turkish political modernization
movement, such as the reasons for the Ottoman decline, Tanzimat, the Republican
experience, transition to democracy, modern political ideologies and nationalism. Under
these considerations we shall firstly analyse some aspects of Kemalism1 and understand
the place it occupied in the elaboration of Islamist conceptualizations of state and
democracy.
                                                
1 Since the six principles of Kemalism were accepted in the third congress of the
Republican People’s Party in 1931 and were included in the Turkish constitution in
1937, here we use the word of Kemalism to describe a political mind which made
several secularizing reforms from above through a social engineering. It is certain that
Kemalism as an ideology was in the stage of formation for the period I have discussed
in the earlier sections of this chapter. Still, it would be useful to use Kemalism here
simply because Islamism reemerged in 1943 when Kemalism established itself as an
ideology of the regime.
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4.1 Kemalism: Participating in a Modern “Civilization”
The Turkish Grand National Assembly, at the very beginning, was united with the aim to
liberate the caliphate and sultanate from the custody of the enemies and contained a wide
range of political views, including westernists and Islamists. Within the political
atmosphere of the First National Grand Assembly, Islamist views found an avenue to
express their opposition to the policies of the First Group which was established by
Mustafa Kemal. Second Group2 which consisted of different tendencies such as liberals,
conservatives and some Islamists like Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Hasan Basri Çantay,
showed an opposition to the increasing monopoly of power in the hands of Mustafa Kemal
and defended the supremacy of the Assembly. However, the course of the time witnessed
the disappearence of the Second Group and the unquestioned authority of Mustafa Kemal
and the First Group in the Second Assembly where the regime was able to initiate its
secularizing reforms without almost any opposition. Moreover, in 1925 and 1926 through
the Law on the Maintenance of Order (Takriri Sükun Kanunu) just after the Şeyh Sait
revolt and the trials of İzmir assasination, the Kemalist regime got rid of all potential
competitors for the leadership, including the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver
Cumhuriyet Fırkası) which contained many famous personalities of the National Struggle
such as Kazım Karabekir, Refet Bele, Rauf Orbay and Ali Fuat Cebesoy, and some leaders
of the Union and Progress who wanted to have a say in the new regime.3 These events
culminated in the monopoly of political power by Mustafa Kemal and his close friends, in
                                                
2 For more information on the ideas of the Secound Group see İhsan Güneş, Birinci
TBMM’nin Düşünce Yapısı (1920-1923) [Intellectual Structure of the First GNA]
(Ankara: İş Bankası yayınları, 1997) and Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet:
İkinci Grup [Opposition in the First Assembly: Second Group] (İstanbul:İletişim,
1994).
3 Erik Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor: the Role of the Committee of Union and
Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926 (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1984), 158-
160, 170.
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Zürcher’s words: “..the rather amorphous but democratic political structure of the
nationalist movement gave way gradually to a monolithic power structure dominated by
the radical wing of the movement under Mustafa Kemal Pasha Atatürk.”4
In the course of Kemalist reforms, for Islamists it became certain that despite the usage of
some Islamist slogans during the war of Independence, the ideal of establishing a “true
Islamic state” to realize Islamic ideals was not acceptable to Kemalist mind which
regarded Islam, at least in its current forms and institutions, as an obstacle to progress and
to the goal of reaching at the level of modern civilization. Since Turkey had to be
transformed “from a medieval, superstition country to a twentieth century, westward-
looking nation”5, there could not be a place for Islam in the legitimization of a new state
and society. To westernize what was oriental in Turkish culture, the Kemalists regarded
Islam as the representation of orientalness, as Sayyid argues: “it was through Islam that the
Orient was given shape. Islam then became a marker of oriental identity. Hence, Kemalists
could see that in order to westernize they had to de-Islamize.”6 In this way, Kemalist
reforms were initiated by a set of mind, which exalted the virtues of the positivism, and of
Western civilization and by the same token vilified the Islamic past. Pre-Islamic Turkish
history gained a significance mainly in order to glorify the “golden age” of Turks who, had
achieved great things in their national past as well. Having inherited a new ideology of
                                                
4 Zürcher, Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive
Republican Party, 1924-1925 (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1991), viii.
5 Henry Elisha Allen, The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious
Development (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 9.
6 Boby S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism
(London: Zed Books, 1997), 68-69.
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imagination i.e. Turkish nationalism, from the Young Turks7, the Kemalist modernization
has reached its aim: the creation a modern (secular) nation-state.
The Republican ethos, like that of any other modernization movements, was based on a
firm conviction of the necessity of becoming a part of the modern western civilization
through the establishment of a new secular nation-state.8 This consisted of a series of
secularizing reforms: the abolition of the sultanate in 1922, the abolition of caliphate in
1924, the prohibition of orders and closure of their lodges in 1925, the introduction of the
new secular civil code in place of Sharia in 1926, the removal of the clause stating that the
religion of the state was Islam from the Constitution in 1928, the introduction of the latin
alphabet in 1928 and the inclusion of the clause stating that Turkish state was secular in
1937. Kemalism, by abolishing the caliphate, constituted a radical “epistemological
break”9 with the classical Ottoman political system since continuity with the Islamic past
was considered as an obstacle to the realization of the Turkish revolution. But on the other
hand, Kemalism especially by its stress on civilization, nationalism and positivism was the
                                                
7 See Ergun Özbudun, “Antecedents of Kemalist Secularism: Some Thoughts on the
Young Turk Period,” in Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change ed. Ahmet Evin
(Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1984). For a view seeing the Kemalist revolution as “an
extension of the Young Turk movement, in which the policies of that movement, in
which the policies of that movement were taken one step further, but based on the
same concepts and attitudes” see Erik J. Zürcher, “The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish
republic: An Attempt at A New Periodization.” Die Welt Des Islams. 32, (1992): 252.
8 For the early western evaluation of the Atatürk’s struggle see Nur Bilge Criss,
“Atatürk’s Movement at Its Start: The Views of Outsiders (1919-1921).” Atatürk
Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi. VI/17 (Mart 1990): 345-376 and for the reflection of
Kemalist reforms in Islamic world see İskender Gökalp and François Georgeon,
Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası [Kemalism and the Islamic World] trans. Cüneyt Akalın
(İstanbul: Arba, 1990) and Richard Hattemer, “Atatürk and the Reforms in Turkey as
Reflected in the Egyptian Press.” Journal of Islamic Studies. 11/1 (January 2000): 21-
42.
9 Nilüfer Göle, “The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity,” in
Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey ed. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat
Kasaba (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), 86.
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last stage, though the most radical one, of Turkish modernization movement since the
times of Sultan Selim III.10
In Kemalist mind, perhaps, the most important aspect of continuation with the Islamic past
has been its solidaristic perception of society which coalesced without any privileges and
classes. As to the continuation of Umma structure in which community was considered as
a coalescent unity and everbody was equal in front of God, as Mardin perceptively
observed, Kemalist solidarism “was a programme that kept some of the features of the
older Ottoman/Islamic culture in the sense of its affirmation of a sense of community
responsibility and idealized conception of civil intercourse as free of conflict. Solidarism
as an ideology was taken over by the more clearly secular-Jacobin- founding fathers of the
Turkish Republic who made it the ideological foundation of republican society in 1923.”11
Political ideas of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was strongly influenced by the positivist and
nationalist thought of the Young Turks whose dreams were fulfilled in the Turkish
republic, as correctly argued by many students of Turkish politics.12 In the search of
determining the ideological roots of Kemalism, Ziya Gökalp’s ideological impact on
                                                
10 According to Davison, Atatürk’s emphasis on raising the country to the level of
modern civilization is “almost pure Tanzimat language- as the Hatt-ı Hümayun of
1856 put it, to achieve a situation in conformity with the position that it (the Empire)
occupies among the civilized nations” Essays, 260.
11 Mardin, “Civil Society and Islam,” in Civil Society, ed. J. A. Hall (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995): 294 and Din ve İdeoloji. 101. Levent Köker, in his
analysis of the continuity in the forms of legitimacy from the Islamic-nomocratic form
of the Ottoman empire to Kemalism, argues that the Islamic-nomocratic transcendental
reference was replaced by again a transcendentally constructed notion of positivist
scientism, “Kimlik Krizinden meşruluk krizine: Kemalizm ve Sonrası.” [From Identity
Crisis to Legitimacy Crisis: Kemalism and Its Aftermath] Toplum ve Bilim. 71 (Winter
1996): 157 and “National Identity and State Legitimacy: Contradictions of Turkey’s
Democratic Experience,” in Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World ed.
Elisabeth Özdalga and Sune Persson (İstanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1997), 68.
12 Lewis, the Emergence. 292; Özbudun, “antecedents,” 43 and Hanioğlu, The Young.
216.
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Mustafa Kemal’s ideas was overstated, though it was significant especially in the areas of
solidarism and nationalism. However, Kemalist principle of nationalism with its more
emphasis on secularism and westernism differed from the ideas of Ziya Gökalp whose
secularism, “in essence aimed at adjusting Islam to Turkish life and of interpreting its
institutions accordingly.”13 Frank W. Creel draws our attention to the fact that the some
important elements of Kemalism have clear roots in the westernism of Abdullah Cevdet.14
Şerif Mardin also states that many of the themes taken up in Abdullah Cevdet’s journal of
İçtihad -ranging from the importance given to the women’s rights to westernization with a
materialist-biologist framework-, anticipated the secular reforms of Atatürk under the
republic.15
Kemalist modernization has been characterized by “its radical commitment to emulating
and matching Europe and the fragile synthesis it has formed with democracy.”16 This
fragile synthesis with democracy has led to the different interpretations of Kemalism
among Turkish political scientists. A line of argument which found the basic parameters of
liberal democracy as embedded in the very intentions and ideals of Kemalism is best
illustrated in Ergun Özbudun’s statement:
                                                
13 Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multiparty System (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1959), 50. Atatürk’s perception of religion as obstacle to
progress was also beyond Gökalp’s thought on Islam see Mardin, Türkiye’de Din ve
Siyaset. 59, 97.
14 Frank W. Creel, “Abdullah Cevdet: A Father of Kemalism.” Journal of Turkish
Studies. 4 (1980): 9. This observation is also consistent with the statement that
Westernism rather than Turkism has become more influential in the Kemalist
reshaping of a new state and society, though the latter was declared to be as the most
important foundation of Kemalism see Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish
Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp (London: Luzac Company and
the Harvill Press, 1950): 151.
15 Şerif Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908 [Political Ideas of the Young
Turks1895-1908] (İstanbul: İletişim, 3rd edition, 1989), 168.
16 Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, “Rethinking the Connections Between Turkey’s ‘Western’
Identity Versus Islam.” Critique (Spring 1998): 8.
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No component of the RPP doctrine provided a permanent legitimation for the
single-party system. On the contrary, liberal democracy remained the ideal,
and authoritarianism was justified only as a temporary measure arising out of
the need to defend the Kemalist revolution against counterrevolutionaries.
Kemalism as a doctrine was much closer to nineteenth-century liberalism than
to the authoritarian and totalitarian philosophies of the twentieth century.
Communism and fascism were never seen as models to be imitated.17
An opposite line of argument in regard to the relationship between Kemalizm and
democracy is provided by Levent Köker and Taha Parla. By criticizing the perception of
Kemalism as “a democratizing ideology” within the framework of modernization theories,
Köker points to the thrust of Kemalism: the nineteenth-century positivism which
emphasized the elitist and centralized strong state and which had a authoritarian and
nondemocratic conceptualization of the idea of historical progress. At the time when the
ideological formation of Kemalism was achieved, it was not possible to regard the western
type of democracy as “the final goal” for Turkey. Moreover, due to the necessity of
implementing the reforms by the bureaucratic intelligentsia, and due to the political nature
of Turkish revolution, Kemalism was transformed into a “bureaucratic-conservative
ideology.” 18 Parla’s analysis is more concrete on the non-democratic nature of Kemalism:
Atatürk’s notion of republic was not a democratic one but rather a “Bonapartist,
plebisiterian and dictatorial republic.”19 Certainly, since this chapter does not propose
                                                
17 Ergun Özbudun, “Paradoxes of Turkish Democratic Development: The Struggle
between the Military- Bureaucratic Founders of Democracy and New Democratic
Forces,” in Politics, Society and Democracy: Comparative Studies ed. H.E. Chehabi
and Alfred Stepan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 299; see also Metin Heper,
“’Kemalizm’ ve Demokrasi.” [Kemalism and Democracy] Türkiye Günlüğü. 28 (May-
June 1994): 37-39; Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, “Demokrasinin ‘Prelude’ü olarak Kemalizm.”
[Kemalism as a Prelude to Democracy] Türkiye Günlüğü. 28 (May-June 1994): 16-19;
Toktamış Ateş, “Mustafa Kemal, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi.” [Mustafa Kemal,
Kemalism and Democracy] Türkiye Günlüğü. 28 (May-June 1994): 20-23.
18 Levent Köker, Modernleşme Kemalizm ve Demokrasi [Modernization, Kemalism and
Democracy] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1990), 121-122.
19 Taha Parla, Türkiyede Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları, cilt 1, Atatürk’ün Nutuk’u,
(İstanbul: İletişim, 1991), 79 and 138.
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discussing the interplay between Kemalism and democracy in greater detail and is not a
suitable place to further the discusson, we try to investigate, in a broad outline, some of the
basic points of discussion in order to situate Islamism within the Republican context.
It was certain that Kemalism established itself as the ideology of modernizing Turkey
when liberalism and democracy had also been discredited in the eyes of this modernizing-
bureaucratic elite not only due to the unstable nature of democracies in Western Europe,
but also due to the desire for a radical transformation on the part of the elite. Kemalist
modernizers were impatient to see a new society rise in a very short time. Halide Edip,
writing at the end of 1920s, stated that such words as liberalism and freedom of thought
which implied a slow growth were out of favor both in Turkey and in the world: “there has
never been so much ‘doing’ instead of ‘thinking’ as there is in the world today. No other
country in the world stands more in need of ‘doing’ than Turkey. This fundamental
psychology in the world and in Turkey will tend to create and maintain strong, centralized
governments in Turkey, although the dictatorial form is a passing phase.”20
In the eyes of some Kemalist intelligentsia like M. Esad Bozkurt, the authoritarian and
totalitarian regimes of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany appeared as the similar political
regimes to that of Kemalism which was an “authoritarian democracy with its chief (şef)
who came from within the people.”21 Hence, the Kemalist intelligentsia saw themselves as
the guides of society (the top of pyramid) with the right to determine what was wrong and
                                                
20 Halide Edib (Adıvar), Turkey Faces West (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930),
222-223.
21 M. Esat Bozkurt in İlk İnkilap Tarihi Ders Notları, [The First Course Notes of the
History of Revolution] ed. Oktay Aslanapa (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları
Vakfı, 1997), 46 and 73. Just after the death of Atatürk, Bozkurt who regarded
Kemalist revolution as one of the true revolutions like the French and Russian
revolutions, shared the observation of a German historian: both National Socialism and
Fascism were versions of Kemalism with more or less changes see p. 73. Recep Peker
also clearly spoke of the totalitarian nature of Turkish revolution see Ibid., 212.
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what was true for the Turkish people in the path of modernization. The Kemalist principle
of revolutionism (inkilapçılık) meant revolutionary cadres had the right and duty of
discovering this “collective idea of the society, express it, and illuminate the people on the
road to progress. In this perspective, politics was seen not as a process of accommodating
and aggregating diverse demands and interests of social groups but of discovering what is
right for the entire society.”22 As a consequence of this conceptualization of democracy
and politics, the parliaments of Kemalist regime were composed not of elected politicians
but of selected intellectuals, educating and enlightening the people without representing
any societal interests and it was a place where the enlightened and rational legislation for
the interests of the nation was made. This understanding was on the same side with the
above mentioned organic nature of the umma structure. For the reproduction of this
organicism by the help of a new cement, nationalism, Islam had to be redefined and
resituated in the new republic. The burden for the task of finding an ideological bases for
creating a new society and individual was on the shoulders of intellectuals. Therefore,
Islam and intellectuals in relation to Kemalism are here primary subjects of the discussion
regarding the study of Islamism within the republican context.
4.2 Kemalism, Intellectuals and Islam
After the elimination of the clause that the religion of the state was Islam, the theological
faculty of Istanbul University presented a report with regard to the reformation of Islamic
worship practices. The report proposed two significant innovations in the practice of
worship: the introduction of pews and instrumental music into the mosques and the use of
Turkish language in the practice. The aim was not to destroy Islam but to nationalize it.
                                                
22 Ergun Özbudun, “State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey,” in Political
Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1993), 252-253.
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Through a series of secularizing reforms, Kemalism reduction of Islam to a secondary role
as an affair of individual conscience was accompanied by an attempt to give Islam a more
rational and national form. Similar to some Islamist argument that Islam should be purified
from the superstition which had gradually found its way into the religious life, Kemalists
discussed the necessity of purifying Islam from superstitions and Judaistic intolerance to
give people the holy techings of Islam in their primary simplicity. This purification had to
be made by examining the whole structure and the foundations of Islam in a rational and
scientific way according to modern concepts.23
Despite the intention of reforming Islam as manifested in the report of reformation in
1928, it is still hard to claim that Kemalist elite had a clearly defined policy of reformation
which would nationalize and rationalize Islamic system of belief and its institutions. This
reluctance in the reformation of religion might be partly related to the fact that Kemalists
did not want to empower the ulema and to continue the ideological strength of religion in
the formation of societal and individual mind.24 On the other hand, Kemalists did not aim
                                                
23 Halil Nimetullah, Milli Mecmua. (August 15, 1927) in Lutfy Levonian, The Turkish
Press (Athens: School of Religion, 1932), 11, 14-15. On the March 1, 1924, in the
opening of the Assembly, Atatürk stated that “We also recognise that it is
indispensable, in order to secure the revival of the Islamic faith, to disengage it from
the condition of being a political instrument, which it has been for centuries through
habit” A Speech. 700. Professor Nimetullah also provided a Kemalist, secular reading
of the political life of the early Islam: “The prophet has not given any religious
command or direction for the affairs of the State. His successors have also left the
affairs of the State completely in the hands of the council of the people and thus they
have demonstrated that the affairs of the State are secular and so subject to the will of
the people... In modern terms, they were presidents of a republic. But later on, some
despots, in their anxiety to secure a religious authority over the people, gave a religous
meaning and status to the institution of the Caliphate. They had established a despotic
government which is not derived from the religion of Islam. The Turkish Revolution,
by abolishing this meaningless institution, rendered a great service to Islam, and to
Turkey.” See Halil Nimetullah, professor of logic in the university of Istanbul, the
Darül Fünun, Milli Mecmua, September 1, 1927 in Levonian, The Turkish. 39.
24 Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması (1923-
1931) [The Foundation of the Single Party Rule in the Turkish Republic (1923-1931)]
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to eradicate the faith in Islam and to accept a new faith, for example a Christian one, but
wished to get rid of the paramount influence of Islam in both public and societal life. The
failure of the hesitant Kemalist attempt to reform Islam might be also partly connected to
the pacifist resistance of the old ulema who took their place in the offices of the Directorate
of Religious Affairs. Within this background, it is true to conclude that the basic aspect of
Kemalist approach towards religion was the intention of replacing Islam with a
Durkheimian “civic religion” which would promote the loyalty of citizenship and
individual morality on secular basis.25
Pertaining to the main source of a new civility, Kemalist political elite put the burden of
creating an “imaginary”, i.e a new “Turkish identity” on the shoulders of intellectuals by
making them as a part of the propaganda of the republican regime.26 Kemalist
intelligentsia was the continuation of the intellectual trend which took its main elements of
                                                                                                                                         
(Ankara:Yurt, 1981), 220. The Kemalist attitude on the subject of the reformation of
Islam might be more clearly understood in the light of the fact that Kemalism has
always shown a charateristics of “control over Islam,” despite its changing strategy at
different periods see Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, “ Parameters and Strategies of Islam-
State Interaction in Republican Turkey.” International Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies. 28 (1996), p. 248-9.
25 Mardin, “Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey,” in Islam in the Political Process
ed. James P. Piscatori (Cambridge: Columbia Univ press, 1983), 142. Mardin’s
observation of a “civic religion” was reinterpreted by Mustafa Erdoğan’s adoption of
David Apter’s “political religion” which replaces older beliefs about the forms of
allegiance and which is actually a political doctrine but with the functions of political
religion. According to Erdoğan, the secularization process of Kemalism resembles the
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citizenship and public morality. David E. Apter, “Political Religion in the New
Nations,” in Old Societies and New Satates: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and
Africa ed. Clifford Quest (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 58-9; quoted
in Mustafa Erdoğan “Islam in Turkish Politics: Turkey’s Quest for Democracy
Without Islam,” in Islam, Civil Society and Market Economy ed. Atilla Yayla (Ankara:
Liberte, 1999), 77-80.
26 Mardin, “Cultural,” 203.
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worldview from positivism.27 Positivism represented “an epistemic community” in the
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century among the Ottoman intellectuals.28
French positivism rather than German idealism was considered by the Ottoman
intellectuals and elite as practical in order to understand the goals of modernization. For
this positivist trend, “the “carriers” of the modernist ideology were the judges, secondary
school teachers, military officers, provincial governers, university professors, and the
“enlightened (aydın) intelligentsia.”29
In the Republican ideology, then, the intellectual was regarded as a representative of the
basic goals and values of the regime and as the creator and disseminator of legitimacy in
place of the ulema in the Ottoman Empire. This dependence on the state was by no means
confined to intellectuals; it was an inherent nature of the relationship between the state and
civil societal elements in a country where state was traditionally strong.30 The notions of “a
general interest” was central to the conceptualizaton of intellectual in republican Turkey.
For a definition of this general interest, it is true to say that Turkish intellectual has always
spoken from within a group whether it was a position of pro-regime or anti-regime
discourse. The notion, as well as the perception, of the public was thus crucial in the
conception of the intellectual.31
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28 Hüsamettin Arslan, Epistemik Cemaat: Bir Bilim Sosyolojisi Denemesi [Epistemic
Community: An Attempt At Sociology of Science] (İstanbul: Paradigma, 1992).
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The Kemalist project of modernization as a conversion into Western civilization gave a
prominent place to the intelligentsia’s power and mission of transforming the society in the
path of progress. The portrait of the intellectual in Kemalist undertanding was a secular,
progressive, rational, and ethical one which saw himself/herself as the carrier of
westernization/modernization to the undeveloped parts of the country. In other words,
Kemalist intellectual is the educator of the uneducated and the civilizer of the uncivilized.
This civilizing mission of the Kemalist intelligentsia legitimized the bureaucratic measures
of “from top to bottom” to penetrate (and “enlighten”) into every aspects of public and
societal life basically by means of issuing new laws and education. It should be noted, as
Turan argues, the Kemalist intelligentsia resembled the Ottoman ulema in the basic way
that they both had the claim of possessing the knowledge and prescriptions to define and to
construct the ideal society for the Turkish people. It is likely that the Ulema’s role in the
Ottoman society was a model for its counterpart in the Republic: a secular intellectual, a
“westernist ulema” (aydın, münevver). Both of them regarded their duty as the
transmittion of an absolute truth (an Islamic dogma or a positivist one) in the construction
or in the continuation of the society.32
At the end of the 1920s, in their project of a civilizational conversion from the orient to the
West, the Kemalist intelligentsia were aware of the difficulty of creating a “sense of
civilized morality”: “the establishment among us of European judgements of value of
goodness and truth is still remote; meanwhile no trace has been left of the old judgements
of value. Although those old judgements of value did not possess a high meaning, as they
were all based on hypocrisy and fatalism, still they were better than sheer non-morality.”33
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Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu) was not alone in his observation that this civilizational
conversion which resulted in the sudden fall of old values was creating a crisis of value in
Turkish society. Speaking on the event of some conversions to Christianity in the
American School at Bursa, Köprülüzade expressed the idea that Turkish society was
passing through a very deep “cultural crisis”. This crisis through which Turkey had been
passing since the beginning of modernization movement, reached its zenith.34 In this
setting, the Turkish intellectual had to face the challenge of putting new values and public
morality in place of the Islam-based values that had been destroyed, in order to give a new
ideal and a new direction to individual and society. Put it differently, what emerged from
this sense of the deeply rooted cultural crisis in the minds of the Turkish intellectuals was
the search of new roots.
4.3 What Happened to Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period?
During the authoritarian one party rule of the the Republican People's Party (RPP) (1923-
1945) which aimed at “a wholesale Westernization” of the Turkish political and social
life35, the Islamist current of thought was pushed out of the political arena, and was not in a
position to criticize the radical reforms of Kemalism.36 Whatever their opinion about the
secular reforms of Kemalism, the voice of Islamists were not heard at the formation of the
new regime. That is to say that there was no active Islamist political opposition to the
republican revolutions due to the simple fact that Kemalism did not provide any space for
such opposition. Islamists, being very aware of the nonexistence of any space to oppose
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the new regime, directed their energies to the study of religious sciences and to the
conservation of Islamic values and forms.37 But still, it would be useful to make a
classification of the Islamists of the second constitutional period by determining how they
approached the republican revolutions and the question of the new relationship between
Islam and state.
The Islamist position towards the new regime might be classified into four lines38: 1) those
who took somehow a significant part in the formation of the secular order by emphasizing
Turkish nationalism and the rational approach to religion; Mehmet Ali Ayni, Şerafettin
Yaltkaya, M. Şemsettin Günaltay, Seyyid Bey and, İzmirli İsmail Hakkı. Actually, the
change that occured in the political ideas of this group in the republican period, makes it
difficult to continue calling them as Islamist.39
2) those who did not (and could not) have an important place in the formation of the
regime but took a part in the religious and educational institutions; the Directorate of
Religious Affairs and the İstanbul Darülfünun. This line of Islamists did not participate in
the attempt to nationalize (to reform) Islam and further one may argue that they showed a
pacifist resistance to the reformation of religion both by filling the positions in the
Directorate and by writing Islamic books on the subjects of tefsir, hadis and ilmihal in
traditional ways without critizing the regime. Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, Ömer Nasuhi
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Bilmen, Babanzade Ahmed Naim, Ömer Ferit Kam, Elmalılı M. Hamdi Yazır were the
most prominent names. Upon the demand of the Turkish Grand National Assembly,
Elmalılı and Babanzade prepared a commentary on the Qur’an (tefsir) and a collection of
the tradition of the Prophet (hadis), respectively. Mehmet Akif Ersoy was also expected to
write a translation of the Qur’an again by the demand of the Assembly but he dropped his
promise due to the fear that the Kemalist regime would use the translation in its project of
Turkicization of worship.40 The report of reformation issued by the theology faculty of
İstanbul Darülfünun might be helpful in clarifying the border between the first group and
the second one. İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, Mehmet Ali Ayni, Şeraffetin Yaltkaya put their
signatures under the recommendations of the reform committee while Babanzade Ahmet
Naim ve Ferit Kam declined to do so. The latter two were not given a post in the university
after the 1933 Darülfünun reform. 41
3) those who waged a cultural opposition to the positivism of Kemalism in order to
conserve the belief in Islam, mainly Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. He was a member of the
ulema from the Islamists in the second constituitonal period and his influence increased
significantly in the republican period through his advocation of himself (called as the New
Said) as showing the truths of Islamic belief via books called Risale-i Nur (Books of
Light). Contrary to his political activism in the second constitutional period (called as the
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Old Said), he was not involved in politics in the republican period but did not escape from
the court trials and custody.42
4) those who severely criticized the republican revolutions such as the abolition of
caliphate and the introduction of a new secular code by taking a refuge in a foreign
country, mainly Şeyhülislam Mustafa Sabri Efendi. Mustafa Sabri, who was a şeyhülislam
in the cabinet of Damat Ferit Pasha government (1919) and who opposed the National
Struggle from its very beginning whereas the former three groups supported the Struggle.
He left Turkey together with the members of the old regime and took refuge in Egypt (later
in İskeçe, Greece publishing a newspaper called Yarın) and wrote articles and books to
denounce the irreligious direction of the “new Turkey” under the Kemalist rule. According
to Mustafa Sabri, the Kemalists, by abolishing the caliphate (Islamic government) and by
its strong dedication to Turkish racism, committed apostasy from its religion. What was
behind the Kemalist victory in İzmir against the armies of the Greece and Allied powers
was the agreement, by the help of Jews, between the two sides on the abolition of the
caliphate in return for the acceptance of the new regime.43 By publishing a newspaper
called as Yarın, he strongly criticized the Kemalist revolutions and provided some
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materials for Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s deconstruction of the Kemalist discourse pertaining
to the Turkish revolutions and its achievements, as it will be elaborated in the next chapter.
Spiritualism gained much sympathy among the Islamists in the Second Constitutional
Period facing the dominance of materialism and positivism in the Ottoman-Turkish
intellectual life. Due to the fact that spiritualism has a system of knowledge and thought in
comformity with all religions44, it provided an alternative channel for Islamists and
conservatives to discover the real West. As a reaction to the materialism and positivism of
the Westernists, spiritualist current in Turkey pointed to the “ethical void” in the
foundations of Turkish modernization. Turkish spiritualism was, at the beginning, based
on the sufism’s doctrine of ontology, Vahdet-i Vücud and later was accompanied by
Bergsonism.45
Among the leading members of the Turkish spiritualism, there were some famous Islamist
intellectuals of the Second Constitutional Monarchy period, like Şehbenderzade Filibeli
Ahmed Hilmi and M. Şemsettin Günaltay. In the Republican period, some Islamists,
chiefly İsmail Hakkı İzmirli, İsmail Fenni Ertuğrul and Ö. Ferit Kam continued to write on
religious matters and continued this spiritualist intellectual tradition. With the transition to
multiparty politics, this spiritualist trend eventually provided a fertile ground for the
reemergence of Islamist political thought, notably in the writings of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek
(1905-1983) and Nurettin Topçu (1909-1975). In fact, if Kemalism was rooted in
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Enlightenment, the French Revolution and positivism,46 these Islamist intellectuals were
inspired by the spiritualist and idealist tradition in the West: Bergson’s intuitionism in
Kısakürek and Maurice Blondel’s philosophy of “action” in Topçu.47 Indicative of this
spiritualist influence, they employed the spiritual-versus- material dichotomy in their
opposition to the Kemalist reforms as well as and in their ideological formulation.
4.4 The Revival of Islamism in the Republic
Under the democratizing/liberalizing impact of the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the
transition to competitive politics in Turkey started in the following year when the
Republican People’s Party (RPP) allowed the establishment of the Democratic Party (DP)
by some members of the RPP -Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Refik
Koraltan- as an opposition party.48 The restoration of party politics, despite the DP’s
commitment to the Kemalist principles, produced a space in which Islamic demands could
articulate themselves. Actually, the RPP itself modified its conception of secularism by
initiating some liberal policies on the issue of religious education and worship after its
General Congress in 1947. Within this liberalizing political framework, Turkish society
witnessed the revival of religious orders and communities which did not lose their hold on
some sectors of the society. In fact, the leaders of the Islamic revival were mainly shaikhs
of the Sufi orders like Nakshabendism and or Islamists who survived from the second
constitutional period, like Said-i Nursi’s movement. Islamist circles voiced their views
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through articles in the 1940s and the 1950s in Büyük Doğu, Sebilürreşad, Hareket, Allah
Yolu, İslam, Müslüman Sesi, Din Yolu, Fetih, Hilal, Hür Adam, İslam, Serdengeçti and
Ehli Sünnet.49 It is important to note that in this period, Islamist ideas often identified
themselves with Turkish nationalism but colouring it with Islamic tones and values. By
this combination, they tried not only to desecularize Kemalist principle of nationalism but
also to use it as a shield to their Islamist ambitions.
But what is significant here about the Islamic revival in the 1940s and 1950s, especially
when studied for the purpose of delineating the intellectual transformation of Islamism, is
that, aside from the importance of orders and communities in the process of the revival, we
concentrate on the reemergence of Islamist thought, at the level of intellectuals. What is
also significant in this revival is the politicization of Islam in the hands of intellectuals who
brought the issue of Islam into the Kemalist public agenda. An attempt to investigate the
reasons for the Islamic revival, in general, has to take into account the achievements of
Kemalism such as the effect of educational mobilization, urbanization and economic
development.50 But specifically, the study of the reemergence of Islamist intellectuals has
to focus not only on the paramount influence of Kemalism with its state-oriented mind but
also on the weaknesses of Kemalism, in order to contextualize Islamism. The Kemalist
reluctance, if not a failure, of reforming Islam created an opportunity for the revitalization
and politicization of Islamic tradition in several forms. This observation might be linked to
the paradox which Bobby Sayyid found in the Kemalist treatment of Islam:
“Paradoxically, the Kemalists did not depoliticize Islam, but, by removing it from the
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centre of their constructions of political order, they politicized it: unsettling it and
disseminating it into the general culture, where it became available for reinscription.”51
Moreover, Kemalism, with the exception of Turkish nationalism could not provide a social
and ethical map by drawing its principles out of a “credible ideology.” The inability of
Kemalism in creating “a social ethos that appealed to the heart as well as to the mind”
culminated in an ideological vacuum in a society where Islamic rules and values shaped
the everyday of the individual and the society.52 Mardin furthers the inability of Kemalism
as such to the extent that it neither became a rival ideology to Islam by sending its
ideological forms to even villages, nor allowed the emergence of any other rival ideologies
to Islam.53
Actually, the reemergence of Islamism in the hands of intellectuals occured within the
given context. Before starting to portray an Islamist intellectual, it would be appropriate to
analyze what an intellectual is at a general level and to establish connections with the
Turkish context.
4.5 The Intellectual Under the Shadow of the State
The concept of the intellectual emerged in France in the late nineteenth century in relation
with the Dreyfus Affair, forging the participation in political life as its main characteristics.
Due to the intention of intellectual activity in transforming its abstractions about the world
into social reality, the intellectual has a strong tendency to intervene in the political world.
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In other words, the intellectual came to see an “unmediated relationship between the
creation of ideas as an intellectual vocation and doing politics.”54
From a historical perspective, “the idea of intellectual is a child of the Enlightenment and
the forces that supported or opposed what has come to be called modernization. The idea
of progress, of social development through the application of human reason to the world,
has been a central theme in the generational formation of intellectuals.”55 Intellectuals as a
distinct social group acquired a paramount influence first in modern western societies and
then in the rest of the world as concomitant to the process of
modernization/westernization.56
Intellectuals who employ general symbols and abstract references, in expressing their ideas
concerning man, society, and the universe, create and develop a high culture by
transmitting their modes of understanding reality to the next generations through an
intimate interaction57 It is this prolonged contact with the modern culture which makes the
intellectual. But what is more important is that the intellectual is the main actor in the
“discovery of the glories of the past, of cultural traditions, which usually was but not
always an action, ex post facto, which legitimated the claims asserted on behalf of that
newly imagined collectivity.”58
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The constitution of the intellectual identity in the West by constructing “the other” was
carved out of the bourgeois public sphere, against the middle class.59 The other of the
intellectual in a French-inspired country, Turkey, was the ancien regime and its
legitimating culture (read the Ottoman Empire and Islam). Thus, the constitution of the
Turkish intellectual in the republic took shape in opposition to the empire and its values.
Conversely, constructing the Kemalist “imitative” modernizers as the other to glorify the
empire and to reislamicize the Turkish society was a part and parcel of the reemergence of
the Islamist intellectual.
The intellectual in the West derives his/her authority and legitimation from the roots which
lie deep in the western philosophy and in the Enlightenment. In a modernizing country, the
project of particZipating in the “civilization” has allowed the modernizing intellectual to
claim some special insights into societal affairs to judge and to transform the society. The
political and social identity of the Turkish intellectual congealed in a context of the debates
of how to reconstruct every aspect of Turkish life to join the western civilization while
departing from the eastern and medieval one. Expectedly, the discourse around the
civilization and the dichotomy of the West and East has been crucial to the formation of
the Turkish intellectual, whether as westernist or as Islamist one. In the context of Turkish
modernization, the mission of the intellectual was to arrive the level of modern civilization.
The means of this mission was politics but with the reservation that politics was basically
perceived as education by other means: “it was the process by which the most educated
sector of the population acted on the masses and provided them with ideals by which to
live and to organize their common life.”60
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In modern times, as Shils states, the major political vocation of the intellectuals has been
the “enunciation and pursuit of the ideal.”61 This is true for the intellectual experience both
in the West and in the modernizing countries. Seen from this perspective, both the Young
Ottomans’ search for the modern liberal and constitutional politics and the republican
intellectual’s quest for the revolution (whether in the Kemalist intelligentsia as the Turkish
revolution or in Islamist expectations of a true revolution) have largely been the
enunciation and pursuit of the ideal. Indeed, revolutionary politics in the modern age could
not be explained without mentioning the primary role of the intellectuals as such. Edward
W. Said goes further: “there has been no major counter-revolutionary movement without
intellectuals. Intellectuals have been the fathers and mothers of movements, and of course
sons and daughters, even nephews and nieces.”62
The state featured prominently on the horizon of the Turkish intellectual. Independently of
his/her position in relation to the political center, the nature of the Turkish political culture
ensured that even those who remained outside the centre were left with an imprint of the
idea of the strong/transcendental state. This sense of the state was not acquired exclusively
by the bureaucratic recruitment of the elite but also through the reproduction of the
Ottoman classical values: order and justice (in modern times it meant progress). A
significant part of the intellectual heritage of Islamic political thought, as depicted in the
first chapter, ensured that the supremacy of the state was given and saluted so as to keep
the unity of the political system. The strong state tradition of the Empire had been
intensified through the process of modernization in the hands of the
bureaucratic/modernizing elite, resulting in the direct and active involvement of the state in
the creation of culture and in regulating the direction and framework of intellectual
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activity. In the early Republic, intellectuals did not succeed in freeing themselves from the
tradition of strong state. Neither the Islamist intellectuals who regretted the destruction of
the Islamic institutions, nor the Kemalist intelligentsia who looked forward to a world of
new civilization could emancipate themselves from this tradition. It remains to be analyzed
how this authoritarian bureaucratic-intellectual paradigm, which was established in the late
nineteenth and in the early twentieth century, continued to define the contours of the
intellectual intervention in public life throughout the republican era.
In the Turkish context, the usage of the term intellectual for both Kemalists and Islamists
was problematic. Because of the emphasis on the sense of a mission, the intellectual
became “a contested concept and a nom de guerre taken on to do battle with the
establishment. Thus, the intellectual took on for a time the same connotations as the
intelligentsia: an identifiable group with a self-proclaimed mission to defend ‘culture’,
either by doing battle with all established authority or as the defenders of ‘standards’
against those who would degrade them.”63 Intelligentsia connoted a type of intellectuals
who were bound up with the idea that they had a mission and even an obligation to civilize
and enlighten the dark corners of the society; and the modernizing state was their main
instrument and their ally.64 Seen from this perspective, both the Kemalist elite and
Islamists shared these features. But here, due to their critique of the Turkish modernization
and their opposition to the Kemalist establishment by proposing an alternative ideology for
shaping the society and state, we name those who drew on an Islamic discourse as Islamist
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intellectuals while calling those who became a part of the establishment by developing an
ideological legitimation for the secular reforms as Kemalist intelligentsia.
4.6 A New Genre of Islamist intellectuals As Critiques of Kemalism and In Quest of
an Islamic Ideology
During the one party rule, the political, social and institutional contexts (such as journals,
medreses, parliament so on) which had sustained and helped to constitute Islamist
intellectual tradition narrowed. The Islamist intellectual tradition, with the exceptions of
religious and philosophic arenas, were in a danger of disappearing.
In late thirties and early forties a new group of Islamist intellectuals appeared. A search for
an ideology dominated Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, (Büyük Doğu: Great East of Kısakürek),
Nurettin Topçu (Anadoluculuk: Anatolianism) and other intellectuals whose thoughts
indeed comprised “the four elements accepted as general characteristics of ideology: a
philosophy of history, an analysis of man’s present stage of development, a projection into
the future and a plan of action.”65 By the same token, their political thinking went beyond
the agenda of the Islamists of the Meşrutiyet (adaptation of Western institution and saving
the state from decline) by their quest for the realization of the ideal state, community and
individual. Apart from the fact that they were heavily influenced by Western (Christian)
spiritualism- Kısakürek and Topçu were among the first students who were sent to France
by the Republic, they derived their “ideological symbolic resources”66 from Sufism
(tasavvuf) to formulate their ideologies. Actually, in the reemergence of Islamist
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intellectual thought in Turkey, Sufism served as a “second culture” through which they
have kept an interactive relation with the Islamic tradition.67
The politicization of the reemerging Islamist intellectual partly resulted from the
Kemalism’s politicization of the intellectual activity. With state management of culture
through the new reforms, every field of intellectual activity took on political and
ideological meanings in the process of the civilizational conversion. Some intellectuals
took part in the creation of the new regime by accepting and producing the ideological
norms of Kemalism. But some of them moved into the political opposition by the
advocation of a new ideology. Islamist intellectual was the one who produced a new,
modern ideology from the old values destroyed by the Kemalist regime. The Kemalist
intelligentsia was the elite identifying themselves with republican principles such as
secularism and nationalism as the instruments of westernization and of social and cultural
transformation while the Islamist intellectual, drawing from an Islamic discourse, was a
dissident who believed that the Kemalist project of modernization did not correspond to
the needs and roots of the Turkish society.
It may be argued that the reaction of Islamist political thought in this period went beyond
criticism of the modernization of the state and the establishment of a secular nation-state; it
also challenged Kemalism's attempts to penetrate into every aspect of Turkish life68 on the
basis of a six-fold ideology: republicanism, secularism, nationalism, revolutionism, statism
and populism. Bound with the Republican intellectual setting, however, Islamist
intellectuals dwelt mainly on nationalism, revolutionism and secularism. As the urban
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Turkish elite culture at the time was French inspired, their criticism of the republican
ideology was formulated in a genuinely Western mode.69
It may be said that the Islamist intellectual was the one who found his/her emotional core
in Islam and its value system. The real problem with the modernization paradigm was that
there were many modernities (or modernities and traditions). Intellectuals create political
ideas to influence a world that is dominated by the political actors (leaders) and institutions
(parties). Islamist intellectuals had the claim to not only appeal to the sectors of the society
that were discomforted by the strictly secular reforms of Kemalist elite, but also to give a
renewed worldview (a totalistic vision), providing the very means through which a new
political ideology against the capitalist and communist ones was available. Islamist
intellectual performed its intellectual tasks (theorizing about state and democracy), through
the means of communication and literary, namely journals and newspapers.70 The
publications such as Büyük Doğu and Hareket, provided the vehicles for the expression
and even the very formation of critical intellectual tradition along Islamic lines, basically to
criticize and problematize Kemalist project of modernization. Certainly, democratization
and the transition to multiparty politics provided the very possibilities for the creation of
journals and newspapers which were the bastions of “the counter-cultural intellectual.”71
Islamist intellectual was different from a nationalist-conservative intellectual on the point
that the first recognized Islam as an independent force in the every aspects of societal life,
including the political one whereas the latter acknowledged religious values as
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complementary element of Turkish culture.72 The first and foremost aim of Islamist
intellectual was to reconstruct Islamic way of thinking and living. Islamist intellectual with
his grasp of western philosophy and critical attitude towards political power was different
from the traditional ulema. On the other hand, they also “stress[ed] the preservation of the
internal consistency of Islam through setting up a channel between cosmological,
ontological, epistemological, and eschatalogical bases, and a axiological and sociological
evaluations. Methodologically, there [was] an attempt in this trend to develop a new
version of the mentality of alim rather than accepting the partial and limited core of the
mentality of intellectual in western sense.”73
Islamist intellectual transformed the cognitive framework of the Islamic teachings to
produce an ideology which would be helpful in understanding and explaining the universe,
the world and the place of the individual in relation to these two. As Mardin states, religion
by its “set of symbols” provides individual with enough conceptual opportunities to have a
unique perspective in the perception of the outside world.74
In the transformation-process of Islam into an ideology/discourse of opposition, the
gaining of a religio-political consciousness was seen as vital firstly to deconstruct the
“victories” and “achievements” of the Kemalist regime and secondly to create a new
worldview in order to realize the ideal system. Islamist intellectuals positioned themselves
as the guardians of this new worldview in relation to the place of the ulema as the heir of
the prophet in the classical period, in order “to act as the carriers of a cultural
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transformation which will lead to the internalization of the Islamic worldview by the
masses.”75
In their portrayal of the west as distinct from the orient, it does not seem true to say that the
attribution of all that was good in Islam and all that was bad in the West is the prominent
feature of the writings of all Islamist intellectuals.76 But by the distinction of East and
West, they made “occidentalization” to determine what was western and at the same time
made “orientalization” to elaborate what was oriental. This attempt, more or less,
necessitated the acceptance of an essentialist logic, similar to the Orientalist tradition.
For the Islamist intellectuals, “Islam is a social discourse which represents an alternative to
the Western and secular Gesellschaft in contemporary Turkey, one which would be free of
the emptiness and injustice that they attribute to modern society.”77 Islamist intellectual
was the one who aimed at the re-invention of a Muslim’s “strong self perception” as a
source of a new worldview in the face of the western supremacy.78
Islamist intellectual attempted to restore the break which Kemalism created by its “weak
historicity.”79 In contrast to the Kemalist conceptualization of modernity as the project of
civilization by adopting the western way of life, Islamist intellectual had the desire of
rediscovering the past which might be tantamount to its reinvention. But on the other hand,
Islamism produced a type of weak historicity by its strong rejection of Kemalism which
was also a continuity with the political culture of the Ottoman elite.
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Both Kemalist and Islamist intellectuals used history and culture in a similar way,
recreating a past for understanding (reconceptualizing) and shaping the present as a source
of collective identity and a new society. Islamists intellectuals were those who wrote or
spoke out in public either as opponents to the Kemalist project of modernization or as
active supporters of the ideologization of Islam. İlter Turan, in his evaluation of the role of
religion as an ideology in Turkey concludes that religion has constituted one of the
elements of “a political counter-culture”. Hovewer, it is hard to share Turan’s argument, at
least for the Islamist intellectuals, in that those who were dedicated to this counter-culture
were individuals who were unable to deal with change and their marginal status in
society.80 This reemerging Islamist intellectual, especially Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, took part
in the secular milieu and clientele of Kemalist intelligentsia.
True to the very emergence of the intellectuals in the non-western countries, Islamist
intellectual was the most susceptible to the challenge, if not the infiltration, of western
ideas. One of the reasons for this was surely that he/she had been educated in western-type
schools or had been educated in a western country. This enabled him to have a priviliged
access to western culture and philosophy. Thus, Islamist intellectuals were familiar with
the western philosophy, literature and art which constituted the cultural bases for the
secular intelligentsia in their project of “civilizational conversion.” They were engaged in
the intellectual history of France not only to learn the positivist and materialist current
which put the emphasis on the progress and order, but also to acquire the spiritualist
current such as the views of Henri Bergson. Thus, through the language they use, the
western philosophers they cite, they belonged to the secular culture of the Kemalist
intelligentsia. While they inherited, more or less, the Islamist criticism of the Ottoman-
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Turkish modernization by the Islamists of the second constitutional period, they were the
products of the Republic.
4.7 Formation of an Islamist Intellectual: Necip Fazıl’s Political and Intellectual
Biography
Born in İstanbul in May 26, 1904, Kısakürek (1904-1983) came from a family which was
descended from a branch (Kısakürekler) of Dülkadiroğulları. His father, Abdülbaki Fazıl
bey (d. 1921) acted as a public prosecuter and judge and his mother was Mediha hanım (d.
1977) who came from an emigrant family from Crete. His grandfather, Mehmed Hilmi
Efendi was a retired president of the Court of crime and appeal in İstanbul and was
conferred by a medal of “Légion d’honneur” due to his participation in the committee
which composed the Mecelle. Kısakürek attended several schools, including a local school
(mahalle mektebi), French and American colleges, Rehber-i İttihad school, Büyük Reşid
Paşa school and lastly Heybeliada Numune school in which he completed his primary
school education.81 He completed his high school education in 1920 in Mekteb-i Fünun-u
Bahriye-i Şahane (the Naval School), where Nazım Hikmet also received his education. It
might be noted that this military education had a great influence on him and constituted a
channel through which Kısakürek was tied to the authoritarian and elitist tradition of the
civil-military bureaucracy. In other words, the one basic characteristic Kısakürek shared
with the Kemalist intelligentsia was that they were trained in the French-type schools of
the Empire, which had been constructed for the creation of modern bureaucracy, including
the military branch.
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After his enrolment in the department of philosophy in İstanbul Darülfünun, he became
succesful in the examination that the ministry of education held for sending students to
Europe, just after the declaration of the republic. Kısakürek, being among the first group of
students who were sent to France, went to Paris, Sorbonne University to study
philosophy.82 Kısakürek’s bohemian life i.e. addiction to gumbling, and his intellectual
crisis in Paris were complemented by his doubts about the fundamental values of the west.
In one of his autobiography, Kısakürek evaluated the West he personally saw from a
retrospective glance: “Paris, which with its civilization symbolized the West, exhibited on
its front page designs of miraculous refinement which, however, turned out to be etched on
a background of plastic, the latter, in fact attracting one’s eye by what it disguised, namely,
ruin and darkness; a civilization that was condemned to hit its head against one wall after
another and play hide and seek from one crisis after another.”83
Due to his bohemian life and spiritual crisis in his Paris experience, Kısakürek did not
complete his study and was called back to Turkey by the ministry. Upon his return to the
country, he found employement in various banks; Felemenk Bahr-i Sefit Bank, Osmanlı
Bank and lastly İş Bank where he had worked for nine years and had a personal contact
with Celal Bayar. He completed his military service between 1931 and 1933 with
intervals. Until 1934 when he met with shaikh Abdul hakim Arvasi, as one member of the
newly emerging intellectual class, he published books of poetry, Örümcek Ağı in 1925,
Kaldırımlar in 1928 and Ben ve Ötesi in 1933. Kısakürek benefited intellectually from
both some Islamists like Ahmed Hamdi Aksekili and İbrahim Aşki Bey who were his
teachers in Naval school and some conservative intellectuals like Mustafa Şekip Tunç and
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İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu who were his teachers in the department of philosophy in
Istanbul Darülfünun.
Kısakürek published his books of poetry in the formative years of the republic
institutionally and ideologically. Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period did not have
a political agenda whether preferring to live outside Turkey like Mehmet Akif Ersoy or
devoting themselves to the study of religious sciences like Babanzade Ahmet Naim and
Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır. Kısakürek’s intellectual mind was formed by both the sorrows of
the collapsed empire and the republican enthusiasm of the Kemalist intellectuals. This
setting provided enough fertile ground for his experience with a metaphysical/intellectual
crisis which he regarded as the foremost condition of being a true intellectual.84 He
described his crisis as a crisis of a vanguard who was a part of the intellectual of the
twentieth century and who had lived in a spiritless and aimless society, while talking about
the intellectual background of one of his poetry, Kaldırımlar (pavements).85 This crisis had
been closely related both to an individual search for a meaning of existence in the world
and to an intellectual quest for establishing a new individual, society and state from the
ruins of the old empire. In one of his works on theatre, Bir Adam Yaratmak, just before the
world war two, he gave a portrayal of a Turkish intellectual who lived a crisis in the face of
a westernizing society and who questioned this society’s basis of spirit and belief with a
special reference to the issues of God, fatality and death.86 In Kısakürek’s intellectual life,
these considerations culminated in an effort to account for the Turkish modernization
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movement from Tanzimat to the republic in the context of some significant issues such as
national history, worldview, the duality of material and spirit, the distinction of east and
West, the future of the western supremacy, political ideologies, and lastly religion.
As appropriate to his own statements in O ve Ben (He and Me) his intelllectual and
political life could be classified into two periods: old Kısakürek (1904-1934) before his
meeting with Abdul hakim Arvasi, and new Kısakürek (1934-1983), after this meeting.
Despite his spiritualist/religious inclinations that came from the influence of his
grandfather Mehmed Hilmi Efendi, in the first period, Kısakürek’s meeting with sheikh
Arvasi constituted a turning point in his life. Through this meeting the bohemian and
crisis-ridden life of a republican poet was transformed into an Islamist intellectual who
ideologized Islam as an alternative ideology to both western political ideologies of
capitalism and communism and to the Kemalist ideology and who shouldered an ideal of
reestablishing the Turkish state and society on the basis of Islamic principles.87
Kısakürek, in one of his early writings, “Godless world,”(Allahsız Dünya) pointed to the
decline of belief in God and spiritual/religious life in the world. In an existensialist view,
he spoke about the absence of any notion of “merveilleux” and infinity. Moreover, the
spiritual crisis of humanity was to be related with the fact that God had withdrawn from
the world. The way of salvation from this “Angstphilosophie” was to find out a new
metaphysic and belief.88 After stating that he was a man of cosmos (order), Kısakürek
conceived his involvement in politics as the effort to establish his ideal society in his world
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of art and idea.89 With the aim to know, find and establish the true regime, Kısakürek
devoted himself to the salvation of Turkey which had been in spiritual “flames and
fumes.” To initiate a great intellectual movement, he published the journal of Büyük Doğu
in 1943.90
The period from Ağaç (1936) to Büyük Doğu constituted a period of preparation and was
much coloured by spiritualist and metaphysical leanings around the issues of existence,
belief, death and art. But his ideological makeup was more or less shaped by the context of
the late forties and fifties. In an article called “Ben Buyum”, he delineated the major
corners of his ideology as nationalist-Anatolist (opposite to imitative Europeanism and
European colonialism), spiritualist (opposite to materialism), maveracı (that which was
beyond, opposite to fanatic and atheist), personalist-qualitatist (opposite to unlimited
freedom), anti-property (opposite to great individual capital), abstractive and essentialist in
art, idea and science (opposite to rootless and non-detailed systems), supportive of class in
terms of anti-elitism (elitism) in mind and spirit (antidemocratic), interventionist
(antiliberal) but also antifascist and anticommunist.91 Still at this period, he had good
relations with the Kemalist establihment and intelligentsia to the extent that he wrote the
poem of Büyük Doğu as the new national anthem in 1938 upon the demand of Falih Rıfkı
Atay to be presented to Atatürk92 and wrote a book on Namık Kemal for the Turkish
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Language Institution (Türk Dil Kurumu) in 1940. The minister of education, Hasan Ali
Yücel appointed him as a professor to firstly Ankara Yüksek Devlet Konservatuarı and
later to İstanbul Academy of Fine Arts.93 According to his statements, he was even offered
as a deputy candidate for the parliament by Refik Saydam in the late 1930s and by
Memduh Şevket Esendal in 1942 but was vetoed by İsmet İnönü.94 In 1941, Kısakürek got
married with Fatma Neslihan, a niece of an Islamist of the second constitutional period,
Babanzade Ahmed Naim.
Kısakürek started to publish his spiritualist/Islamist ideas in their soft, ambigous and
general forms in 1936 in his journal of Ağaç.95 Later, at the time that Kısakürek
concretized his Islamist political ideas in general and his anti-Kemalist reading of Turkish
history through his journal of Büyük Doğu for the first time in 1943, there were some
Islamist intellectuals who survived from the second constitutional period, engaging in the
publication of religious books. For example, in 1941, Eşref Edip (1882-1971), who had
been the editor of the Islamist periodical Sebil-ür-Reşad, began the publication of an
encyclopedia (Türk İslam Ansiklopedisi: Turkish Encyclopedia of Islam) from a Muslim
point of view, together with his friends, as reaction to the translation of the Encyclopedia
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of Islam by the Turkish Ministry of Education, published in Leiden by an international
team of European Orientalists.96 Nurettin Topçu also began to publish his
nationalist/Islamic ideas by issuing the journal of Hareket in 1939. But certainly, it was
Necip Fazıl Kısakürek who ideologized the Islamic revitalization in the 1940s and 1950s
by transforming Islam publicly into an ideology, namely Büyük Doğu.97 This
ideologization of Islam meant a presentation of Islam as a worldview/ideology that did not
accept any division in the holism of Islam. These two decades were the times of
ideologization of Islam in various parts of Islamic world such as the Muslim Brotherhoods
(Müslüman Kardeşler) in Egypt and Islamic community (Cemaat-i İslami) in India (later
in Pakistan). But what is important here is that Kısakürek presented his Islamist ideas at a
time when the translation of the books of Islamists from Egypt, Pakistan and later Iran, had
not started yet.
Kısakürek, following the Young Ottomans, used the literature especially poetry as “an
instrument of change”98 in the creation of a new society and individual. Journalism, which
was the intellectual instrument for spreading Islamist ideas in the nineteenth century
continued its significance for the Islamist intellectual in the republic. Journal of Büyük
Doğu, in its several periods, embraced a wide range of Turkish intellectuals within its
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cadre of writers. Actually, these intellectuals were not only confined to the Turkish right
but also to the large spectrum of left and right.99 This does not mean that Büyük Doğu and
its writers were united. On the contrary, despite of its early rich cadre of writers, in the
course of Kısakürek’s Islamist and polemical struggle against the regime, the cadre of the
journal had changed a lot. Kısakürek made polemical debates with some of these
personalities such as Peyami Safa and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın. In some periods, Kısakürek
himself, under pseudonyms100 wrote many articles in the journal. It should also be added
that the journal also played a significant role in the creation of a group of Islamist
intellectuals by opening its pages to these new writers.101
One may argue that through his journal of Büyük Doğu, his political party under the same
name and his conferences in every part of the Anatolia, Kısakürek was a political
intellectual who was not only a producer of ideas but also tried to establish a “material
source” to embody his political and social ideas in his life.102 With his insistence on
publishing the journal of Büyük Doğu, despite its close down sometimes by the regime
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 239.
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and sometimes by lack of finance, his activities, constitutive of critical discourse against
Kemalism, continued in the form of political journalism. Before the liberalization in 1946,
the appearance of a political journal, critical of Kemalist reforms was a rare occurrence.
The publication of Büyük Doğu might be regarded the start of his Islamist struggle both in
terms of the exposition of his ideology in various issues of Büyük Doğu and in terms of his
opposition to the Kemalist regime. His ideological struggle was in terms of the ideal of
Islamic umma and Islamic civilization.103 By the publication of Büyük Doğu, Kısakürek’s
way totaly departed from Kemalist and leftist intellectuals and he was called as Islamic
fascist or Islamic communist or neo-Muslim or ex-poet by these circles in order to point to
his ideological way. Trials and prison terms started at the same time. Büyük Doğu was
closed down by the decision of the committee of ministers in 1944 on the grounds that it
incited disobedience to the regime by issuing a tradition of the prophet, stating that there
was no obedience to those who did not obey God. In 1946, Kısakürek was tried in courts
three times for the similar reasons, and the following year, he was in prison for having
insulted Turkishness (Türklüğe hakaret davası). Kısakürek was in prison when the DP
came to power in 1950 and released by the first Menderes government’s law of
amnesty.104 Kısakürek’s inclination to political action for the realization of his ideology
manifested itself by establishing Büyük Doğu Association which called for Muslims to
                                                
103 Kısakürek denied to meet with his brother who announced publicly that he did not
share Kısakürek’s ideas. Kısakürek severely criticized his brother by the statement that
“you rejected an umma, a civilization in my personality. There could not be any link
with a brother who did not share my loft ideal,” quoted by his son Mehmet Kısakürek
in Mustafa Özdamar, Üstad Necip Fazıl [Master Necip Fazıl] (İstanbul: Kırk Kandil,
1997), 83.
104 Anahatlarıyla. 7-9; Kısakürek, Müdafaalarım [My Defenses] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu,
1994, 5th edition), 91-92. The trials and prisons had not separated from Kısakürek until
his death in 1983. It would be enough to enlist some of his trials by their names and
dates: Sümerbank (1946), Türklüğe hakaret and Rejimi Kötüleme (1947), Şapka
(1950), Malatya (1952, 1954), 1965, Great East Association (1967), 1968, 1969, 1970
and lastly Vahidüddin (his death) for the details of Kısakürek’s defences in these trials,
see Müdaafalarım.
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gather around a view of world, human being and society in 1949. In the same year, like
Mustafa Kemal, starting from Samsun, he gave several conferences in various parts of
Anatolia in order to ferment a new youth and to put his ideal into an action.105 As I will
discuss in related sections in the following two chapters, Kısakürek gave political support
to the leaders of the right, from Adnan Menderes in the 1950s, to Süleyman Demirel in the
1960s and to Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş in the 1970s. This did not mean
that he established a stable relation with these leaders. Due to the fact that he tried to
persuade these political leaders in implementing the Great East ideology, his political
relations had a changing nature. But what had not changed was his insistence on the search
for a political reason to realize his political ideas. Until his death in 1983, he continued to
give conferences in different parts of Turkey and to publish books and the journal of
Büyük Doğu despite several interruptions.
Before we start to study Kısakürek’s political ideas in the next two chapters, an exposition
of his view of the intellectual and his evaluation of the Turkish intellectual might be
illuminating for further analysis. Apart from his political struggle, it should be stated that
Kısakürek paid significant attention to the discussions of the intellectual and the Turkish
intellectual within the fraemwork of the country’s salvation. From a Platonian view, he
regarded an intellectual as the one who would save his people from the darkness of four or
five centuries. What the Turkish society and Islamic world needed was the emergence of a
true intellectual who had a true worldview in evaluating world, society and state.106
Intellectuals as the avant-garde had been always in a position to revolt in their search for
                                                
105 Kısakürek, Benim Gözümde Menderes [Menderes in My Eyes] (İstanbul: Büyük
Doğu, 1993, 3rd edition), 116.
106 Kısakürek, Tanrı Kulundan Dinlediklerim [What I Heard from the slave of
God](İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1993, 4th edition), 263; Sahte Kahramanlar [False
Heroes] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1987, 4th edition), 9-11; Konuşmalar. 47; Doğru. 147;
Hitabeler [Speeches] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1985, 2nd edition), 73.
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the ideal society and state and could not be satisfied with the existing ones.107 Looking at
the history of the Turkish intellectual, Kısakürek presented a positive picture compared to
the medieval intellectual who was in total agreement with his society and civilization. The
medieval intellectual stood in a systemized platform which was established by his society
and Islamic belief and ideology. Fuzuli, Baki, Nabi, Nefi, Nedim, Şeyh Galip, Sinan, Katip
Çelebi and Dede Efendi represented different dimensions of a true intellectual who had: ”a
view of world, a view of things and events, a decision of what was good and bad, a
measure of perfection, a desire for tomorrow, a balance of criticism, a cultural tie, an
individual web and a concern of society.”108
But besides the urgent need of a true intellectual/hero, Tanzimat and post-Tanzimat
intellectuals could not give a birth to “an evolution of an internal world” in the realization
of the new coming world (the supremacy of the West) but adhered to mere admiration and
imitation. The West, to this imitative intellectual was not “a problem” to be matured in the
national quality but a “phenomenon” to be worshipped.109 Since Tanzimat, the existence
of false intellectuals/heroes who exploited the national will in the service of the enemies of
the nation and of Islam had been the vital issue of the Turkish history. All leading
statesmen like Mustafa Reşit Pasha, Ali and Fuat pashas and well-known intellectuals like
Namuk Kemal and Ziya Gökalp were false heroes/intellectuals.110 Intellectuals of his time,
                                                
107 Kısakürek, Rapor 7/9 [Report 7/9] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1993, 2nd edition), 204.
108 Kısakürek, “Manzara 2: Türk Orta Çağ Sanatkar ve Entellektüeline Kısa Bir Bakış.”
[Scene 2: A Short Look at Turkish Medieval Artisan and Intellectual] Ağaç. 5 (April
11, 1936):1.
109 Kısakürek, “Manzara 3: Tanzimat Sanatkar ve Entellektüeline Kısa bir Bakış.” [Scene
3: A Short Look at Tanzimat’s Artisan and Intellectual] Ağaç. 6 (April 18, 1936): 1-2;
“Manzara 5: Büyük Harp Sonrası Türk Sanatkar ve Entellektüeline Kısa Bir bakış.”
[Scene 5: A Short Look at Turkish Artisan and Intellectual After the Great War] Ağaç.
8 (May 23, 1936): 1-2.
110 Kısakürek, Sahte. 59, 63, 79; “Milli İrade.” [National Will] BD. (July 10, 1965) in
Çerçeve 3 [Framework 3]. 262-3.
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centered around Babıali 111 were far from being representatives of the true intellectual. In
his book of Babıali, through his intellectual autobiography, he severely criticized the
members of Turkish intellectual, from Nazım Hikmet to Peyami Safa.112 Kadro movement
also belonged to the chain of false intellectuals by its futile attempt of providing the
National Struggle and Kemalism with a communist ideology and a new nationalism.113 In
sum, Kısakürek could not see the grand intellectual who combined an idea with an action
in neither his own generation and nor in the coming generations of the republic. To
Kısakürek, those individuals who gained the status of being intellectual in the context of
their support to the imitative modernization process through the institutions of the
Kemalist establishment could not be named as intellectuals. To him, in a Mannheimian
sense, intellectuals were those individuals who were entitled to present a worldview to
their society.114An intellectual was, thus, in essence a thinker and a hero whose concern
was to create, to explain and, in this way, to help overcome the obstacles barring the way
to the attainment of a worldview in general, the ideology of the Great East in particular.
The vanguard role in the revolution, putting the ideology into action, was given to the
intellectual as well. As such the intellectual became the expected saver (beklenen kurtarıcı)
of Turkey and the Islamic world.
                                                
111 Babıali in its political usage was originally the Subleme Porte, the central office of the
imperial government of the Ottoman Empire in İstanbul. But here, Kısakürek enlarged
its second meaning (a quarter in ıstanbul that had a concentration of publishers) to
connote to the Turkish intellectuals, including artists, musicians, writers, poets and
journalists.
112 See Kısakürek, Babıali. 110, 225, 270, 283-284.
113 Kısakürek, “Yedinci Mektup.” [Seventh Letter] BD. 1st year, vol. I, number 11
(Decmber 26, 1943): 5, 11 see also Tanrı. 190-191; Hesaplaşma [Settling Accounts]
(İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1985),137-138; Hitabeler. 34.
114 See Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (London: Routledge, 1936/1960), 10.
215
4.8 The Relevance of Sufism and Nakshibendi Order as the Spiritual Sources of
Islamist Intellectuals
Despite the abolition of religious orders, Sufism and its institution tariqa (order) did not
lose their hold among the intellectuals and masses in the republican period.115 By its
adherence to individual purification and perfection, Sufism meant mainly “an
interiorization of Islam, a personal experience of the central mystery of Islam, that of
tawhid, to declare that God is One.”116 A religious order was the organization that
provided the education of perfection for the individual salvation by means of a relationship
of a master-an disciple (sheikh and murid). Among many orders who survived in the
republican period, here we put the stress on Nakshibendi order117 which influenced many
rightist and Islamist intelllectuals and political leaders. Nakshibendi order was
characterized by “its strict observance of shariah and the normative example of the prophet
and his caliphs, compared with other sufi orders’ spiritual exercises,”118 and served well
                                                
115 For a general view on orders in the Ottoman empire see articles in The Dervish Lodge,
Architecture, Art and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992); Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “İslam, Tasavvuf ve Tarikatlar.” [Islam, Sufism and
Religious Orders] Türkiye Günlüğü. 45 (March-April 1997): 5-10.
116 Annemaria Schimmel, Mystical Dimension of Islam (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1975), 17. For more on Sufism’s views on universe, man, nature
ans so on see Abu Bakr al-Kalabadhi, The Doctrine of The Sufis trans. Arthur John
Arberry (Cambridge: The University Press, 1935) and Mahir İz, Tasavvuf [Sufism]
(İstanbul: Kitabevi, 1990, 4th edition).
117 Halidiye, a significant branch of Nakshibendi order that had been influential on
Turkey, including Kurdish populated areas of the southeastern region. This branch was
tied to the teachings of Mawlana Khalid and represented in the Ottoman empire by
Gümüşhanevi Ahmed Ziyauddin whose influence extended itself to the republic on
politicians and intellectuals, for his life and ideas see İrfan Gündüz, Gümüşhanevi
Ahmed Ziyaüddin: Hayatı-Eserleri-Tarikat Anlayışı ve Halidiyye Tarikatı
[Gümüşhanevi Ahmed Ziyaüddin: His Life, Works, Understanding of Religious Order
and Khalidiye]. (İstanbul: Seha, 1984).
118 Mardin, “The Nakşibendi Order in Turkish History,” in Islam in Modern Turkey:
Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State ed. Richard L. Tapper (London: I.
B. Tauris and Co. Ltd, 1991), 124; Hamid Algar, “The Naqshbandi Order in
Republican Turkey.” Islamic World Report. 1/3 (1996): 51.
216
for the creation of an Islamist ideology, spiritually based while keeping the compatibility
with the literal readings of the Qur’an. Despite their early support to the process of
modernization in the reign of Mahmud II, upon a further secularization trend in Tanzimat,
the Nakshibendis showed opposition to this process as in the so called Kuleli Incident of
1859. Nakshibendism as a mystic order by its emphasis on sharia might be considered as
the most successful synthesis of Gellnerian dual cultural systems of Islam: the High Islam
(scripturalist, rule-observant, sober, learning oriented, anti-mediationist, and puritanical)
and Low or Folk Islam (ritualistic, hierarchic, magical, ecstatic and saint-mediated).119
Nakshibendism also has become a significant avenue for Islamic revivalist movements,
aiming at transforming the Folk Islam in the way of scripture and early “true” Islamic
experience.
Due to the Nakshibendi’s stress on sharia, Kısakürek did not advocate an approach which
allowed a large liberty to the interpretation of Islamic truths. He preferred a blend of
mystical and literal interpretations, while the latter was more dominating that the former
one. His orthodox Sufi brand of Islam, Nakshibendi order, with its strong advocation of
sharia provided an important key (as a spiritual element) to the foundations of his ideology,
the Great East, as well as to its position in relation to Islam. Nakshibendi order, perceived
as the threat to the republican regime had “an image of subversion” on the part of the
Kemalist intelligentsia.120 It was significant that the first Islamist opposition, in the
republican period, to the Republican reforms in particular and to the whole process of the
Ottoman-Turkish modernization in general, on the grounds that they were imitative and
                                                
119 See Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992),
9-14.
120 Mardin, “The Nakşibendi,” 121.
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alien to Islamic/national roots of the Turkish nation/society was influenced by a
Nakshibendi shaikh, Abdul Hakim Arvasi.121
The activating force of Sufi orders, especially of Nakshibendism in the nineteenth-century
on masses was not new but its employment in the ideologization of Islam by a succesful
poet of the republic, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek might be regarded as a novelty worthy to be
studied. Seen in his autobiographies, Babıali and O ve Ben, the Turkish intellectual was in
a spiritual crisis in solving the problem of identity against the coming new world and the
Kemalist project of civilizational conversion. The crisis of morality in the republic could
be solved by a Sufi understanding of Islam which was based on the search of a high
standard morality for both individual and society. Kısakürek personally solved his
intellectual crisis by the help of a Sufi map of world and universe. In Plotanian sense,
Kısakürek as an intellectual/saver came back from the world of ideas (Sufi world) to save
the society and individual and threw himself to the public sphere (agora). 122
According to Kısakürek, Sufism was the internal side of Islam whereas sharia was its
external form. Hence, Islam was the expession of these two orders (rejim) which were
organically tied to each other as a non-divisible totality. The Islamic understanding of the
spirit, material, morality, this world, other world, meaning of existence, and of the way of
eternal life were to be found in Sufism. The view that attached Sufism to the Neo-Platonic
                                                
121 Arvasi came from a Kurdish family of a long-standing Sufi and ‘alim tradition. He
came to Istanbul in 1919 and was appointed postnişin at the Murtaza Efendi tekke. He
was twice arrested, first in 1925 and then in 1933, and in 1943 he was banished to
İzmir. Dying the same year, he was buried in the village of Bağlum in Ankara see
Algar, “The Naqshbandi,” 60-61.
122 Kısakürek, Batı. 138 and O ve Ben.107. Kısakürek’s senstivity to the classical Sunni
beliefs was so apparent that he preferred Imam Rabbani’s vahdet-i Şuhud to
Muhyiddin Arabi and Hallac-ı Mansur’s’s idea of Vahdet-i Vücut, see Batı. 126, 166,
173; Tanrı. 9; Tarih Boyunca Büyük Mazlumlar [Oppressed throughout the History]
(İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1985, 3rd edition),153-157.
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school of philosophy was rejected by Kısakürek on the grounds that sufism came from an
original source, the prophet.123
He attempted to build Islamic bases for an ideology of action from sufism. This fact might
be related to Mardin’s observation that the Nakshibendi order in Turkey has been able “to
change its idiom in accordance with circumstances and mobilize the intelligenti as well as
large populations” in a way which western political ideologies like communism and
socialism has intended to bring to fruition.124 The influence of Nakshibendis in the revival
of Islamism in the Republic was mainly due to the fact that after the abolition of the
medreses in the very early years of the Republic, they provided the religious learning and
education: “in the early part of the republican period, many Naqshbandi shaykhs assumed
the task of maintaining Islamic learning in Turkey. Whereas the class of ulama could be
dissolved with great ease by the state to which it had always been tied, the tarikats, with
their autonomy and closeness to the people, were a different matter.”125
Kısakürek’s meeting with Shaikh Abdulhakim Arvasi126 made such a great influence on
the young poet that later he attributed all his religious and political ideas, ranging from the
glorification of Abdul Hamid II to the strong rejection of Islamist modernists like Afghani
                                                
123 Kısakürek, İdeolocya Örgüsü [Ideological Web] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1986, 5th
edition), 126-127; Sahte. 270-271.
124 Mardin, “Aspects of a sociology of Islam.” Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations. Annual
2 (1987):151.
125 Algar, “The Naqshbandi,” 62. The Nakshibendis have always been more willingful in
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Sufi orders.
126 Abdülhakim Arvasi’s emphasis was on the advocation to the classical Sunni
undertanding of Islam. He, like his follower Kısakürek, “waged polemical battles not
only against the ‘secularism’ of the republic, but also against Shi’ism, Wahhabism, the
so-called Salafi school of Afghani and Abduh, and any manifestation of what was
rather broadly called ‘reformism’ (reformluk).” Algar, “The Naqshbandi,” 61.
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and Abduh, to his spiritual master.127 True to the fact that the Nakshibendi order had a
fuction in the Ottoman integration of heterodox groups to Sunni orthodoxy128, Kısakürek
took a positive attitude towards the Ottoman past in general. Although they were not
among those orders which obtained Abdul Hamid II’s support of Sufism in his reign, the
Nakshibendis of Turkey have had a very positive view about the sultan; Arvasi was not an
exception to this. Nakshibendism appeared in Kısakürek’s ideological framework as the
soul and spirit of the ideologization of Islam. Accompanying the Nakshibendi order’s role
in the creation of a new ideology as an alternative to modern political ideologies, was his
presentation of it as the true Islam against the reformist approaches. Its emphasis on the
identity of Muslims was linked to the rejection of imitating the western civilization. Sufism
also contributed much to the solving of identity and belief crisis at the level of intellectuals.
By the accession to spiritual world, Sufism kept its attractiveness for the Turkish
intellectual in the secularizing framework of the Kemalist republic.
                                                
127 This meeting of 1934 was a turning point/a revolution in his ideological makeup. In the
book, “O ve Ben”, he divided his life into basically two parts: before (1904-1934) and
after his meeting with the shaikh (1934-until his death in 1983). Kısakürek later
conceived his position in front of Shaikh Arvasi as the position of Platon in the face of
Sokrat. He only gave the expression to his master’s understanding of Islam.Hence,
through sufism he found the most perfect manifestations of spiritual philosophic
explanations about the world and the universe, Konuşmalar. 81, 84 and Ahmet
Kabaklı, Sultanü’ş-Şuara Necip Fazıl [The King of the Poets Necip Fazıl]
(İstanbul:Türk Edebiyatı Vakfı yay., 1995), 143.
128 Şerif Mardin, “The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey,” in Fundamentalisms and the State:
Remaking Politics, Economics and Militance ed Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 207.
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CHAPTER V
FROM PROGRESS TO IDEOLOGY: ISLAM AS A HARD IDEOLOGY IN
KISAKÜREK’S POLITICAL IDEAS
Just as the political writing of the Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period, Necip
Fazıl Kısakürek developed his Islamist ideas within the confines of the debate on the
decline of the Ottoman state. Expectedly, this debate led him to the critique of the Turkish
modernization process and the Republican reforms. With the aim to present an alternative
way to the Kemalist modernization project, he, similar to the Islamist emphasis on
progress and civilization in the second constitutional period, saw Islam as a “hard
ideology” which would determine every aspect of political, social and economic life. His
formulation of Great East was derived from Islam in order to save the Turkish nation and
the Islamic world from the centuries-old decline.
5.1 Formation of A critical Discourse around the Decline
In the explanation of the reasons why the Islamic civilization declined, Necip Fazıl
Kısakürek shared the mainline Islamist conviction that this mainly stemmed from the
influence of pre/un-Islamic traditions, like that of Byzantine and Persian impact. Like all
the Islamist arguments, the departure of Muslims from the true Islamic principles (sharia)
and from the practices of the early Islam constituted the major part in Kısakürek’s analysis
of the decline. Unlike the Islamist trend in the Young Ottomans and in the second
constitutional period, Kısakürek’s interest in the discussion of the decline was not directed
to prove that Islam was not an obstacle to progress and civilization though he vehemently
refused the idea that Islam was the cause of the Muslims’ decline.1
                                                
1 See Kısakürek, Batı. 215; Dünya Bir İnkilap Bekliyor [World is Waiting a Revolution]
(İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1993, 3rd edition), 23; Rapor 7/9. 125.
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In the Ottoman Empire2 which, in his eyes, was the “realization of true civilization” in the
Turkish history, the decline had started in the sixteenth century when the Islamic spirit and
ideology ( the love and ecstasy; aşk ve vecd) had begun to become frozen in a mood of
pride about the greatness of the empire. Due to the absence of a Turkish
thinker/philosopher as a saviour in the Turkish history, Islamic spirit and ideology, just
after the passing of the great conquests, could not be translated into new interpretations,
especially into the “firm and continous ideal of city” (Site, medine mefkuresi).3 In the
centuries that followed the reign of Sultan Suleyman the Lawful, this loss had been
complemented by the increasing power of the rude fanatics (kaba softa, ham yobaz) who
sacrified Islam, in the name of sharia, to their self-interests whereas in the same centuries,
through the attempt of the Renaissance, the West had been systematically advancing “the
domination of reason over the things and events” (şeyler ve hadiselere tahakküm) which
was originally an order of Islam. Tied to Kısakürek’s basic conviction that every
enlightenment (feyz) belonged to Islam and had to be appropriated by Muslims, similar to
the Islamist arguments of the Second Constitutional Period, he argued that the spirit in the
Renaissance -the conquest of material and events by human reason which advanced the
world of the West- was of Islamic origin not of Christian one. Hence, the Ottoman state
should have appropriated the useful inventions of the West which were not contrary to
sharia, instead of naming the introdoction of the print and Nizam-ı Cedit as a blasphemy.4
                                                
2 Kısakürek gave a special importance to Fatih and Yavuz among the sultans of the
classical period. The former tied Europe to the Islamic civilization by capturing
Istanbul and the latter followed the policy of Islamic unity by transferring the caliphate
to Turks see Kısakürek, Sahte. 40 and Hitabeler. 166-173.
3 Kısakürek, “Ahlak Sükutumuzun Tarihçesi.” [History of Our Moral Decline] BD. 1st
year, vol. II, number 16 (December 31, 1943): 5, 16; also in Tanrı. 58. Actually, in
Kısakürek’s mind, the thinker who Turks needed was a combination of thinker and
statesman, a kind of Platonian philosopher-king, see Kısakürek, Yeniçeri [Janissary]
(İstanbul: Büyük Doğu,1977, 2nd edition), 19.
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The “expected revolution” in this age of the Western challenge was to show how this
“formalist conservatism” (kışri muhafazakarlık) was against the very ideals of Islam.
Within an Islamic rule, the inability in comprehending Islam with its total essence and
purity, and the inability in applying the Islamic principles to the new times, spaces and the
complexities of the society were accorded as the characteristics of the period which
followed Kanuni’s reign. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these fanatics were
replaced by another type of fanatics who found the same fanaticism in the imitation of
Europe by destroying Islam. That was a “full colonization spiritually” and “semi
colonization materially” (or “cultural imperialism”) by the West. 5
From Ibn Khaldunian understanding of the rise and fall of empires, to Kısakürek, the
decline of the “everlasting state” of Ottomans (devlet-i ebed müddet) was inevitable since
the law of God that every rise would change into fall was absolute. Therefore, Kısakürek
advocated a circular understanding of history rather than a linear one.6 To the decline of
the Ottoman state, Kısakürek assigned specifically the date as Kanuni’s reign when he
appointed the şeyhül İslams, as a civil servant and when he accepted Jews into the empire
and the palace. The appointment of şeyhülislam commenced the deterioriation of Islamic
milieu which had been constructed by the earlier ulema such as Emir Buhari, Molla
Fenari, Zenbilli, Ibn-i Kemal and Ebussuud Efendi in the classical period. The Persian and
Byzantine state tradition which positioned statesmen above the Islamic principles and
                                                                                                                                         
4 Kısakürek, “İslam Nasıl Bozuldu? Kanuniden Sonra.” [How was Islam Corrupted after
Kanuni?] BD. 3rd year, vol. IV, number 81 (February 20, 1948): 2; Büyük Doğuya
Doğru İdeolocya Örgüsü [Towards Great East: Ideological Web] (Ankara: Hilal,
1959), 150-151 and “Beklediğimiz İnkilap.” [Our Expected Revolution] BD 1st year,
vol. II, number 37 (July 12, 1946): 2.
5 Kısakürek, “Tarih Hükmü.” [Judgement of History] BD. 9th year, number 74 (July 30,
1952) also in Başmakalelerim 1 [My Editorials 1] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1990), 128-
131; “Ahlak,” 1; “Bizde Buhran.” [Our Crises] BD. 1st year, vol. I, number 11
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which controlled the religious men (the ulema) through state apparatus had been the major
foreign element responsible for the Ottoman/Islamic decline.7 The ulema had also lost
their religious and idealistic stands in the course of the time by issuing fetwas in
accordance with the whims of the sultans and pashas. The moral decadence emerged
firstly in the circles of palace, government and military, being unable to infuse into the
Turkish family, village and society for centuries. By taking its morality from Islamic spirit,
the Turkish society had secured this spirit as its sacred value for a long time in spite of the
contradiction between itself and the ruling mechanism.8
The process of decline (or moral decadence) was not a sudden fall but a gradual one which
comprised of four stages: from Kanuni to Tanzimat, from tanzimat to Meşrutiyet, from
meşrutiyet to the Republic, from republic to now. The speed of the decline increased in
every following stage like “a rolling body.” In other words, the line of the decadence had
been taken to lower points by the periods of the Tanzimat, Meşrutiyet, and Cumhuriyet
since these added new maladies, let alone repairing the defect of the first stage. Instead of
reforming old institutions such as medresse and janisarries, they were totaly replaced by
western ones which had not taken root in Islamic/Turkish society.9 His writing on decline
was concentrated more on the beginning of the modernization process with the Tanzimat.
Under the direction of this basic assumption, Kısakürek insistently read the Turkish history
and the process of Turkish modernization as the history of decline and further decline.10
                                                                                                                                         
6 Kısakürek, Konuşmalar. 211; Sahte. 163-164.
7 Kısakürek, “İslam Nasıl Bozuldu?Kanuni Devrinde.” [How was Islam Corrupted in
Kanuni’s Reign?] BD. 3rd year, vol. IV, number 80 (February 13, 1948): 2; Büyük
Doğuya Doğru. 148-149; Doğru. 113; Hesaplaşma. 75; Başmakalelerim1. 18.
8 Kısakürek, “Ahlak,” 59-60.
9 Kısakürek, Sahte. 275.
10 He gave a graph of Turkish history, indicating the points of the decline. Tanzimat,
Meşrutiyet and the Republic were presented as points of full decline, interestingly at
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5.2 A Story of Further Decline: Turkish Modernization Process From Tanzimat to
the Republic
Kısakürek criticized Turkish modernization experience from the Tanzimat to the Republic
for imitating the West without proper understanding of its foundations and its spirit and
without conserving the spiritual roots of the Turkish society. The spiritual crisis through
which Turkish society had been passing since the Tanzimat period (early nineteenth
century) had reached its zenith in the Republic. At this point, it must be noted that
Kısakürek continued the Young Ottoman tradition of criticizing the imitative nature of the
Turkish modernization though he treated the Young Ottomans in the same way. As
discussed in the preceeding chapters, the critical attitude towards Tanzimat reforms was
also shared by the Islamists of the second constitutional period. But this time, Kısakürek,
faced with the Kemalist official historical writing, tried to present an alternative reading of
the history as a manifesto or a framework of a new ideology.11
The main defect which Kısakürek found in the Turkish modernization had been its failure
to understand the East and the West properly, culminating in “complexe d’inferiorite” on
the part of the political elite. Not only the modernizing pashas of the Tanzimat (Mustafa
Reşit, Ali and Fuat pashas) but also their opposition, the Young Ottomans (Şinasi, Namık
Kemal, Ziya Paşa), their followers; Midhat Pasha, the Union and Progress were on the
                                                                                                                                         
the twenty-sixth anniversary of the declaration of the Republic in 1949 see the cover of
Büyük Doğu 5th year, number 3 (October 28, 1949): 1. Kısakürek later modified this
line of decline in the way that the foundation of the Republic was portrayed as a point
of rise but further decline after the foundation, see the cover of Büyük Doğu 28th year,
15th year, number 12 (March 24, 1971): 1.
11 His aim was to expose publicly the “false revolutions” from the Tanzimat to the
Republic which enslaved the Turkish nation to the executioner, the West, “Tavşanlı
Hitabesi.” [Tavşanlı Speech] BD. 6th year, number 27 (September 22, 1950): 7, also in
Hitabeler. 214. Kısakürek voiced his opposition to the official history-writing in one of
his poetry; “Muhasebe”: “I do not believe in the history that was taught to me” in Çile.
403.
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same track.12 Europenization as a false state of mind, had taken the sense of destroying the
Turkish personality and identity. Turks did not (could not) belong to the Western family in
spite of the reforms in this respect, having different historical, civilizational and religious
roots, Kısakürek said.13 Thus, every revolution of the Turkish modernization since the
Tanzimat led the Turkish society not to improvement but to the further decline and
regress.14 These revolutions had constituted a “Felix Culpa (happy guilt), something good
in appearence, but disastrous in essence.” Every attempt of reform which did not come
from the nature of Turkish society and which did not construct its economic, social,
spiritual and political bases within this nature was a Felix Culpa.15 Tanzimat was a
“declaration of the state’s will to slide the Turkish medieval society from an old world
(East) to a new, different world (West).”16
The worst part of the Tanzimat was, to Kısakürek, that it produced a trend which attributed
the decline to the customs and roots (read Islam) of the Turkish society. Finding
themselves upon the material challenge of the West, the reformers chose the way of “blind
imitation” whereas they had to view the new age from the Islamic angle and had to
                                                
12 Kısakürek, Ulu Hakan II. Abdülhamid Han [the Great Sultan Abdul Hamid II]
(İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1977, 3rd edition), 41-42; Rapor 4/6 [The Report 4/6]
(İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1993, 2nd edition), 296. For instance, Namık Kemal was the
second false heroe (sahte kahraman) after Midhat Pasha. Kemal was far away from
being an intellectual who comprehended the reasons for the decline, the question of
East-West and so on; see Ulu Hakan. 249-250.
13 Kısakürek, “Avrupalı Tuzağı.” [European Trap] BD. 2nd year, vol. III, number 78
(January 30, 1948): 2 also in İdeolocya Örgüsü. 72-73.
14 Kısakürek, “Neye İnanıyoruz?” [What do we believe in?] BD. 2nd year, vol. III,
number 60 (April 25, 1947): 2; also İdeolocya Örgüsü: Büyük Doğuya Doğru
[Ideological Web: Towards Great East] (İstanbul: Kayseri Yüksek İslam Enstitüsü
Talebe Derneği Yayınları, 1968), 95.
15 Kısakürek, “Felix Culpa-Mesut Suç.” [Happy Guilt] BD. 14th year, number 3 (July
1969): 7; İdeolocya Örgüsü. 377-378; see also Rapor 7/9. 40-41; Rapor 10/13 [The
Report 10/13] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1993, 2nd edition), 72-73.
16 Kısakürek, “Manzara 3: Tanzimat Sanatkar ve Entellektüeline Kısa Bir Bakış.” [Scene
3: A Short Look at Tanzimat’s Artisan and Intellectual] Ağaç. 6 (April 18, 1936): 1-2.
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appropriate the good aspects of it. Actually, the imitation was the declaration and
acceptance of the defeat against the rival world, removing Islam from being an alternative
worldview though Tanzimat stated its allegiance to Islamic principles. Tanzimat had to be
made in a greater and fundamental way but in the service of Islam. Deriving its
enlightenment (feyz) from the Turkish spiritual roots, the reform movement should have
advocated itself to the ideal of a new Eastern civilization which would be an example to
the West. The acute shortage of Turkish thinkers (intellectuals) and its substitution by false
intellectuals and heroes prevented the real revolution in this period.17 Rather, they faced
the supremacy of the West in a mood of “unconditional imitation, admiration and
inferiority complex.”18
Turkish revolutions had not been able to go beyond the selective combination of the
eastern and western civilizations in the Tanzimat and beyond the radical civilizational
conversion to the West in the republic due to the national inability in the creation of an
intellectual class who comprehended the interplay between two civilizations, and who
evaluated the imported products from the West such as democracy, freedom, nation,
civilization, revolution and other isms in the light of the Turkish (Islamic) thought.19 On
the issue of westernization, the Tanzimat intellectual was supposed to make “Examen de
conscience” (nefs murakabesi) to develop a new worldview from the roots of the Turkish
society, but to no avail.20 The question of learning from the West had to be treated in a
                                                
17 Kısakürek, “İslam Nasıl Bozuldu? Tanzimat Devrinde.” [How was Islam Corrupted in
Tanzimat Period?] BD. 3rd year, vol. IV, number 82 (February 27, 1948), 2; Büyük
Doğuya Doğru. 152-153; “Mukaddesatçı Türk’e Beyanname.” [Declaration to a
Conservative Turk] BD. 14th period, number 6 (November 1969): 8-11.
18 Kısakürek, “Manzara 3,” 1-2.
19 Kısakürek, “Asıl İnkilap.” [True Revolution] BD. 14th period, number 5 (September-
October 1969): 10; İdeolocya, fifth edition. 375-377; “Noktalar.” [Points] BD. 9th year,
number 29 (June 13, 1952): 2; also in Başmakalelerim 1. 60.
20 Kısakürek, Konuşmalar. 193; Babıali. 199-200; Hitabeler. 235.
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non-imitative way that would prevent the feeling of complexity but would select the
needed elements such as kowledge from the West. Parallel to the Islamist mainline of the
Second Constitutional period, according to Kısakürek, there could not be anything spiritual
to be taken from the Western civilization, only “reason” ought to be taken from this
civilization.21
Describing the process of modernization in anti-colonial terms, Kısakürek stated that the
imitative nature of westernization in Turkey might be perfectly explained by the example
of the Public Debts of the Ottoman empire (düyunuumumiye):
Every movement of imitation which did not contain national personality (milli
benlik) is a spiritual public debt. The Young Turks are the generation of
public debts, Edebiyatı Cedide (New Literature) is a literature of public debt.
Each influence coming form the West, including professor in the university
and artist in the cinema is a kind of spiritual public debt unless the national art,
national thinking and national politics are established.22
The polemical side in Kısakürek’s critique of the imitative nature of the Turkish
modernization was sometimes heightened to the extent that he came to blame of Tanzimat,
Meşrutiyet and even the Republic as “a product of Jewish and Masonic intrigues.”23
Meşrutiyet revolution as a second movement of the Tanzimat was directed to demolish the
spirit and unity of Islam. Turkism of the Union and Progress, with its desire to place
                                                
21 Kısakürek, “Program.” [Programme] BD. (April 15, 1956) in Başmakalelerim 2 [My
Editorials 2] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu,1995), 38; La edri, “İrfan Davamız.” [Our issue of
Culture] BD. number 9 (May 1, 1959): 12; Benim. 491.
22 Kısakürek, “Maddi ve Manevi ‘Düyunuumumiye’ler.” [Material and Spiritual Public
Debt] (April 24, 1939) in Çerçeve 1. 100-101.
23 Kısakürek, “Kimin Hesabına Konuşuyoruz.” [Whom Behalf are We Talking of] BD.
1st year, vol. II, number 44 (August 30, 1946): 2; also in Çerçeve 2 [Framework 2]
(İstanbul: Büyük Doğu,1999, 2nd edition), 89-90; Kısakürek, “Yahudi ve Menderes.”
[Jews and Menderes] BD. 9th year, number 34 (June 18, 1952): 2; also in
Başmakalelerim 1. 70; Hadiselerin Muhasebesi 1 [Evaluation of Events 1] (İstanbul:
Büyük Doğu, 1999), 288.
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nationalism in place of Islam could not bring an ideal to the Turkish society, but destroyed
the remaining foundations of the ideal of Islam.24 In the name of liberty, equality and
justice, the great sultan (ulu hakan) Abdul Hamid II was dethroned by the revolution of
1908 entirely as the work of a Masonic-Jewish conspiracy. The committee of Union and
Progress was helped by Freemasonic lodges that welcomed the idea of overthrowing
Abdul Hamid, an Islamist and nationalist sultan. 25 Denying to call Abdul Hamid as red
sultan (kızıl sultan) due to his despotic rule, Kısakürek came to defend the absolutist rule
of the sultan as something inevitable and needed. He actually recreated the image of Abdul
hamid who was denounced also by Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period as an
unIslamic despot. For instance, the sultan, contrary to the accusation of the violation of the
sharia, advocated himself to sharia and Nakshibendism.26 The Islamist argument that the
sultan’s absolutism was the foremost impediment to progress gave its place in Kısakürek’s
evaluations, to the claim that the sultan kept the unity of the empire through these centralist
and absolutist measures, even doing less of what he had to.27 By this portrayal of Abdul
                                                
24 Kısakürek, “Ahlak Sükutumuzun,” 5; also Tanrı. 230; “İslam nasıl Bozuldu?
Meşrutiyet Devrinde.” [How was Islam Corrupted in Constitutional Period?] BD. 3rd
year, vol. IV, number 83 (March 5, 1948): 2; Rapor 1/3 [The report 1/3] (İstanbul:
Büyük Doğu,1993, 2nd edition), 89. Kısakürek’s hostile feelings towards the Young
Turks was so intense that he visiualized the Salaniko as a place where all the minority
disorders, Jewish-Masonic plans and the imitative westernists were concentrated
against the Islamic and national Anatolia, see Ulu Hakan. 420, 449, 563.
25 Kısakürek, Ulu Hakan. 248, 440; Vahidüddin: Vatan Haini Değil Vatan Dostu
[Vahiduddin A Patroit not A Traitor] (İstanbul: Toker, 1968), 47; Tarih Boyunca. 522.
The incident of 31 Mart was a planned event by the Committee to get rid of the sultan
Ulu Hakan. 534-536. In Kısakürek’s positive evalaution of Abdul Hamid, there was an
aspect of his family. His grandfather, Mehmed Hilmi Efendi was a man of Abdul
Hamid (a chief of the court of appeal) and opposer to the Union and Progress see Kafa
Kağıdı [Identity Card] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1984), 63.
26 Kısakürek, Ulu Hakan. 326. Abdul hamid burnt the books that were deemed as
harmful by the men of religion and science not the Islamic books, see ibid, 196-197.
27 Kısakürek, Ulu hakan. 378-379. Kısakürek cticized the sultan on some points that he
did not use the force of the state, for example, against the Hareket Army in 1909, pp.
198-199; 472. His censorship, secret agency were the correct measures to protect the
national body from disasters, pp. 182, 193-4
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Hamid, apart from being totaly different than the Islamists of the second constitutional
period, he accused them of seeing “the false freedom of the Union and Progress as a
service to sharia,” and Meşrutiyet as the constitutional regime based on sharia.
Additionally, they were also on the wrong side when they called the absolutist measures as
despotism (istibdat) and injustice (zulüm).28
To Kısakürek, during the thirty-three years of his reign, except for the Greco-Turkish war
of 1887, Abdulhamid II did his very best to avoid wars of any importance. He was the only
Ottoman Emperor who had a definite internal and external policy. He postponed the
further dissolution of the empire by playing European rivalries off against each other and
thus consequently preventing any major European power from attaining too much
influence on the empire. Apart from his Islamist policies, he was a nationalist sultan, who
concealed his nationalist tendency because of the fear that it might produce divisions in the
empire, but of course his nationalism was Islam based.29
Prompted by the desire to portray an alternative modernizer/hero to Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk30, Kısakürek made the personification of Abdul hamid as the nationalist and
                                                
28 Kısakürek made these criticism about the Old Said Nursi see Son Devrin Din
Mazlumları [Oppressed Ulema of the Last Period] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1979, 6th
edition), 198-200. But his view about other Islamists of the second constitutional
period who collobrated with the Kemalist regime like M. Şemsettin Günaltay, M. Ali
Ayni, Şerafettin Yaltkaya was more severe than the above evaluation. They were on
the same track with the RPP in the hostility towards Islam.
29 Abdul Hamid gave a special importance to Anatolia, Ulu Hakan. 339.
30 In fact, Kısakürek’s opposition to the ideological foundations of the Republic firstly
centered around the themes of the near Turkish history. The image of Abdul Hamid
was the most important part of his counter writing about the official history, from 1943
to 1971 and even to his death. His first prison experience was connected to this effort.
In the exposition of his ideal, Kısakürek determined two historical personalities as two
different and hostile poles. To concretize an understanding of history, Abdul Hamid
was chosen as the positive and friendly personality to Kısakürek’s ideal whereas he
could not find the chance to write a book on the major enemy to his ideal. It was not
clear who was it, but to the speculative view of anyone, he must be either Mustafa
Kemal or İsmet İnönü, see Ulu Hakan. 9-10.
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Islamist sultan though he was not a kind of the savor whom the Turkish society had been
expecting. In the face of the Republic’s modernization claim, he depicted Abdul Hamid as
a succesful modernizer31 who brought the seeds of material civilization into the country,
such as train, technical shools, industry and so on. The dignified and genuine
understanding of civilization found its first expression in the statesmanship of Abdul
hamid who “derived the spirit of this understanding from the East and its reason from the
West by appropriating it into the national roots.”32 Kısakürek’s personified conception of
history reminds us the similar themes in the Kemalist understanding of history which had
been made by heroes through the struggle between good and evil people or true heroes and
false heroes. Indeed, Kısakürek’s presentation of İsmet İnönü as a “false hero” who
destroyed the very bases of the Turkish society was the manifestation of the same state of
mind. Put it differently, it may be correct to argue that the Turkish intellectual mind was
dominated by such conceptualization of history in general, in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.
5.3 The Republic: Its Last Stage of the Decline
In his several books and articles, he took every opportunity to discredit the westernization
movement which started with the imitation of Tanzimat reforms and culminated in the
Republican reforms, furthering the process of imitation and undermining the essence of the
Turkish nation. Kısakürek’s perception of the Turkish revolution as such was in
contradistinction to, for example, a member of the Kemalist intelligentsia; Mahmud Esat
                                                
31 In one occasion, he stated that in order to progress Turkey in a real sense, it had to be
returned to the age of Abdul Hamid where a balance of material and spirit was
established; Rapor 7/9. 40-41.
32 Kısakürek, Ulu Hakan. 255; Vahidüddin. 29; Son Devrin. 12; Rapor 10/13. 70. Abdul
hamid’s politics conformed to the main ideals of the Great East: spiritualist, self-
esteem, qualitative, nationalist, moralist, order oriented, see Ulu Hakan. 294.
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Bozkurt’s statements in this respect.33 Although he paid some merit to the “material”
achievements of the National Struggle, Kısakürek actually saw a continuity between the
earlier periods of reforms in the Empire and the Turkish revolution. All the periods of
reform including the last republican one constituted a line of decline for the history of
Turks in the eyes of Kısakürek.
A major area where the damages and falsities to be found in Kemalist modernization, to
Kısakürek, appeared in sharp focus was in the writing of Turkish historiography about
Tanzimat, Meşrutiyet and especially the National Struggle. By discussing critically the
different aspects of the War of Independence in the various issues of Büyük Doğu, ranging
from Sultan Vahdettin’s impeachment to the victory of Lausanne and to the property of
Mustafa Kemal, he, in a sense, tried to rewrite the Turkish historiography which has been
formed by Atatürk’s famous Speech (Nutuk). Kısakürek’s early treatment of the Republic
was soft to the level that he confined his criticism of the revolution (after stating that he, as
every Turkish intellectual, was a follower of the Republican revolution and the National
Independence) to the following statement in 1943: the Kemalist revolution could not bring
a sense of morality (ahlak telakkisi).34 But four years later, he rejected the basic claim of
the Kemalist ideology by his statement that the Turkish nation was not born with the
foundation of the Republic, in these words: “ the history is not what you teach, the world is
not what you show us, the past is not as you denounce, the future is not as you expect.. and
the life is not as you live. The history of this nation did not start in 1923. It was not you
                                                
33 M. Esat Bozkurt found similarities between the prophet’s work and the French and
Russian revolutions see İlk İnkilap. p. 55. False heores of Kısakürek, Mustafa Reşit
Paşa, and Midhat Paşa were true heroes of East Bozkurt.
34 Kısakürek, “Ahlakımız 1.” [Our Morality 1] BD. 1st year, vol. 1, number 13
(December 10, 1943): 2.
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who created us from nonexistence.”35 In presenting a critique of the revolution, Kısakürek
seemed to be influenced from both the ideas of the internal opposition such as members of
the Second Group (Hüseyin Avni Ulaş, the leading deputy of the second group) and the
views of the outside opposition such as Mustafa Sabri Efendi’s and Arif Oruç’s writings in
the journal of Yarın, published in Greece. Arif Oruç described the Kemalist regime and
Atatürk’s way of conducting politics as dictatorship and personal despotism in the name of
national sovereignty.36 This description was used later by Kısakürek to denounce the RPP
and İsmet İnönü though he himself criticized the notion of national sovereignty. The
Islamist stand who opposed to the separation of sultanate and caliphate and later to the
abolition of the caliphate such as Hoca Şükrü’s (Çelikalay) views, a deputy in the first
Grand national Assembly has to be added to this list.37
Kısakürek, with his aim to rewrite the Turkish historiagraphy, denied the Kemalist claim
of Vahidüddin’s co-operation with the Greek and Allied Armies, during the War of
Independence. Let alone Vahidüddin’s patriotism against the claims of treachery, he was
the one who send Mustafa Kemal into Anatolia, financing him with his own personal
budget in order to save the country. The idea of initiating the National Struggle originally
                                                
35 He wrote these sentences at the anniversary of the Republic’s foundation, see “Artık
Bu kadar Yeter.” [It is Fair Enough] BD. 5th year, number 3 (October 28, 1949): 2 also
in Çerçeve 2, 145-146 see also “Asıl Hikaye.” [Real Story] (November 30, 1978) in
Çerçeve 5 [Framework 5] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu,1998), 295-296.
36 Arif Oruç strongly questioned the democratic nature of the Kemalist regime, preferring
more the Anglo-saxon type of democracy, see, “Hakimiyet-i Milliye Davası.” [Issue of
National Sovereignty] BD. 6th year, number 41 (December 29, 1950): 14-15 and “Sen
ey Milli hakimiyet Hangi Ellere Düştün?” [You O, National Sovereignty in which
hands are you?] BD. 6th year,number 40 (December 22, 1950): 7, 11.
37 Şükrü (Çelikalay) was one of the nine members in the general administrative
committee of Great East Society (Büyük Doğu cemiyeti) under the chairmanship of
Kısakürek see BD. 6th year, number 32 (October 27, 1950): 13.
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belonged to the sultan Vahiduddin not to Mustafa Kemal who wanted to become a
minister of War in the post-Union cabinet after the treaty of Mondros.38
At the treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish delegation by the intrigues of Hayim Naum, a Jew,
was forced to make the concession of abolishing the caliphate (Islamic nature of the
Turkish state) in return for the Western acceptence of the new state. As a result, the
“victory” of the Independence by Mustafa Kemal and his friends was not a real victory and
was something given by the West at the expense of the nation’s vital roots: eliminating the
Islamic nature of Turkish state and society and replacing it with the principle of laicite
(laiklik).39 Kısakürek’s retrospective glance at the Republican political history of the
formative years, included, among many aspects, an evaluation of some Islamist and Sufi
personalities who were executed or put in trial by the Republican regimes: Şeyh Said,
İskilipli Atıf Hoca, Şeyh Erbilli Esad Efendi, Said Nursi, Süleyman Efendi, Esseyyid
Abdülhakim Arvasi. The most famous event of Şeyh Said, in Kısakürek’s eyes, gave the
opportunity to the Kemalist regime to destroy the religious personalities and orders such as
nakshibendism through the foundation of the Independence tribunals. After the dissolution
                                                
38 This idea firstly appeared in Arif Oruç’s article and later expressed by Kısakürek as
well; see taken from Yarın, Arif Oruç, “Birinci Cumhurreisi Meselesi Halledilmeden
Bu Memlekette hiçbir Dava Konuşulamaz.” [There is no possibility of speaking
something in this country without solving the issue of the First President] BD, 6th year,
number 36 (November 24, 1950): 11; and see also for Kısakürek’s ideas in this respect,
Dedektif X Bir, “Nasıl başlayıp Nasıl Bitirdiler?” [How Did They Start and How did
They Complete?] BD. 6th year, number 33, (November 3, 1950): 3, 16; Vahidüddin.
138-140, 155, 164, 185. Vahidüddin’s dispatch of troops, called as the army of the
caliphate against the National Struggle, together with discrediting the struggle as
contrary to religion were the crucial points that Kısakürek seemed to neglect in his
claims.
39 Dedektif X Bir, BD. 5th year, number 3 (October 28, 1949): 3, 16; “Lozan
Antlaşmasının İçyüzünü Buyurun.” [Look At the Hiddenside of the Lausanne Treaty]
BD. number 22 (July 31, 1959): 8-9; “Lozan Zaferinin İçyüzü.” [Hiddenside of the
Lausanne Victory] BD. number 24, (August 14, 1959): 8-9; Be. De. “Hadiselerin
Muhasebesi.” [Evaluation of Incidents] BD. 6th year, number 39 (October 15, 1950): 8-
9; Çerçeve 4 [Framework 4] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1996), 264.
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of sharia institutions, this order with its strong advocation to sharia was seen dangerous to
the regime in spite of the abolition of dervish lodges.40
According to Kısakürek, those who confined the pride of the National Struggle to
themselves were a party which showed an unprecedented westernism since the
Tanzimat.41 Seen in his views of Abdul hamid too, Kısakürek had an inclination to
evaluate the experience of Turkish modernization through the deeds and ideas of
statesmen and intellectuals. As expectedly, he had very harsh arguments about the leaders
(Atatürk and his friends) of the westernist movement in the republic and their laicist
reforms: “the first two presidents’ policies damaged the roots within the country and
enslaved the nation outside by the claim of being a member of the western family.” The
West, thus in a sense, colonized Turkey through the Kemalist reforms, without sending an
army.42 But perhaps at the very beginning because of Atatürk’s high position as saviour of
the country and later due to the legal and ideological impossibility of criticizing Atatürk
publicly, he chose the way of directing his hostility towards the RPP and İsmet İnönü. His
severe critique of the RPP and the Kemalist regime did not include the evaluation of
Atatürk as if the new Republic was not basically a product of Atatürk’s ideas and reforms,
but rather a product of İsmet İnönü. Despite his (possible) positive attitude towards Atatürk
and his good relations with the Kemalist intelligentsia like Hasan Ali Yücel and Falih Rıfkı
Atay at the end of 1920s and the 1930s,43 he voiced his critical assessment about the
                                                
40 Kısakürek, Son Devrin. 55-57, 87, 132-133. The incident of Menemen too was a plan
of the regime to eradicate the religous personalities ibid., 133.
41 Kısakürek, Rapor 4/6. 298-299.
42 Kısakürek, “Politika-Tarihimiz boyunca- (3).” BD. 9th year, number 102 (August 27,
1952): 1; also in Başmakalelerim1. 206.
43 Even in 1937, before the death of Atatürk who was uncomfortable with the Islamic
nature of the Turkish National Anthem (İstiklal Marşı) written by Mehmet Akif Ersoy,
Kısakürek was encouraged to write a poetry as the Turkish national anthem by Falih
Rıfkı Atay who beared the duty of presenting this poet to Atatürk.. Kısakürek wrote the
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personality of Atatürk in the relatively liberal era of the transition to the muliparty politics
from 1946 to the very early 1950s till the promulgation of Law on the protection of
Atatürk (Atatürk’ü koruma kanunu) by Adnan Menderes.
In one of few articles about Atatürk, Kısakürek presented him as the enemy of Islam and
of the prophet. By making references to the Speech, he came to decide that Atatürk was an
ardent materialist, going beyond Marx and Lenin and he was an atheist (Allahsız) who did
a lot of things in his fifteenth-year performances to eliminate Islam.44 Atatürk, in addition
to his many policies against Islam and the Turkish nation, was also the first leader of the
communist movement in Turkey due to the fact that the Turkish communist party was
established upon his order.45 After a short period of criticizing Atatürk directly, Kısakürek
preferred to confine his criticism to Ataturkism, the RPP and the Republic by separating
Atatürk’s personality from his main target. Ataturkism of the RPP was an attempt of
                                                                                                                                         
poetry of Büyük Doğu (Great East), the name of his ideology as well, for this project,
but the death of Atatürk came before the presentation see Kısakürek, “Büyük Doğu.”
[Great East] BD. 1st year, vol. 1, number 4 (September 8, 1943): 12. The early writings
of Kısakürek implied positive considerations regarding Atatürk’s role as a savor of the
Turkish nation: “Atatürk with his superior features of salvation will revive within the
soul of the Turkish nation” see Kısakürek, “Atatürk Dirilecektir.” [Atatürk Will
Revive] BD. number 10 (November 19, 1943): 2.
44 In 1947, in the trial of denouncing the regime and Turkishness (Rejimi kötüleme ve
Türklüğe hakaret), Kısakürek was sentenced to prison because of his articles against
Atatürk, see Dedektif X Bir, “Allahsız.” [Atheist] BD. 6th year, number 40 (December
22, 1950): 6, 11 see also Dedektif X Bir, “Hakikat için Hakikat.” [Truth for the Truth]
BD. 6th year, number 25 (September 8, 1950): 3, 10, “Müzakere Usulü.” [Method of
Negotiation] BD. 6th year, number 36 (November 24, 1950): 10 and “Millet partisi ve
Tezadı.” [The Nation Party and Its Contradictions] BD. 7th year, number 42 (January 5,
1951): 3, 12. But later, due to the above mentioned reasons, he dropped speaking and
writing about Atatürk and even he denied İsmet İnönü’s claim that Kısakürek called
Atatürk as a false hero see Kısakürek, “Kolpo.” [Opportunity] BD. number 4 (March
22, 1959): 1 also in Başmakalelerim 2. 175-177.
45 Dedektif X Bir, “İlk.” [The First] BD. 6th year, number 24 (September 1, 1950): 3, 7.
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creating an idol that legitimized this party’s unislamic policies and that did not allow any
change in the direction of the regime.46
The Republican period of the Turkish modernization, despite of its radical and brave
attempts of reform, had not changed the westernist tradition of imitation and had not
brought a new morality and an ideology which were in accordance with the spirit of the
Independence Struggle, Kısakürek wrote. But rather it completed the project of separating
Turk from Islam and participating in the western family. That meant saving Turk in
material sense but destroying him in spiritual sense.47 The spiritual and intellectual crisis or
void that the Republican revolutions created in “the minds and spirits of the Turkish people
was deeper than the decadence of Sodom Gomore and Rome.”48 In his analysis of what
the Republic brought, he enumerates four basic points as follows: republic as a form of
government, as an ideal of reaching at the level of the modern civilization, as a revolution
and democracy. Republic as a type of government could not be an ideal but a simple
framework that every thing was tied to its contents and meaning. Although Kısakürek
considered the goal of reaching at the level of modern civilization as sound, he saw its
Kemalist version as a mere imitation. Revolutions, far way from taking root in the Turkish
spirit, could not fill the void that emerged by the destruction of old values and institutions.
                                                
46 Kısakürek, “Bunlar Ne İstiyorlar?” [What Do They want] BD. 9th year, number 38
(June 22, 1952): 1 also in Başmakalelerim1. 77-78; Rapor 4/6 [The Report 4/6]
(İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1993, 2nd ed.), 298-299.
47 Kısakürek, “Teşhis.” [Diagnosis] BD. 1st year, vol. I, number 9 (November 12, 1943):
2; “Ve Tarihçe.” [And Short History] BD. 1st year, vol II, number 30 (May 24, 1946):
11, also in Tanrı. 63-64, “İslam Nasıl Bozuldu? Son Devirde.” [How was Islam
Corrupted in the Last period?] BD. number 84 (March 12, 1948): 2 ; Doğru. 146;
Tanrı. 266; Benim. 65.
48 Adını Vermeyen Profesör, “Türkiyenin Manzarası.” [Turkey’s Panaroma] BD. 12th
period, number 2 (September 29, 1965): 2; also Kısakürek, Türkiyenin Manzarası
(İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1985, 2nd edition), 10-11; Tanrı. 55, 198. For examples of his
poetry that criticized the republican revolution see “Muhasebe.” in Çile. 402-404;
“Destan.” in Çile. 406-407; “Aman.” in Çile. 426-428.
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Lastly, democracy, in the Turkish experience, took “a form of uncontrolled freedom which
was more disastrous than bloody despotic rules.”49
The Kemalist goal of the civilizational conversion from the East to the West meant
“changing a society’s center of mind and spirit and its focus of culture and civilization”
and it had resulted in the search for a new essence for Turks and thus had produced a crisis
of personality and identity.50 The republican revolutions, as rootless revolutions, resembled
to the “spurious fruits of the Tree of Christmas” (Nobel Ağacının yemişleri) which did not
grow up from the roots.51 Looked at from this perspective, the six principles of the
Republican regime seemed to him as full of foreign and cosmopolitan influences: “ the six
arrows of the People’s Republican Party resembles to the six fingers that hit the head of the
nation. The republican finger was an instrument of the Pharaoh’s despotism while the
nationalist finger was of the imitation of the West. The statist finger was an instrument of a
group’s sovereignty while the revolutionist finger was of corruption’s conservatism.”52
Following the same line of thinking, the secularizing reforms of the Kemalism, ranging
from laicism to the alphabet, hat, civil law reforms were also regarded as the acts of
eliminating Islam from the Turkish roots and of deterioriating the individual’s spirit and
the society’s culture. To give an example, the language and alphabet reform, for
Kısakürek, constituted one of the major failures which could not open the way towards the
                                                
49 Adını Vermeyen Profesör, “İdeal.” [Ideal] BD. 15th period, number 16 (April 21,
1971): 3; also in Türkiyenin. 33-34; see also “Bekliyoruz.” [We are waiting] BD.
number 9 (July 2, 1954): 2; Rapor 1/3 [The Report] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1993, 2nd
ed.), 90.
50 Kısakürek, “Abdülhak Hamid ve Dolayısiyle.” [On Abdulhak Hamid] (1938) in
Hitabeler. 65; Tanrı. 266; “Ayasofya.” [Hagia Sophia] BD. number 6 (April10, 1959):
1 also in Başmakalelerim 2. 183.
51 Kısakürek, “İnkilap Dedikleri.” [The So Called Revolution] BD. 9th year, number 31
(June 15, 1952): 1; also in Başmakalelerim 1. 63; İdeolocya 5th edition. 83.
52 Kısakürek, “Altıparmak.” [Six Fingers] BD. 6th year, number 16 (January 27, 1950): 2;
also in Çerçeve 2. 157.
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Latin and Greek culture while disrupting the connection with the basic (Islamic-Turkish)
culture and creating a further decline of national spirit.53 Kısakürek’s declaration of the
failure on the part of the secular reforms made it certain that he could not actually see any
positive reform in the Kemalist project of modernization.54 Even, the Republican
“revolution” was not successful in bringing up its cadre to formulate an intellectual and
ideological framework for the reforms. The Kemalist intelligentsia centered around the
RPP was a cadre which did not have any idea but just their self interests and their
institutions of educating people such as Köy Enstitüleri (village enstitutes) and Halkevleri
(people’s houses) functioned as the places in which the Anatolian youth were taken away
from the Turkish values and in which the youth’s minds were filled by atheism,
communism, materialism and non nationality (milliyetsizlik).55
                                                
53 Kısakürek, Babıali. 147.
54 See Kısakürek, “Artık Bu Komedya Yeter.” [Enough! This Comedy] BD. 1st year, vol.
II, number 41(August 9, 1946): 2; also in Çerçeve 2. 84-85; “24 Maddede 24 Yıl.” [24
Years in 24 Points] BD. 2nd year, vol. III, number 70 (October 31, 1947): 2; also in
Çerçeve 2. 105-107.
55 Dedektif X Bir, “Köy Enstitüleri.” [Village Institutes] BD. (5th year, number 5 (April 8,
1949): 1, 4; “Bugünün Aktüalitesi Dünkü Köy Enstitüleri.” [Today’s Actuality:
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vol. II, number 28 (September 11, 1959): 8-9; Kısakürek, “Kadro.” [Cadre] (October
20, 1977) in Çerçeve 4. 140-141;“Köy Enstitüleri.” [Village Institutes] BD. (March 22,
1962) in Başmakalelerim 3 [My Editorials 3] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1995), 50-51;
Çepeçevre Sosyalizm Komünizm ve İnsanlık [Socialism, Communism and Humanity]
(İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1985, 2nd ed.), 108; Hesaplaşma. 138. The Republican regime
also prevented a counter-revolution against itself by exploiting the nation’s sense of
unity see Kısakürek, “İhtilali Nasıl Önlediler?” [How Did They Prevent Revolution?]
BD. 9th year, number 32 (June 16, 1952): 1; also in Başmakalelerim 1. 65-66.
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5.4 His Ideology: The Ideal of Great East (Büyük Doğu)
Necip Fazıl sought to create a new truly Islamic community and state through social
engineering. With the aim of proposing a “manifesto” (ideolocya örgüsü) for both the
Turks and the People of the East (read Islam), Kısakürek redesigned every aspect of life
through the idea of ‘true revolution’ (inkilab) from the organization of state to the creation
of a “new generations” (yepyeni nesiller yaratmak). His ideological formulation might be
considered as the first case of “repoliticization of Islam” which called for the foundation of
an Islamic state, though indirectly, in the republican Turkey. His Islamist reading of the
concepts of west and east culminated in the creation of a new entity of civilization and
identity, named as Büyük Doğu, as well. Islam was rediscovered by Kısakürek as a major
marker of identity and as a major source of a political ideology. Since its persistent seek
for an ideology, this rediscovery of Islam and the ensuing criticism of Kemalism were
formulated in modern/western modes. Everything that Turkey had, ranging from east,
west, spirit, material, yesterday, today, tomorrow, religion, language, history and politics
had to be rediscovered in the light of Islam.56 The mission of constructing a new
worldview and an understanding of societal system belonged to the great artisan/thinker
(büyük sanatkar) and as a covetious (muhteris) artisan, he took the Great East on his
shoulders.57 That was to bring an evaluation of Turkey and the world that any Turkish
intellectual, including Mehmet Akif, could not achieve.58 Certainly, this radical state of
                                                
56 Kısakürek, “Yeniden Keşfolunmak.” [to be Rediscovered] BD. 1st year, vol. I, number
13 (January 25, 1946): 2; also in Çerçeve 1. 46. Kısakürek’s over emphasis on religion
led Elisabeth Özdalga to see Kısakürek as an example of Mircea Elida’s homo
religiosus, who had areligous belief that made meaningful all being see “Tasavvuf
Bahçelerinde Dolaşan Bir Milli Kahraman: Necip Fazıl Kısakürek,” [A National Hero
Walking in the Gardens of Sufism] in Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik, [Republic,
Democracy and Identity] Nuri Bilgin (ed.) (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1997), 191.
57 In 1941, Kısakürek, Konuşmalar. 43.
58 Kısakürek, Hitabeler, 127.
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mind was contrary to the incrementalist and evolutionist attitude of Islamists in the Second
Constitutional Period.
The names of his ideology, journal and party, Büyük Doğu, interestingly were the title of
his poet, written as a national anthem in 1937 to be presented to Atatürk. The Great East as
a totalistic belief and view connoted to the reemergence of the East. The concept of the
East was not connected to any geography and race considerations outside the boundaries
of the fatherland of Turkey. The significance of the Turkish fatherland in his early
formulations of the Great East, was apparent by placing the map of Turkey within the
motto of his journal of Büyük Doğu. Despite the fact that Kısakürek’s early ideological
formulations contained territorial features, whether in the form of Anadoluculuk or in the
form of Great East59, he later presented the central theme of its ideology; Great East as an
abstraction: “we are seeking for the Great East within the boundaries of today’s and
tomorrow’s fatherland at a plan of spirit and quality. It wishes to realize itself not at the
level of place or space but at the level of time.”60
A symphony which stemmed from the spiritual roots of the East and which fostered the
tree of western “material achievements” was playing to spring up the ideal of Great East
from within the East. The symphony and worldview of the Great East was consisted of the
true and pure Islamic spirit which embraced both the eastern and western worlds, together
with their pasts, todays, tomorrows, truths and experiences. Inspired much from the
distinction between the spiritual and material, he connected this distinction to another
dichotomy of West-East. In this sense, the Great East had been the synthesis of the East
                                                
59 In the 1940s, the Great East was depicted as an emergence within the boundaries of
Turkish fatherland with the national cadres see Kısakürek, “Büyük Doğu’ya Doğru.”
[Towards Great East] BD. 1st year, vol. I, number 1 (September 17, 1943): 2.
60 Kısakürek, “Büyük Doğu.” [Great East] BD. number 2 (March 13, 1959): 2; Büyük
Doğuya Doğru, 1.
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who neglected the material of the West who had not cared what was spiritual.61 The
Islamist content of this ideology had been expressed in many times by Kısakürek also as
follows: “the Great East is the adjutant of Islam (İslamın emir subaylığı). The Great East is
neither a new religious sect nor a new gate of ijtihad. It is only the gate of opening the way
for Islam within the absolute and unbargaining framework that expressed by the term of
Sunni (Sünnet ve Cemaat Ehli).. the affair of applying an authenticity that has been lost for
a long time, to the things and events in the treshold of the twenty-first century.”62
Since the place where the Great East would flourish was seen as Turkey, he took the issue
of the Turkish modernization as the major problematic of his ideology in reaching the
synthesis of the East-West. Therefore, his intellectual zeal was concentrated on the
establishment of an ideological framework in which the spiritual and material life of Turk
would be reinstituted by evaluating, at the level of universe, the false revolutions since the
Tanzimat.63 The implication of Kısakürek’s critique for the imitative nature of the Turkish
modernization was not that learning from the West had to be totally left aside, but that
“selective appropriation” of the good aspects of the West was the appropriate way through
which to have a “Turkish culture” (irfan) or “culturalization” (kültürlenme). It is clear that
Kısakürek in this sense shared the Islamist idea of taking “good sides of the western
civilization”  while leaving its bad sides. Learning from the foreign sources, namely the
West could be regarded as a gate to the goal of creating the Turkish own culture or
culturalization. By mentioning the two dimensions of national and international (human)
aspects of culture (modernity), he spoke of putting the “essential roots” (öz kökler) in “an
                                                
61 Kısakürek, “Orkestra, Senfonya ve Biz.” [Orchestra, Symphony and Us] BD, number
22 (July 31, 1959): 2; Konuşmalar. 89-90.
62 Kısakürek, İdeolocya 5th edition. 10.
63 Kısakürek, “Büyük Doğu,” 2; Konuşmalar. 57.
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action of culturalization” (kültürlenme aksiyonu).64 That was indeed tantamount to the call
of modernization from within.
Kısakürek signified basically three sources for the issue of Turkish culturalization: 1) the
essential root from the foundation of the Ottoman empire to tanzimat; 2) the Eastern root
from Arabs to Persians, Indians and Chinese; 3) the western root, absorbing the good
aspects of the west; positive sciences and ideologies.65 Like Islamists of the second
constitutional period, by quoting the prophet’s tradition (stating that ‘Hikmet müminin
kaybolmuş malıdır, nerede bulursa alır’ ve ‘ilmi çinde bile olsa isteyiniz’) he called for the
appropriation of the “accepted efforts of progress” in order to establish a new (ideal) city of
Baghdad.66 To his mind, revolutions were against the nature of society and the rule, but at
the same time, every revolution had to base itself on the essential roots of their own culture
as the French revolution, the Bolshevik revolution, Fascism and Nazism did in their
countries. Unfortunately, the Turkish revolution, by the change of language and alphabet,
ruptured its link with the Turkish essential roots.67
                                                
64 Kısakürek, “Türk İrfanı.” [Turkish Culture] BD. 1st year, vol. I, number 14 (February
1, 1946): 11; also in Tanrı. 112-115; “Kültürlenme Davası(1).” [Issue of
Culturalization 1] (May 3, 1939) in Çerçeve 1. 107-108; “Kültürlenme Davası(2).”
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Davası(4).” [Issue of Culturalization 4] (May 6, 1939) in Çerçeve 1. 111-113;
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66 Kısakürek, Sahte. 56.
67 Kısakürek, “Kültürlenme Davası(3).” [Issue of Culturalization 3] (May 5, 1939) in
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number15 (February 8, 1946): 11; also in Tanrı. 119-121.
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Another goal of the Great East, though less emphasized, was the unification of the Islamic
world in two ways: 1) escalating the Islamic world in thought and material at a high level
that dominated the things and events; and 2) more specifically, establishing the great
Islamic shura (Büyük İslam Şurası) among Islamic nations in Medina.68 The enemies of
Great East were those people who were rootless, atheist, cosmopolitans and false
revolutionaries whereas its friends were all conservatives (mukaddesatçılar), nationalists,
true Turks and Anatolians.69
The Ideology of Great East was typically elitist. This elitist feature in Kısakürek’s political
ideas constituted a paralel positioning to the elitist political culture of Turkish elite and
intellectuals. As Frederick W. Frey wrote that “One of the central problems of Turkish
politics is and has long been the problem of elitism. By this term, I mean the tendency of a
small privileged sector to dominate society and consciously or uncounciously, to regard its
domination as legitimate and desirable because of the cultural or intellectual inadequacy it
attributes to nonelite elements.”70 One may argue that Kısakürek, through his elitism and
his insistence on the necessity of having a totalistic social program to be implemented in
the recreation of the society and individual was typical of the Republican elite. Put it
differently, an obvious manifestation of the Jacobin element in Kısakürek’s ideology was
his insistence on presenting a totalistic solution to Turkish Society’s ills.
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Another important element in Kısakürek’s ideological makeup was its salvationist and
personalistic inclination. As discussed in the following sections, the decline of the Muslim
world and the Ottoman empire was analyzed in terms of ideas and thoughts but not in
terms of the socio-economic parameters. The idea of salvation whether in the form of
expecting a heroic statesmen /political party or in the form of creating a new ideology/true
revolution was also linked to the evaluation of Turkish modernization process from this
perspective. The Turkish nation had been expecting a savor since the sultan Suleyman the
Magnificient. This savor would give an end to the imitation of the West by comprehending
the internal crisis of the West and the weaknesses of the East. Salvation entailed the
rejection of all western imported political ideologies such as democracy, capitalism and
communism and the acceptance of Islam as the ideology which had what the other
ideologies tried to have.71 Certainly his expectation of a super man/hero (üstün
insan/kahraman) who went beyond his society, but who shaped his society was closely
related to the institution of the prophethood and to the Islamic tradition of renewal (tecdid).
The absolute heroes were prophets whereas the relative heroes were the ones who changed
the human history by establishing new ideologies.72 It has to be added that this heroism
also reminds us the republican exaltation of Atatürk as the savor of the Turkish nation.73
What Muslim countries and Turkey lacked and needed for centuries was precisely the
emergence of a hero who would put an end to the decline and who would bring the
greatness once achieved in the glorious days of the golden age. And what the Islamic
world and the Eastern world in general had been expecting was the emergence of a
                                                
71 Kısakürek, “Beklenen Kurtarıcı.” [Expected Saviour] BD. 22nd year, 12th period,
number 3 (October 6, 1965): 1; Hitabeler. 178-180; Türkiyenin. 175-176. The
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245
thinker/intellectual who combined idea with action.74 From a civilizational perspective, he
worded his claim that all those who aspire for civilization were in the crisis in the second
half of the twentieth century and all the humanity was waiting for a savor. The absolute
savor who represented the real civilization was certainly Islam, bringing the cure to the
humanity.75 The expectation of a savor was also expressed in terms of a modern
construction, a revolution. The world was waiting for a revolution, recognizing that all
human institutions and ideologies failed with the exception of Islam. This “revolution”
would rescue humanity from the domination of machine by finding the lost spiritual
essence and would be realized in the three circles: the external circle (world), Islamic
world within the external circle and the center (Turkey), under the leadership of Turkey.76
It is obvious that this expectation of a hero/intellectual and revolution was a new element
which could not be found in the political ideas of the Islamists in the Second Constitutional
Period.
For Kısakürek, the art, including poetry was a tool in the exposition of the truth as well as
an important element in the discovery of this truth. In his poetica, Kısakürek made it clear
that art/poetry was the search of the absolute truth, God through the way of beauty and
secrecy, for the sake of society, not for art. By the claim that there could not be anything
without religion, he stated that all sections of art were inspired from the senses of beyond,
death, love and pain which belonged to religion. State had ben under the duty of
institutionalizing art and poetry by supporting the artist and poet unless he/she injured the
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ideological bases of the state.77 It is to be noted that as Kısakürek moves from his
nonpolitical, art-engaged position to the problems of the republican regime he is more and
more inclined to be concerned with the daily politics and to lay the blame for the further
decadence of Turkish nation on the republican reforms and the RPP’s role in this respect.
For this purpose, Kısakürek did not hesitate to deal with many subjects ranging from
politics, economics, art to religion, without having specialized knowledge about some of
them.
Similar to the Kemalist positivist faith in the power of education in the creation of a new
society and individual, but certainly partly inspired by the classical Islamic sources’
emphasis on the importance of education for the perfection of man, Kısakürek considered
the education as the main vehicle to the realization of the true revolution: “ what is to be
done is the emergence of a great movement of thought (fikir hareketi) that would live the
essence of the revolution not its word... This could be done by a movement at a level of
state by the imposition of National Education [ministry].”78
Like the Kemalist elite and even the Islamists of the second constitutional period,
Kısakürek with his tendency towards centralization and order, did not adhere to the liberal
ideas of Prince Sabahattin (1877-1948), a supporter of individual initiative and
decentralisation. He also propogated the view that the downward trend of Islamic history
was about to end and that it would return to its original condition by means of the
realization of the Great East ideology. The fact that the distinction between West and East
was perceived in absolute terms and that this became the primary preoccupation of the
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Great East, promoted the aspiration for the leadership of the Eastern civilization. As a
characteristics of the Turkish modernization, Kısakürek, like the sultan Mahmud II and
Atatürk, entrusted his ideal of the Great East to the youth. Again as a reaction to Atatürk’s
speech to the Turkish youth, he wrote an alternative speech to the youth.
In sum, Islamist ideology of the Great East had the following characteristics: 1) an account
of the universe 2) considering this world and the other one 3) framing the absolute and true
pole (Islam); embracing the spirit of construction and destruction that western ideologies
could not reach at, 4) putting the material in the service of the spirit, 5) classifying the
Turkish history into five periods as the rise (vecd ve aşk), return and stagnation, decline,
lost of identity in the Tanzimat, eradication of spiritual roots in the Republic, 6) showing
the true and false heroes, 7) glorifying the notion of revolution, 8) understanding
nationalism in the spritual sense, 9) accepting freedom as being voluntary slaveness to the
truth and defining democracy as a facit circle which allowed all wrongs in order not to be a
victom of a wrong, 10) situating justice in accordance with the measues of God, 11)
searching for the new, right, good and beautiful in every breath.79
Kısakürek wanted to arrive at a formulation which would do justice to the urgent need of
having a comprehensive ideology in the modern age in order to provide a map of
meanings for religiously oriented people and also to the realization of Islamic ideals in
Turkey. In his early literature based writings, which were of a Bergsonian and spiritualist
nature, he considered Büyük Doğu (or nationalism) in the context of Anadoluculuk
(Anatolism), a kind of Turkish nationalism around the concrete territory of Anatolia rather
than the abstract idea of Turan. But in the course of the time, his ideology became
crystillazed around Islamic discourses. His later political and ideological writings exposed
                                                                                                                                         
78 Kısakürek, in 1981, Konuşmalar. 229.
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more openly his Islamist solutions as directly inspired by the strong influence of a
Nakshabendi shaikh, Abdül Hakim Arvasi. His nakshabendism based ideology was
contrasted with Westernism in general and Kemalism in particular and was proposed as
the way of a salvation for humanity, Muslims and especially for Turks.
Kısakürek’s attempt in carving out an ideological space for Islam among the contemporary
ideologies was not a new endeavor but a new version. The Young Ottomans ideologized
Islam to direct the political mind and to mobilize masses in the path of progress and
constitutionalism whereas Kısakürek derived an ideology from Islam to provide the
Muslims with “a map of action” to understand and to explain the modern world.
Kısakürek’s ideological web (ideolocya örgüsü) did not only entail the political questions
of a Muslim individual, but also his social relations and his “everday.” The term “day” that
Mardin adopted from Michel de Certeau is one which might manifest the
comprehensiveness of Kısakürek’s ideology in presenting “a map” to Turkish individual
and society. “The web of every day which creates the material of people’s lives, and
creates every day, are the hundreds of particles of place, behaviour, conduct, aeshetics, and
morality.”80 Like Ghazzali, Kısakürek, by drawing basically on sufism and other schools
of Islamic tradition (fıkh, hadis and siyer), tries to formulate a map for Muslims’ “rules of
social behaviour” and daily life, especially in his book, İman ve İslam Atlası which was a
modern form of İlmihal (a book of religious and social rules). Although it is correct to say
that Kısakürek was not only directed towards filling the void which Kemalism left in
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Militance, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and London: The
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 224.
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ethics and daily life, he, like other Islamists underlined this void in order to strengthen his
basic claim that Kemalism was neither a worldview nor an ideology. The role of religion
as a “soft ideology, the much more diffuse, unfocused and amourphous cognitive and
belief systems of mass publics”81 became concretized and became a kind of “hard
ideology” in Kısakürek’s formulation, determining every aspect of political, societal and
individual life.
5.5 The Anaysis of His Expected Islamic Revolution (İnkilab)
Kısakürek’s formulation of an ideology, of course, aspired for a revolution to realize its
implementation on state and society. Though the idea of revolution had been famous since
the July revolution of 1908, it gained its overarching significance in the minds of the
Turkish intellectuals within the context of Kemalism’s republicanism and the Bolshevik
revolution of 1917. Hence, one might say that the notions of ideology and revolution took
the place of progress which dominated the writings of all schools of thought in the second
constitutional period. Kısakürek’s attitude of finding everthing in Islam did not miss the
word of revolution. Accompanying the existence of the real form of revolution in Islam
was the rejection of the revolutions in the process of Turkish modernization such as
Tanzimat, Meşrutiyet and the Republic. The Turkish nation had been expecting “an
Islamic revolution” since the reign of Kanuni. The twentieth century would see the coming
of this revolution and actually the Great East could be regarded as the first voice of this
coming revolution in this century.82 After stating his intellectual responsibility of
delineating the ideological web of Islamic revolution, firstly he underlined the point that he
                                                
81 Şerif Mardin, “Religion as Ideology,” in Yavuz Abadan’a Armağan (Ankara: Ankara
Üniv. Siyasal Bilgiler Fak. Yay., 1969), 194.
82 Kısakürek, “Beklediğimiz,” 2. The expectation of an Islamic revolution in Turkey
continued its vitality in Kısakürek’s mind up to his death, for existence of this idea see
Rapor 4/6. 89.
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was not in a position of presenting and propagating an ideology against any regime
(implying the Kemalist regime). But rather he defined his goal as “a pure idealization and
ideologization of Islam” beyond any national and historical consideration, for the Islamic
world, including Turks, Arabs, Persians, Indians, and non-Muslims. Islam, in the
personality of each intellectual (münevver), had been under the duty of establishing its
ideology of revolution which was above space and time but for the application to the all
times and spaces. But despite of his rhetoric as such, it was certain that the target was
Kemalism.
Kısakürek classified revolutions into two: absolute revolutions like prophets’ revolution
(Islam); and relative and land based revolutions like Renaissance, the French Revolution
and the Communist revolution. That classification came to mean that there was only one
revolution: Islam which, by cihad-ı ekber (the great warfare i.e, the struggle in one’s own
heart to reduce it to meek submission to the divine ordinances) prepared human being
spiritually as well. In the search of an “ideal heaven”, human being was in a state of
revolution within himself and his own society.83 Kısakürek enumerated some
characteristics of a revolution as followed: a worldview which had an evaluation of world
and universe, science and art, leader and cadre, self-sacrifice,courage, morality of action
and ideal, order and discipline, technic and method.84 To Kısakürek, all revolutions were
based on a book or a written work like French and Bolshevik revolutions, implying the
significance of the Book, the Qur’an, in the expected Islamic revolution.85 Upon the
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the early Islamic practice as a form of revolution, see M. Esat Bozkurt, İlk İnkilap. 51-
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84 Kısakürek, İhtilal. 336-347
85 Ibid., 336.
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advancement in the weaponry, he state that there was no any more possibility of revolution
in the sense of people’s movement.86
He enumerated several groups in his discussion on the issue of a cadre of the revolution
who would build the web of Islamic revolution: reformists (röformacılar), those who
remained in the crust of sharia (ham yobaz ve kaba softa), false sufis (sahte sofiler ) and
true and deep Muslim (derin ve gerçek müslüman). The expected Islamic revolution could
only be made by the last group; the true Muslims.87
Revolution had to be considered as a means to reah a certain goal, not vice versa. Change
in the name of change was nonsense. Revolution was not a metamorphosis but an ideal of
establishing any idea’s society in the future.88 Closely tied to his understanding of Islam,
Kısakürek inevitably felt the necessity of determining a framework for a revolution.
Hence, if revolution was depicted as an endless search of truth around the unchanging and
absolute axis for rediscovering, rechanging and developing without staying at any stop,
this existed in Islam in its true form. The unchanging and absolute axis in the search of the
truth was Şeriat in Islam. Those things that were not deemed as forbidden by Şeriat were
free in Islam.89 The truths that the great French revolution and the following revolutions
(socialist movements, the communist revolution, fascism, Nazism, liberalism and
capitalism) tried to attain without a success found their expressions in Islam.
Revolutionism was to find/follow the way of the great prophet.90
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The subjection of Islam to modern ideologies in the form of Islamic socialism and
communism, Islamic fascism, Islamic liberalism or Islamic democracy could not be
thought. Islamic revolution, perceiving Islam as a totality was in a position of correcting all
wrongs and corruptions and of answering all the questions without losing any one’s right.
The ruling ideologies of liberalism, socialism and fascism would reach at their common
balance in Islam after they sacrified their names and bodies to Islam. They would see the
right of property for individual, the economic and social equalization and cooperation, and
the order of the truth in Islam in their perfect forms. Thus, Islamic revolution would mean
the synthesis of these ideologies’ thesis and anti-thesis.91
The expected Islamic revolution would not be an affair of static and piecmeal reform, but
rather an affair of dynamic and absolute change. The revolution would be realized in the
minds and spirits by means of expression (söz) and pen(kalem). The place for this
revolution was Turkey with her big cities and towns and its cadre was the conservative and
nationalist youth (mukaddesatçı ve milliyetçi gençlik).92 In addition to the internal
instruments which had to be matured in the spirit of individual, such as love, discipline,
aesthetic, dialectic, rhetoric and tactic, the external channels to reach at the expected
revolution were the following items: arts (especially, literature, theater, cinema),
publications (newspaper, journal, book), ways of persuasion (conference, sermon, talks),
cultural establishments (clups everywhere) and directing the Islamic capital.93
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Politics in the Islamic revolution was a way of concretizing the ideological composition
that its every point and line was completed. Internal politics of the Islamic revolution,
through the inclination of “enemy and friend” was dichotomized into two poles, the side of
enemy where the atheists, westernists, masons, cosmopolitans, ignorants and fanatics (ham
ve kaba softalar) came together and the friendly side which comprised of the new
generations who took the early practice of Islam as their example, nothing any more.94 The
external policy of the Islamic revolution contained two dimensions: a) taking the good
aspects of the West to create a new compositon from the East, though the west would no
allow such an emergence; b) feeding the revolution and salvation of the East against the
material and spiritual imperialism of the West but having still good relations until the
maturation of this emergence. Hence, this salvation might take a period of 50 or 100 or
300 years.95 At this point, Kısakürek’s conceptualization of Great East geographically
gave its framework: Asianism (Asyacılık); the Great Asia, including Africa but excluding
Europe, America and Australia as the opposite and enemy.96
His ideal formulation of the Islamic politics and society had been concerned with
explaining of what the Islamic revolution would do in political, social, economic and
cultural fields ranging from the question of state, politics to the place of women in the new
regime. The portrayal of the dimenisons of the expected Islamic revolution was so
totalistic that it included village, city, family, school, youth, positive sciences, arts, court of
law, health and beauty, army and reproduction.97
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By the emergence of a great personality who would save the Turkish society (not the
ordinary people), Kısakürek often stated that he did not mean an Islamic revolution similar
to the revolutions of idea (the French and communist ones), since the possibility of such a
revolution did not have any chance in the twentieth age. The emergence of a great
personality (hero/thinker) might come from an organized and actionary idea which would
penetrate into the Turkish people. By the will of people, thus, the Great East ideology
might take the power.98 But that does not mean that Kısakürek did not consider anti-
democratic measures as sound such as military intervention, in the realization of his ideal.
In one occasion, he put his mind into words in the following way: “ the folowers of an
ideal that has a true aim, has to be fascist as a method if it is needed. An ideal should be
evaluated by its essence (quality), not by its method.”99
5.5.1 Islamist Reproduction of the Kemalist Political Mind
An observation of Kısakürek’s involvement in daily politics and his relations with political
leaders might be useful in explaining how this revolution would take place within the
present parameters of Turkish polity. Being aware of the nonexistence of a great
personality who combined idea with action, he tried to convince political leaders either a
president/prime minister or a leader of an opposition party to implement his ideological
principles in the life of state. His call for this job actually included many famous politicians
and parties of the right in Turkish politics, from Celal Bayar in 1943 and Menderes (the
DP) in the 1950s to Süleyman Demirel in the 1960s and 1970s, and to Necmettin Erbakan
(the MSP) and Alparslan Türkeş (the MHP) in the 1970s. His hostile feelings towards the
RPP often determined his direction of support to these politicians as he severely ciriticized
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Erbakan for his decision of forming a coalition government with the RPP in spite of his
early support to the MSP. In this way, as seen in his advice to Fevzi Çakmak, the chief of
General Staff in the late 1930s and later to Adnan Menderes in the 1950s to close down the
Republican People’s Party, he perceived military solutions as appropriate in the true hands
in order to attain a particular goal, the ideal of the Great East.
In order to put the ideal of the Great East into action, he personally determined two ways:
publishing a newspaper and establishing a political party.100 His experience with a political
party was a short one though he continued to publish his journal/newspaper Büyük Doğu,
interruptedly from the early 1940s to the late 1970s. First in the form of an association
(cemiyet) in June 28, 1949 and two years later as a political party, Kısakürek established a
political organization in order to realize his ideal.101 The effort of manipulating the rightist
parties through his political support in the journal, in the way of the Great East constituted
the main line for his involvement in politics.
Kısakürek, as Kemalists did, believed that political power was the main instrument to carry
out a real revolution namely, an Islamic revolution which would save both the Islamic
world and the Turkish nation. On the one hand, for Kısakürek, just like the other so called
                                                
100 Kısakürek, “Mukaddesatçı Türk.” [Conservative Turk] BD. 7th year, number 58 (June
1, 1951): 2, 7, 16; “Sonsöz.” [Last Word] BD. 7th year, number 62 (June 29, 1951): 2,
16.
101 The program of the association and the party were a summary of Kısakürek’s ideology
see “Büyük Doğu Cemiyeti Ana Nizamnamesi.” [Great East Association and Its
Regulations] BD. 5th year, number 17 (July 1, 1949): 2-3. Among the members of the
General Administrative Committe of Büyük Doğu Association, there were some
Islamist personalities of the time; Şükrü Çelikalay, an Islamist deputy in the First
Grand National Assembly, Cevat Rifat Atilhan, and Abdürrahim Zapsu see BD. 6th
year, number 32 (October 27, 1950): 13. The effort of establishing a political party
with the aim of getting the power in the elections was not realized. see “Büyük Doğu
partisinin ana Nizamname projesi.” [A Project of the Great Est Party’s Programme] BD.
7th year, number 60 (June 15, 1951): 8-9, 16; and 7th year, number 61 (June 22, 1951): 14-16.
Later, he rejected to consider as a political organization but as a cultural association,
Konuşmalar. 60.
256
revolutions of the Turkish history, the Kemalist revolution could not be called as a
revolution simply because it did not contain the essential feature of a revolution: the
evaluation of universe and world.102 But on the other hand, he was not uncomfortable with
the further centralization and bureaucratization of the republican reforms by social
engineering (from top to bottom) but its further secularization policies irritated him. In the
same line of thinking, Kısakürek’s conceptualization of politics hardly comprised
participation of societal groups in the process of political decision making and
responsiveness to the demands of interest groups as such.
Kısakürek’s totalist and forceful Islamic revolution shared the Kemalist wish of reshaping
the state and society from all institutions to daily life through an intellectual/social
engineering.103 The Kemalist engineering was based on reason and knowledge whereas
Kısakürek’s formulation put the emphasis on Islam and sharia. The significance of
law/legal issues both in the Kemalist creation of a Turkish nation-state and Kısakürek’s
formulation of Islamic revolution might be connected to the nomocratic tradition of the
Ottoman state, which I have discussed in the first chapter. For both Kemalists and
Kısakürek, the vehicles of the revolution were the state, the law and the education, the new
society/nation was to be created through these vehicles.104
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5.6 Rejection of Religious Modernism and Reformism
In Kısakürek’s epistemological framework, a quest for knowledge was not a reaching at
the unknown but a discovery of the known, Islamic truths. The knowledge to be
discovered was not conceived of as changing but as given, certain and eternal by God.
This understanding of knowledge had clearly an aspect of Sufism. Since the truth
(hakikat), he wrote in several articles, had existed in Islam, the only thing required was to
discover (keşfetmek) it. Nevertheless, the discovered nature of knowledge in Kısakürek
included a conception of “knowledge for power,” which W. Montgomery Watt thought it
as peculiar to a western man for controlling nature, man and society.105
Kısakürek applied his conceptualization of knowledge to Islam as a religion: “we will
discover Islam as what it is, without sacrifying a point from Sharia.. but we don’t accept
Islam as we found [in the present].”106 That was to say that purification or renewal of
Islam as a discovery but not as an invention would be realized by an emergence of the
saviour (kurtarıcı) whom the Islamic world and even the whole world was expecting for
centuries. This actually constituted the expected revolution as well.107 Again, Islam was
perceived as an ideology for power in order to shape individual and society, added to its
control over the nature.
Not unexpectedly, this understanding of religion could not feel a smpathy towards the idea
of reform in Islam. According to Kısakürek, the word “reform” meant restructuring
something that had lost its form, by adding some parts to its body. This meant the
destruction of its essence. The renewal in Islam would be limited to discovering and
comprehending Islam with its essence and purity without losing any roots of it, in order to
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clear it up from the dust which had been colected by the centuries.108 On the issue of the
reformation in Islam, Kısakürek felt himself to battle on two fronts: Kemalists and
modernists.
Despite of its hesitant nature, the Kemalist intention of reforming the religion, like other
social institutions, on scientific and national lines by a committee of the theological
faculty, under the chairmanship of professor Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad was the first
front he attacked by calling this project as “an attempt of destructing Islam.” The basic
conviction of the committee’s report that religion, like all other social institutions ought to
satisfy the exigencies of life and pursue the process of development was a “sign of
unbelief.” Turkification of the language of worship and the introduction of musical
instruments into the mosques were aimed at the invention of a new religion from within
Islam. But the attempt failed due to the fact that RPP did want to tolerate an existence of a
reformed religion, even a “christinized religion” in Turkey.109 Kısakürek also heavily
criticized the reformist attitude of the nationalist intellectual who accepted the significance
of the religion (the belief in God) for the society and the individual, but who regarded the
forms of worship as primitive and the application of sharia as unacceptable.
One might remind here that the reformist portrayal Kısakürek gave was similar to the
understanding of religion by Kemalism, with its Durkheimian conception of religion. To
Kısakürek, since Islam was a totality, the selection of some parts of religion and its
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adaptation to the modern needs, with the claim that the essence of religion was kept while
renewing it, constituted an attempt of changing Islam from its very centre.110
The second front, perhaps the dangerous one in his eyes, was the understanding of religion
by some Islamists like Afghani, Abduh, Seyyid Kutup and Mevdudi, who took place
within the reformist current through their “distortion of Islam from its essence.” According
to Kısakürek, this reformist attitude started with Ibn al-Taymiyyah who was the first
example of seeing Islam in a materialistic way. Al-Taymiyyah’s emphasis on reason and
his interpretation of Islam (and Sharia) in accordance with the mere appearance (zahir) of
Islamic truths without accepting Islam’s inner dimension (batın), namely Sufism
(tasavvuf), was an attempt of bringing a kind of materialism and of mere rationalism (kuru
akılcılık) into the very heart of Islam. Certainly, the most unacceptable side of this line in
his eyes, was its discrediting attitude towards Sufism, alongside the unficiation of schools
of law.111
Upon the challenge of the Europe’s domination over the material, to Kısakürek, Afghani-
Abduh line failed in finding the reasons of the decline and thus could not advance the idea
of applying Islam to the new life at the level of the universe. Without being able to
examine the West and the East, this line, by the desire of reforming Islam, followed a way
of unbelief that made Islam dependent on its hostile worldview. What was to be done was
opening the age of true Islam (gerçek İslam çağı) but rather, they tried to adapt Islam to the
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age which was destined to decadence.112 To Kısakürek, Islam could not be thought as a
passive entity in the face of the Western challenge, one whose role in the relationship
between West and East was limited to reaction, but rather it was a dynamic factor both in
creating a new society, individual and state and in solving the crisis of humanity in general.
The true Islam of Kısakürek, if elaborated in relation to the religious understanding of the
Islamists in the second constitutional period, contained: 1)the idea that there could not be a
contradiction between Islamic principles and reason 2) no need for an opening of the gate
of interpretation but the rediscovery of the Islamic truths 3) the strong rejection of the
unification of schools of law 4) rediscovering the true nature of the all religious schools
without trying to adopt to the necessities of the modern times. On the issue of the
compatibility between the true Islam and modern civilization, Kısakürek had a
conservative tendency by claiming that all the good aspects of the western ideologies
(liberalism, socialism and democracy) were given in their most perfect forms, in Islam.
What was to be done was not an adaptation of Islam to the rationality and progress of the
modern civilization but rather a discovery of these principles in Islam. Kısakürek’s
portrayal of Islam as an ideology and a source of action went beyond its reconstruction as a
dynamic force in the minds of the earlier Islamists to acquire progress.
Unlike Afghani and Abduh, rediscovering Islam, for Kısakürek, was not aimed at the
restoration of early origins. Renewing Islam and the return to the early Islam of the prophet
and the four caliphs, for Kısakürek, did not mean the removal of medieval formulations in
the cognition of Islam. Although the present religious understanding of the Muslims was
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distorted by the external factors and by the loss of aşk and vecd, and was the major reason
for the decline of Muslims, the spritual essence (vecd) of Islam had to be rediscovered for
the Islamic revival. True to Kısakürek’s dedication to the orthodox Sunni Islam and
Nakshibendism, he stongly rejected the Islamist argument that the medieval religious
understandings caused Muslim’s decline and called this line of thinking as reformist. As a
sincere representative of Sunni Islam, Kısakürek accepted the religious interpretations of
the medieval ulema, especially that of al Ghazzali while criticizing the understanding of
Islamic ideals as just forms and imitation by reactionaries (ham yobaz ve kaba softa).
Kısakürek was cautious about the late nineteenth century Muslim reformist thought and its
tendency to reinterpret the principles of Islam in the light of modern civilization (the
compatibility between the dominant ideas of Europe and the traditional islamic principles),
fearing that this approach would distort the meanings of Islamic values and would lose
what distinguished Islam from other religions and ideologies. He seems to be aware of the
fact that once the orthodox understanding of religion was abandoned, it was difficult to say
what was truely Islamic and what was not. He was trying to close the door to the
reformation of religious understanding by his insistence on the impossibility of making
ijtihad in the present time, as the great founders of law schools did in the past. Yet, the
great ulema of the medieaval age did what had to be done in the best way. Hence, the gate
of ijtihad was closed but there still remained something: Evaluating all the values derived
from the progress of the humanity in accordance with Islam and that was tantamount to a
new ideological emergence, only Islam. The place of this expected emergence was
Turkey.113
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His closure of the gate of ijtihad reminds us Mustafa Sabri’s views as such. Indeed, He had
a contact with Mustafa Sabri Efendi who sent his photograph to Kısakürek.114 Mustafa
Sabri both in his writings in Beyan-ül Hak and in his writings of the exile in Egypt and
Greece, presented a wide range of arguments against the Islamist and nationalist circles
that urged the opening of the gate of ijtihad.115 But on the other hand, in spite of his
orthodox understanding of Islam, Kısakürek could not achieve to run away from the same
‘naive’ position of the reformists while considering good elements of modern ideologies as
the characteristics of true Islam such as the nonexistence of private life, as enunciated by
Lenin.116 Kısakürek belonged to a trend of thought which had concentrated on Islam while
stressing those features which distinguish it from other ideologies. This line of thinking
also paid attention to more universal problems of ideologies and find their solutions in the
rediscovery of Islam.
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private life for a communist, claimed that there was no private life for a Muslim.
Lenin’s statement was something lost by Muslims and ought to be acquired wherever
it was found, as the prophet’s tradition stated, see Batı. 91 and “Müslüman ve Hayat.”
[Muslim and Life] BD. (May 6, 1965) in Çerçeve 3. 191.
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CHAPTER VI
DEMOCRACY, STATE AND NATIONALISM FROM NECİP FAZIL
KISAKÜREK’S ISLAMIST PERSPECTIVE
“Ne mutlu müslümanım diyene” Kısakürek.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the concepts of state, democracy and
nationalism were formulated in Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s ideological and political
discourse. Specifically, it seeks to investigate, at practical level, his evaluations of the
transition to democracy in Turkey, the RPP, İsmet İnönü, the DP and Menderes. In this
regard, this chapter also deals with how he addressed theoretically democracy, the idea of
opposition, Islam and state and his ideal state (başyücelik devleti). Integral to our analysis
of the various dimensions of Kısakürek’s conceptualizations of democracy are the issues
of Turkish nationalism and the role of military in the Turkish democracy as well.
6.1 Introduction: Transition to Multi-Party Politics (1946-1950)
The transition to competitive politics in Turkey started in 1945, when the Republican
People’s Party (RPP) allowed the establishment of the Democratic Party by some
members of the RPP- Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koraltan- as
an opposition party. Following its representations in the parliament in the 1946 national
elections with a minority, in the 1950 elections, the DP came to power, easily mobilizing
such peripheral elements like peasants. As a result this election was described as “ victory
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of the periphery over the center.”1 Altough there was not a great ideological difference in
relation to the Kemalist principles between the two parties, their relations quickly
deterioriated to the extent that the successive DP governments resorted to anti-democratic,
authoritarian measures against the opposition. True to the observation that “opposition
groups in Turkey had always been libertarian out of power and autocratic once in power,”2
the DP leadership became authoritarian in power while the RPP voiced the demand for the
freedom. Such state of affairs paved the way to the military intervention of 1960.
The cultural legacy of the single party period continued to influence the understandings of
democracy and opposition on the part of the political elite and intellectuals in the 1950s.
Certainly, this is not the proper place for discussing the relations between the political
power and the opposition in the period in detail. What is relevant for our purpose is that
Kısakürek expressed his political ideas mainly in this period by publishing his journal
Büyük Doğu from 1943 to 1960 with intervals. This fact compels us to determine
Kısakürek’s attitudes towards the DP in power and the opposition by outlining his
evaluations of the DP (and Adnan Menderes) and the RPP (and İsmet İnönü).
In analysing the transition of multiparty politics in Turkey, Kısakürek drew the attention to
one major point: democratization from above which is granted by the Kemalist elite with
the limitation of democratic politics as a product of external influence, even by the force of
the West. Democratic institutions were not established by the real, sincere intentions of
Kemalist elites, but were imposed by the changing conjunction of the outside world which
                                                
1 Ergun Özbudun, “State Elites and Democratic political Culture in Turkey,” in Political
Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne
Riemer Publishers, 1993), 255.
2 İlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayari, “Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects,” in
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule in Southern Europe, ed. Guillermo O’Donnell,
Philippe C. Schmitter and Leonard Whiteheads (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1986), 166.
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then had started to polarize between the democratic regimes and communist ones. By
signing the United Nations Charter in San Fransisco in 1944 under the dictate of the USA,
the RPP and its chief, İsmet İnönü accepted this transition to adjust the regime to the world
which had been shaped by the victory of the democracies.3 Despite of this nature, the
transition to democracy and the DP’s coming to power was saluted as the people’s
revolution though a cheap one, against the RPP’s twenty seven despotic rule.4 As all
Islamist circles from 1945 to 1960, supported the transition to democracy and the
Democratic party with the hope that some Islamic demands might be met and some
secular reforms might be returned back by the party, Kısakürek also expected that
Menderes would reverse back the republican reforms and advocate a kind of Islamist
position in relation to Turkey’s position in the Islamic world. While some Islamist journals
in the 1950s like Sebil ür Reşat, edited by Eşref Edip advanced the view that early Islamic
political practice was an example of “a democratic republic”5, as I have discussed in the
following sections, Kısakürek did not establish such equivalence between democray and
Islam though he often claimed that the real democracy was given by Islam. In other words,
he did not try to give an Islamic legitimation to the transition to competitive politics in
1946.
6.2 The RPP and İnönü as the Counterpart of Sultan Abdulhamid
Since the Young Ottomans, the Islamist criticism against the Ottoman-Turkish
modernization process had found its severe manifestation in Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s
                                                
3 Kısakürek, “Artık Anlaşılıyor mu?” [Is it Understood Finally?] BD. 1st year, vol. II,
number 42 (August 16, 1946): 2 also in Çerçeve 2. 86; Benim. 114; Hesaplaşma. 140;
Rapor 1/3. 107; Para. 176.
4 Be. De, “Hadiselerin Muhasebesi.” [Evaluation of Incidents] BD. 5th year, number 22
(August 18, 1950): 8-9, Benim. 131.
5 Tunaya, İslamcılık. 198-199.
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attacks to the RPP and İsmet İnönü. As a Republican Islamist, Kısakürek was very
discomforted about the direction and nature of the RPP’s secular reforms. Firstly, these
reforms did not meet the Islamist expectations of establishing a new Islamic state from the
ruins of the Ottoman empire. On the contrary, the RPP’s reforms were directed to a more
radical  westernization than what the Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet periods achieved. Secondly,
the RPP regime was considered by Kısakürek as the main obstacle to the realization of the
Islamist ideals. As such, the RPP and its reforms were seen as the false productions of
what the Turkish people had been expecting for centuries. Hence, it must be noted that
Kısakürek’s involvement in daily politics whether in the form of supporting the rightist
parties, the Democratic Party in the 1950s, the Justice Party (AP) and other small ones
national Salvation Party (MSP), National Action Party (MHP) in the 1960s and 1970s or
in the form of establishing his party Büyük Doğu in 1949 was directed to one basic goal:
the destruction of the RPP and its regime.
Naturally, Kısakürek’s early statements about the RPP and İsmet İnönü in 1946-1950
period were rather soft in its tonation of critique. In his article, “To our President”, he
urged the President İnönü to reevaluate the Republican revolution which saved he
fatherland in material sense but lost this victory at spiritual level by its inability in bringing
an ideology and worldview to the new generations in place of the older one. During its
twenty three years rule, the RPP had lost its respect in the eyes of the nation and what
remained as a choice for the party was to chose one of the two: “to be or not to be.” The
option of “to be” meant reversing the way of the Kemalist regime back and reevaluating
what was taken from the West and what was eliminated. To his call, Kısakürek added the
statement that there was no anyone who would realize the true revolution, with the
exception of İnönü.6 Certainly, despite such writings in the period of 1943-1950,
                                                
6 Kısakürek, “Cumhur Resimize.” [To Our President] BD. 2nd year, vol. III, number 62
(May 9, 1947): 2 and “Cumhur Reisimize.” [To Our President] BD. 2nd year, vol. III,
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Kısakürek did not expect anything from the RPP and İnönü in this respect. The DP’s
capture of the power in 1950 elections was also a starting point in Kısakürek’s writings
that denounced the RPP, its ideology and leadership, ranging from critiques of Turkish
modernization process to the more polemical and insulting essays in his journal.
His conceptualization of politics showed one important aspect of elite political culture: the
“tendency to view the world in group versus outgroup terms.”7 In Kısakürek’s daily
political essays in the journal of Büyük Doğu, through the inclination of “us against them”,
the arena of Turkish political system was dichotomized into two basic political positioning,
the side of the RPP where the enemies of the nation and false heroes came together and the
other side which was under the duty of abolishing the all elements of the RPP regime and
ideology in order to meet “the expectations of the nation” in this respect. In fact, there had
been many illustrations of this tendency in Kısakürek’s political ideas:
In this world, one’s domination is standing with the subjection of other. No
share for darkness where the light entered. Opposing worldviews are the
same... Did Islam recognize a right of life and idea for the unbelievers when it
became dominant?... did the French revolution accept a right of existence for
whom from the king’s rule? What did the communism do? How did Fascism
and Nazism conduct the affairs? Did they allow their enemies to the struggle
aroung the people’s will? No. The notion of the right of life between two
parties can exist if they agree on the principles but only differ in small reform
and program details. Can the RPP be one of them? It is a pure enemy of the
fatherland but in the claim of creating this country from nonexistence. Since it
was knocked down by the hands of the people, it must be thoroughly
destroyed... The Democrat Party! Your foremost duty is to kill this mouse of
pestilence [the RPP] through the legal ways in order to represent the national
will who elected you for taking the revenge from this mouse.8
                                                                                                                                         
number 63 (May 16, 1947): 2. See also, “C.H.P.’ye Hitap.” [Adress to the RPP] BD.
1st year, vol.II, number 38 (July 19, 1946): 1 also in Hücum ve Polemik [Attack and
Polemic] (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu, 1992), 62-68.
7 Frey, “Patterns,” 65.
8 Kısakürek, “Bu Sıçanı Gebertiniz.” [Kill this Mouse] BD. 9th year, number 55 (July 11,
1952): 1 also in Başmakalelerim 1. 101-102.
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Kısakürek often stressed the claim that although the RPP came to power after the victory
of the Independence War, it turned into a group who exploited the spirit of the
Independence. This party tried to take the revenge that the West had been unable to take
from Islam for a thousand years and undermined the roots of the nation: history, custom,
language and family.9 The despotic and oligarchic rule of the single party era and the
ideology of the RPP were likened to the communist party’s rule and ideology, as expressed
in the following words:
Except its so called nationalism, which one of the RPP’s six principles was
contrary to communism? The RPP’s conceptualization of laicism was on the
same track with communism in the enemity towards Islam though real laicism
connoted to a total and absolute freedom and to a separation of religion from
government. The rest of the principles are not in tight share with communism
but also they are not contrary to each other. Communists are also republican,
revolutionist, statist and populist.
Even, the RPP’s despotism went beyond the totalitarian regimes by its claim that
sovereignty belonged to the nation.10 The spiritual, intellectual and moral void was the
greatest product that the RPP gave to this country. There existed two fashionable principles
in the Republican world: Islam was reactionism and the Western civilization was the
master.11 The similarity established between the RPP and communism was complemented
by the said spiritual void that the party created. Hence, the responsibility of the communist
movement in Turkey completely belonged to the RPP which provided a fertile ground for
the blossoming of communism. The Republican regime and communism were indeed, in
                                                
9 Kısakürek, “Kement.” [Losso] BD. number 13 (May 29, 1960): 1 also in
Başmakalelerim 2. 199-202. In his late writings, Kısakürek called the RPP as the
internal agency of the West see Rapor 4/6. 112.
10 Be. De. “Hadiselerin Muhasebesi.” [Evaluation of Incidents] BD. 6th year, number 24
(September 1, 1950): 9; Kısakürek, “Ve İsmet İnönü’nün Suratı.” [And İsmet İnönü’s
Face] BD. 22nd year, 12th period, number 2 (September 29, 1965): 1; Başmakalelerim
3. 129.
11 Kısakürek, “CHP Vebali.” [Responsibility of the RPP] BD. 22nd year, 12th period,
number 1 (September 22, 1965): 1 also in Başmakalelerim 3. 125-126.
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cooperation in the destruction of religion such as the examples of communist cadres at
high offices of the state, village entitutes and Kadro movement.12 The rightist parties had
to wage a new independence war against it.13 It was not possible to think of any revolution
or opposition in Turkey without eliminating the RPP totally.14
Kısakürek’s attacks to the Kemalist regime focused on the personality of İsmet İnönü who
had become, in a sense, the questionable and fragile symbol of the Kemalist ideology.
After the death of Atatürk, İnönü, being elected as the RPP’s permanent chairman at the
party’s extraordinary congress on December 26, 1938, also adopted the title of National
Chief. In Ahmad’s words, Kemalist regime assumed “the fascist form aptly described by
the party’s slogan ‘one party, one nation, one leader’.”15 In those years, Kısakürek was
writing on the examplifying position of the national chief to be loved by the nation.16 But
with the transition, İnönü and the RPP had become a main target to be attacked.
Expectedly, İnönü was portrayed as the atheist, anti-Islamic, non-Turkish personality17,
reminding us the portrayal of Abdul Hamid as the red sultan in the second constitutional
                                                
12 Dedektif X Bir, “Türkiye’de Komünizma.” [Communism in Turkey] BD. 5th year,
number 4 (April 1, 1949): 2; “CHP ve Komünizma.” [the RPP and Communism] BD.
vol. II, number 30 (September 25, 1959): 8-9; Kısakürek, Hitabeler. 32-35; Rapor
10/13. 50.
13 Kısakürek, “Manalandırma,” [Interpreting] BD, June 23, 1965 in Çerçeve, 2, 33; “Yeni
İstiklal Savaşı,” [New Independence War] June 23, 1980 in Rapor 10/13, 20-22.
14 Kısakürek, Rapor 4/6, 192.
15 Ahmad, The Making. 69.
16 See Kısakürek, “Millet Şefi, Örnek Şef.” [National Chief, Exemplary Chief] (February
29, 1939) in Çerçeve 1. 49-50; “Şef Niçin Sevilir.” [Why is Chief Loved?] (March 5,
1939) in Çerçeve 1. 53.
17 Kısakürek, “Sağır.” [The Deaf] BD. 6th year, number 29 (October 6, 1950): 8-9 also in
Hücum. 137; “İsmet İnönü ve Türklük.” [İsmet İnönü and Turkishness] BD. 6th year,
number 41 (December 29, 1950): 8 also in Hücum. 141-142; “İsmet İnönü ve
Müslümanlık.” [İsmet İnönü and Islam] BD. 6th year, number 41 (December 29, 1950):
9 also in Hücum. 143; “Ben Senden Niçin Nefret Ediyorum?” [Why am I hating you?]
Hücum. 153-155 and 156-157.
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period. In that way, İnönü and the RPP constituted the republican counterpart of the
despotic sultan in Kısakürek’s ideology. His hostility towards the RPP and İnönü had
continued to colour his political writings even until his death.18
6.3 Islamist Effort to Manipulate the Political Power (1950-1960): Adnan Menderes
and Kısakürek
Actually, Kısakürek had a two sided approach towards the Democrat Party. On one level,
from its foundation to the 1960 intervention, he regarded it as another manifestation of the
RPP, not having the intention of changing the very basis of the Kemalist ideology. In its
oppositional years (1946-1950), he expected the Democrat Party to behave as the Free
Republican Party had done in 1930. According to Kısakürek, the DP was founded by
some members of the RPP as a “token opposition” which would keep the government on
its toes without actually challenging its legitimacy. That was why İnönü pressed Celal
Bayar to become the leader of the opposition even though Bayar was uncertain of the
outcome.19 The group who made the Republican revolution could not allow any
opposition based on any worldview since they did not see any manifestation of something
good or right outside of themselves. The performance of the Kemalist modernization could
not be evaluated since the matter of the first president was out of the suject of any
questioning.20 The liberal and democratic ideas of the DP did not mean a departure from
                                                
18 See Kısakürek, Çerçeve 4. 198; Türkiyenin. 86-87.
19 Be. De., “Hadiselerin Muhasebesi.” [Evaluation of Incidents] BD. (March 12, 1948) in
Hadiselerin 1. 244; “Muhasebe.” [Evaluation] BD. (June 24, 1949) in Çerçeve 2. 136-
137; Dedektif X Bir, “Muhalefet.” [Opposition] BD. 5th year number 15 (January 20,
1950): 3, 16; Benim. 48. The RPP, the DP and the Nation Parti, (Millet Partisi) were
visualized as coming from the same root: Kemalism, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, see the
cover page of Büyük Doğu, 6th year, number 35 (November 17, 1950): 9.
20 Dedektif X Bir, “Serbest Fırka: Bizde Muhalefet Komedyasının Bir Numaralı
Kahramanı.” [The Free Party: The First Actor in the Comedy of Opposition] BD. 5th
year, number 21 (March 3, 1950): 3, 7.
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the RPP’s ideology, including its conceptualization of laicism. What the DP was trying to
do was not becoming an opposition to the RPP but rather becoming a better example of the
RPP. They agreed on the principles but on some applications they differed.21
On the other side, during all the period of 1950-1960, he urged the DP, especially
Menderes to be the expected saver of the Turkish nation by eliminating the “ancien
regime” of the RPP. Kısakürek’s harsh statements about the RPP during the Menderes
governments suggests that he advised Menderes to pursue a path that should lead to a
return to authoritarianism by punishing the RPP for “the creation of the old period” (devri
sabık yaratmak) because of its policies in the single-party era.22 The nation gave its support
to the DP in return for the total destruction of the RPP. Menderes had to act as “a
government of revolution” (ihtilal hükümeti) by eradicating the all spirit, reforms and
cadres of the “ancien regime”, as the French revolution did to the royalists or Hitler did to
Jews or the Bolshevik revolution did to the supporters of the Tsar; otherwise he would be
toppled down by those who were allowed to survive by Menderes himself.23 That was the
call for a counter-revolution, but without success. Kısakürek often tried to persuade
Menderes to accept and implement his ideology of the Great East in order to realize a
worldview that had been expecting since 1839.24 The expectations from Menderes led him
to hope for an Islamic goal of cooperation among Islamic countries in foreign policy. For
                                                
21 Kısakürek, Benim. 59.
22 Kısakürek, “Kabahat,” 22.
23 Kısakürek, “İhtilal Hükümeti.” [The Revolutionary Government] BD. number 9 (July
2, 1954): 2; Prof. Ş. Ü., “Kurtarıcı İhtilal Hükümeti.” [Saviour Revolutionary
Government] BD. number 14 (June 5, 1959): 2; “Oluşa Davet.” [Invitation to Being]
BD. number 6 (April 10, 1959): 2; Kısakürek, Benim. 131, 194.
24 Kısakürek, “Gözümüzün İçine Bak.” [Look into Our Eyes] BD. number 25 (August
21, 1959): 1; “Adnan,” 64-66; “Ko-va-dis?” [Where to Go?] BD. number 3 (March 20,
1956): 1. It is obvious that Menderes did not pursue an Islamist policy, but he gave
financial help (from hidden ammount, gizli ödenek) to Kısakürek in order to publish
his journal, Büyük Doğu.
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example, the establishment of the Bagdat Pact was such an attempt of spiritual unification
among some Islamic countries and a declaration of identity and personality against the
West.25
Kısakürek shared the basic notion of the political culture of the single-party period that
those who gained political power could exercise it without restraint. This understanding of
political power in absolute terms was accompanied by the consideration that the
institutions of the state were under the unqualified command of the ruling party.26
Kısakürek persistently stated the view that the DP and Menderes had the right to
monopolize and to use power for destroying the RPP and its regime totally by reminding
that the DP had the mandate of the “national will.”27 His conviction that the DP in power
had to act in the totalistic way (hepçi olmak) that the RPP did in the past mainly came from
his hostility towards the Kemalist reforms. The notions of democracy, party and opposition
were mere instruments for the search of an ideology and its application by the state
institutions. To recognize the right of opposition to the old despot RPP meant allowing a
harmful freedom for the destruction of the DP government. To Kısakürek, the construction
of the real freedom necesitated the use of power to give an end to the exploitation of
freedom.28 His criticism of Menderes for respecting democracy too much might be linked
                                                
25 Kısakürek, “İran Seyahati.” [Trip to Iran] BD. (April 23, 1956); “Şehinşah.” BD. (May
17, 1956); “Türkün Haysiyetinde Adnan Menderes.” [Adnan Menderes in Turkish
Honour] BD. (May 18, 1956) in Başmakalelerim 2. 45-47, 87-88, 89-90, respectively.
26 Ilter Turan, “The Evolution of Political Culture in Turkey,” in Modern Turkey:
Continuity and Change, ed. Ahmet Evin (Leske Verlag+Budrich Gmbit: Opladen,
1984), 98.
27 Kısakürek, “Açık Hükümet Gizli İktidar.” [Open Government. Secret Power] BD. 9th
year, number 114 (September 11, 1952): 1 also in Başmakalelerim 1. 231-233.
28 Be. De, “Vicdanlı Şiddet.” [Conscientious Violence] BD. number 11 (May 15, 1959):
9; Kısakürek, “Demokrasi Derdi.” [Problem of Democracy] BD. 9th year, number 87
(August 12, 1952): 1 also in Başmakalelerim 1. 164-165; “Hep’çi Olunuz Muhterem
Başvekil.” [Be Totalist, Dear Prime Minister] BD. 9th year, number 19 (June 3, 1952):
1 also in Başmakalelerim 1. 40-41; “O’na.”[To Him] BD. (April 3, 1954) in
Başmakalelerim 2. 18-20.
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to his legitimization of Abdul Hamid’s suspension of Meşrutiyet until the conscience of
constitutional democracy (Kanun-i Esasi), in accordance with Islam, emerged in the minds
of the nation.29
He disregarded the democratic principle that state institutions ought to be neutral in
relation to political parties and the opposition for the case of the RPP. Because the RPP
used all the state institutions in the service of the party while in power, then there could not
be a right of opposition for the RPP. For instance, he supported the confiscation of the
RPP’s properties and the formation of Parliamentary Investigation Committee to examine
the subversive activites of the opposition, namely the RPP in these words: “You [the RPP],
the cadre of Nimrods! You have robbed the nation completely from its belief and religion
to its last shoe for twenty seven years and ... you undermined the right, justice, conscience,
morality and belief and then now you demand them!”30 There could not be a chance of
becoming an opposition for the RPP which ruled the country despotically for twenty seven
years.31 He even regarded the formation of the investigation committee as a political
weakness. Rather, Menderes had to destroy (close down) the RPP by the claim of
provoking a military revolution.32 According to Kısakürek, the Democratic Party was not
committed to dismantling the reforms of the RPP’s one-party regime by destroying all the
basis of this party though it gained the nation’s support through promising to abolish the
                                                
29 Menderes ought o be advocated to a higher ideal than the stroy of freedom and
democracy Benim. 265, 267 see also Ulu Hakan. 104, 459.
30 Kısakürek, “İlk Tedbir Budur.” [This is the first measure] BD. 9th year, number 21
(June 5, 1952): 1 also in Başmakalelerim 1. 44-45; see also “Kabahat.” [Fault] BD.
(April 6, 1956) in Başmakalelerim 2. 21-23.
31 Kısakürek, “Tek Çift Oynayanlar.” [Players of Odd or Even] BD. 9th year, number 50
(July 6, 1952): 1 also in Başmakalelerim 1. 99; “Palyaço.” BD. number 22 (July 31,
1959): 1, 16 also in Başmakalelerim 2. 235-238.
32 Kısakürek, “Adnan Menderes.” BD. (November 25,1951) in Başmakalelerim 1. 5-6;
Benim. 420-421; Cinnet. 292. Menderes was killed because of the fact that he did not
destroy the RPP.
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RPP’s reforms.33 In February 1959 when Menderes survived an airplane crash in which
most passengers were killed in London, Kısakürek interpreted this event as a devine mercy
but also as the last chance to be or to be killed (ya ol, ya öl). Kısakürek gave a date for
Menderes’s fall from power by force: 1959 and 1960 were the last dates.34 By leaving
aside the use of state institutions, Menderes’s establishment of a mass organization (called
as Vatan cephesi, Fatherland Front to face the growing opposition of the RPP, media, and
universities) was seen by Kısakürek as a sign of further weakness.35 To Kısakürek, the
main factor that brought the demise of Menderes was his hesitation in using the political
power in the way that Atatürk and İnönü used.36 According to Kısakürek’s statements, he
urged Menderes to close down the opposition parties and eliminate the RPP totally from
the motto in the Assembly that sovereignty belonged to the nation to its all reforms, in
1960, in his last meeting with Menderes.37
On many occassions, Kısakürek spoke of his disillusion with Menderes and the DP
governments because of their reluctance of becoming the true party of the nation and their
anti-islamic policies. For example, he criticized the DP’s implementation of the Article of
163 (in the Turkish criminal code) which was about the outlawed organizational activities
aimed at changing the structure of the government on the basis of religious principle.38
                                                
33 Kısakürek, “Beklediğimiz İnkilap ve Yeni İktidar.” [Our Expected Revolution and
New Power] BD. 9th year, number 6 (May 21, 1952): 1.
34 Kısakürek, “Kement.,” 1 also in Başmakalelerim 2. 199-200; Benim. 408.
35 Kısakürek, Benim. 398.
36 See An opposite explanation in this regard was given by a hard line Kemalist, Metin
Toker. He argued that the demise of the DP leaders was because of their consideration
of themselves as Atatürk and İnönü of the 1930s, see İsmet Paşayla On Yıl, [Ten Years
With İsmet Pasha] vol.1 (İstanbul: Akis yay, 1966, 3rd edition), 140.
37 Kısakürek, Benim. 338, 428-429.
38 Kısakürek, “Milletçe Ağlıyoruz.” [As A Nation We are Crying] BD. number 1 (April
23, 1954): 3; “163. Madde.” [Article 163] BD. 9th year, number 24 (June 8, 1952): 1
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6.4 Kısakürek’s Concept of Democracy: A Schumpeterian or An Islamic View?
In analysing the democratic experience in the Ottoman-Turkish history, Kısakürek
underlined the fact that freedom and democracy had been imported from outside with the
influence of the French revolution, without being able to internalize their real senses.
Rather, the experience of democracy had constituted a mask for the domination of some
groups from Meşrutiyet to the republic. Every group demanded freedom just for
themselves and for their oppression but used it to accuse other group of ruling
despotically.39 By the slogan that the sovereignty belonged to the nation, the despotic
regime of the RPP identified its own will with the national will though it conducted an
oppressive rule, similar to the communist party’s rule in Russia. During the RPP
governments, the national will had not been represented by the Assembly, rather it was in
the hands of the national chief (implying both Atatürk and İnönü).40 Kısakürek’s this
argument about the RPP’s attitude towards democracy reminds us of Said Halim Pasha’s
claim that the bureaucrats demanded a constitutional regime for themselves but in the
name of people.
According to Kısakürek, the transition to democracy in 1946 was also achieved by the
imposition of the western democratic regimes in San Fransisco, but was not a product of
good intentions on the part of the Kemalist regime. Basically emanated from this
observation, Kısakürek did not regard the democratic institutions as the ultimate criterium
                                                                                                                                         
also in Başmakalelerim 1. 51; “Dünya ve Biz.” [World and Us] BD. number 4 (May
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period, number 1 (September 22, 1965): 2; also see Kısakürek, Türkiyenin. 8-9; “Irzına
Geçilen Hürriyet.” [Raped Freedom] BD. June 25, 1965 in Çerçeve 3, pp. 237-238;
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in shaping the future of Turkish state and society. In this way, as seen in his advice to
Fevzi Çakmak to make a military intervention against İsmet İnönü in the late 1930s and
the early 1940s and to Adnan Menderes in the 1950s to close down the Republican
People’s Party, democratic institutions would be easily sacrified for the aim of constructing
a “true”/Islamic system in Turkey.41 Regarding the Turkish experience of democracy,
Kısakürek’s critique of republican governments contained itself to the point that their
practice was not related to the true democracy of the West and did not concentrate on the
point that they had not implemented democracy with its all ideas and institutions.
The magical word of freedom was, to Kısakürek, not an end (gaye) by itself, but a means
(vasıta)/a condition for the realization of an ideal and for finding the truth. After the
devotion to the truth, human beings became a slave to the truth, and that was the meaning
of the true freedom.42 Kısakürek’s conceptualization of freedom had a Sufi nature that
reality became apparent after you dropped your claims by a submission to the truth. Here,
similar to the subjection of reason to the (divine) truth, freedom also had to be understood
in a limited way that it was fulfilled within the eternal principles of Islam.43 If the anti-
thesis of abstract freedom was despotism, its illness was freedom for the sake of freedom
or unlimited freedom (başıboş hürriyet= animal freedom, hayvani hürriyet) which would
be detrimental to the truth. To Kısakürek, such corrupted understanding of freedom had
been the reason behind the failure of the Turkish modernization process. The search for
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freedom for the sake of freedom had culminated in a crisis in Europe in the form of fascist
and Nazist ideologies as well.44
Following a critique of European’s unlimited freedom, Kısakürek gave his opinion about
the very essentials of democracy:
indeed, there is no distinct (mahsus) word for everyone, no distinct idea for
everyone, no distinct decision for everyone, and no distinct preference for
everyone. The truth is one (Hakikat birdir). One person finds the truth and
makes it confirmed by one million people. Thus, order and harmony emerge
[from this confirmation]... If this person’s truth was wrong, another person
comes to find the truth and makes it confirmed by the people, again by
himself.
Similarly, all revolutions with their truths and wrongs, had been made by one person who
erected from the sleeping society.45 The talk of freedom in his mind was closely connected
to the word of order (nizam) and an analogy that gained much frequency in the political
writings of Kısakürek concerning state and democracy was the relationship between a
doctor and his patient, between a commander and his soldier. He claimed that the
relationship between state and individual was not dissimilar. The responsibility of the
doctor was to cure his patient and, thus, there could not be a preference of any drug by
patients.46 In order to establish the true freedom, there would be a need of using force
when necessary.47
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Parallel to the general trend in Islamic political thought which has been elaborated in the
preceeding chapters, Kısakürek put emphasis on the issue of who rules rather than the
form of government. “Constitutional regime, republic and democracy are only the methods
through which ideologies can be applied”, he wrote. By the claim that democracy was not
an ideal, he perceived democracy as a mechanism/method in order to attain a particular
goal/worldview, the ideal of the Great East, in his case.48 Put it differently, it would be
correct to argue that he made a Schumpeterian conceptualization of democracy; a type of
government and procedure in electing those who ruled the people, certainly with some
defects. Similar to Schumpeter’s elitist and technocratic vision of democracy, Kısakürek
regarded democracy as an institutional arrangement which provided the selection of the
intellectuals by the people in order to realize the truth (Islamic ideals). Kısakürek
condemned democracy (as a procedure) of preferring the ‘ignorant’ fifty-one people to
forty-nine ‘wise’ people. To him, ruling was a matter of virtue and for that reason, the rule
of the true intellectual aristocracy had to be established. For his elitist outlook, it was not
possible to accept the principle of democratic equality that equalized al-Ghazzali’s view
with that of a garbage collecter.49
Similar to Schumpeter’s democratic elitism, in Kısakürek’s başyücelik state, the role of the
leaders (başyüce and the members of başyücelik kurultayı) is very large. In Kısakürek’s
formulation, a society is better off if its people participate merely in a moral way by
electing leaders. The leaders have discretion to do what they think is best without much
regard for what people want. The major point to be respected by the leaders is the moral
standards of Islam, not the wishes of the people. Kısakürek’s formulation, like
Schumpeter’s “democratic method,” seems to be discomforted by the idea of an extensive
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participation of the people in a political system to reflect their self-interests. Both
Kısakürek and Schumpeter tend to believe that ordinary people are easily manipulated by
powerful interests or demagogues. In addition to this minimal role of the people, both
Kısakürek and Schumpeter assign a minimal responsibility of legislators to the people. All
in all, it should also be stated that Kısakürek’s ideal political system which is expected to
include the good sides of democracy is, unlike Schumpeter, far from acknowledging the
importance of competition in politics.
Kısakürek also denied the idea of popular sovereignty on the grounds that sovereignty
belonged to God, not to people. If the sovereignty belonged to the nation, Islam could not
be declared by the prophet in Mecca.50 As an extension of his conviction that history was
made by great personalities/heroes like Alexander the Great, Ceasar, Jenghiz Khan, Timur,
Yavuz and the like, he advanced the view that national superiority/inferiority came from
superior/inferior personalities and ideologies, not from types of rule/government which
might only create proper grounds as a secondary factor.51
Democracy, like the western philosophy, was everyone’s right of searching for the truth
among falsities. Democracy was a right to speak and do all forms of wrongs in the name of
finding the truth. Since the truth was one, democracy was the name of a system which
looked for the truth among the numberless things.52 Kısakürek was certain about the fact
that there could not be such a right where the truth got the power beacuse freedom of
democracy was “a kind of freedom that idolized the whims of human being.” The truth
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might not emanate from the conflict of ideas but might disappear within “the conflict’s
cloud of dust.” What was to be done was the establishment of “the truth’s authority by
determining the rights of individual within the focus of justice.” Political power should be
given to the hands of an aristocracy of idea/intellect (fikir aristokrasisi) who would
determine the rights of the society better than society itself. Sovereignty belonged to the
Right, not to people. “Who were the people?”53 and he continued: “democracy was the
will of the people but what would happen if the people wanted the evil... a Right above the
people, there is no such thing in democracy.”54 With regard to the theory of democracy,
Kısakürek seemed to learn democracy basically from the Social Contract of J.J. Rousseau.
In his differentiation of liberalism and democracy, he traced back the idea of democracy to
Rousseau while tracing back liberalism to Montesqieu. In democratic regime, the people’s
rule could be imposed upon individual whereas liberalism put the emphasis on the
freedom of individual by refusing the despotism of the society. To him, the proper balance
between these two could only be established in an Islamic system.55
Freedom and democracy could only be understood as a method/procedure to attain the
right and truth otherwise democracy would be inclined to exploitation and despotism of
one falsity in the name of the truth.56 The notion that any idea was respected (fikir
muhteremdir) could not be accepted because not any understanding of freedom might
concede that its opposite was right. Every truth was excused in its contempt and hostility
towards its opposite. According to Kısakürek, the absoluteness of any claim to the truth
would be in suspicion of itself if it allowed and respected wrongs, thus not every idea was
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respected.57 Hence, any possibility of minimum share (asgari müşterek) between the truth
and falsities was out of discussion but instead, maximum share (azami müşterek) had to be
established: “is there any agreement (muvazaa) between day and night?..one of them
dominates over the other.”58
Kısakürek’s reservations about democracy reminds us the Islamists’ similar statements
about freedom. Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period underlined the idea that
unlimited freedom would corrupt the constitutional regime and its institutions. By the same
way, Kısakürek also regarded democratic regime as the lesser of the evils (ehven-i şer) or a
system in reserve (ihtiyati sistem). Allowing both the good and the evils at the same time,
democracy was good of its permission to the realization of the truth among many evils.
But on the other hand, democracy was not acceptable because of its permission to the
destruction of itself and to despotism of the evil such as communism. The chaotic regime
of democracies supplied a ground for the flourishment of communism which would not
allow even the talk of democracy in its own regime.59 In addition to communists,
cosmopolit groups like Masons, Jews and Westernists and the enemies of Islam had
different views of democracy and regarded governments that did not rule in accordance
with their interests, as undemocratic and despotic.60 Seen from this perspective, mainly
resulted from the fact that it did not have a peculiar ideological/philosophical system,
                                                
57 Kısakürek, “Muhterem-Muhakkar.” [Respected-Contemptious] (December 21, 1977)
in Çerçeve 4. 199-200; see also Sahte. 282-283.
58 Kısakürek, “Asgari Müşterek.” [Minimum Shared Belief] (November 21, 1978) in
Çerçeve 5. 283-284.
59 Kısakürek, “Tek ve Mutlak.” [One and Absolute] BD. (March 3, 1965) in Çerçeve 3.
112-114; “Ukde-i Hayat.” [Tie of Life] BD. 9th year, number 43 (June 29, 1952), 1 also
in Başmakalelerim 1. 88-90; “Musaviler,” 8; Konuşmalar.179.
60 Kısakürek, “Demokrasi Anlayışları.” [Understandings of Democracy] BD. 9th year,
number 88 (August 13, 1952): 1 also in Başmakalelerim 1. 166-168.
282
democracy was destined to exploitation that would culminate in its total destruction in the
hands of it enemies.
Despite of his all reservations on democracy, like his inclusive attitude towards the ideals
of modern political ideologies, Kısakürek claimed that Islam/the Great East embraced the
democratic ideals of freedom and justice but in their real senses. Given the example of the
early Islamic practice by shura, Kısakürek mentioned a free atmosphere of the shura in
front of the head of the state for the search of the truth and thus: “the truth of freedom,
individual right, democracy and the republic were in Islam.”61 Contrary to the Islamist
thinking in the second constitutional period, Kısakürek did not express Islamist
legitimation of democracy and its institutions through identification of shura and ijma with
democracy and parliament. Instead, in line with the dominant aura of the time, the creation
of an ideology/worldview, seen as the salvation of Islamic world/Turkish nation, gained
priority over the issue of democracy. The grand narratives of the early decades of the
twentieth century had been totalitarian political ideologies such as communism and
fascism, not democracy.
The victory of the western democracies over the fascists and Nazis in the second world
war did not put an end to the suspicion about the performance of liberal democracies.
Certainly, after the war, the advance of the communist movements in Europe and in the
third world was a factor that inhibited the emergence of more positive grounds for the
evaluation of democracy. The perceived threat of communism in Turkey had produced the
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negative result that the transition to democracy had not been internalized by Islamists,
including Necip Fazıl Kısakürek.
It is important to discuss his view of “national will” (milli irade) which had been a crucial
notion of the debates on democracy in the 1950s and further. Denying to understand the
concept of national will in an abstract way, Kısakürek expressed his deep suspicion about
the existence of free will on the part of the nation: “nation did not and could not want
anything, in every place of the world, ... nation is made wanting and embracing
something.. like a doctor and his patient. There existed nothing for the patient to demand,
but the doctor had something to give [him].”62 National will was an abstract concept which
had always been a toy of some major classes and groups in practice though it was the great
power within the whole fatherland.
Since the Tanzimat, the dominant group that exploited the national will by trying to take its
place had been the “rootless, cosmopolit and false intellectuals.” They represented the
destructive interests of communists, capitalists, and imperialists but did this in the name of
national will as well. The class of great capital and the reactionaries of the revolution
(inkilap yobazlığı) were to be added to those who exploited the national will, being in the
service of international Jewish capital. 63 The reflection of this situation on the state
pyramid was the reversal of the democratic principle that the assembly was subjected to
nation, government to the assembly, executive to the government. By this reversal, the
nation had lost its sovereignty to the assembly and to the governments.64
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One specific issue to test Kısakürek’s understanding of democracy was to examine his
attitude and ideas with regard to the growing influence of communism on Turkish youth in
the 1950s and 1960s. The “near threat of communism” to Turkey was a subject that he
often underlined to denounce the secular reforms of the RPP and its will to educate the
youth through Köy Enstitüleri (village institutes). Apart from the fact that the Turkish
communist party was established in the early days of the republic, a manifestation of
communist movement, the Kadro movement led by Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir), Yakup
Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), Burhan Belge and Vedat Nedim (Tör) was also backed by the
RPP ( İsmet İnönü) in their endeavour to form an ideological framework for the
revolution: a historical materialism (tarihi materyalizm).65 Within the political setting that
the 1960 military intervention brought into Turkey, the communist movement had
achieved its aim of positioning communist cadres in the stragegic places of state and
society, including publications, universities, ministry of national education and TRT
(Turkish radio and television). Its legal political organization was the Turkish Worker’s
party which was flourished by the RPP’s “left of the center” (ortanın solu) policies.66 After
stating that it was only Islam that could eradicate a dynamic system of communism,
Kısakürek called for the total destruction of the communist movement in Turkey and
supported the rightist parties, the DP and AP in this respect though he found their measures
against the movement too soft. Every deliberate government which really wanted to
destroy communism in this country had to make a coalition with Muslim-Turks and
nationalists of spiritual essence. Before the 1980 military intervention, Kısakürek’s support
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to nationalists (ülkücüler) took the form of demanding a cooperation between nationalists
and state to destroy totally the communists in order to put an end to the anarchy.67
For the struggle against communism, he proposed to establish two state intitutions: an
administrative institution, a department of struggle with foreign ideologies tied directly to
prime ministry (yabancı ideolocyalarla mücadele dairesi) and courts of national protection
(nanevi korunma mahkemeleri). These institutions would control all publications, art
activites like theatre and cinema, social and economic associations such as labour
organizations68, and state departments and would clear up “the microbe of communism”
from the mentioned places.69 Those people who were suspected of communism had to
show their “devotion to the national spirit.” In contrast to the basic logic of laws, these
people had to prove their innocence in the courts since on the issue of communism,
sentence (mahkumiyet) not freedom from guilt (beraet-i zimmet) was the essential
principle to be applied. Communists had to be treated like an harmful insect, without
allowing their exploitation of the weaknesses of democracy and of the chastity of the rule
of law. To overcome the terror agains the state, state’s terror was the only way to be
followed by state institutions.70
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It is high time to dwell on Kısakürek’s ideas regarding the institutions and subjects of
democracy, like political party, opposition and the role of military in Turkey.
6. 4.1 Expecting An Ideological Party : The Party of Right (Hak Partisi)
A political party, to Kısakürek, emerged in this country as an alien institution with an aim
of imitation, imported from the West since its first establishment by the Young Ottomans.
In every part of the world, a political party was entitled to create “a native synthesis from
its own fatherland’s ideals by kneading them within all human problems.”71 Not being
derived from the national roots, Turkish political parties served the function of destroying
the country as a result of western material and spiritual imperialism.72 In addition to their
responsibility regarding the failures in the Turkish history, from the Union and Progress to
the RPP and to the DP, no one of the Turkish political parties had a worldview and
ideological web in comprehending things and events. The Union and Progress had lost a
huge Ottoman empire without having any idea of society, individual and world. Hürriyet
ve İtilaf party who opposed the National Struggle was not able to bring any worldview as
well. After saving the country materially, the RPP killed it spiritually by its oppression and
imitative westernization. The DP as a recation to the RPP could not materialize a passive
revolution of people against the Kemalist regime and was destroyed for this reason.
Opposition parties had not emerged from a positive/a thesis as an independent center but
rather they were formed by a reaction and settled themselves in the already established
center.73
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All the political parties of Turkey had been foreign/opposite to the Turkish nation’s
spirit,essence, roots and unity. None of them had acquired conditions of being a real party;
grasping an ideology like other political parties in the world. For a century, the Turkish
nation had been expecting a real political party; “an ideological party.”74 Actually, these
parties were supposed to pick their inspiration from Turk’s spiritual roots and to synthesize
it with the western positive sciences in order to give a birth to a new Eastern civilization
which would be an example to the west.75 Kısakürek’s negative assestments on party were
related to partly its call for unlimited freedom (başıboş hürriyetçilk) and to partly its effects
of divisiveness on the nation. The West exported the institution of political party to Turkey
simply with the aim to destruct the eternal truth while it had formed political parties to
search for the truth within its own democratic system. Therefore, in the Turkish-Islamic
setting the institution of party could only exist as the Party of Right (Hak Partisi), being
devoted to the totality. 76
Regarding the issues of political power and opposition, Kısakürek did not see a real
appearence of political power and opposition who had a worldview/thesis/antithesis in the
history of Turkish politics from Tanzimat and its opposition to Abdul Hamid II and his
opposition (Union and Progress) to National struggle and its opposition (the palace and
Hürriyet ve İtilaf) and to lastly the DP and its opposition (the RPP and the Nation party).
Tanzimat movement was stuck with the imitation of the western civilization without
comprehending the crux of modernization issue while its opposition, reactionaries (kaba
softa, ham yobaz) was far from understanding the reality of applying sacred principles
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(read Islam) to space and time. The young Ottomans as an opposition to the sultan
Abdulaziz served the function of destroying all the basis of the Turkish nation. Union and
Progress’s opposition to Abdul Hamid II coud not bring a real worldview but just the
words of freedom, equaliy and justice and the copied ideal of Turkism.77
As shown in the preceeding sections, Kısakürek shared the basic notion of the political
culture in the single-party period that those who gained political power could exercise it
without restraint. This understanding of political power in absolute/totalist terms could not
allow actually a suitable space for an opposition. His constant call for the destruction of the
RPP (opposition party) by the DP in power and his support to the antidemocratic measures
of the Menderes governments seemed enough for the clarification of Kısakürek’s negative
attitude towards opposition. Sometimes, this negative attitude towards opposition had a
claim of representing the national will as he saw a right for the DP to close down the RPP,
but basically it was related to his evaluation of Turkish modernization process in
ideological terms. The notions of democracy, party and opposition were mere instruments
for the search of an ideology and its application by the state institutions. The words of
freedom and democracy could not be understood in a way that an opposition might change
the policies of a “true” political power.78
In this way, the idea that the press represented opposition was not acceptable simply
because of the fact that opposition could not be continuous, professional and interest-
based. Publishing a newspaper had to be controlled by an academic commission which
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would give the permission of publication to those who had intellectual capability and
works. In the case of press, opposition had a strong tendency of making an opposition for
themselves and for their interests. However, any opposition had to rely on an idea and if
any opposition emerged not for the sake of the truth (hakikat adına) but for their interests,
it had to be destroyed totally.79
6.4.2 Militarism and the Role of Military in Turkey
As he discussed every issue of the Turkish politics, Kısakürek studied the subject of
military in relation to the Ottoman past and its change/continuity in the republic.
Paralelling to the general decline of the empire since Kanuni’s times, according to
Kısakürek, the institution of military had lost its order and Islamic love (vecd ve aşk) until
the reign of Abdül Hamid II. Janissary who was an ideal soldier in the classical times had
become corrupted into a revolting and destroying form due to the system of devşirme
(recruiting of christian boys for the Ottoman army) which recruited foreign and hostile
elements to the Turkish muslim army.80 In its corrupted form, the janissary came to
represent a kind of soldier that was defeated by the enemy in the borders but victorious
over its own nation within the fatherland as an occupation force.81
In the republican period, military had a system, submission and order but without any
belief and worldview (ideal) that would complement the military order. Military, as the
instrument of the strong state had to be in the service of an ideal/an idea that was best
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instead of conquering hostile countries, see Yeniçeri. 13.
81 İsmini Vermeyen Profesör, “Fikir Ordusu.” [Army of Idea] BD. 15th period, number 13
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illustrated by the armies of the prophet’s companions otherwise it became a mere force,
destroying all the things.82 By the command of holy war (cihad) as the duty of Islamic
state, Islam embraced the ideals of Turks’ “Golden Horde” (Altın Ordu) and Germans’
“Great army” (Büyük Ordu) in their real senses since its aim had been the salvation of all
societies and individuals by reaching them at the eternal state (ebedi devlet, high level of
sufi perfection) without leaving to themselves. Thus, the sword in Islam came to constitute
an instrument of mercy and benevolence to save patients by force like the surgeon’s
lancet.83 Declaring its militarist aspect, Kısakürek gave a significant place to military in his
Islamist ideology in these words: “the ideal of the Great East can not separate from its
militarist mentality in the sense of an army of idea (fikir ordusu).” This military would not
be in conflict with its society’s rule and will and would serve for an eternal idea (ebedi
fikir) not for a transitory person (fani bir şahıs).84 Kısakürek’s Islamist positioning of
military can be best found in his glorification of a Turkish soldier, Mehmetçik who was the
representative of Islamic/Turkish spirit. In the ideal of spreading the religion of Islam,
military and Mehmetçik were important to the extent that mehmetçik exemplifed the
Islamic spirit within the nation which had been strongly devoted to the Prophet.85
Militarism of the Great East was not supporting a mere force, based on weapons and
material power like the corrupted janissaries of the empire. Militarism in the sense of
glorifying the institution of military for the sake of its own existence was not acceptable
since there could not be a military for military (ordu için ordu yok) but military for the
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83 Kısakürek, “İslam ve Ordu.” [Islam and Military] BD. 2nd year, vol. III, number 72
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nation (millet için ordu). Military was an instrument or a fist (yumruk) of the
nation/society, submitting to the spirit and head (baş) of this nation/society. In the age of
civilization, tied to the notion of civil rule, there could be nation-army (millet-ordu) but not
army-nation (ordu-millet).86 In the expected Islamic revolution, military, not being
involved in daily-politics, would not be an instrument of any group/faction. It, as a great
tool of action against the external enemies, had to be submitted to the center of idea and
spirit with its advocation to Islamic martyrdom and holy war.87 Based on his observation
that all revolutions in Turkey whether good or evil had been made by relying on the
military, he argued that any revolution/Islamic revolution could not be achieved without
taking military on its side.88 His method of revolution while speaking about the need of a
surgical intervention (cerrahi müdahale) for the country, seemed to share some militarist
elements though he stated that it would not be a military movement. The spirit of military
could exist in every place and in every group and therefore, the surgical operation “was the
imposition of an intellectual group’s brain who owned the spirit and order of the ideal
military through the legal possibilities... by force but through law.89
In endeavouring to describe further Kısakürek’s opinion about the military in relation to
his conceptualization of democray we must turn to explain his interpretations of the
military interventions in Turkey. Certainly, the Young Turk revolution of 1909 which
dethroned Abdul Hamid II and the 1960 intervention which hanged Menderes were not
acceptable to Kısakürek who perceived them as the examples of the revival of janissaries.
Destroying the false balance in the political system, the 1960 intervention which did not
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87 Kısakürek, “Ordu,” [Military] BD. 6th year, number 17 (February 3, 1950): 2.
88 Kısakürek, “Ordu ve İnkilap.” [Military and Revolution] BD. 9th year, number 25 (June
9, 1952): 1 also in Başmakalelerim 1. 52-54; İhtilal. 353.
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have any ideal to be implemented, created a fertile ground for communism, atheism,
hostility towards belief and order, self-interest and corrupted partisanship. Again
expectedly, Kısakürek stated that if this intervention took place against İsmet İnönü, it
could not be called as a revival of janissary.90 In fact, this country had deserved a true
revolution for two centuries, especially in three periods: the reign of the sultan Abdulaziz,
of the Union and Progress and of İsmet İnönü. Revolutions ought to burst as a revolution
of idea in these periods.91 Apart from the fact that he gave a full support to the 1980
military intervention, Kısakürek offered some measures to be taken by the new regime. He
perceived this intervention as “a state intervention within state” in order to reform the
spoiled state apparatus, otherwise there would not remain neither nation nor state, but the
total collapse of Turkey. The targets of the intervention were correctly corrupted political
parties, the assembly, separatism, communism and exploitation of religion in the name of
religion (like the National Salvation party’s Jeruselam meeting in Konya).92
The 1980 intervention, different from the 1960 and 1971 interventions seemed to him as
acting in the way that determined the problems correctly and showed a tendency of
establishing the truth (their solutions).93 Expecting a change in the conceptualization of
secularism (laiklik) from the new regime, he proposed twenty points to be regarded as the
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recipe for the salvation, some important ones as follow: bringing a despotism of justice and
an authority of right that would control all aspects of the societal order, even by
determining hours of sleep for individual; initiating a struggle of culture (irfan), conscience
(idrak), belief and morality, by every means, including the stick (sopa); leaving the word of
democray aside until its time and true version would come and preventing its exploitation
by cosmopolitians and westernists; closing down all political parties, labour organizations
and associations; trying to unite Islamic community on one focus though they were
separate in the forms of different nations and states; forming an assembly from
intellectuals (idrak soyluları) and leaving the decision to them; establishing an academy
from intellectuals (fikir çilekeşleri) who would decide the matters of culture, language and
alphabet.94 Moreover, for the construction of a new regime he argued that the senato was
needless and Court of Constitutional Law was preventive. University’s autonomy, TRT’s
privileges, exploitation of labour organizations and associations emanated from the
weakness of democracy beside its good aspects.95
In legitimating the military intervention in politics, Kısakürek stated his deeply rooted
suspicion towards democracy, similar to the state elites who put the emphasis on the
vertical dimension of democracy. As Heper argued, state elites (civil and bureaucratic
elites) conceived democracy as a matter of “enlightened debate”, aimed at determining the
one best way” to solve any given problem. The politicization of sectoral and group
interests in the hands of irresponsible politicians were often regarded as occuring at the
expense of the general (national) interest.96 Kısakürek attributed the notion of
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irresponsibility not only to politicians but also to the very nature of democracy. Democracy
was open to being paralyzed by some major groups and classes for their interests as
contrary to Turkish unity but in the name of national will. Thus, democracy was a
medallion, its one side was death while its other side was life. Military by the 1980
intervention as a movement of salvation, brought the life side to the forefront.97
6.5 Kısakürek’s Conceptualization of State
Politics was “a subaltern,” subjected to the service of an ideal/ideology. Politics for politics
meant a profession/institution of deceiving people. But politics in the sense of
implementing the ideal of belief on events and things through its ideological web had been
the affair of heros and might be named as a great politics, or in Islamic terms, as ’Siyaset-
ül-Medine.’98
Kısakürek showed a general characteristic of Turkish intellectuals who, as Frey stated,
preferred “organic theories of state and society” and who looked for “strong men” if they
leaned toward the right or looked for “strong ideology” if they leaned towards the left.99
But Kısakürek seemed to look for both strong man/hero and strong ideology to save the
country. That was actually the combination of personal aspect with an abstraction such as
an idea. This aspect of Kısakürek’s thought reflected itself on his understanding of state as
well. On the one side, he gave some ideological principles for the construction of a state
                                                
97 Kısakürek, “Madalyonun Tersi.” [Other Side of the Medallion] (October 30, 1980) in
Rapor 10/13. 200-201. For the true way of Turkish modernization, Kısakürek expected
a needed center of idea and force from military since he did not see the word of
democracy as an ideal and was open to militarist solution in the realization of his
ideology, see Rapor 1/3. 100.
98 Kısakürek, “Politika-Bence- (2).” [Politics in My Opinion] BD. 9th year, number 101
(August 26, 1952), 1 also in Başmakalelerim 1. 202-203; “Sen Nerdesin.” [Where are
you?] BD. 9th year, number 25 (June 9, 1952): 2 also in Çerçeve 2. 207; “Küçük
Politika.” [Little Politics] BD. (April 23, 1965) in Çerçeve 3. 169-170; Tanrı. 257.
99 Frey, “Patterns,” 70.
295
but on the other side, he envisioned a perfect personality such as başyüce as the head of
state who was expected to have some ideal/superior features.
In Kısakürek’s Başyüce state, society was considered to be composed of occupational
groups, such as businessmen, workers and farmers, interdependent to eact other, not
seeking for their self-interests. This understanding of classes was in paralel to the Kemalist
principle of populism which did not recognize classes as having conflicting economic
interests.100 Kısakürek’s conceptualization of state in general contained Kemalist features
by seeing the state as the instrument that imposed the social change upon the society from
top to bottom until the nation matured enough. He also seemed to share the basic mission
of the Kemalist intelligentsia that was to enlighten people in the way of development and
innovation.101 In this way, Kısakürek did not understand the role of the state in a liberal
way but rather in an interventionist way to create a new individual and society. State was
held responsible from the way of life that its people followed and from directing its people
to the truth. As an expression of discipline like a worship, state had to be totalitarian in
determining every aspects of societal and indvidual life.102 He gave De Gaulle as an
example of the head of state who laid his one hand upon democratic order and his other
hand upon authoritarian order when necessary. The head of state as a personality of focus
had to know how to be totalitarian in the name of the truth and to be libertarian when
needed.103
                                                
100 For the Kemalist principle of populism see Karpat, Turkey’s. 51-52.
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6.5.1 Islam and State: The Hidden Supremacy of Sharia
He was firmly attached to the idea that the real Islam and its fundamental values prescribed
as Sharia must form the basis of the state and society in the new worldview of Great East.
Sharia in appearance and sufism in spirit were regarded as the essential foundations for the
conceptualization of state and political regime, certainly with a reference to the early
Islamic practice.104 It was not possible to think of any area that was out of Sharia’s
consideration because Islam determined the areas that were not related to sharia, by giving
a spirit to the sound reason (selim akıl) in its conduct in these areas. Therefore, sharia as
the name of Islam constituted an absolute divine institution that could not accept any
independence outside of its area. There could not be anything, limiting God’s
determination and will in the world that He created.105
Kısakürek, as the first person who voiced the demand of sharia, took a position on the
significance of Şeriat clearly and diametrically opposed to the secularist Kemalist
intelligentsia. However, he often rejected the understanding of sharia as the formal legal
principles to be applied, but rather “sharia’s principles are fine, boundless and secret codes.
Sharia is not only a composition of measures to be applied, but also a divine institution to
be devoted with love.”106 Kısakürek’s sometimes usage of sharia as an abstraction did not
mean that he advocated a reformist view to reinterpret the strict commands of sharia such
as cutting a thief’s hand. In this way, he advanced the view that a Muslim was inevitably a
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follower of sharia. Moreover, he embraced theocracy by the claim that it came to connote
to sharia in Turkey.107 As I have explained in the section related to Kısakürek’s
understanding of Islam, he rejected to reinterpret sharia even through opening the gate of
ijtihad. His emphasis on sharia was so strong that his proposals regarding both Turkish
daily politics and his idealized politics and state had been coloured by the principles of
sharia though he did not mention directly the name of sharia in this respect, due to the
illegality of calling the application of sharia in the Turkish law.
A theme, directly related to his emphasis on sharia was laicism/laicite and its place in both
his conceptualization of state and his critique of the Republican state. The separation of
state and church in Europe was dissimilar to the relationship between state and Islam. The
removal of the Christian church which did not have any rules of shariah about state and
worldly affairs, from its medieval dominating position through the principle of laicite was
forcing the church to its right place. But a similar thing could not be thought for Islam
which had a sharia regarding all worldly affairs. Since Islam prescribed the principle of all
issues, it was not possible to marry Islam with a laicite.108 The experience of laicite in
Turkey had taken a nature of destroying Islam and its all manifestations though the
European experience contained itself to the separation of church and state, allowing the
appearence of religious ideas and movements in the public sphere. Even, the clergy took
place in the education and foreign policies of the European laic state since Europeans
knew that laicism was to be free of the obligation of obeying to the clergy. Moreover, the
principle of laicite did not prevent the church from criticizing state and announcing its
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views to influence the political process whereas in Turkey, laicism directed itself to the
separation of Muslim Turks from Islam.109
Adhering to the Ottoman principle of din ü devlet (religion and state), Kısakürek saw the
state as a composition of order and institutions which were established in accordance with
the believed religion. To him, a state that separated from beliefs (religion) could not be
thought and there was no any example of this nihilistic, not laic understanding.110 On the
issue of the interplay between state and Islam, he was also certain that there would not be
any separation between these two. Simply because of the organic togetherness between
Islam and state, Islam could not leave aside an institution which meant the will of society.
People was the appearence (zahir) of the right (hak) and the right was the hidden (zahir) of
people in Islam; therefore, the only criteria for the Islamic state was the Right (God).
Sovereignty belonged to the Right not to the people.111 The freedom of people in Islam
could be realized by the submission to the Right in its most perfect form. Islam combined
the most developed statism with the most advanced freedom within the same place and
time. Regarding the forms of government, Kısakürek made it clear that “there is no any
type of rule in Islam but the spirit of rule. Lofty and freed Islam has no connection with the
simple and primitive types of rule...such as sultanate, republic and so on.”112 Islam prefers
one individual’s sovereignty who became enslaved to the Right to the rule of unlimited
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freedom. But of course, the rule of meşveret (shura), composed of the society’s
outstanding representatives was perceived as superior to others.113
From the spiritual foundations of rule in Islam, the main principle was an ordered system
under the leadership of a great and central personality who was selected by all the nation
and the society, like the order of praying. The state under the leadership of this personality,
who called as “ulü-l emr” was the most advanced form of rule in respect to other types of
state and rule, being alien to personal despotism (nefsani saltanat). The head of Islamic
state was the most perfect and developed Muslim personality within the society, lower
than the prophet.114 This description of a head of Islamic state had a close resemblance to
both Mawerdi’s theory of caliphate and al-Farabi’s head of virtous city.115
The form of state and rule to which the Great East ideology advocated itself was the most
advanced version of republic. Despite of his reservations and critiques on democray,
Kısakürek repeatedly expressed his positive view about republic as a type of state.116 The
same attitude can be seen in his presentation of an ideal state, Başyücelik devleti which
constituted indeed a republican reading of the jurisdic theory of caliphate. Here, an Islamist
attitude of Islamizing western concepts by the usage of classical terms worked and
Kısakürek argued that republic in the sense of people’s rule was an order of God by the
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verse of shura. But this republic might take a form of the despotism of intellectuals’ shura
(entellektüeller şurası) for the rule of the truth.117 His Islamist conceptualization of republic
that contained some anti-democratic features also put the stress on order and devotion to an
idea. As a continuation of his belief that Islam inherited good aspects of all political
ideologies, he came to regard the Fascist and Nazist emphasis on the order, tied to the
superior idea (üstün fikre bağlı nizam) as Islamic in nature though he denounced the
violence of these regimes in the practice.118 State was an institution of people in a truely
Islamic country, but it did not take people’s opinion with regard to the application of
Islamic principles, since the sovereignty belonged to the God and the people submitted to
Him as well.119
In his novel, Aynadaki Yalan, he gave an application of Sufism into the society in order to
reach at the expected order of humanity. First step was the (spritual) annihilation of people
in superior human beings while the second step was the establishment of a new order of
state and rule which might be called as the aristocracy of intellectuals (münevverler
aristokrasisi).120 On the issue of human being’s caliphate to God, he connected the Sufi
understanding of reaching spiritual perfection to the modern view of dominating over
nature. Human being was the caliph of God both materially (in dominating over nature)
and spiritually (in reaching at God through spiritual perfection).121
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6.5.2 Nine Principles: Ideological Framework of an Ideal State
Kısakürek’s ideology of the Great East rested on the nine basic principles which
constituted the major ideological principles of his ideal state; Başyücelik state: spiritualism
(ruhçuluk), qualitativism (keyfiyetçilik)122, personalism (şahsiyetçilik)123, moralism
(ahlakçılık), nationalism (milliyetçilik)124, regulationism in capital and property (sermaye
ve mülkiyette tedbircilik), communitarianism (cemiyetçilik)125, orderism (nizamcılık),
interventionism (müdahalecilik). Although Kısakürek’s formulation of Büyük Doğu was
initially more imbued with the spiritualist leanings but he did not pursue his emphasis on
spiritualism very far and directed his mind to the task of reviving Islamism in a new epoch,
spiritualism, among these nine principles, had been the most significant one in his
ideological system. Interestingly enough, the spiritualist attitude in his ideology could
explain both the development of Islamist discourse from Sufism and the western influence
on his ideas. For the first observation, it is true to say that before his meeting with the
Nakshibendi shaikh, Abdulhakim Arvasi in 1934, Kısakürek had a
religious/mystical/spiritual sensitivity.126 His deep involvement with Sufism led him to the
formation of a new ideology, the Great East by ideologization of Islam.
The idealist and spiritualist philosophers and themes of the West found an access to
Kısakürek’s ideology via the same spiritualist aspect: Socrates, Plato, Henri Bergson,
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Maurice Blondel, action, existensialism, symbolism, mysticism. The western influence on
Kısakürek was apparent especially in his works regarding literature and poetry.127 The
early spiritualist element of resisting to the positivist and materialist mind left its place, in
Kısakürek’s ideas, to the attempt of combining the material with the spiritual in the
optimum of Islam. Later, the spiritualist discourse constituted a mantle to his Islamist
ideas.128 Actually, the influence of the above mentioned western philosophers and schools
on Kısakürek did not take the form of following one philosopher or one school but rather
in the form of selective appropriation of some concepts and ideas to be used in the
construction of his Islamist ideology. For example, Blondel’s concept of “action”129, the
notion of existence and Bergson’s130 definition of nationalism and spiritualism/mysticism
were employed but could not colour all the ideological system of Kısakürek. Here, it
would be correct to argue that one might not find Kısakürek’s ideas as greatly inspired
from one philosopher or school. Rather, it is true to say that similar to his exposition of
Islamic ideology as the combination of the good aspects of modern ideologies, he tended
to take what seemed to him appropriate for his purposes.
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Given the pivotal role of Islam, spiritualism connoted the religious spiritualism which has
its “line of horizon” (ufuk çizgisi) in Islamic “conceptualization of God” (Allahçılık). The
spiritualist attitude which drew attention to the limitations (insufficiency) of observation
and experience by the five senses were tied to the existence and supremacy of a higher
being, God and his religion, Islam. This kind of spiritualism was a total submission to God
and to his prophet. In the age of spiritual crisis in the world, Kısakürek was offering an
Islamic spiritualism as the way of salvation to all humanity.131 His spiritualist priciple did
not omit the issue of the machine which gave its name to the twentieth century. He
denounced the dominance of machine/material over the spiritual, seeing the world war two
as the manifestation of the crisis which emanated from the glorification of the machine.
But on the whole, Kısakürek did not oppose to man’s control over nature through
technology since human being was created by God as his caliph in the earth to dominate
things and events. Seen from this angle, the machine and technology were deemed as
useful if they were in the service of the spirit or Islam. Learning from the West in this
respect, had to be in the nature of comprehending this western crisis and appropriating the
institutions that made the machine. That was making the machine which produce
machine.132
Moralism, by defining the crisis of humanity as a crisis of morality was the glorification of
Islamic morality by an emphasis on Sufism’s search for a morally perfect man.133
                                                
131 Kısakürek, “Ruhçuluk.” [Spiritualism] BD. 1st year, vol. II, number 19 (January 18,
1944): 2. According to Kısakürek, the notions of fatherland, nation, family, love,
mercy, honor, heroism were the goods of the spiritualist cadres.
132 Kısakürek,”Makine ve Harp.” [Machine and War] (June 29, 1939) in Çerçeve 1. 146-
147; “Kurtarıcı Hikmet.” [Saviour Wisdom] BD. 6th year, number 29 (October 6,
1950): 2; “Makine ve İslam.”[Machine and Islam] BD. 28th year, 15. period, number
14 (April 7, 1971): 2 and “Makineyi Anlamak.” 14; Türkiyeninı. 62-65.
133 Kısakürek, “Ahlakçılık.” [Moralism] BD. 1st year, vol. II, number 20 (January 25,
1944): 2.
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Rejecting unlimited, excessive individual capital and property, the principle of
regulationism in capital and property would allow the right of property to individual in
every field of work but on the condition that it would not exploit other labour measures.
This economic understanding constitute the elimimation of the evil sides of socialism and
capitalism while approriating their good sides.134 The sense of order, partly inspired from
modern ideologies and partly inspired from the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition, had a
significant place in Kısakürek’s ideological expositions. His ideal state and society showed
a high level of orderism. Order was not an aim but a means that had a dominating power
over the aims. From a Sufi perspective, he found an order in every part of the universe and
came to conclude that: “in the world, we can accept neither a single order without idea and
movement nor a single idea/movement without order.” Order was a manifestation of the
spirit upon the material.135
The last of the nine principles, interventionism was an individual’s submission of his right
of supervision (murakabe hakkı) to the instrument of a community which would secure
him more perfectly than himself. By a more advanced form of statism (devletçilik),
interventionism was to believe in the superiority of father in competence over his son,
husband over wife, doctor over patient and society over individual and was also to institute
the instrument of the competence of social supervision in an organic way that established a
balance between society and individual.136
                                                
134 Kısakürek, “Sermaye ve Mülkiyette Tedbircilik.” [Regulationism in Capital and
Property] BD. 1st year, vol. II, number 35 (June 28, 1946): 2.
135 Kısakürek, “Nizamcılık.” [Orderism] BD. 1st year, vol. II, number 25 (March 31,
1944): 2. The idea of order coloured Kısakürek’s mind to the extent that he, in one
occasion, said: “My adherence to order is comparable to nothing...Islam is totaly an
order” quoted by Kabaklı, Sultanü’ş-Şuara. 133.
136 Kısakürek, “Müdahalecilik.” [Interventionism] BD. 1st year, vol. II, number 26 (April
7, 1944): 2.
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Kısakürek’s interventionism was an attempt to clear up the spirit of democracy who had
been depressed by the excessive individual freedom, from all negative poles. This kind of
interventionism had the claim of both escalating individual authority and enslaving it to the
ideal through intervening in every field of the individual life. This organic understanding
envisioned the supremacy of two things; true freedom (being a slave to the truth) and
absolute submission of the individual to the eternal divine laws, while denouncing two
things; unlimited freedom and despotism.137 Indeed these moralist and elitist principles
were concretized in his formulation of an ideal state: Başyücelik Devleti.
6.5.3 Başyücelik Devleti as an Islamic Nation-State
In a similar vein to the Islamist emphasis on the moral purposes of the state, as discussed
in the previous chapters, Kısakürek put the stress on the goals of any rule not on its form.
Any rule that committed to the Islamic principles could be a form of state in the Islamic
revolution whether it was a sultanate or republic.138 Kısakürek’s own formulation of an
ideal state, Başyücelik devleti was a type of state which represented a perfectness by
embracing the good aspects of three types of state: absolute rule (mutlakiyet), republic and
one party dictatorship; while leaving their bad aspects aside. In other words, Başyücelik
devleti would comprise the good aspects of Plato’s “Republic,” Nietzsche’s “superman,”
Aristo’s state and Marx’s classless state but would exclude their harmful dimensions.139
Başyücelik Devleti was heavily centralized and totalistic, which implied that not only the
distribution of political and economic resources within the polity but also the social,
                                                
137 Ibid.
138 Kısakürek, “Devlet.” [State] BD. 5th year, number 11 (December 23, 1949): 2; Büyük
Doğuya Doğru. 104-106. Kısakürek also regarded başyücelik devleti as the most
advanced form of republic by denying any accusation of being a supporter of sultanate
regime.
139 Kısakürek, “Teşkilat ve İdare.” [Aministration and Rule] BD. 6th year, number 32
(October 27, 1950): 2, 11; Büyük Doğuya Doğru. 102-103.
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cultural, artistic and moral life of society should come under the scrutiny of the state. One
may find many similarities between Kısakürek’s idealization of state and society in
İdeolocya Örgüsü (ideological web) and Plato’s ideal state in the ‘Republic.’ In Popperian
sense, like Plato’s republic, Kısakürek’s conceptualization of ideal state and society
offered a version of a closed and totalitarian system. In addition to the paramount influence
of western totalitarian conceptions of state, Kısakürek’s başyücelik devleti bore marks of
both jurisdic theory of caliphate and al-Farabi’s ideal city.
True to his strong reservations on the notion of national sovereignty, in Kısakürek’s
opinion, the political hegemony belonged to the aristocracy of intellectuals while the
sovereignty (in absolute terms) belonged to God. In order to elevate people to the level of
“real sovereignty” which went beyond selfish considerations, sovereignty had to be
subjected to the truth and had to be tied to the will of intellectuals in Başyücelik devleti
otherwise there was no way ouf of the crisis which human being had been experiencing in
the twentieth century.140
Başyücelik devleti was consisted of mainly six parts: Yüceler Kurultayı, Başyüce,
Başyücelik hükümeti, Yüce Din Dairesi, Halk Divanı, Başyücelik Akademyası. Yüceler
Kurultayı, which might be called as “the authority of true intellectuals” was situated in a
position that national assemblies occupied in democratic regimes. Similar to a parliament,
Yüceler Kurultayı had been the place where the all decisions of political community were
taken in accordance with laws. But every law as a practical edict of an ideological mind,
had been connected to the main principle, implying sharia. Tied to the notion that
“sovereignty belonged to the Right,” this assembly would be the enslavement to the truth
in the hands of “superior human beings” who never had selfish interests and who were
                                                
140 Kısakürek, “Teşkilat,” 2, 11.
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faithful to God and His sharia.141 Since it rejected unlimited freedom, Yüceler Kurultayı
could not accept the claim that “nation wishes it in this way” and could not allow the
despotism of quantity/majority over the quality.142 His elitist conceptualization of the
parliament was similar to the Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period who thought
legislation as the work of the most competent and learned men. Both the Islamists and
Kısakürek seemed to translate the medieval notion of ehl-i hal ve’l akd into a modern
institution; a parliament. But the limitations of the medieval formulation were still there:
morality, learning and competence.
Like the qualifications of an ideal authority in the caliphate theory, Başyüce was the prime
example of his nation, being at a higher level of morality, knowledge and intelligence.
Given his non-selfish attitude, he was entitled to a high level of authority which did not
contradict with the laws, prescribed by Yüceler Kurultayı. By a reference to the concept of
“Ulülemr” in Islamic political terminology, Kısakürek envisioned başyüce as “an ideal
person.”who was not only the executive but also the judiciary. He could change
governments by his one command since all government officials acted in his name. Justice
was also distributed by his name. 143
Reminding the office of şeyhül-islam within the structure of Ottoman state, in Kısakürek’s
başyücelik devleti, there existed another institution, called as Yüce Din Dairesi which
voiced the knowledge and conscience regarding government policies and which was
selected by başyüce. Apart from its duties of internal and external propaganda, religious
education, cadres and waqfs, this department, would act as a major center of consultation
                                                
141 Kısakürek,”Yüceler Kurultayı.” [Assembly of Exalted] BD. 1st year, vol. II, number 38
(July 19, 1946): 2; İdeolocya, 1st edition. 253-256.
142 Ibid.
143 Kısakürek, “Başyüce.” [HeadExalted] BD. 1st year, vol. II, number 40 (August 2,
1946): 2; İdeolocya, 1st edition, 258-260.
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for the state. In fact, this place given to the religious men was complemented by the
necessity that the spirit of this institution would be internalized by all state and government
institutions as well.144
Kısakürek envisioned a highly ordered and disciplined state that had a complex and
penetrating organization into every sides of societal and individual life. State had to create
and impose on society and individual what was good and had to remove totally what was
evil. Moreover, society and individual were depicted as morally ordered and disciplined
entities. In other words, societal and individual life were full of morality, prutanism,
principles and ideals. Every aspect and institution of life from city, mosque to schools,
highways, army and to courts were portrayed as being in the perfect forms.145 Kısakürek’s
ideal formulation of state were strictly based on the Orthodox reading of sharia, especially
for measures of punishment without mentioning its name.146
                                                
144 Kısakürek, “Hükümetin 11 Davası.” [Eleven Issue of the Government] BD. 1st year,
vol. II, number 42 (August 16, 1946): 2; İdeolocya 1st edition. 263-266.
145 See Kısakürek, “Başyücelikte Umumi Manzara.” [General Panaroma in Başyücelik]
BD. 1st year, vol. II, number 47 (September 20, 1946): 2; İdeolocya 1st edition. 276-
278. Moral duties of state was emphasized by Kısakürek to the extent that he even
offered an establishment of police institution for pleasure, beauty and training (terbiye
ve zevk zabıtası) see, “Başyücelik Emirleri-Terbiye ve Zevk Murakabesi.”
[Commands of Başyücelik:Good Manners and Control of Pleasure] BD. 7th year,
number 45 (January 26, 1951): 2.
146 Punishment was strict and severe. For example, in every kind of theft, measure of
punishment was to cut the handle of thief, or those who made adultery were punished
in a public arena, changing according to the marital status; or murderer who killed
someone intentionaly was quickly executed by the principle of retaliation. The
punishment for blasphemy and treachery to the belief of political community and to the
fatherland, including communists was execution. In Kısakürek’s mind, the
implementation of legal punishments was so strict and severe that he even argued that
in order to create the ideal society, if needed, the whole society might be destroyed as
the manifestation of justice and mercy until there remained a nucleus of one ideal man
and woman; see Kısakürek, “Başyücelik Emirleri-Kanun Esaslarımız.” [Commands of
Başyücelik: Our Principles of law] BD. 7th year, number 46 (February 2, 1951): 2 and
“Başyücelikte Ceza Ölçüsü.” [Measure of Punishment in Başyücelik] BD. 1st year, vol.
II, number 46 (September 13, 1946): 2; İdeolocya 1st edition. 273-275.
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The commands of Başyücelik devleti Each command started with the sentence that “after
issuing this command it would be like that” and so on. In general, these commands
included prohibitions and Islamist interpretations of the nation-state institutions. Every
forms of gambling, drinking alcohol and drug, adultery, interest, dancing, statue were
prohibited by başyücelik devleti. Women were to be dressed according to sharia
principles.147 The press, cinema, radio and TRT and university were taken into the close
scrutiny of başyücelik devleti by abolishing their autonomies and freedom. In the ideal
society, there could not be any classes like working/capitalist classes and any antagonism
between workers and patrons. Rather, society was regarded as a moral family in which
workers and patrons came together by the help of Islamic spirit.148 Lastly, the ideal
society/fatherland would be comprised of only Turks and Muslims, expelling Jews,
Greeks, Armenians and dönmeler (member of Jewish community who were converted to
Islam in the 17th century) from the country.149
In order to observe a transformation of the caliphate into an Islamist conceptualization of a
modern/totalitarian nation-state in the hands of Kısakürek, the above analysis of his
                                                
147 See Kısakürek, “Başyücelik Emirleri-Kumar.” [Commands of Başyücelik:Gambling]
BD. 6th year, number 34 (November 10, 1950): 2; “Başyücelik Emirleri-İçki ve Zehir.”
[Commands of Başyücelik: Drink and Poisiton] BD. 6th year, number 36 (November
24, 1950): 2; “Başyücelik emirleri-Zina ve Fuhuş.” [Commands of Başyücelik:
Adultery and Prostitution] BD. 6th year, number 35 (November 17, 1950): 2;
”Başyücelik Emirleri-Faiz.” [Commands of Başyücelik:Interest] BD. 7th year, number
52 (March 16, 1951): 2; ”Başyücelik Emirleri-Dans.” [Commands of Başyücelik:
Dance] BD. 7th year, number 48 (January 16, 1951): 2; “Başyücelik Emirleri-Heykel.”
[Commands of Başyücelik:Statue] BD. 7th year, number 51 (March 9, 1951): 2;
“Başyücelik Emirleri-Kadın Kılığı.” [Commands of Başyücelik: Women Dressing]
BD. 7th year, number 43 (January 12, 1951): 2.
148 Kısakürek, “Başyücelik Emirleri-İşçi.” [Commands of Başyücelik: Worker] BD. 15th
period, number 4 (January 24, 1971): 2; “Başyücelik Emirleri-Sermaye ve Patron.”
[Commands of Başyücelik: Capitan and Patron] BD. 15th period, number 5 (February
3, 1971): 2.
149 Kısakürek, İdeolocya 1st edition. 314-316.
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başyücelik devleti might be followed by a glance to his attitude towards nationalism and
Turkish nationalism.
6.6 Turkish Nationalism and Turkishness in the Service of Islam
The political ideas of Kısakürek, though couched in nationalist terms and related,
sometimes with visible effort such as the use of a pre-Islamic symbol; grey wolf, to
Turkish nationalism, are of Islamic origin and express nationalist adoption of the medieval
caliphate theory (başyücelik=halife). Kısakürek’s terminology and concepts such as
fatherland, Turkey, Turks, Anatolia, grey wolf150, language and culture were expressed
within the confines of nationalist framework but with the Islamist connotations. For
example, he was clear on the vitality of Turkish language when he voiced his criticism
about both the dominance of Arabic and Persian words over Turkish and the attempt of
language purification in the Republic (uydurukça).151 Like Kemalist nationalism,
Kısakürek’s nationalism, at the beginning more clearly by placing the map of Turkey
within the motto of his journal of Büyük Doğu152, contained territorial features, whether in
the form of Anadoluculuk or in the form of Great east. The Ottoman empire was portrayed
                                                
150 His writings are full of this symbol, for instance see Hitabeler. 139-141. The symbol of
the grey wolf (bozkurt) was denounced as pre-Islamic by the Islamists of the Second
Constitutional period, see SR. “Bozkurt Kafası.” [Head of Grey Wolf] XXIII/584 (17
Kanun-i Sani 1340/10 Cemaziyelahir 1342): 190. Bozkurt as a mythological element
of central Asia was transformed into willow (söğüt ağacı) after the Turkish acceptance
of Islam in Anatolia, and that was the beginning of Turkish life as well. “Mehmetçik.”
[Turkish Soldier] BD. (March 22, 1965) in Çerçeve 3. 136-138.
151 Kısakürek, “Uydurma Dil Felaketi.” [Disaster of Invented Language] BD. 15th period,
number 15 (April 14, 1971): 2; also İdeolocya 5th edition. 386-387. Kısakürek kept its
sensitivity towards the Turkish language and in one occasion, he said that “I give my
speeches in Turkish and tomorrow when I die I will want my forgiveness in Turkish as
well,” quoted by Kabaklı, Sultanü’ş-Şuara. 105.
152 See the issues of Büyük Doğu in 1943, 1945 and 1946.
311
as the Turkish empire when he blamed the Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet for destructing the
national unity of the Turkish nation.153
Kısakürek, after quoting Bergson’s sentence that nationalism is not a mind (or conscience)
but a mental state (Bir şuur değil, bir haldir) came to conclude that nationalism was a
psychology, not an ideology, since a system that did not have something to say for every
nation and for all the humanity could not be an ideology.154 He defined nationhood as
being derived from a nation’s (kavim) spiritual essence within the framework of its own
unique and intellectual disposition (or nature). This spiritual essence was certainly Islam
for Turks. Nationhood was nationhood if it was based on Islam. Since the values of
spiritual contents (a Durkheimian notion), or religion and worldviews could be an ideology
whereas their forms; ethnicity (kavm) and devotion to an ethnicity was a psychology, not
an ideology.155 In this way of putting the matter, Kısakürek attacked Ziya Gökalp’s
reading of Durkheim on the issue of nationalism. Gökalp became unsuccessful even in
copying Durkheim’s conceptualization of nationalism that was concentrated on the
spiritual contents namely religion. But Gökalp tried to transplant the love of race (kavim
sevgisi) in place of the religious emotion (dini heyecan; Islam). The true reading of
Durkheim had to give the importance to Islam in the formation of the nation whereas
Gökalp was an enemy of Islam because of his atempt to replace nationalism with
Islam.156According to Kısakürek, Gökalp’s nationalism was not an ideology but a
                                                
153 Kısakürek, Dünya. 72-3. His counter-revolution to the republic did not entail the
removal of Turkishness from its foundations: ”This house [the Republic] must be
destroyed and restructured from its cellar to its roof, except its foundation: the
Turkishness” see Rapor 1/3. 22.
154 Kısakürek, Konuşmalar. 109-110; Sahte. 295.
155 Kısakürek, Sahte. 295.
156 Kısakürek, “İdeal.” [Ideal] BD. 15th period, number 16 (April 21, 1971): 3; Türkiyenin.
33; Batı. 77-78; Hesaplaşma. 92; Son Devrin. 6. Kısakürek named Gökalp’s ideas on
turkicization of worship as unbelief after quoting the famous poem, “A land where the
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psychology based on racism while his ideal of Turan also had the defect of attributing a
mystic identity to the fatherland which was in reality a concrete space.157
Nationalism could be positive only if it was placed in the service of Islam or if it emanated
from Islamic essences. Racism (kavmiyetçilik or ırkçılık) of any kind had to rejected. His
argument that someone was a Turk only if he/she was a Muslim had been the favorite one
for decades in his writings on nationalism.158 He did not attribute a supremacy to the
Turkish race and even on another occassion he was more explicit: “there can not be a
claim of racism for the moralist Turkish youth (mukaddesatçı Türk gençliği) and if I have
to choose a supreme race, I would prefer Arabs of the past.”159 Kısakürek warned that the
concept of the nation originally meant the followers of a belief in general, the followers of
Islam in particular. Seen from this perspective, there was only one Islamic nation,
composed of different races such as Turks and Arabs.160
“True nationalism” of the Great East, one of its basic nine principles concentrated on the
spirit and essence of a community by going beyond the conditions of race and land. Turk
                                                                                                                                         
call to prayer from the mosque is recited in Turkish...” see Sahte. 87-88. Kısakürek
also criticized Nihal Atsız because of his special attention to the pre-Islamic origins of
Turks, see Babıali. 393-394. Moreover, Kısakürek tried to transform the Turkish
nationalism represented by the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Upon the advice of
Kısakürek, Alparslan Türkeş declared publicly his party’s commitment to Islam based
turkish nationalism before 1977 elections in order to get Kısakürek’s support.
157 Kısakürek, Batı. 79; Rapor 1/3. 89. Kısakürek’s early evaluations of Ziya Gökalp were
actually positive. Gökalp had been the first and only Turkish thinker who understood
the West and tried to present a system of thought, since the Tanzimat. Although he
differentiated his understanding of nationalism from Gökalp’s one, Kısakürek, in this
period, seemed more inclined to nationalism than his later Islamism. He spoke of
Gökalp’s place in the creation of a “consciousness of Turk, Turkish and Turkey,” see
“Manzara 5.” Ağaç. 8 (May 23, 1936): 1, 3.
158 Kısakürek, Sahte. 311-312. In this way, he also stated that “ we are Turkist of Turks
whom accepted Islam“ Biz İslamı kabul ettikten sonra Türkün Türkçüsüyüz), Batı. 79.
159 Kısakürek, “Beklenen Zuhur.” [Expected Emergence] 1975 in Hitabeler. 257.
313
was consisted of a spiritual tissue with one character within the peculiarities of a certain
belief, devotion, thinking, intitution, rememberance, impression, behaviour and indication.
It was a unity built around a certain belief, morality, thinking, quality, imagination,
memoirs, character, manner and language. The cover of this “absolute and independent
spiritual tissue” was Anatolia.161 Hence, Turkish nationalism contained two elements:
Islam and the Turkish race. The former one was universal and dominating while the latter
was dependent and valuable if it was in the service of the spiritual element, Islam like in
the metaphor of crescent (Islam) and star (Turk) in the Turkish flag.162 Kısakürek, in the
exposition of his utopia, the expected Islamic revolution, regarded nationalism as a matter
of spirit, essence and time but not as a matter of form, material and space. In Islamic
revolution, nationalism had to confine itself in accordance with the limits of Islam, that
was to say that it was a “limited nationalism” (sınırlı milliyetçilik) or “permitted
nationalism” (izinli milliyetçilik). The nationalism of the revolution, after accepting Islam
as the source of spirit for humanity was an idea of superiority as a sign of merit in the
competiton of realizing this spirit among the ethnicities.163
Nationalism was not an institution (müessise) that to be rejected in Islam. By reference to
the prophet’s saying that people could not be blamed for the love he/she felt towards
his/her ethnicity (kavm), Kısakürek gave a significant place to the reality of race or
ethnicity simply because it was the race, Turks that would reflect and realize the ideals of
                                                                                                                                         
160 Zabıt Katibi, “Din-Millet-Şeriat.” [Religion-Nation-Sharia] BD. 28th year, 15th period,
number 16 (April 21, 1971): 5.
161 Büyük Doğu, “Milliyetçilik.” [Nationalism] BD. number 24 (August 14, 1959): 2. see
also İdeolocya 1st edition. 334-336.
162 Kısakürek, Hitabeler. 184-186.
163 Kısakürek, “İslam İnkilabında Milliyet.” [Nationality in Islamic Revolution] BD. 5th
year, number 13 (January 6, 1950): 2; Büyük Doğuya Doğru. 113-114.
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Islam.164 Kısakürek emphasised the special attributes of Turkish race (as pure race, saf ve
temiz ırk) and sometimes spoke of Outside Turks (Dış Türkler) without panTurkist appeals
but with a view to Turkism in the service of Islam, demonstrating much concern on the
leading role of Turkey within Islamic world in the past and in the future as well. Islam after
the decline of Arabs, regained its brightness in the hands of a pure race, called as Turks. 165
He frequently spoke and wrote of Turks as the representative of the East (especially in the
personality of the Ottoman Empire) upon the challenge of the West or as the people who
would achieve the revival of the Great East. The Turkish nation was expected to find a
way to save firstly itself, and in the second stage, all the East and lastly all the humanity
simply by the advocation to Islam. That was indeed the way of the divine fate whether
Turks were aware of this fact or not.166 It was a just dream to expect the Islamic revival
from other Muslim countries. Given the historical privilege to Turks by the devine will,
other muslim countries had been in a position of recognizing Turks as their model without
being able to establish a state since the fall of Islamic Arab empire. It was only Turks who
showed the ability of establishing the everlasting state (devlet-i ebed müddet) and it had
survived until the seventeeth century.167
In fact, Kısakürek’s Islamism was coloured by the supremacy of Turks and Turkey (hakim
millet) among Islamic nations by a reference to the leading role of the Ottoman state. The
western attack over the Ottoman empire in the world war one destroyed more or less
                                                
164 Kısakürek, Sahte. 311-312.
165 Kısakürek, Doğru. 161-2,
166 Ibid.
167 Kısakürek, “Ancak Burada Düzelirse.” [If only it is Put into right here] BD. (April 7,
1978) in Çerçeve 5. 47; see also İdeolocya 5th edition. 420-2. His attribution of the
leading role to Turkey in the revival of the East reminds us the Kemalist
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achieved unity of Muslims under the leadership of Turks through the caliphate. The
destruction of Islamic unity had been furthered by Turkey’s abolition of caliphate and
secularizing reforms. Thus, the revival of Islamic world would start from Turkey where
Muslims’ position deterioriated and then would spread to the rest of the Islamic world.168
The development of Islam had to commence by movements of idea and action in every
Islamic country. The next step was the spiritual, social, economic and political unity of the
Islamic world against the West.169 It was clear that this way of thinking accepted the
necessities of nation-state system in envisioning an Islamic unity. But what was more
important to our purposes here was the openly spoken supremacy of Turks in the expected
unity of Muslims. One might note that this mood was different than the Ottoman sense of
superiority in the service of Islam but it contained marks of nationalist thinking.
The Turkish acceptance of Islam was the exit from the darkness of the history and the
Ottoman Empire, in his eyes, came to constitute “the most perfect balance between Islam
and national structure”, or the “realization of true civilization”. Only after Islam, Turks
were able to institutionalize their nation, society, state and human being.170 On the other
hand, he mentioned one essential failure for the Turkish nation: not being able to create a
Turkish thinker, or philosopher (mütefekkir) at a level of the world, like Muhyiddin-i
Arabi, Al-Ghazzali, Imam Rabbani.171
                                                                                                                                         
intellelligentsia’s perception of Turkey as the source of inspiration for the liberation of
the Third World countries.
168 Kısakürek, İdeolocya 5th edition. 420-422; Rapor 1/3. 137.
169 Kısakürek, Rapor 7/9. 127.
170 Kısakürek, “Oluş.”[Being] BD. 1st year, number 7 (October 29, 1943): 2; Büyük
Doğuya Doğru. 35-36; “Tarih,” 1.
171 Kısakürek, “Sebep.” [Reason] BD. 1st year, number 8 (November 5, 1943): 2; Büyük
Doğuya Doğru. 37-38.
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Kısakürek persistently expressed in his belief in the wisdom of Turkish nation that was
more advanced than its false intellectuals (sözde aydınlar). This populist element in
Kısakürek’s nationalism led himself to the conclusion that the secret nation (gizli
millet)who had the order of good, truth and beauty in her spirit and who must be trusted in
this respect, understood him and his ideology.172 This trust in the nation was
complemented by his ideas on Anatolism. In his early literature based writings, which
were of a Bergsonian and spiritualist nature, Kısakürek considered Büyük Doğu (or
nationalism) in the context of Anadoluculuk (Anatolism), a kind of Turkish nationalism
around the concrete territory of Anatolia rather than the abstract idea of Turan. Given the
spiritualist tendency in his early writings (poets, plays such as Tohum), Anadoluculuk
constituted a transitional ideological period173 in Kısakürek’s search for the ideology of the
Great East. To him, Anadoluculuk, as a narrow view, was an expression of the hatred
which stemmed from being deprived and from simple emotional devotion to the land. 174
This did not mean that he dropped the terms of Anatolism in the expression of his
understanding of nationalism; rather he incorporated the term Anadolu into the general
framework of the Great East. The dichotomy of Rumeli and Anadolu gained a significance
in explaining the betrayal of Anatolia by the false heroes of Rumeli, beyond Selaniko.
Anatolia had been exploited and enslaved by these false heroes since the Tanzimat.175 The
real Anatolism which was far from being a matter of land, signified the internalization of
Anatolia’s spirit in the individual, society and state.176 Anatolia was depicted firstly as the
                                                
172 Kısakürek, “Burdur’dan Mektup.” [Letter from Burdur] BD. (March 17, 1965) in
Çerçeve 3. 130-131.
173 He published his early poets in the journal of Anadolu see Ülken, Türkiye’de. 479.
174 Kısakürek, Kafa. 193.
175 Kısakürek, “Anadolu ve Anadoluculuk.” [Anatolia and Anatolism] BD. number 21
(July 24, 1959): 1, 16 also in Başmakalelerim 1. 230-234 and Para. 145-146.
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source of the spiritualist revival (War of Independence) against the encroachements of the
Western “machine civilization,” later as the land where the Islamic revival would flourish.
In other words, the ideology of the Great East would find its land in Anatolia and would
bring back the personality, will and “true civilization” to Turks.177 Despite being a land of
many different civilizations, Kısakürek Islamized the sense of Anatolia to the extent that it
was a land of martyr and saints. Anatolia, defined as the bed of Islamic umma represented
the real element which followed the mission of Islam as an action all over the world.178
Kısakürek’s combination of Islam and Turkisness, as Özdalga179 perceptively states, might
be regarded a forerunner of Turkish-Islamic synthesis despite the very early signs of this
synthesis in the Second Constitutional Period, as I exposed in the previous chapters.
In Kısakürek’s conceptualization of political community, Turkishness, with its language
and culture and the Sunni Islamic faith were among the dominat elements of membership
in this respect. In the era of transition to multiparty politics in 1950 when Kısakürek
presented a wide range of counter-arguments to the Kemalist historical writing, he
denounced the Kemalist oppression of Zazas who were of Turkish origin, in Dersim.180
The reduction of Kurds to a branch of Turks came to recognize the existence of a Kurdish
ethnicity at the end of 1970s. There had remained nothing except from the state’s police
power in the region since religion has been left aside in the Republic: “those who say I am
Turk by leaving Islam give the right to Kurds to say I am Kurd”. The question of Kurdish
                                                                                                                                         
176 Kısakürek, Kafa. 194.
177 Kısakürek, “Anadolu,” 1.
178 Kısakürek, “Harim-i İsmet.” [Innermost Shrine] BD. 6th year, number 37 (December 1,
1950): 2 also in Çerçeve 2. 176-177.
179 Özdalga, “Tasavvuf,” 190.
180 People of Dersim came from Akkoyunlu descent were pure Turks, but wrongly called
as Kurds see Dedektif X Bir, “Doğu Faciası.” [The Eastern Calamity] BD. 6th year,
number 18 (February 10, 1950): 3, 15.
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community broke out at a time when the total failure of the “story” of Turkish revolution
became clear.181
Kısakürek’s attitude towards Alevi communty was an illustrative example of his orthodox
Sunnism and reminded us the classical attitude of the Ottoman “center” towards the
“periphery.” Unfortunately, in the Sunni Ottoman empire, it did not become possible to get
rid of the heretic religious movements such as Alevis, Durzis and Yezidis, despite the
Islamic attempts of the three sultans; Fatih, Yavuz and II. Abdul hamid.182 Alevis as a
heretic sect had always been open to the exploitation by the anti-religious movements.
Alevis, like in the destruction of Islamic principles by the so called revolution, had not
shown any iderct or indirect recation to this destruction but rather they had remained
indifferent to their exploitation. What was to be done was to sunnify the Turkish Alevis
through culture and persuasion.183
                                                
181 Kısakürek, Rapor 4/6. 109.
182 Kısakürek, Doğru. 109, 77.
183 Ibid., 77.
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CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I have argued that Islamism constitutes a spectrum that covers different
positionings in relation to the conceptualizations of state and democracy from
authoritarian/totalitarian tendencies to democratic interpretations. That is to say that there
are many Islamist discourses within an ideological spectrum called as Islamism, given
their specific historical, local, political, socio-economic realities. Islamism as an ideology
or a wide set of political discourses is derived from different particular/specific
understandings of Islam, being open to reformulations. That is, an ideological material for
the Islamist constructions are provided by different readings of the Islamic text/tradition
and history of Islamic civilization to meet the needs of the time. Hence, both modern and
medieval conceptions of Islam and Islamisms are based on some specific readings and
translations of the text and the Islamic historical experience into contemporary notions.
Following this line of thinking, I claim in this dissertation that the major problematic of the
Islamist intellectuals is how Muslims could be authentic/Islamic and modern at the same
time. Islamist aspiration for the golden age of the early Islam is not a will to return back to
the past, but rather it might be understood as an intention of joining with the adventure of
modernity by advancing a specific/native version of modernity, Islamic modernity. With
the urgent need of responding to the challenge of the West, they urged for the revitalization
of Islamic civilization. The notion of Islamic civilization has constituted a useful
framework for coping with the challenge of modernity and for meeting the need of a true
Islamic life as connected with the necessity of a meaningful response to the western
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supremacy (modernity). Moreover, Islamists intellectually embraced the concept of
civilization not only to criticize the modernization movements in the Islamic world and to
underline the moral decadence of the West but also to express their quest for a new
paradigm. In other words, the employment of the civilization concept aims to go beyond
western modernity and to find an alternative to it. Seen in this light, indeed, the concept of
Islamic civilization contribute not only to the ideologization of Islam but also to learning
from the West withouıt losing authentic features of Islam. I have also suggested that
Islamist discourses around the concept of Islamic civilization could be seen as attempts of
recreating/reinventing an Islamic tradition/traditions and as a contribution to a plural
conceptualization/internalization of the experience of modernity.
As delineated throughout the thesis, Islamist intellectuals mainly argued that Islam was not
an obstacle to progress and civilization but on the contrary, Muslims were backward since
they had lost the true nature of Islam and departed from the true Islamic principles (sharia)
and from the early practice. The influence of pre-Islamic traditions (superstition) and
abandonment of ijtihad should be added to the list of the reasons for the decline of Islamic
civilization. In explaining the reasons for the decline, a Republican Islamist, Kısakürek
also shared the mainline Islamist conviction that this mainly stemmed from the influence
of pre/un-Islamic traditions, and the departure of Muslims from the true Islamic principles
(sharia) and from the practices of the early Islam. Unlike the Islamist trend in the Young
Ottomans and in the second constitutional period, Kısakürek’s interest in the discussion of
the decline was not directed to prove that Islam was not an obstacle to progress and
civilization but rather to the presentation of Islam as containing the positive sides of the
modern political ideologies.
Again, to criticize Tanzimat reforms as the superficial westernization without
understanding fully Western civilization has been a common theme in the history of
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Turkish intellectual thought, starting from the Young Ottomans to Ziya Gökalp1 and to
Islamists both in the second constitutional period and in the republican period. The
imitative nature of Ottoman-Turkish modernization movement without taking into account
the Ottoman/Turkish nation’s own hars (culture)was presented by Islamists as an illness
which would have resulted in further decline. Reading the process of Turkish
modernization as the history of decline and further decline, Kısakürek also crticized it for
imitating the West without proper understanding of its foundations and its spirit and
without conserving the spiritual roots of the Turkish society. Certainly this time,
Kısakürek, faced with the Kemalist official historical writing, had to present an alternative
reading of the Turkish modernization process as a framework of a new ideology.
But on the other hand, it is also true to say that Turkish intellectuals, on the whole,
accepted the Tanzimat’s basic conviction that Turkey should learn from the West,
certainly differing on the vital issue of what should be taken from the West according to
their ideological stand as Islamist, Turkist or Westernist. Nineteenth century’s dominant
concepts of “civilization” and “progress” were conceptualized by Islamists in a way that
might be instrumental in adopting the positive (good) sides of the Western modernity
which were seen in accordance with the Islamic principles. The necessity of learning from
the West was justified by the conviction that modern western civilization was the inheritor
of Islamic civilization. Their response to the Western challenge was romantic that they
presented true Islam as something containing all the “good” elements that were operative
in the rise of the West. They were keen to use Western political institutions as a lever for
the revitalization of Islamic civilization. The narrative on “civilization” provided a terrain
for Islamists to present Islamic civilization as a real and universal civilization which was
immune from the shortcomings of western civilization. Islamic civilization was, prescribed
                                                
1 See Heyd, Foundations. 74-78.
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by sharia, based on cooperation, right, justice and virtue whereas the western one was
established on might and interest. All in all, it might be said that Islamist intellectuals
shared the belief that Islam and modernity are compatible, once both are properly
understood. The compatibility of religion and science, the concept of ijtihad as to pave way
for the adoption of new ideas and institutions was a manifestation of the Islamist desire to
advance an Islamic modernity.
From Islamizing “Progress” to the Ideologization of Islam: Necip Fazıl Kısakürek
Kısakürek stood in the same Islamist line that had spoken the need of a selective blending
of Islamic values and some modern notions and he gave basic lines of how this selection
was to be made and to be imposed upon society. Like Islamists of the second constitutional
period, he called for the appropriation of the accepted efforts of progress in order to
establish a new (ideal) city of Baghdad. Selective appropriation of the good aspects of the
West was regarded as the appropriate way for the goal of creating the Turkish own culture
or culturalization (the call of modernization from within). Reminding the Islamist
admiration of the western material progress, Kısakürek often paid attention to the western
domination over nature and development of positive sciences as a duty of Muslims to be
accomplished. The place given to the idea and science by the West was highly appreciated.
Both Islamists in the second constitutional period and Kısakürek stated that Islamic
civilization was the major sources of inspiration for the European Renaissance by being
the channel of transfer for the Greek classical texts to Europe.
A major point of difference between Islamists and Kısakürek appeared in the
conceptualization of the true Islam. As a result of the emphasis on the compatibility
between Islam and reason and progress (Islam as a natural religion), Islamists of the
second constitutional period tried to clear up the distorted understandings of Islam by
reconstructing all the religious schools of Islam through opening the gate of ijtihad.
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Although Kısakürek also spoke of rediscovering the true understanding of Islam in order
to reactivate Turkish Muslims, he rejected the idea of opening the gate of interpretation
and the unification of schools of law, but thought that the rediscovery of the Islamic truths
was enough. To do this, he conducted a two-fold campaign: on the one hand, he tried to
prove that Islam contained, in essence, all the good aspects of modern political ideologies
such as liberalism, communism and fascism; on the other, rejected modernist and reformist
interpretations of Islam as depicted by Afghani-Abduh line, fearing that this line would
distort the authenticity of Islamic beliefs and principles.
On another level, Kısakürek’s emphasis on human domination over the nature as
something Islamic was indeed very much in the spirit of the Enlightenment. One may say
that despite his insistence on a classical Sunni understanding of Islam which subjected
reason to the text, Kısakürek, by his effort to present Islam as a coherent ideology to offer
solutions for all problems, contributed more or less to the rationalization of religion which
is a part of modernity. Thus, in Kısakürek’s Islamism, a modernist approach was subjected
to his traditionalist sensitivity of keeping the medieaval, Sunni orthodox understanding of
Islam intact both by defending it against the reformist attackes and by presenting it as a
new ideology which would save all the humanity.
Significantly, an important matter of difference between the Islamists in the empire and in
the republic was also the attitude taken towards Sufism. In contrast to Islamists of the
Second Constitutional period who saw sufism as a source of passivity, docility and
contentment, it appeared in Kısakürek’s political framework not only as the ideological
symbolic resources for the ideologization of Islam but also as the “true Islam” agains the
reformist approaches. As the present thesis has manifested, in the reemergence of both
Islamic revival in general and particularly of Islamist intellectual thought in Turkey
(including Kısakürek, Nurettin Topçu and Sezai Karakoç), sufism served as an alternative
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base of socialization through which they have kept an interactive relations with the
Ottoman and Islamic tradition. Deriving an ideology of action from Nakshibendi
understanding of Islam, Kısakürek presented an Islamist opposition to both the Republican
reforms and to the whole process of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization. Kısakürek had
internalized a mystical/sufi understanding of Islam. This Sufi/Nakshibendi background
facilitated his advocation of sharia- the strict observation of sharia principles and the
rejection of Islamic reformism. In the presence of Republican challenge, the tension
between two intellectual traditions within Islam, the ulama and the sufis was to be resolved
by an intellectual; Kısakürek who felt deeply the need of finding a base of morality and
ideology. He employed Sufism to establish a type of personality/identity that was actively
interested in the rediscovery and supremacy of Islam as an ideology/worldview and in the
reconstruction of society, state and individual along Islamic lines. Kısakürek wanted to
revive a kind Islam wich created a revolution in history through the struggles of prophets
and which would solve the problems of humanity.
The Supremacy of Sharia as the Framework for Islamist Conceptualizations of
Democracy
The supremacy of sharia was so significant that the juristic theory legitimized the sultanate
so long as it ruled in accordance with the stipulates of the shari’a and the value of state was
evaluated in terms of realizing this moral purpose. This nature of the Islamic polity
reflected a conceptualization of state with the transcendental reference of the supremacy of
the shari’a which is regarded as coterminous with “good” and “just.” The supremacy of
sharia as prior to the state and the community enables us to call an Islamic polity as
nomocracy which does not name a governmental system, but designates a certain kind of
placement of the ultimate source of state authority, regardless of the form of government.
Islamic law, though divine in its origin, is human in its matters, its promulgation, its
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implementation and its end: the welfare of man or public wealth (maslaha). This
nomocratic element in the conceptualization of state coloured all theories of Islamic
political thought, including the literary one. The Ottoman state tradition as an example of
blending the sultanate and caliphate included a nomocratic element (supremacy of shari’a
and its conciliation with the kanun) alongside a patrimonial principle and a centralist
bureaucratic principle.
The abolition of caliphate did not mean the end of the jurisdic theorization on state and
government but rather, various Islamist movements and intellectuals tried to revitalize the
theory of caliphate either by adaptation to the requirements of the nation-state in the form
of a call for an Islamic state. That was an attribution of personal aspects of a caliph to a
modern construction, namely nation-state. Hence in a paradoxical way, despite their
ideological rejection of nationalism and nation-state as a harmful importation from the
west, Islamists at the same time, accepted the nation-state as their operational framework
and many of them were strongly attached to the notions of territory, nationhood,
nationalism and a modernizing national state and its way of conduct (reform from
above)which was seen as necessary to bring about the creation of a new Islamic society
and individual.
Keeping in mind the fact that the worldly and relativistic roots of democracy’s philosophy
which contradicts any religious claim to a monopoly over the absolute truth is a point of
tension in the discussions on the (in)compatibility between Islam and democracy (a
Schumpeterian and moralized conception) in the writings of these intellectuals, one may
argue that these discussions have to escape from a naive position of taking Islam and
democracy as ideal types. Rather, it is more meaningful to study Islamist positionings and
conceptualizations of state and democracy with a reference to specific historical
conjuncture and intellectual/political trends. By this way, in the present study, I have
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argued that the question of whether Islam is compatible with democratic values should be
reworded in the way that whether Islamist interpretations/reconstructions of Islamic
tradition were/are compatible with democratic values or not. It should also be stated that
the absence of democratic rules in Islamic countries could not be properly analyzed by
focusing only on the political cultures of these countries though we, in the present thesis,
have studied the Turkish Islamist political thought in relation to their conceptualization of
state and democracy. It is obvious that the experience with democracy and elite’s attitudes
in this respect are also significant for the establishment and consolidation of democracy in
the Islamic world in general and in Turkey in particular.
In fact, Islamist ideology in general does not seem to be compatible with the idea of
democracy. When they voice positive comments on democracy, Islamists are basically
keen to see democracy as the limitation of an arbitrary/despotic rule and as the
establishment of the rule of law, implying a rather Schumpeterian conceptualization of
democracy: a type of government and procedure in electing those who rule the people. But
Islamist positionings regarding democracy should not be conceived without paying
attention to the political and intellectual settings of the time. In the light of my
examinations of Islamist intellectuals, it might be concluded that the totalitarian nature of
Islamist ideology/discourses have had a close tie to the dominant ideological atmosphere
in the West and to the modernizing mind in their relevant countries. Islamist depictions of
state and democracy whether in the Ottoman Empire through Islamist identification of
shura with constitutional regime or in the Repulican period through Necip Fazıl
Kısakürek’s totalitarian Başyücelik State, seem to be influenced by the political ideologies
of their times such as liberalism, communism, fascism, and Kemalism. Any possibility of
Islamist adoption(s) of democratic values and institutions in the Islamic world is also
related to another possibility: the establishment of a democratic political tradition on the
parts of the ruling elite. Nevertheless, one could also express the view that the guidance of
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sharia for a Muslim individual and society would continue to constitute a source of
Islamist demands and further Islamist revitalization of the idea of an Islamic state. The
supremacy of sharia in the minds of Islamists constitutes a major point of the difficulty for
the adoption of democratic values and institutions in order to create democratic
inclinations in the future formation of Islamic political thought.
Transformation of Caliphacy into a Totalitarian Nation-State: Başyücelik Devleti
Islamists urged Muslim masses to participate actively in politics in order to force their
rulers to accept “democratic” institutions and in order to oppose the imperialist
encroachments of the Western countries against the Islamic world. Complemented by the
publicized discussions on the necessity of getting a true understanding of Islam, Islamist
intellectuals popularized the agenda of elite regarding the state affairs by rejecting the
traditional dichotomy of different systems of value for the elite and the people in their
journal articles. The word revolution (inkilap) as something positive was incorporated into
Islamist discourse(s) by the July revolution and continued to be used in that way in the
Republican period.
Indeed, both in the empire and in the republic Islamists gave their support to the political
groups which aimed to change the nature of the political regime (the Young Turks,
Kemalists during the war of Independence and the Democrat party) certainly with the
expectation that a more Islamic regime would settled instead of an old one. But with no
exception, the performance of these groups in power defeated Islamists’ expectations by
not carrying out Islamization policies. For instance, the Grand National Assembly
appeared to Islamists as the proper basis in order to establish the Islamic state and in order
to Islamicize not only the secularist policies of the Young Turks but also the reforms that
had been made through the process of Tanzimat-Islahat Edicts. Thus, it was inescapable
that Islamists had been in a conflict with different political powers on how to define the
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ideological features of the future Turkish state and society on the direction of the Ottoman-
Turkish modernization process.
As this thesis indicates, one striking feature of Kısakürek’s exposition of his Islamist
ideology was the language in which he wrote. Islamists of the second constitutional period
expressed their ideas in the language of the classical theories, that of the jurists and
philosphers-using notions such as shura, caliphate, and ijma, citing Qur’anic verses and
Prophetic sayings. But Kısakürek’s political writings did not contain the political language
and terms of the medieval age and of the Islamists of the second constitutional period
either, with the exception of the notion of Şeriat. Rather, he preferred creating new terms to
express the classical notions of ruler, government and state: başyüce for a caliph,
başyücelik state for a caliphate, kurultay for shura and so on.
Islamists translated the jurisdic theory of the caliphate into a positive constitutional system
and the sultan-caliph conceptualization of the Ottoman classical times into the sultan as the
head of executive, who were under the duty of sharia’s application. Consultation
(meşveret), perceived as the core value and institution of Islamic political theory took the
central place of the caliphate in the jurisdic theory. Therefore, Islamist identification of
modern democratic institutions with the classical theory of caliphate weakened the
authority of the caliph. Seeing the caliph only as the head of government, this line of
thought transferred the representation of the national sovereignty from the caliph to the
assembly when the abolition of the caliphate was discussed in the First Grand National
Assembly. Certainly, the Assembly inherited the moral purpose of the caliphate which was
ensuring the application of the stipulations of the shari’ah. The insistence on the
enforcement of sharia represented a major difference between Islamists and other
ideological positionings, including conservatism and Turkish-Islam sythesis. In order to
defend the enforcement of the sharia, Islamists made a reference to national will or to
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people’s government against the further secularization policies of the newly emerging
Kemalist regime. Islamist arguments about nativity and conservatism were directed to the
preservation of the present Islamic characteristic of the national culture from further
secularization in the hands of Kemalists. In this vein, to them, the republic indicated the
total sovereignty of the nation’s spirit, will and beliefs. With the weakening of the
institution of caliphate, the first glimmerings of the idea of Islamic state, based on sharia,
manifested itself in the second constitutional period and the idea of caliphate was
transferred to the parliament in the early 1920s.
Kısakürek’s Başyücelik Devleti constituted indeed a republican reading of the jurisdic
theory of caliphate. On the one side, he regarded some ideological principles for the
construction of an Islamic state as a type of nation-state; but on the other side, he
envisioned a perfect personality such as başyüce as the head of state who was expected to
have some ideal/superior features. His description of a head of Islamic state had a close
resemblance to both Mawerdi’s theory of caliphate and al-Farabi’s head of virtous city.
Like the Islamist identification of meşrutiyet with shura, Kısakürek argued that republic in
the sense of people’s rule was an order of God by the verse of shura. But his
conceptualization of republic was a form of the despotism of intellectuals’ shura
(entellektüeller şurası) for the rule of the truth, putting the stress on order and on devotion
to an idea. Both Islamists of the empire and Kısakürek were firmly attached to the idea that
Sharia must form the basis of the state and society. As a manifestation of the ideological
influence, coming from the totalitarian ideologies ofthe time, Başyücelik Devleti was
heavily centralized, disciplined and totalistic to the extent that the social, cultural, artistic
and moral life of society was determined by the state. State had to create and impose even
perceptions of good and bad on society and individual. One might say that like Plato’s
republic, Kısakürek’s conceptualization of ideal state and society offered a version of a
closed and totalitarian system.
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Generally, it might be concluded that Islamist conceptualization of state had two
dimensions: a) state as a transcendental and abstract entity and 2) state as body politics, the
level of rulership. In the first meaning, state was necessary and good while in the second
sense, it had to be corrected by bringing good rulers to the power. The form of government
for the Islamic state was open to the good aspects of the modern state, paying attention to
its essence (the rule of sharia), not to its form.
Contrary to the literature on Pan-Islamism, in this dissertation, I have found that in the
second constitutional period, İttihad-ı İslam were concerned much with the revival of
Islamic civilization in its religious and cultural dimensions to advance Muslims rather than
with the political unity of all Muslims around the world. Although Islamists advocated the
idea of the umma, they also accepted the reality of different ethnic groupings or
nationalities. The recognition of the emerging nation-state system in the Islamic world
continued in in the republican period in Kısakürek’s construction of the Great East which
envisioned the spiritual, social, economic and political unity of different Islamic nation-
states against the West as the last stage of the unification of the Islamic world. The
acceptence of different ethnicities/nations in the empire later turned into an advocation of
Turkish nationalism in Kısakürek’s formulation in the form of a limited and permitted
nationalism in the republican period. Islamist appropriation of the idea of fatherland in the
empire transformed into a nationalist imagination around the territory of Anatolia in
Kısakürek’s ideas, despite of his Islamic union through idea of the Great East.
Nevertheless, a negative view on nationalism due to its racist/secular nature did not lose its
significance even in the republican period.
The emphasis on Turkish ethnicity, as the leading element of the Ottoman and Islamic
nation during the second constitutional period gained strength in Kısakürek’s writings as
the supremacy of Turks and Turkey among Islamic nations by the belief that the revival of
331
Islamic world would start from Turkey. Expressing Islamist ideas under the cloak of
Turkish nationalist/conservative discourse, Kısakürek often defended nationalism but
colouring it with Islamic tones and values. In this combination, there was certainly a desire
of desecularizing Kemalist principle of nationalism as well. On the other hand, perhaps,
the most noteworthy ideological influence of Kemalism on Kısakürek might be seen in his
acceptance of Turkish nationalism and nation-state though nationalism, to him, could be
positive only if it was placed in the service of Islam or if it emanated from Islamic
essences. In Kısakürek’s conceptualization of political community, Turkishness, with its
language and culture and the Sunni Islamic faith were among the dominant elements of
membership in this respect. In sum, as long as the Ottoman imperial system survived, the
Islamists found it difficult (problematic), to combine nationalism with Islamic principles.
But with the establishment of the Republic, it became possible (easy) to designate the
locus of sovereignty to the people (nation) in the way required for development of a
nationalist polity (nation-state) along modern lines.
From “Islamizing” Democracy to the “Malaises” of Democracy
Islamists of the Second Constitutional period like the Young Ottomans, had the inclination
of adopting modern democratic institutions and notions for the cause of adopting good
aspects of Western civilization by translating European liberal constitutionalism into
medieval/traditional jurisdic theory: shura and meşveret turned into national sovereignty or
parliament (hakimiyet-i milliye ve meclis-i Mebusan), the shari’ah into the constitution
(Kanun-i Esasi). In this way, Islamists also tried to transform the Islamic legal conceptions
of hürriyet, müsavat and uhuvvet into political ideas as something similar to the
democratic political concepts of freedom, equality and fraternity.
In Islamist definition, meşrutiyet denoted a contract, a social contract, between the nation
and the government on the condition that the nation had the right of controlling the
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government. Meşrutiyet, being defined in contradistinction to despotism was composed of
justice, meşveret (shura) and limitation of power in law. Islamist discourse envisioned a
very close and organic tie between meşrutiyet and sharia by regarding meşrutiyet as a form
of government that would realize the goals of sharia such as unity, progress and religiosity.
Islamists of the second constitutional period, differing from the Islamic medieval
theorization on politics which underlined values such as justice and the application of
sharia, laid a great emphasis on the necessity of institutionalization (a Schumpeterian
notion) such as constitution and parliament. The acceptance of the compatibility between
constitutional rule and meşveret by Islamists of the second constitutional period took a
different form in Kısakürek’s argumentation. He argued that everthing good, including
positive aspects of democracy and political ideologies were contained within Islam.
Although he accepted democratic institutions such as constitution and parliament as given,
Kısakürek presented a wide range of arguments against democracy. Democracy by giving
a right of speaking and doing all forms of wrongs and to truth in the name of finding the
truth was an imperfect regime since the truth was the one. By this nature, to Kısakürek,
democracy was open to the exploitation and despotism of one falsity in the name of the
truth. Kısakürek also criticized democracy, as a procedure, for preferring the ‘ignorant’
majority to ‘wise’ minority. To him, ruling was a matter of virtue and for that reason, the
rule of the true intellectual aristocracy had to be established. These arguments remind us
al-Farabi’s statements on the fragile nature of democracy towards the dominance of
wrongs over the good.
Unlike the Islamist thinking in the second constitutional period, Kısakürek did not try to
justify the adoption of democracy and its institutions through their identification with shura
and ijma. Instead, in line with the dominant aura of the time, the creation of an ideology
gained priority over the issue of democracy. In line with the general trend in Islamic
political thought, the issue of who rules rather than the form of government was important
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to his political mind. Constitutional regime, republic and democracy were only the
methods through which ideologies could be applied. By the claim that democracy was not
an ideal, he perceived democracy as a mechanism/method in order to attain a particular
goal/worldview, the ideal of the Great East, in his case. Democracy was seen in the same
light as political ideologies of liberalism, communism and fascism and considered as a
manifestation of Western decadence and corruption. Kısakürek’s suspicion towards
democracy was clear enough in his justification of the 1980 military intervention in politics
as a movement of salvation. Kısakürek attributed the notion of irresponsibility not only to
politicians but also to the very nature of democracy. Democracy was open to being
paralyzed by some major groups and classes for their interests as contrary to Turkish unity
but in the name of national will.
Freedom was understood by both the Islamists and Kısakürek, as a means for the
realization of an ideal and for finding the truth. They, on the whole, suggested the idea that
freedom had to be settled within the sphere of sharia otherwise an unlimited freedom
which might take a form of despotism or slavery to selfishness. Freedom in their mind was
closely connected to the idea of order (nizam). Islamist understanding of limited freedom,
both while accepting the constitutional regime (Islamists of the Second Constitutional
period) and while rejecting national sovereignty (Kısakürek) seemed to be coloured by an
elitist understanding of democracy like the Schumpeterian one. Hence, any accepted form
of democracy had to be structured in accordance with the ultimate values of Islam (sharia).
National sovereignty was evaluated in positive terms by Islamists of the second
constitutional period because they believed that the Islamic nation, not a caliph had a right
of control and sovereignty over the early Islamic government for realizing the ideals of
sharia; shura and justice. Kısakürek denied the idea of popular sovereignty on the grounds
that sovereignty belonged to God, not to people.
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In the eyes of Islamists, the shura represented an indigenous principle of representative or
constitutional government in Islam or a check on the ruler’s authority or power. The
inclusion of non-Muslims into the circle of meşveret, was also closely related to the
imagination of Ottoman citizenship by enlarging Islamic brotherhood to non-Muslims. But
in the republican period, Kısakürek’s yüceler kurultayı was exclusionary to the extent that
communists, non-muslims and even immoral people could not be thought as a part of the
nation or the parliament. The qualifications to be elected as a member of the parliament
(the most wise, religious and learned) were defined by both Islamists of the second
constitutional period and Kısakürek in a way that actually described the characteristics of
the ulema in the jurisdic theory or the philosopher king in the theory of Muslim
philosophers. Certainly, according to those Islamists who accepted the legislative power of
the parliament, it had to make laws which were in accordance with sharia. Kısakürek
seemed to accept implicitly the supremacy of sharia in legislation even though it was very
difficult to name it openly at the time.
Islamist conception of parliament in general presumed that the political and social conflicts
that occurred among Europeans would not take place in Islamic societies; if any conflict
arose, it would be resolved by the application of sharia or virtue. This understanding does
not seem to be open to the articulation of different political, economic and social
interests/conflicts and to the recognition of differences as to religions, ethnicities in any
Islamic(ized) society. Furthermore, it was not very easy to say that Islamists were not
discomforted with the idea of opposition to power, simply because of the quest for unity
and solidarity in the empire (to keep the unity of Ottoman state) and in the republic (to
prevent the communist threat). The idea of political party and opposition was recognized
by Islamists of the second constitutional period as something legitimate with reservations
about its harmful results such as hatred and division, while Kısakürek regarded political
party as an alien institution with an aim of imitation, imported from the West. In the
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Turkish-Islamic setting the institution of party could only exist as the Party of Right (Hak
Partisi), being devoted to the totality. For Kısakürek, the notions of democracy, party and
opposition were mere instruments for the search of an ideology and its application by the
state institutions. Democracy could not be understood in a way that an opposition might
change the policies of a “true” political power.
Two Conflicting But Paralleling Worlds: Kemalism and Islamism
Perhaps, a rather interesting aspect of the present study has been its aim to understand the
interplay between Kemalism and Islamist intellectuals. It is obvious that within the
intellectual setting of the Republic which discussed the formation of a new regime,
Kısakürek’s political thinking went beyond the agenda of the Islamists of the Meşrutiyet
by his quest for the realization of the ideal state, community and individual. it would be
beneficial to conclude with some major commonalities and differences between Kemalism
and Kısakürek’s political ideas. To begin with the second aspect, unlike the influence of
positivism on Kemalism, Islamist intellectuals and Kısakürek were inspired by the
spiritualist and idealist traditions in the West. Indicative of this spiritualist influence,
Kısakürek employed the spiritual-versus- material dichotomy in his opposition to the
Kemalist reforms as well as and in his ideological formulation.
But on the other hand, like Kemalist ideology, Kısakürek had a solidaristic perception of
society uniting without any privileges and classes as an aspect of the organic nature of the
umma structure. Politics was seen not as a process of accommodating and aggregating
diverse demands and interests of social groups but of moralistic discovering what was right
for the entire society. As a consequence of this conceptualization of democracy and
politics, the parliaments of Kemalist regime and Kısakürek’s yüceler kurultayı were
composed of selected intellectuals, educating and enlightening the people without
representing any societal interests. Parliament was a place of the enlightened and rational
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legislation for a supreme end (the interests of the nation). Similar to the Republican
positioning of intellectual as the educator of the people and the civilizer of the country by
representating the basic goals and values of the regime, Kısakürek visualized intellectuals
as thinkers/heroes whose basic duties were to provide a worldview to the masses. The
vanguard role in the revolution, i.e. putting the ideology into action, was given to the
intellectuals as well. As such intellectuals became the expected savers of Turkey and the
Islamic world. Kısakürek desired to reconstruct Turkish society along the lines of his own
idealism: the Great East. But this reconstruction, he argued, could be fulfilled only at the
hands of a hero/intellectual who was inspired by high ideals and who did not have self-
interests.
Given the supremacy of social engineering in his ideas, Kısakürek’s conceptualization of
state in general contained Kemalist features by seeing the state as the instrument that
imposed the social change upon the society from top to bottom until the nation matured
enough. In this way, Kısakürek did not understand the role of the state in a liberal way but
rather in an interventionist way to create a new individual and society. State was held
responsible from the way of life that its people followed and from directing its people to
the truth.
Moreover, with Kemalism, Kısakürek shared the authoritarian bureaucratic-intellectual
paradigm, which underlined the idea of the strong/transcendental state since the Ottoman
times. Kısakürek’s early life was very similar to that of Kemalist intelligentsia. The elitist
feature in Kısakürek’s political ideas constituted a paralel positioning to the elitist political
culture of Turkish/Republican elite and intellectuals. His insistence on the necessity of
having a totalistic social program to be implemented in the recreation of the society and
individual was typical of the Republican elite. His expectation of a super man/hero who
shaped his society was not only related to the Islamic tradition of renewal. It also reminds
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us the republican exaltation of Atatürk as the savor of the Turkish nation. In this context, it
should be also stated that the sultan Abdul Hamid, perhaps constituted an interesting
personality who arosed different perceptions in the minds of Islamists in the empire and in
the republic. Islamists of the second constitutional period without exception pictured
Abdul Hamid as a selfish and unjust despot who was seeking to fulfill his desires and
interests at the expense of the nation’s interests, while Kısakürek came to see the sultan as
an Islamist/nationalist sultan who modernized the empire succesfully by bringing the seeds
of material civilization into the country. But here the more interesting point is that the
major stimulus behind Kısakürek’s positive picture of Abdul Hamid was the desire of
portraying an alternative modernizer/hero to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The need for an
enemy/the other seems to give way to Kısakürek’s portrayal of İsmet İnönü as an atheist,
anti-Islamic, non-Turkish personality in response to the picture of Abdul Hamid as the red
sultan in the republican period. In that way, İnönü and the RPP constituted the republican
counterpart of the despotic sultan in Kısakürek’s ideology.
Finally, Kısakürek, as Kemalists did, believed that political power was the main instrument
to carry out a real revolution namely, an Islamic revolution, which would save both the
Islamic world and the Turkish nation. The Kemalist engineering was based on reason and
knowledge whereas Kısakürek’s formulation put the emphasis on Islam and sharia. The
significance of law/legal issues both in the Kemalist creation of a Turkish nation-state and
Kısakürek’s formulation of Islamic revolution might be connected to the nomocratic
tradition of the Ottoman state. For both Kemalists and Kısakürek, the vehicles of the
revolution were the state, the law and the education, the new society/nation was to be
created through these vehicles. Kısakürek had a totalistic vision, through which a new
political ideology (Islam) against the capitalist and communist ones was made available. In
contrast to the Kemalist conceptualization of modernity as a civilizational conversion into
the West, Kısakürek had the desire of rediscovering/reinventing the great days of the
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Islamic/Ottoman past. Nevertheless, Kısakürek’s Islamism produced a type of weak
historicity by its strong rejection of Kemalism which had important effects on the
formation of his political mind as well.
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(Dedektif X Bir), “Hakikat için Hakikat.” [Truth for the Truth] BD. 6th year, number 25
(September 8, 1950), 3, 10.
“Tavşanlı Hitabesi.” [Tavşanlı Speech] BD. 6th year, number 27 (September 22, 1950), 7.
“İslam İnkilabı: Hülasa ve Netice.” [Islamic Revolution: Summary and Result] BD. 6th
year, number 33 (October 3, 1950), 2.
“Kurtarıcı Hikmet.” [Saviour Wisdom] BD. 6th year, number 29 (October 6, 1950), 2.
“Sağır.” [The Deaf] BD. 6th year, number 29 (October 6, 1950), 8-9.
(Be. De.), “Hadiselerin Muhasebesi.” [Evaluation of Incidents] BD. 6th year, number 39
(October 15, 1950), 8-9.
“Asyacılık.” [Asianism] BD. 6th year, number 31 (October 20, 1950), 2.
“Teşkilat ve İdare.” [Organization and Rule] BD. 6th year, number 32 (October 27, 1950),
2, 11.
(Dedektif X Bir), “Nasıl Başlayıp Nasıl Bitirdiler?” [How Did They Start and How did
They Complete?] BD. 6th year, number 33 (November 3, 1950), 3.
“Başyücelik Emirleri-Kumar.” [Commands of Başyücelik: Gambling] BD. 6th year,
number 34 (November 10, 1950), 2.
“Başyücelik emirleri-Zina ve Fuhuş.” [Commands of Başyücelik: Adultery and
Prostitution] BD. 6th year, number 35 (November 17, 1950), 2.
“Başyücelik emirleri-İçki ve Zehir.” [Commands of Başyücelik: Drink and Poison] BD. 6th
year, number 36 (November 24, 1950), 2.
(Dedektif X Bir), “Müzakere Usulü.” [Method of Negotiation] BD. 6th year, number 36
(November 24, 1950), 10.
“Harim-i İsmet.” [Innermost Shrine] BD. 6th year, number 37 (December 1, 1950), 2.
“Sen Ey Milli Hakimiyet Hangi Ellere Düştün?” [You, O National Sovereignty, in which
hands are you?] BD. number 40 (December 22, 1950), 7, 11.
(Dedektif X Bir), “Allahsız.” [Atheist] BD. 6th year, number 40 (December 22, 1950), 6,
11.
“Hakimiyet-i Milliye Davası.” [Issue of national Sovereignty] BD. 6th year, number 41
(December 29,1950), 14-15.
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“İsmet İnönü ve Türklük.” [İsmet İnönü and Turkishness] BD. 6th year, number 41
(December 29, 1950), 8.
“İsmet İnönü ve Müslümanlık.” [İsmet İnönü and Islam] BD. 6th year, number 41
(December 29, 1950), 9.
“Medeniyetlerin Hali.” [Situations of Civilizations] BD. 7th year, number 42 (January 5,
1951), 2.
(Dedektif X Bir), “Millet partisi ve Tezadı.” [The Nation Party and Its Contradictions] BD.
7th year, number 42 (January 5, 1951), 3, 12.
“Başyücelik Emirleri-Kadın Kılığı.” [Commands of Başyücelik: Women Dressing] BD.
7th year, number 43 (January 12, 1951), 2.
“Başyücelik Emirleri-Dans.” [Commands of Başyücelik: Dance] BD. 7th year, number 48
(January 16, 1951), 2.
“Başyücelik Emirleri-Terbiye ve Zevk Murakabesi.” [Commands of Başyücelik: Good
Manner and Control of Pleasure] BD. 7th year, number 45 (January 26, 1951), 2.
“Başyücelik Emirleri-Kanun Esaslarımız.” [Commands of Başyücelik: Principles of Law]
BD. 7th year, number 46 (February 2, 1951), 2.
“Başyücelik Emirleri-Heykel.” [Commands of Başyücelik: Statue] BD. 7th year, number
51 (March 9, 1951), 2.
“Başyücelik Emirleri-Faiz.” [Commands of Başyücelik: Interest] BD. 7th year, number 52
(March 16, 1951), 2.
“Başyücelik Emirleri-Üniversite.” [Commands of Başyücelik: University] BD. 7th year,
number 53 (March 23, 1951), 2.
“Mukaddesatçı Türk.” [Conservative Turk] BD. 7th year, number 58 (June 1, 1951), 2, 7,
16
“Büyük Doğu Partisinin Ana Nizamname Projesi.” [A Project of the Great East Party’s
Programme] BD. 7th year, number 60 (June 15, 1951), 8-9, 16.
“Büyük Doğu Partisinin Ana Nizamname Projesi.” [A Project of the Great East Party’s
Programme] BD. number 61 (June 22, 1951), 14-16.
“Sonsöz.” [Last Word] BD. 7th year, number 62 (June 29, 1951), 2, 16.
(Dedektif X Bir), “Parti.” [Party] BD. 7th year, number 62 (June 29, 1951), 3, 16.
“Adnan Menderes.” BD. (November 25, 1951) in Başmakalelerim 1, 5-6
“Beklediğimiz İnkilap ve Yeni İktidar.” [Expected Revolution and the New Power] BD.
9th year, number 6 (May 21, 1952), 1.
“Ne İstiyoruz.” [What do we Want] BD. 9th year, number 11 (May 26, 1952), 1.
“Hep’çi Olunuz Muhterem Başvekil.” [Be Totalist, Dear Prime Minister] BD. 9th year,
number 19 (June 3, 1952), 1.
“İlk Tedbir Budur.” [This is the First Measure] BD. 9th year, number 21 (June 5, 1952), 1.
“163. Madde.” [Article 163] BD. 9th year, number 24 (June 8, 1952), 1.
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“Ordu ve İnkilap.” [Military and Revolution] BD. 9th year, number 25 (June 9, 1952), 1.
“Sen Nerdesin.” [Where are You?] BD. 9th year, number 25 (June 9, 1952), 2.
“Noktalar.” [Points] BD. 9th year, number 29 (June 13, 1952), 2.
“İnkilap dedikleri.” [The So Called Revolution] BD. 9th year, number 31 (June 15, 1952),
1.
“İhtilali Nasıl Önlediler?” [How Did They Prevent Revolution?] BD. 9th year, number 32
(June 16, 1952), 1.
“Yahudi ve Menderes.” [Jews and Menderes] BD. 9th year, number 34 (June 18, 1952), 2.
“Bunlar Ne İstiyorlar?” [What do They want?] BD. 9th year, number 38 (June 22, 1952), 1.
“Ukde-i Hayat.” [Tie of Life] BD. 9th year, number 43 (June 29, 1952), 1.
“Tek Çift Oynayanlar.” [Players of Odd or Even] BD. 9th year, number 50 (July 6, 1952),
1.
“Bu Sıçanı Gebertiniz.” [Kill this Mouse] BD. 9th year, number 55 (July 11, 1952), 1.
“Başıboş Hürriyet ve Gerçek Sistem.” [Unlimited Freedon and Real System] BD. 9th year,
number 62 (July 18, 1952),1
“Cumhuri ve Şahsi İdareler.” [republican and Personal Rules] BD. 9th year, number 65
(July 21, 1952), 1.
“Tarih Hükmü.” [Judgement of History] BD. 9th year, number 74 (July 30, 1952), 1.
“Evvela Laik Olmanın Çaresi.” [Firstly, Solution to become a Secular] BD. 9th year,
number 85 (August 10, 1952), 1.
“Demokrasi Derdi.” [Problem of Democracy] BD. 9th year, number 87 (August 12, 1952),
1.
“Demokrasi Anlayışları.” [Understandings of Democracy] BD. 9th year, number 88
(August 13, 1952), 1.
“Milli İrade, Zıt Kutuplar, Menderes.” [National Will, Opposite Poles, Menderes] BD. 9th
year, number 92 (August 17, 1952), 1.
“Politika-Bence- (2).”[Politics-In My Opinion (2)] BD. 9th year, number 101 (August 26,
1952), 1.
“Politika-Tarihimiz boyunca- (3).” [Politics during Our History]BD. 9th year, number 102
(August 27, 1952), 1.
“Açık Hükümet Gizli İktidar.” [Open Government, Secret Power] BD. 9th year, number
114 (September 11, 1952), 1.
“Yaşamak ve Yaşatmak İsteyenler, Öldürmek İçin Yaşamak İsteyeni Öldürürler.” [Those
who want to live others have to kill those people who live to kill someone else]
BD. 9th year, number 119 (September 16, 1952), 1.
“O’na.” [To Him] BD. (April 3, 1954) In Başmakalelerim 2 [My Editorials 2], 18-20.
“Milletçe Ağlıyoruz.” [As A Nation, we are crying] BD. number 1 (April 23, 1954), 3.
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“Muhalefette Haysiyet.” [Honour in Opposition] BD. number 3 (May 21, 1954), 3.
“Dünya ve Biz.” [World and Us]BD. number 4 (May 28, 1954), 2.
“İhtilal Hükümeti.” [Revolutionary Government] BD. number 9 (July 2, 1954), 2.
“Bekliyoruz.” [We are waiting] BD. number 9 (July 2, 1954), 2.
“Ko-va-dis?” [Where to go?] BD. number 3 (March 20, 1956), 1.
“O’na.” [To Him] BD. (April 3, 1956) In Başmakalelerim 2 [My Editorials 2], 18-20.
“Kabahat.” [Fault]BD. (April 6, 1956) In Başmakalelerim 2 [My Editorials 2], 21-23.
“Program.” [Programme] BD. (April 15, 1956) In Başmakalelerim 2 [My Editorials 2], 37-
39.
“İran Seyahati.” [Trip to Iran] BD. (April 23, 1956) In Başmakalelerim 2 [My Editorials
2], 45-47.
“Adnan Menderes’e Hitap (1).” [Adress to Adnan Menderes 1] BD. (May 7 1956) In
Başmakalelerim 2 [My Editorials 2], 64-66.
“Adnan Menderes’e Hitap (2).” [Adress to Adnan Menderes 2] BD. (May 8, 1956) In
Başmakalelerim 2 [My Editorials 2], 67-69.
“Şehinşah.” [King of Kings] BD. (May 17, 1956) In Başmakalelerim 2 [My Editorials 2],
87-88.
“Türkün Haysiyetinde Adnan Menderes.” [Adnan enderes in Turkish Dignity] BD. (May
18, 1956) In Başmakalelerim 2 [My Editorials 2], 89-90.
“Hizaya Gel.” [Get Into Line] BD. (May 20, 1956) In Başmakalelerim 2 [My Editorials 2],
91-92
“Tarih Boyunca Bizde Muvafakat ve Muhalefet.”[Consent and Opposition in Turkey
throughout the History] BD. (June 12, 1956) In Başmakalelerim 2 [My Editorials
2], 119-121.
“Büyük Doğu.” [Great East] BD. number 2 (March 13, 1959), 2.
“Kolpo.” [Opportunity] BD. number 4 (March 22, 1959), 1.
“Ayasofya.” [Hagia Sophia] BD. number 6 (April 10, 1959), 1.
(Prof. Ş. Ü.), “Oluşa Davet.” [Invitation to Being] BD. number 6 (April 10, 1959), 2.
(La edri), “İrfan Davamız.” [Our Issue of Culture] BD. number 9 (May 1, 1959), 12.
“Ölçü.” [Measure] BD. number 11 (May 15, 1959), 1.
(Be. De.), “Vicdanlı Şiddet.” [Conscientious Violence] BD. number 11 (May 15, 1959), 9.
“Ben Senden Niçin Nefret Ediyorum?” [Why am I Hating You] BD. number 11 (May 15,
1959), 16.
(Prof. Ş. Ü.), “Kurtarıcı İhtilal Hükümeti.” [Saviour Revolutionary Government] BD.
number 14 (June 5, 1959), 2.
(Ne. Fe. Ka.), “Musaviler.” [Equals] BD. number 18 (July 3, 1959), 8.
392
“Anadolu ve Anadoluculuk.” [Anatolia and Anatolism] BD. number 21 (July 24, 1959), 1,
16.
“Palyaço.” [Buffon] BD. number 22 (July 31, 1959), 1, 16.
“Orkestra, Senfonya ve Biz.” [Orchestra, Symphony and Us] BD. number 22 (July 31,
1959), 2.
(Dedektif X Bir), “Lozan Antlaşmasının İçyüzünü Buyurun.” [Look At the Hiddenside of
the Lausanne Treaty] BD. number 22 (July 31, 1959), 8-9.
(Büyük Doğu), “Milliyetçilik.” [Nationalism] BD. number 24 (August 14, 1959), 2.
(Dedektif X Bir), “Lozan Zaferinin İçyüzü.” [Hiddenside of the Lausanne Victory] BD.
number 24 (August 14, 1959), 8-9.
“Gözümüzün İçine Bak.” [Look into Our Eyes] BD. number 25 (August 21, 1959), 1.
(Dedektif X Bir), “Bugünün Aktüalitesi Dünkü Köy Enstitüleri.” [Today’s Actuality:
Yesterday’s Village Institutes] BD. number 26 (August 28, 1959), 8-9
(Dedektif X Bir), “Köy Enstitülerinin İçyüzünden Örnekler.” [Examples from the
Hiddenside of the Village Institutes] BD. II: 27 (September 4, 1959), 8-9.
(Dedektif X Bir), “Yine Köy Enstitüleri İfşaatımız Devam Ediyor.” [Our Disclosure of
Village Institutes is continuing] BD. II: 28 (September 11, 1959), 8-9.
(Dedektif X Bir) “CHP ve Komünizma.” [the RPP and Communism] BD. II: 30
(September 25, 1959), 8-9.
“Hürriyet.” [Freedom] BD. II: 31 (October 2, 1959), 1.
“Kement.” [Lasso] BD. number 13 (May 29, 1960), 1.
“Komünizma Geliyor.” [Communism is Coming] (1962) In Hitabeler [Speeches], 27-51.
“Köy Enstitüleri.” [Village Institutes] (March 22,1962) In Başmakalelerim 3 [My
Editorials 3], 50-57.
“Usul.” [Method] BD. 21st year, number 2 (October 7, 1964), 2.
“Vasıta.” [Means] BD. 21st year, number 5 (October 28, 1964), 2.
“Parti.” [Party] BD. 21st year, number 7 (November 11, 1964), 3.
“Tek ve Mutlak.” [One and Absolute] BD. (March 3, 1965) In Çerçeve 3 [Framework 3],
112-114.
“Burdur’dan Mektup.” [Letter from Burdur] BD. (March 17, 1965) In Çerçeve 3
[Framework 3], 130-131.
“Mehmetçik.” [Turkish Soldier] BD. (March 22, 1965) In Çerçeve 3 [Framework 3], 136-
138.
“Küçük Politika.” [Little Politics] BD. (April 23, 1965) In Çerçeve 3 [Framework 3], 169-
170.
“Manalandırma.” [Interpreting] BD. (June 23, 1965) In Çerçeve 3 [Framework 3], 233-
234.
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“Irzına Geçilen Hürriyet.” [Raped Freedom] BD. (June 25, 1965) In Çerçeve 3
[Framework 3], 237-238
“Ne Bekliyoruz.” [Whar are we Waiting] BD. (July 3, 1965) In Çerçeve 3 [Framework 3],
250-251.
“Milli İrade.” [National Will] BD. (July 10, 1965) In Çerçeve 3 [Framework 3], 262-4.
“CHP Vebali.” [Responsibility of the RPP] BD. 22nd year, 12th period, number 1
(September 22, 1965), 1.
“Ve İsmet İnönü’nün Suratı.” [Inönü’s face] BD. 22nd year, 12th period, number 2
(September 29, 1965), 1.
(İsmini Vermeyen Profesör), “Türkiye’nin Manzarası.” [Turkey’s Scene] BD. 12th period,
number 1 (September 22, 1965), 2.
(Adını Vermeyen Profesör), “Türkiyenin Manzarası.” [Turkey’s Scene] BD. 12th period,
number 2 (September 29, 1965), 2.
“Beklenen Kurtarıcı.” [Expected Saviour] BD. 22nd year, 12th period, number 3 (October 6,
1965), 1.
(İsmini Vermeyen Profesör), “Partilerimiz.” [Our Parties] BD. 12th period, number 7
(November 3, 1965), 2.
(İsmini Vermeyen Profesör), “Ordu.” [Military] BD. 12th period, number 10 (November
24, 1965), 2.
“163.” BD. 12th period, number 10 (November 24, 1965), 1, 16.
“Huruç.” [Exodus] BD. (February 15, 1967) In Çerçeve 4 [Framework 4], 57-58.
“Tedbir.” [Measure] BD. (February 22, 1967) In Çerçeve 4 [Framework 4], 64-65.
“İslam ve Devlet.” [Islam and State] BD. number 12 (October 4, 1967), 19.
(Prof ?), “İhtilalin Otopsisi.” [Autopsy of Revolution] BD. 14th period, number 1 (May
1969), 4-5.
“Millet ve Ordu.” [Nation and Military] BD. 14th period, number 2 (June 1969), 7.
“Felix Culpa-Mesut Suç.” [Happy Guilt] BD. 14th year, number 3 (July 1969), 7.
“Asıl İnkilap.” [True Revolution] BD. 14th period, number 5 (September-October 1969),
10.
“Mukaddesatçı Türk’e Beyanname.” [Declaration to A Conservative Turk] BD. 14th
period, number 6 (November 1969), 8-11.
“Cevap ve Tesbit.” [Reply and Fixation] BD. 14th period, number 7 (December 1969), 19,
32.
“Konuşma.” [Talk] BD. 28th year, 15th period, number 2 (January 13, 1971), 15.
“Başyücelik Emirleri-İşçi.” [Commands of Başyücelik-Worker] BD. 15th period, number 4
(January 24, 1971), 2.
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“Başyücelik Emirleri-Sermaye ve Patron.” [Commands of Başyücelik-Capital and Patron]
BD. 15th period, number 5 (February 3, 1971), 2.
(Dedektif X Bir), “İslamı İlk İmha Davranışı.” [The First Movement to destroy Islam] BD.
28th year, 15th period, number 13 (March 13, 1971), 12-13.
“Anladığımız Ordu.” [Our Understanding of Military] BD. 15th period, number 13 (March
31, 1971), 2.
İsmini Vermeyen Profesör, “Fikir Ordusu.” [Army of Idea] BD. 15th period, number 13
(March 31, 1971), 3, 16.
“Makine ve İslam.” [Machine and Islam] BD. 28th year, 15. period, number 14 (April 7,
1971), 2.
(Dedektif X Bir) “İslam Katliamının Devamı.” [Continuity in the Massacre of Islam] BD.
number 14 (April 7, 1971), 12-13, 16.
“Hürriyet.” [Freedom] BD. 15th period, number 15 (April 14, 1971), 2.
“Uydurma Dil Felaketi.” [Disaster of Invented Language] BD. 15th period, number 15
(April 14, 1971), 2.
(Adını Vermeyen Profesör), “İdeal.” [Ideal] BD. 15th period, number 16 (April 21, 1971),
3.
(Zabıt Katibi), “Din-Millet-Şeriat.” [Religion-Nation-Sharia] BD. 28th year, 15th period,
number 16 (April 21, 1971), 5.
(Dedektif X Bir), “Türkiye’de Komünizmanın Hikayesi.” [Communism’s Story in
Turkey] BD. 28th year, 15th period, number 16 (April 21, 1971), 12-13.
“Kadro.” [Cadre] (October 20, 1977) In Çerçeve 4 [Framework 4], 141-142.
“Muhterem-Muhakkar.” [Respected-Contemptible] (December 21, 1977) In Çerçeve 4
[Framework 4], 199-200
“Laiklik.” [Laicite] (January 15, 1978) In Çerçeve 4 [Framework 4], 233-235.
“İşçi ve Patron.” [Worker and Patron] (March 26, 1978) In Çerçeve 5 [Framework 5], 29-
30.
“Ancak Burada Düzelirse.” [If only it is Put into right here] BD. (April 7, 1978) In Çerçeve
5 [Framework 5], 47-48.
 (Be. De.), “Hadiselerin Muhasebesi.” [Evaluation of Incidents] BD. 34th year, 16th period,
number 1 (May 8, 1978), 8-9.
“Partide İnkilap.” [Revolution in the Party] BD. 34th year, 16th period, number 2 (May 15,
1978), 3.
“Asgari Müşterek.” [Minimum Shared Belief] (November 21, 1978) In Çerçeve 5
[Framework 5], 283-284.
“Asıl Hikaye.” [Real Story] (November 30, 1978) in Çerçeve 5 [Framework 5], 295-296.
“Yeni İstiklal Savaşı.” [New Independence War] (June 23, 1980) In Rapor 10/13 [Report
10/13], 20-22.
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“Umumi Muhasebe.” [General Evaluation] (September 14, 1980) In Rapor 10/13 [Report
10/13], 192-195.
“18’inci Günde.” [In the 18th day] (September 21, 1980) In Rapor 10/13 [Report 10/13],
195-198.
“Meseleler.” [Problems] (October 13, 1980) In Rapor 10/13 [Report 10/13], 198-200.
“Madalyonun Tersi.” [Other Side of the Medallion] (October 30, 1980) in Rapor 10/13
[Report 10/13], 200-202.
“Düşünen İnsan.” [Thinking Human Being] (November 10, 1980) In Rapor 10/13 [Report
10/13], 209-211.
“Kurtuluş Davasında Reçete.” [Prescription for the Salvation] (November 21, 1980) In
Rapor 10/13 [Report 10/13], 216-218.
“Beklediğimiz.” [What we wait] (November 24,1980) In Rapor 10/13 [Report 10/13],
213-215.
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